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3A B S T R A C T
Mawlay Sulayman's reign (1792-1822) has so far received 
little attention from students of Moroccan history. The 
present work is designed to fill this gap in the modern 
history of Morocco by investigating the social, economic, 
political and religious aspects of this period of thirty 
years. It is intended to provide students of the modern 
history of Morocco with basic factual knowledge about the 
period.
Initially, the thesis describes the structures of the 
Moroccan State and of Moroccan society at the turn of the 
nineteenth century. The economic history of the period 
is emphasised, particularly Morocco's commercial relations 
with Europe and the reasons behind the weakening of these 
relations at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
The thesis then reconstructs the political history of 
Morocco during Mawlay Sulayman's reign. The discussion of 
political relations with the major European powers is 
intended to invalidate the long-held view of Morocco's 
isolation during the period under study.
However, the most important - and the least known - 
aspect of the period from 179 2 to 1822 is made up by Mawlay 
Sulayman's religious ideas and policy. To what extent was 
he reformist in his ideas? What was the real impact of the 
Wahhabi doctrine on the religious debate in Morocco, and 
what made the confrontation between Mawlay Sulayman and 
religious groups inevitable? These are some of the questions 
the thesis seeks to answer before moving on to discuss the 
Ffes rebellion (1820-1822) which was really the last serious 
attempt by traditionalist groups to change the course of 
history to their advantage.
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It is almost impossible to devise a unified and homo­
geneous transliteration system. Names of places and tribes 
have been rendered according to the conventional French 
usage (Ouezzane, Tetouan, Beni Hsen, Alt Oumalou etc..). 
Places for which there were still no French or European 
names at the beginning of the nineteenth century will be 
rendered in the simplest Arabic transliteration while
respecting their current usage during the period under
— cstudy (ife. Dar al-Bayda, Arab al-widyan, etc..).
li
Where a word of Arabic origin is used in the plural 
form we have preferred to facilitate the task of non- 
Arabic readers by adding an (s) to the singular form 
(sharif-s, muhtasib-s, mawsim-s, etc...). However, there 
will be instances where the Arabic plural will be used, 
particularly in cases where the Arabic plural form has 
gained universal recognition or where the simple adding 
of an (s) might alter the word's meaning and render it
C  —unrecognizable to the Arabic specialist ( abid instead
c c c —of abd-s, udul instead of adl-s, wujaha° instead of
wajlh-s, etc..). Sometimes the Arabic word might acquire
a slightly different meaning when rendered into its
plural form (eg. tagyld, meaning either note or essay, its
plural tagayid means usually notes). In such cases, every
effort will be made to account for the contextual Arabic
meaning.
A glossary of frequently used Arabic words will be 
found at the end of the thesis to which the English reader 
might refer in case of difficulty.
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CHAPTER ONE
S O U R C E S
The aim of this study is to fill a gap in the modern 
history of Morocco. The period extending from 1792 to 
1822 has remained outside the scope of historical study 
as far as Moroccan historiography is concerned until now. 
Those who have chosen to study modern and contemporary 
history of Morocco have either directed their attention 
to the beginning of the cAlawid dynasty (1666-present) or 
to the period following 1830. Even if some recent attempts 
have been made to explore the reign of Sfdi Muhammad b. 
cAbd Allah (1757-1790) (1), the history of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries has remained 
completely ignored.
One of the reasons which has discouraged students of 
Moroccan history from investigating the period of Mawlay 
Sulayman has been the scarcity of material. Both European 
and Moroccan archival collections are remarkably poor for the 
pre-1830 period and the publication of archival collections 
relating to Moroccan history has overlooked the middle 
period of the cAlawid dynasty from 1718 to 1830. The large 
scale work undertaken by Comte Henri de Castries (d.1927) 
and the Section d'Histoire du Maroc which was designed to 
publish European sources relating to Moroccan history did
(1) Ramon Lourido-Diaz, Marruecos en la segunda mi tad des siglo XVIII, 
Madrid, 1978. The two years' reign of Mawlay al-Yazld (1790-1792) 
has been also extensively investigated by Mariano Arribas-Palau; 
cf. his Cartas Arabes de Marruecos en tiempo de Mawlay al-Yaztd. 
Tetouan, 1961.
not extend beyond 1718 (2). On the other hand, El-
Ouataiq, the recently created archival publication of the 
Direction des Archives Royales at Rabat, has been almost 
exclusively concerned with the publication of official 
documents concerning the period after 1830.
In fact, Makhzen archival sources are extremely poor 
for the Mawlay Sulayman period (3) as a cursory investiga­
tion of the files kept at the Direction des Archives 
Royales would show. It is no accident that the author of 
Ithaf aclam al-nas, who published a considerable amount 
of official letters belonging to the cAlawid sultans, was 
never able to produce an elaborate study of Mawlay 
Sulayman (4).
The problem is worsened by the absence of organization 
and indexation of Moroccan manuscript sources. Apart 
from private collections, most of the material deposited 
at the Bibliotheque Generale in Rabat or the Royal 
Library is not catalogued or, when it is, is so poorly 
done that the investigator must take potluck, especially 
since Arabic traditional titles do not necessarily reflect 
the contents of the book concerned. Thus, a taqyid (note) 
on the Great Plague of 1799 was found in the midst of a 
biographical work relating to the eleventh century A.H. 
(I5th-16th centuries A.D.)(5). We have also come across
(2) Henri de Castries-Section d'Histoire du Maroc, Sources Inedites 
de l'Histoire du Maroc, 1905-1961, 26 volumes.
(3) This coincides with G. Ayache's observation about Makhzen archives. 
See his article "Archives et documentation historique au Maroc" in 
Les Arabes par leurs archives, CNRS, 1976, p.40.
(4) Cf. biography of Mawlay Sulayman in the manuscript volume of Ithaf 
aclam al-nas bycAbd al-Rahman b. Zaydan, Ms.Z.3986, R.L.
(5) Cf. cP b d al-Salam b. Sulayman al-FishtalT, Taqyid f l al-waba 3 (on 
the Great Plague of 1799), Ms. D 283,BGR, fol. 125-126.
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important fatwa-s (legal opinions) by the c alim-s of Fes 
concerning the deposition of Mawlay Sulayman in 1820 
which were indexed under the title of "Letter from Mawlay 
Sulayman to the people of Fes" (6). Another example is 
provided by al-cArbi al-Mashrafl's commentary on the 
Shamaqmaqiya (7) in which the author reproduced several 
letters by Mawlay Sulayman as well as an extract from an 
important khu^ba (sermon) revealing some of his religious 
ideas (8).
The student of Moroccan history is further confronted 
with another difficulty: the nature of the Moroccan
material itself. Historical works as such are very 
limited in number and a historian is often compelled to 
consult various types of sources in quest of information: 
biographic dictionaries, hagiographic literature, fahrasa-s 
(enumeration of one's teachers), religious essays (fatwa-s 
and jawab-s) written by the c alim-s on various issues, 
kunnasha-s (note books), tagyid-s (notes), polemic works 
(munadkarat), etc.
The last, but not the least, obstacle is the 
language problem which confronts European scholars in 
particular. Daring attempts were made during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to translate 
some fundamental works, such as al-Zayani's Turjuman and 
al-Nasiri's al-Istiqga which, since their publication, 
have been intensively used and adopted by successive gene­
rations of scholars. In spite of the inestimable value 
of these two works, they are far from providing a complete 
and accurate chronology of thecAlawid period. The scarci­
ty of studies on the reign of Mawlay Sulayman has made it
(6) Cf. Ms.D.2795, BGR, pp.393-404.
(7) The Shamaqmaqiya is an eulogistic poexn addressed by Ibn al-Wannan 
(d. 1773) to the Sultan SFdf Muljanmad b. cAbd Allah.
(8) Cf. Sharh al-Shamaqmaqiya by al-cArbI al-Mashraff, Ms.G.629, BGR, 
unumbered pages.
' necessary for this thesis to be based primarily on un­
published sources, both Moroccan and European.
I - Arabic Sources
A-Moroccan Manuscript Sources
(1) Chronologies
The basic chronologies used here come from al-Zayani, 
Akansus, al-Ducayf and the anonymous author of al-Ibtisam.
a) Al-Zayanf__( 1735-1833)
Al-ZayanX's works have constituted the major Moroccan 
source of reference to the history of the^Alawid dynasty. 
Plagiarized by Akansus and adopted by al-Nasiri, al- 
Bustan has been for generations an indispensable guide.
The author of al-Bustan is certainly the first historio­
grapher who attempted to write a history of thecAlawid 
dynasty. To his talents as a writer he had behind him a 
long career as a servant of the State. He had visited 
the Ottoman Empire and the Arab East on several occasions 
both on official and private business, had had the 
opportunity to see other political and social systems 
at work and, at the same time, had learnt a lot about 
their history, culture and traditions. As ambassador to 
the Sublime Porte, he met the Ottoman political elite as 
well as scholars who introduced him to the history of 
their Empire. In Egypt he met the famous historian, al- 
Jabarti, among many other intellectual figures (9).
His national pride as a subject of the Western 
Sultanate did not prevent him from developing a discreet 
admiration for certain aspects of Ottoman culture, and
(9)*Abd al-Rahman b. Zaydah, Itfiaf, p. 6 of the manuscript volume, 
Ms. Z 3986, p. 6.
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especially the care Ottoman scholars took to record their 
history and glorify their rulers. Al-Zayani's chrono­
logies are in fact full of references to the history of 
the Ottoman Turks. Comparisons with events from the 
Ottoman history often divert him from his subject and 
denote not only of his vast knowledge but also of his 
admiration for the history of this Empire.
Most, if not all, of al-Zayanl's works were written 
after 1224AH/1809-1810 AD, when he was dismissed by 
Mawlay Sulayman from the royal service. He first 
produced al-Turjuman, which was presented to Mawlay 
Sulayman in 1228 AH/1813 AD (10). This work represented 
a universal history in which the history of Morocco, and 
that of thecAlawid dynasty in particular, only received a 
very brief mention. Al-ZayanT , therefore, decided to 
write a detailed history of thecAlawid dynasty, a task 
which no historian had attempted before. Five years 
later (1233 AH/1817-1818 AD) he completed his basic work, 
al-Bustan, to which he owes his celebrity as a historian. 
Al-Bustan was later extended to cover the last years of 
Mawlay Sulayman's reign. This revision of al-Bustan , 
which was given the title of al-Raw^a al-sulaymaniya, was 
also perfected by the incorporation into the text of 
various notes the author had written on the margins of 
al-Bustan and by annexing to it the laudations that were 
written by eminent contemporaries in favour of this work. 
Strangely enough, al-Raw4a —  which will serve as our 
reference in this study —  never gained the popularity of 
al-Bustan undoubtedly because it was not well-known and 
easily confused with the latter. For Akansus and al-Nasirl 
al-Bustan remained the reference to the history of the 
cAlawid dynasty and nowhere in their works do we find an 
allusion to al-Raw<ja. Al-Zayani himself forgot that he
(10) Al-Zayani, al-Rawja al-sulaymaniya fi muluk al-dawla al-calawiya 
wa man taqaddamaha min al-duwal al-islamiya, Ms.D. 1275, BGR,
p.189.
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was dealing with a different work when he concluded al- 
Rawcja with the statement that "this is the end of what we 
could assemble in al-Bustan"(11). For Levi-Provengal , 
who did not have the chance to consult a copy of al-Rawc^a, 
this work was nothing more than al-Bustan under a 
different and misleading title (12).
All the chronologies which we are concerned with — al- 
Tur juman, al-Bustan and al-Rawda—  were written during 
the last twenty-five years of al-Zayani's long life and 
were based on a vast amount of material and sources. For 
the history of Islam and the Ottoman Empire, al-Zayani 
has access to works of well-known historians such as Ibn 
Khallikan, al-Tabari, al-Mascudr, al-Baladhuri and Kamal 
al-Dln Pasha (13). He also had the many notes he had 
gathered during his travels in the Middle East and the 
volumes on Islamic history he brought back. As for the 
history of thecAlawid dynasty, al-Zayani acknowledged that 
he had relied on unclassified notes (taqayld) belonging to 
various families for the reigns of Mawlay Rashid (1666- 
1672) and Mawlay Ismacil (1672-1727) and had depended on 
his personal experience for the reigns of Sidi Muhammad 
b.cAbd Allah and his sons Mawlay al-Yazfd and Mawlay 
Sulayman (14). We are also told by Akansus (15) that al- 
Bustan was written on the basis of notes belonging to a 
certain Ibn al-Haj al-Miknasi, about whom we know nothing. 
Even if this is true, al-Zayani obviously had recourse to 
the other sources mentioned above as well as to official 
documents (income registers, royal letters, etc) and his 
memory.
(11) Al-Rawcja, fol.231.
(12) Levi-Provengal, Les historiens des chorfas, Paris, 1922, p.183.
(13) Al-Zayahf, al-Tur jumana al-kubrS fl akhbar al-magmur barran wa 
bafrran, Rabat, 1967, pp.53-54, 103-104 and 208.
(14) Ibid., p.546.
,(15) Muhamrvad Akansus, al-Jaysh alcAramram al-khumasT fl dawlat mawlana 
cAll al-Sijilmassi, Ms. D 339, BGR,p.6.
In fact , memory constituted for him a vast source of 
information for the chronology of the events he witnessed. 
This was the reason for the brevity of information given 
to successive years and the numerous mistakes, especially 
in dating events. However, when we bear in mind that the 
author did not start writing until he was approaching his 
eighties, we can easily understand how memory can be so 
treacherous (16).
b) Akansus__( 1796-1877)
Like al-Zayani, the author of al-Jaysh al-caramram was 
also a katib and minister of the^Alawid dynasty. His 
chronicle can be divided into two parts: the first 
covering the^lawid dynasty before Akansus was called to 
serve as katib for Mawlay Sulayman (1235 AH/1819-1820 AD), 
and the second covering from the last years of Mawlay 
Sulayman's reign up to Sidi Muhammad b.cAbd al-Ra^iman 
(1859-1873). In the first part, Akansus did nothing but 
plagiarize Nuzhat al-Hadi by al-Ifranl and al-Bustan by 
al-Zayani (17). In relating the events of thecAlawid 
dynasty up to 1819-1820, al-Jaysh hardly differs from al- 
Bustan . Only after that date does al-Jaysh become 
interesting.
(16) Al-Zayani is very unreliable in dates. Among his errors:
- the year of introduction of the plague into Morocco (al-ZayanT 
gives 1212 AH instead of 1213) ;
- the appointment of al-Salawi as governor of the northern 
provinces (he gives 1223 instead of 1222);
- the arrival of the Wahhabi letter and the pilgrimage of Mawlay 
Ibrahim (he gives 1227 instead of 1226) .
Between al-ZayanT and al-pu^ayf there can be a chronological gap 
of two years or more. Cf. for instance the dates concerning the 
military expedition of Ibn Khadda to the eastern provinces which 
took place,according to al-Zayani,in 1211 AH/1796-1797 AD (al- 
Rawcja, fol.180), while al-Du<ayf gives the date of 1213 AH/1798- 
1799 AD (al-pucayf, pp.391-392).
(17) Akansus avoided, however, al-Zayani's references to the history 
of the Ottoman Qnpire as well as his attacks on Sufi orders, and 
especially the Tijaniya to which the author of al-Jaysh belonged.
Akansus who served Mawlay Sulayman during the last 
critical years of his reign (1819-1822) gives us a first 
hand account which is particularly valuable for, at this 
point, al-Zayani's chronologies show signs of exhaustion 
not only because of their author's remoteness from 
official business, but also because of his advanced age. 
Akansus, however, is to be approached very cautiously 
because, unlike al-Zayani who wrote after he had abandon­
ed palace service, the author of al-Jaysh started writing 
his history when he was less than forty years old and was 
therefore, still tempted by dreams of returning to his 
old post as minister (18). Moreover, the writing of al- 
Jaysh, the author tells us, was undertaken to satisfy the 
demand of Sidi Muljammad b.cAbd al-Rahman. This has 
considerably diminished the historical importance of this 
work which is nothing but "un hommage servile aux princes 
alawites" according to Levi-Proven<jal (19) .
c) Al-gu^ayf__(1752-1818?)
Here is a totally different chronicle by an author who 
never served the palace (20).
All the information we have about al-pucayf is drawn 
from his own work. Muhammad b .cAbd al-Salam al-pucayf 
was born in 1752 and apparently spent most of his life 
as a student travelling from his native town, Rabat, to 
the major intellectual and spiritual centres of the 
country such as Fes, Tetouan and Ouezzane, to attend 
courses by eminent c alim-s of his time. The returns of 
this studious life were, however, quite meagre for, 
surprisingly, his chronicle is full of linguistic and 
grammatical mistakes. The Alfiyya (21) which he studied 
three times in about twenty years seems to have had little
(18) Akansus, p.9
(19) Levi-Provengal, Les historiens des dhorfas, p. 212.
(20) For his biography cf. Bujandar, al-Ightibat bi tarajim aclam al-
Ribaf, Ms. D 1287, BGR, vol. I, pp. 155-156.
(21) The Alflyya is a treatise in Arabic granmar in verse, composed
by the famous Andalusian grammarian Ibn Malik (d.672 AH/1274 AD) 
It used to be learnt by heart by every Moroccan student.
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effect on him. This linguistic handicap certainly helped 
to lower his credit in the eyes of his contemporaries 
and explain, partly at least, why such eminent historians, 
such as al-Nasiri, have not referred to him at all (22).
The historical value of al-pucayf's Tarlkh was dis­
covered only recently. Unlike other Moroccan historians, 
al-Ducayf made no claim to write a general history of 
Morocco. The whole manuscript is devoted to thecAlawid 
dynasty. The author acknowledged that he relied on Nashr 
al-mathanl of Muhammad b. al-Tayyib al-Qadirl (23), and 
particularly on the private notes of Muhammad al-Masnawf 
Murinu (d.1207 AH/1792-1793 AD), a native of Rabat, who 
was in State service during the reign of MawlaycAbd Allah 
(1728-1757) (24) . These notes were apparently reproduced 
by al-Diicayf without the slightest modification,as we 
find the dedications to Sfdi Muhammad b.cAbd Allah and 
his successor Mawlay al-Yazid intact (25).
Al-pucayf, however, started recording the events of 
his time long before the death of al-Masnawi, since he 
mentions information about his private life going as far 
back as 1190 AH/1776-1777 AD. We are therefore indebted 
to al-Ducayf himself for much of the information covering 
the last years of Sfdi Muhammad b.cAbd Allah and the 
reign of Mawlay al-Yazld. As to the reign of Mawlay 
Sulayman, there can be no doubt that the author was rely­
ing on his direct experience. The record of events
(22) Al-Qucayf's manuscript was known to al-Nasiri1 s contemporaries. 
Ibn al-^ aj (d.1899) for instance made reference to it in his 
history of thecAlawid dynasty.
(23) Al-pucayf, p.76.
(24) Bujandar, al-Ightibaf bi tarajim aclam al-Ribat, Ms.D.1287, BGR, 
vol.I, p.137.
(25) Such dedications (nagarahu Allah , may God assist him) are only 
expressed during the lifetime of a sultan.
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becomes more abundant, and also more precise, after the 
death of Sidf Muhammad b.cAbd Allah.
Al-Ducayf's Tarfkh is in fact very similar to a diary 
in which the author noted down national, local and some­
times personal and private events. As a result, the 
manuscript takes the form of a long list of events which 
respects no rule but that of chronological sequence. "His 
writing is, at times, similar to a delirious speech", 
noted the author of al-Ightibat (26). Sometimes the 
information is so abundant that we have a day by day 
record of happenings. Unlike al-Zayani who goes very 
rapidly over the years, al-Ducayf might reserve several 
pages to a single year, covering the events month after 
month, and very often, day after day. His sense of 
precision goes even further and he sometimes notes down 
the hour when an incident occured (27). There can be no 
doubt, however, that al-Ducayf intended to write a history 
of thecAlawid dynasty as he attempted to entitle his 
chapters according to the Khaldunian tradition and 
referred to himself as "the author of this history"(28). 
Unfortunately, the chronicle suddenly stops as 1818 with 
the last sentence of the manuscript unfinished. We can 
only suppose that the author died shortly after he 
abandoned his notes. He was most probably carried away 
by the plague of 1818-1820 for which he must have 
constituted an easy prey because of his advanced age.
The importance of al-Ducayf's work needs hardly to be 
emphasized. The nature of the work as a record of events 
as they occurred, the precision of the information given, 
and the character of its author as an unofficial recorder 
of events conveying a popular perception of what had 
occurred, make of this work not only a useful store of
(26) Bujandar, al-Ightibaf, I, p.156.
(27) For instance, the information he gives about al-SalawI's death: 
11 P.M. on the first day of Qacda, 1230.
(28) Al-Ducayf, p. 172.
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information, but also a necessary tool to complement and 
correct formal chronologies such as those of al-Zayani.
d) Al-Ibtisam
Al-Ibtisam, written by an anonymous author, was initially 
intended to cover the reign of Mawlay ^ bd al-Raljman b. 
Hisham (29). The author, however, by way of introduction, 
devoted a significant part of the book to the reign of 
Mawlay Sulayman and produced an original account of events 
using a narrative style unusual to his Moroccan contempo­
raries .
The author had travelled three times to the Arab 
Middle East and had lived in Egypt for many years, at a 
time when that country was undergoing revolutionary 
changes under the leadership of Muhammad cAli (1805-1849). 
He was profoundly impressed by the Egyptian experience 
as well as by the doctrinal tolerance of the Egyptians 
and the practicality of their educational system. What is 
important in his work is not so much the chronology, but 
the author's impressions and the comparisons he draws 
between the state of affairs in his own country and that 
in the Arab East. However, his observations made little 
impression on his Moroccan contemporaries. The manuscript 
is unfortunately incomplete with many folios missing from 
the middle and the end.
(29) Anonymous, al-Ibtisam fi dawlat Ibn Hisham, Ms.Z. 1204, R.L. The 
information we have about the author is drawn from his manuscript. 
We know that his first name was "Idris", that1 he served as katib 
for Mawlay cAbd al-RaIjman' s minister Mufyanmad b. Idris al- ^Amrawi 
(d.1847) , and that he resided in Cairo for six years (al-Ibtisam 
p. 58) . This author might well be Idris b. al-fayyib b. al-MS^I 
mentioned by al-Mashraff (Nuzhat al-abg5r, p.455) as k&tib and 
poet who lived at the time of Muhanmad b. Idris al-<Amrawi.
(2) §i22i^I?!}i25i_kiterature_^tara2im)
Biographical literature is an essential source for 
Moroccan history. For traditional writers, the history 
of persons, whether they were Calim-s, Sufis, saints 
or temporal figures, was more important than the history 
of events. This was a concept which harmonized with the 
religious view of history according to which eternal 
values and qualities of eminent people were more important 
than temporal and transient events.
The information given about a person in such bio­
graphical dictionaries may vary from a few lines to 
several pages according both to the material available 
and the respect the individual enjoyed in the eyes of the 
author. Usually, such information deals with his dates 
of birth and death, his nasab (genealogy),his education, 
his virtues and qualities, sometimes his affiliation to a 
Sufi order, but very rarely his shortcomings or 
imperfections. The biographical dictionaries can be 
devoted to a single person or to a certain category of 
people (tabaqa), such as the Sufis of a certain religious 
order; they can also include many categories of Sufis, 
saints and calim-s who lived during a particular period.
Mawlay Sulayman's period, characterized by intensive 
intellectual activity, is covered by an abundant litera­
ture of biographies (30). Some of these biographies, such
(30) Many of these biographies were written during the second half of 
the 19th century. Thus we have:
- Ja*far b. Idris al-Kattani, al-Shurb al-mufotaglar min macin ba€d 
ahl al-qam al-thalith cashar, lith. , Fds, 1891-1892.
- Jacafar b. Idris al-Kattani, Kitab fi tarajim ba^d agfiya3 al- 
qam al-thalith cashar, Ms.D.2744, BGR.
- Al-*Arbi al-Mashrafi, Nuzhat al-ab§ar li dhawi al-macrifa wa 
al-istibsar, Ms.K.579, BGR.
- Muhaimad b. Jacfar al-Kattani, Salwat al-anfas wa muhadat al- 
aky5s bi man uqbira min al-^ulama^wa al-gulaha3 bi Fgs, 3* vol., 
lith., Fes, 1899.
More recent biographies include:
-cAbd al-Kabir al-Kattani, Zahrat al-as fi buyutat Fas; Ms.K. 1281 
BGR.
- Muhanmad b. al-Hasan al-Hajwf, al-Fikr al-saml fi al-fiqh al- 
islami, 4 vol., Rabat-Fes, 1921-1926.
-cAbd al-Hayy al-Kattani, Fihris al-faharis,2vol.,Fes,1927-1929.
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as al-Rawd al-munff, dedicated to the sharif-s of  * -  f ________
Ouezzane, or al-Fatfo al-wahbl , devoted to al-cArbi b. 
al-Macti (d.1819), head of the Sharqawi zawiya, 
constitute an important source of information on the 
history of the zawiya-s. Al-Rawd al-munTf, for instance, 
is more than a simple collection of biographies. It often 
reproduces letters exchanged between the Wazzani sharlf-s 
and Mawlay Sulayman and helps to elucidate the nature of 
the complex and obscure relations which existed between 
the Makhzen and the Wazzaniya religious order during the 
second decade of the nineteenth century.
At the end of the nineteenth century, Muhammad b. 
Jacfar al-Kattani produced a major biographical work , 
Salwat al-anfas (31) which he dedicated to the famous 
saints and calim-s buried at Fes. This work served as an 
incentive for the emergence of a regional biographical 
literature. His example for soon followed by ^alim-s 
from Tetouan, Rabat, Sal£, Marrakech and Meknes who 
compiled biographies of the most eminent people of their 
towns (32). Rural areas remained outside the scope of 
this new wave of biographical literature, with the 
exception of the Sous to which al-Mukhtar al-Susi (d.1963) 
devoted his twenty volume al-Macsul (33).
(31) Muhanmad b. Jacfar al-Kattani, Salwat al-anfas, 3 vol., lith.,
Fes, 1899.
(32)-Ahmad al-Ruhuni, cUmdat al-rawln fi tarikh ti^t^win, Ms.675, BGT,
9 vol. available only.
-Muhanmad Bujandar, al-Ightibat bi tarajim aclam al-Ribat, D 1287, BGR.
-Al- cAbbas b. Ibrahim, al-Iclam bi man halla Murrakush wa Aghmat 
min al-aclam, 8 vol.,Fes, 1936-1939. Vol.VI and VII on microfilm 
at the BGR (Mic. 167) .
-(Abd al-Rahman b. Zaydan, Itbaf aclam al-nas bi jamal akhbar 
ha^irat Maknas, 5 vol., Rabat, 1929-1933; unpublished parts at 
R.L., Ms.Z.3986.
-Muhanmad b.cA H  Dinya, Majalis al-inbis5t fi sharh tarajim(ulamaJ 
wa sulaljaJ al-Ribat, 2 vol., Ms.779, R.L.
(33) Al-Mukhtar al-Susi, al-Macsul, 20 vol., Casablanca, 1961.
Biographical works were sometimes devoted to a single 
family or a single person. The authors of these works 
usually wanted either to glorify their own family (34) 
or express gratitude to a respected shaykh (35).
(3) Al-wafayat
This is another category of traditional literature which 
is mainly concerned with ascertaining the dates on which 
eminent people died. However, the author might very well 
include some information which is related to the person 
or to his time. Thus we find mention, often very brief, 
of famous calamities, such as epidemics, famines, locust 
invasions and droughts. At times, a brief description is 
given of the person concerned and, in this case, the 
wafayat can be useful as a biographical reference (36). 
Wafayat works might also expound on a particular event 
which particularly impressed the author. Thus, the 
author of Tadhkirat al-mufrsinlnfwhose father, al-Majdhub 
al-Fasi (d.1844), played an important role in the Fes 
rebellion of 1820-1822, alloted many pages to relate the 
developments concerning the rebellion and gave detailed 
information about its various phases (37).
(34) For instance Muhanmad b. Hamdun b. al-Haj (al-Sulflnil), Riyad al-ward 
ila ma intaha ilayhi hadha al jawhar al-fard, Ms.K.2313, BGR.
(35) -Mawlay Sulayman, cInayat ull al-majd li dhikri al-Fasi ibn al-jadd
Fes, 1928.
-Sulayman al-Hawwat, al-Rawda al maq?Pda wa al-hulal al-mamduda fi 
ma^athir ban! Suda, Ms.K.2351, BGR.
Sulayman al-Haww5t also wrote his autobiography entitled: Thamarat 
unsl fi al-tacrlf bi nafsl, Ms.K.1264, BGR.
(36)-^bd al-Salam b. Suda, Ithaf al-mutalic bi waf ayat aclam al-qam al- 
thalith cashar wa al-rabic, typewritten, no. 10,651,R.L.
-f^ bd al-Kablr b. al-Majdhub al-Fasi, Tadhkirat al-muhsinln fi wafayat 
al-acyan wa hawSdith al-sinln, Ms.K.270, BGR.
(37) Cf. Tadhkirat al-mufrsinln, pp.347-358.
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(4) Fahrasa-s
A fahrasa is a document in which the author enumerates 
his shavkh-s, the disciplines he studied under each of 
them, and his ijaza-s (recognition of competence in a 
certain field). Eminent ^alim-s were usually anxious 
to write such fahrasa-s because of their importance in 
confirming the sanad (chain of knowledge) which was the 
only way to validate the knowledge they had acquired how­
ever, the authors of such documents rarely limit them­
selves to the strict definition of a fahrasa. They 
usually mention all famous Calim-s, Sufis or saints they 
met or with whom they had any spiritual affiliation. 
Sometimes they even give details about their lives, their 
karamat (signs of God's favour) and their virtues (38). 
Thus, al-Zayanl who wrote a fahrasa for Mawlay Sulayman 
mentioned not only his teachers, but all those who 
constituted his intellectual entourage: calim-s who
attended his religious seminars or helped him correct and 
review his essays, his katib-s and those who benefited 
from his learning. This fahrasa also included the 
sciences that Mawlay Sulayman acquired, the ijaza-s he 
received from his teachers, his works and his qualities 
both as a calim and as a sultan (39).
(38) -Al-Zay3nl, Jawharat al-tijan, Ms.7678, R.L. and K.1220, BGR. 
-cAbd al-Qadir al-KQhin, Imdad dhawl al-isticdad, Ms.D.270, BGR.
- Al-cArbI al-Damnati, Fahrasa, Ms.K.1254, BGR.
- Ahmad b. Has sun al-Wazzanl, Fahrasa, Mic.829, BGR.
- Ahmad b. cAjTba, Fahrasa, Ms.D. 1845, BGR.
- Muhanmad al-Talib b. Suda, Tufrfat al-ahbab bima lana min al- 
ashyakh wa al-a?hab, Mic.828, BGR.
(39) This fahrasa (Jawharat al-tljah) was abridged by al-Zayanl's 
pupil, Ibn Rahmun, under the title of al-EXirr wa al^Iqyan fi ma 
gayyadtuhu min Jawharat al-tijan, Ms. D 727, BGR.
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(5) Tabagat_and_Managib
The t;abaqat (categories) are biographical dictionaries 
devoted to a specific category of people. They usually 
provide information about the disciples of a certain Sufi 
order (40). This branch of literature can easily overlap 
with the manaqib —  works which enumerate the virtues and 
deeds of a saint —  as the authors of such works sometimes 
tend to mention not only the biography of the saint or 
the Sufi but also the biographies of his disciples and 
followers as well. However, biographical information in 
this kind of literature tends to be very scanty as most of 
the manaqib works are devoted to the glorification of the 
individual.
(6) Genealogical_literature
The importance of sharifism in Moroccan history and society 
is capital. Unfortunately, no attempt has been made until 
now to write a comprehensive history of sharifian families 
and their impact on the social and political development 
of the country. All we have at our disposal is a vast 
amount of genealogical literature giving the nomenclatures 
of the various holy lineages. The genealogies often 
include biographical information about eminent sharlf-s 
and,when written by an outstanding scholar, such as 
Sulayman al-Hawwat, for example, can provide valuable 
information about the historical evolution of sharifism 
in Morocco and the Makhzen's policy towards the sharif-s
(41) .
(40) -Ahmad Sklrej, Rafc al-niqab ba^d kashf al-hijab camnan talaqa 
maca al-shaykh al-Tijani min al-asfrab, 3 vol., vol.1 and II printed 
at Tdtouan, no date and vol.Ill printed at Rabat, 1971. _ 
-Muhammad b. Abu Ras al-Mucaskarf, Kanz al-asrar fi~ manaqib mawlana 
al-cArbf al-Darqawi wa bacd ashabihi al-akhyar, Ms.D.2339, BGR.
(41) Cf. Sulayman al-Hawwat, Qurrat al-Cuyun fi al-shurafa>al-qatinin 
bi al- cuyun, Ms.K. 1480, BGR (large extracts frcm this work are 
reproduced by Ibn Zaydan in al-cIzz wa al-§awla fr mac51im nudhum 
al-dawla, 2 vol., Rabat, 1961-1962, pp. 84-90. Al-Zayaru. devoted 
also one of his works to the sharlf-s under thecAlawid dynasty; 
see Tufrfat al-hadr al-mutrib fi rafCnasab shurafa-3 al-maghrib, Ms.
2471, R.L.
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(?)
A great number of learned men from Morocco travelled every 
year to the Hijaz on pilgrimage. Some of them recorded 
their observations and impressions of the various 
countries they visited. Important rifrla-s, or travel 
accounts, such as the ones written by Muhammad b.cAbd al- 
Salam b. Nasir at the end of the eighteenth century (42), 
include useful information about the difficulties of 
communication by land, the varying prices from one 
country to another as well as information about the tribes 
and territories they travelled through.
Pilgrimage was also an occasion for Moroccan scholars 
to meet prominent ^alim-s from the Maghrib and the Arab 
East and engage in theological discussions with adepts of 
other madhhab-s. Thus, Muhammad b.cAbd al-Salam b. Nasir 
met Ahmad al-Tijani in Algeria in 1782 and became 
acquainted with his ideas long before their popularization 
in Morocco (43). Al-Zayarii who spent many years in the 
Arab East, both on official and private business, produced 
a voluminous work in which he displayed his historical 
and geographical knowledge (44).
(8) Kunnasha-s_and_Tagayid
Some scholars used to keep a kunnasha, or note-book, in 
which they wrote down all kinds of information : dates of 
births and deaths of their contemporaries, noteworthy 
happenings such as epidemics and other natural calamities
(42) Mubamnd b.cAbd al-Salam b. Na^ ir, al-Rihla al-kubra (1782-83) , Ms.
D.2651, BGR; al-Rihla al-?ughra (1796-97), Ms.121, R.L.
(43) Muhanmad b. cAbd al-Salcim b. Na§ir, al-Rifrla al-kubra, p.72.
(44) Al-Zayanl, al-Turjum3na al-kubra. Other relevant rifrla-s include:
- Ahmad b. Muhanmad al-FSsI, Extracts from his Rilila (1796-1797) in 
Ms.G.88, BGR,"pp.164-181.
- Mawlay rAbd al-Salam al-Darir, Rihla (1773-1774) , Ms.Z. 1317, R.L.
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important political events, reflections on certain issues, 
quotations of verses composed by themselves or by their 
contemporaries, practical information about certain 
remedies, prayers to be said on special occasions, etc... 
The historical value of such kunnasha-s depends on the 
particular interest of their authors. Thus, a kunnasha 
by a sultan's katib, such as al-^ArbT al-Damnatr (45) 
contains many of the letters he wrote on behalf of Mawlay 
Sulayman, while another belonging to al-Macdanf (46), also 
a contemporary of Mawlay Sulayman, is totally devoted to 
his poetry which, with the exception of some verses ex­
tolling the benefits of tea, is of little historical 
importance (47) .
Tagayld, or notes, served the same purpose of record­
ing miscellaneous information(48). A tagyld (when used 
in the singular form) is generally devoted to a certain 
issue which monopolized the author's attention at a given 
time and is then , in fact, an essay.
(9) Religious_Essaysx_Fatwa-s_and_Khu£ba-s
The period of Mawlay Sulayman is extremely rich in contro­
versial issues which involved not only Calim-s and Sufis, 
but also the Sultan himself. Mawlay Sulayman being a 
calim himself and profoundly attached to Islamic orthodoxy, 
he not only encouraged religious discussion through his 
religious seminars and the questions he addressed to the
(45) Al-^Arbl al-Damnatl, Kunnasha, Ms.3718, R.L.
(46) Al-Macdanl, Kunnasha, Ms.5601, R.L.
(47) Other kunnasha-s include:
- Mawlay<Abd al-Rahman b. Mawlay Sulayman, Ms.4001, R.L.
- Al-^Arbi al-Mashraff, Ms.K.204, BGR.
- Abu Bakr al-Manjra, Ms.K.464, BGR.
- A kunnasha belonging to the FasT family, Sbihl Library at Sale, 
not catalogued.
(48) Tagyld when used in the plural form (tagayld) applies to notes 
taken at different times and is, in this case, hardly different 
from a kunnasha.
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c alim-s on various issues, but contributed himself to 
this cultural activity by writing on some of the 
important problems of his time (49).
Contemporary issues, such as the emergence of the 
Wahhabi doctrine, Sufi practices or relations with 
Christians, gave birth to an abundant literature which, 
on occasions, could become polemical. Political events—  
such as the Fes rebellion—  or natural calamities —  such 
as the plague which twice ravaged the country—  were also 
occasions on which the calim-s expressed themselves (50) .
(49) Religious essays and khufba-s by Mawlay Sulayman include:
- Khufba on the mawsim-s, printed at Fes, no date.
- Al-Samac: ma huwa muttafagun^ala hirmatih, Ms.652, Sblhl 
Library, Sale.
- Another khufba on Sufi heterodox practices, extracts in Sharh 
al-shamaqmaqiya by al-Mashraff, Ms.G.629, BGR.
- Risala fi al-kasb (written jointly with al-Tayvib b. Kir an) , Ms. 
D.1838, BGR.
Muhammad al-Ruhuni (d.1815) also has an important collection of 
khutba-s : al-Khufab al-manbariya, Cairo, 1936.
(50) Works falling under this heading include:
- Al-Tayyib b. KTran, radd cal5 madhhab al-wahh5biya,
Ms.K.i325, BGR, pp.21-95.
- Mawlay Sulayman, letter addressed to Sacud b.cAbd al-cAzlz, Ms. 
4624, R.L.
- Muhanmad al-RuhunT, al-Risala al-wajTza al-mufrarrara fT anna al- 
tijara ila arfl al-harb wa bacth al-mal ilavh5 laysa min fic 1 al- 
barara, Ms.D.2438, BGR, pp. 118-127.
- Muhanmad b. Ibrahim al-DukkSH, Fatwa concerning the sale of 
horses to Spain in return for three presidios in al-Mahdi al- 
Wazzani, al-Nawazil al-jadida, lith. , Fes, 1910, III, pp.35-36.
- Al-Tayyib b. Kir an, Muhanmad b. Ibrahim al-Dukkall, Muhanmad 
al-Zarwali and Ahmad b. Suda, Fatwa-s concerning the inmunity of 
zawiya-s, in 14s.Z.3772, R.L., unumbered pages. Ibn KTran’s reply 
is printed in al-Wazzahii’s al-Nawazil al-jadida, III, pp. 80-81.
- Muhanmad cAshur, an essay : on blameworthy festivities celebrated 
at Marrakech on the occasion of the cAshuraf written on Mawlay 
Sulayman’s order, Ms.Z.3772, R.L., pp.1-35.
- Anonymous, Risala fl al-radd calS ahl al-badr wa n5hiyat‘ 
al-mashriq, Ms.D.2594, BGR.
- Ahmad b.cAbd al-Salam BannanI, al-Fuyuflat al-wahbiya fi" al-radd 
fala al-taJifa al-wahhabiya, Ms.170, Filali Library.
- Muhanmad al-Ruhunl, Jawab fT al-ta^ un, Ms.D.2251, BGR, pp. 1-48. 
-Muhanmad b. Abi al-Qasim al-Sijilmassi, Taqyid fi al-tacun,
Ms! D. 2251, pp. 49-79.
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(10) Polemical_Works_^muna4iiarat)
The growing importance of the zawiya-s during the period 
under study, together with the emergence of an Islamic 
reformist ideology in the Arab Middle East, gave rise to 
a dual confrontation both between religious orders and 
between some of them and the defenders of orthodox Islam, 
the calim-s. This confrontation escaped from the limited 
sphere of ideas when some zawiya-s, particularly those 
of sharifian origin, joined the rebellion which deposed 
Mawlay Sulayman in 18 20.
Two main factors lay behind this polemical literature. 
Firstly, there was the introduction of a new Sufi order, 
headed by Ahmad al-Tijanl (1737-1815),into Morocco. It 
enjoyed the benevolence of the Makhzen, if not its active 
support. The Shadhili branches of Moroccan Sufism reacted 
very energetically to this intruder who claimed preeminence 
over all saints, dead and alive (51). The Tijani doctrine, 
on the other, hand quickly acquired adepts among the urban 
aristocracy and the educated society and did not, therefore, 
lack for ideological support. The second factor was the 
emergence in the Middle East of the Wahhabi doctrine which 
had a direct repercussion in the Maghrib. Mawlay Sulayman 
who inherited the Sunni orthodoxy of his father saw in the 
Wahhabi doctrine not only an attempt to restore the purity
(51) Works in favour of the Tijahiya religious order include:
- Muhanmad Akansus, al-Jawab al-muskit, Ms.G.817, BGR.
- cUmar b. Sat Id al-Fawtr, Suyuf al-Sa,cId, Ms.D.2135, BGR.
- Ahmad b.cAbd Allah al-Makkf, Bulugh al-amanT fi manaqib al- 
shaykh Ahmad al-Tijanl, Ms.D.2462, BGR.
Works hostile to the Tijahiya order include:
- Aljmad al-Bakkay, al-Fath al-quddus fi~ al-radd Cala Abr(Abd Allah 
Muhanmad Akansus, Ms.k .2455, BGR.
- Faddul b. cAzzuz, Kashf al-ran can fuDad manic al-ziyara, Ms.K. 
644, BGR.
-CA1I b. Dhahir al-Watri, Ma abrazathu al-aqdar fr nugrat ahl Allah 
Ms.D.1115, BGR.
of Islam, but also a political tool with which to curb 
the threatening influence of the zawiya-s.
A word should be said about a particular form of 
polemical writing, examplified by al-Husam al-mashrafi"
(52) which has other qualities as well. The title of 
this work is a typical example of a misleading title under 
which the author might incorporate a useful stock of 
historical evidence. Intended initially as a reply to 
Akansus for his defamation of the Darqawiya religious 
order, the work also includes two chapters on the history 
of thecAlawid dynasty. The reign of Mawlay Sulayman is 
extensively covered and especially the Fes rebellion for 
which the author provides some important documents (53).
B - Makhzen Letters
Letters, particularly those emanating from the Makhzen, 
will form an essential source for this thesis. As Germain 
Ayache pointed out in his study of the Moroccan archives, 
the Makhzen collection of letters becomes poorer as we go 
back in time, especially for the period before 1830 (54) .
A number of factors account for this. There was, for 
instance, the meagreness of the Makhzen's administrative 
apparatus greatly weakened by political instability and 
plague epidemics. During the short reign of Mawlay al-
(52) Muhanmad al-cArbf al-Mashraff, al-Ijusam al-mashrafi li-qat^ lisan 
al-shab al-jacraff, Ms.K.2276, BGR and Mic.1207, BGR. Because 
both of these copies lack many pages we have used both of them as 
they tend to complement each other.
(53) Being a Darqawi adept, the author had access to the documents of 
the Zawiya branch at Fes, some of which he reproduced in al-gusam. 
The most relevant are:
- Letter from the < alim-s of Fes to Mawlay Sulayman asking for the 
dismissal of the qd^T (Ms.K.2276, BGR, pp.328-329)
- Fatwa by the c alim-s of Fes deposing Mawlay Sulayman (Mic. 1207, 
BGR, p. 474 ff.
- Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to the people of Fes rejecting his 
illegal dethronement (Mic.1207, pp. 485-487).
(54) G. Ayache, In Les ArabeS par leurs archives, p.40.
35
Yazld, Makhzen officials who served under Sfdl Muhammad 
b.^Abd Allah were systematically liquidated or purged.
The Great Plague of 1799-1800 also carried away a number 
of competent katib-s and officials. By the turn of the 
nineteenth century, Mawlay Sulayman was to encounter great 
difficulty in finding experienced servants to whom he 
could entrust his foreign affairs. After Ibn ^Uthman's 
death in 17 99, the British consul general in Morocco 
found it extremely difficult to establish communications 
with the Makhzen because there were hardly any talib-s 
around the Sultan who could handle State business. Of 
the numerous katib-s who had served Sfdf Muhammad "none 
remained, not one!", wrote Matra in 1802 (55). Al-Salawl 
who was entrusted with the royal seal in 1799 was only 
twenty years old and had very rudimentary administrative 
experience (56). The modesty of the administrative 
apparatus necessarily led to a decrease in the volume of 
official correspondence.
Moreover, the administration was not centralized, not 
only because the Sultan had no fixed capital, but also 
because of the presence of wazlr al-bahr at Larache where 
he could be in constant touch with the European consuls 
at Tangier. Wazlr al-bafrr himself was not responsible for 
foreign affairs only. Al-Salawl, for instance, was at the 
same time governor of the northern provinces and we often 
find him campaigning in the Rif or against the Berber 
tribes of the Atlas. This has undoubtedly contributed to 
the dispersal of Makhzen correspondence.
(55) F.0.52/12, 3 May, 1802.
(56) See F.0.52/11, Gibraltar, 6 Aug., 1799. The post of wazlr al-bafrr 
also remained vacant after al-Salawi1 s death in 1815. This only 
confirms the scarcity of qualified administrative personnel during 
the period under study.
This, however, does not mean that there are no records 
for the period of Mawlay Sulayman. For instance, we know 
that al-SalawT used to keep registers of his letters to 
European consuls (57). The customs houses at the main 
ports also used to keep registers of exports and imports
(58). But, until the Makhzen archives are properly 
inventoried and catalogued —  a process which may take 
several decades —  it will be impossible to ascertain 
whether such documents still exist or not.
The files of the Direction des Archives Royales for 
the reign of Mawlay Sulayman are extremely poor when 
compared with the abundant correspondence of the post-1830 
period. They consist mainly of copies of documents kept 
at the Rabat Royal Library and include the correspondence 
ofcAbd al-Rahman cAshcash, governor of Tetouan, and 
Muhammad Bejja, a wealthy merchant who served as Moroccan 
consul in Gibraltar from 1815 to 1820.
Besides the collections of the Direction des Archives 
Royales, the Moroccan Ministry of Culture has acquired 
during recent years a vast amount of Makhzen letters 
through an annual exhibition of manuscripts and documents
(59). Microfilms of such letters are kept at the Biblio- 
theque Generate in Rabat. Unfortunately, here again 
documents relating to the period of Mawlay Sulayman are 
very rare.
Copies of official letters are also to be found in 
various manuscript works. Many of these letters are re­
produced because of their literary or doctrinal value.
(57) F.0.52/15, letter from al-Salawi to James Green dated 16 Feb., 
1810, in which he makes reference to his previous letter dated
11 Dec., 1807.
(58) F.0.52/24, Douglas to Earl Bathurst, 23 June, 1823.
(59) Hassan II Prize for Manuscripts and Documents (H.P.M.D.) .
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Unfortunately, these copies do not always bear the date 
of the originals. Many important letters, for instance, 
occur in the midst of kunnasha-s (60), hagiographic 
works or formal chronologies.
Foreign archives have also provided a number of Arabic 
letters relating to Morocco's relations with Europe. These 
documents help to undermine the long-held theory of 
Moroccan isolationism during Mawlay Sulayman's period.
II - European Sources
European sources involve reports drawn up by European 
consuls and their agents, as well as observations made by 
various European visitors, such as ambassadors, merchants 
or doctors whose assistance was sometimes solicited by 
the Moroccan Court.
J.L. Miege,who had worked on the European archives, 
states that for the period under discussion (1792-1822) 
there was an unprecedented decline in the amount of 
material relating to Morocco. This, he believes, reflects 
a diversion of European interest from Morocco because of 
the Napoleonic wars (61). They placed Morocco "a.ux marges 
du conflit" (62) and the movement of people, goods and 
information declined as a consequence. We shall argue 
later on that these wars, far from relegating Morocco to 
the margin of the conflict, in reality aroused European 
rivalries and jealousies about the southern shores of the 
Mediterranean, particularly over Morocco. Here, however, 
the argument will be limited to countering Midge's sugges­
tion concerning European archives.
(60.) A kunnasha by a Makhzen official such as al-Arbl al-Damnatl includes 
many of the letters he wrote on behalf of Mawlay Sulayman during 
the latter part of his reign. Unfortunately, they bear no date.
(61) J.L. Miege, Le Marco et 1'Europe, 1830-1894, Paris, 1961-63, vol.
II, pp.19-29.
(62) Ibid., p.19.
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The wars in Europe certainly slowed down the movement 
of people and goods between Morocco and Europe, but the 
few Europeans who visited Morocco during the early nine­
teenth century left behind some of the most detailed 
reports and accounts available. Observations made by 
travellers like Jackson, Ali Bey (Domingo Badia), John 
Buffa, Mathieu de Lesseps and others, have long 
constituted major references on Morocco (63). To these 
should be added embassy reports drawn up by European 
envoys, two of which have been published (64).
As far as consular archives are concerned, there is 
no evidence to suggest that they diminished during the 
period under study. The amount of British consular 
letters covering the reign of Mawlay Sulayman outweighs 
by far the amount covering his father's reign (65). The 
same observation applies to the French consular 
correspondence. The volume of consular archives seems 
negligible only if compared with that of the post-1830 
period.
European archives have long been a target of contempt 
and suspicion for the current generation of Moroccan
(63) J.G. Jackson, An Account of the Empire of Morocco, London, 1814;
Ali Bey, Travels of Ali Bey in Morocco, Tripoli, Cyprus, Egypt, 
Arabia, Syria and Turkey between the years 1803 and 1807, 2 vol., 
London, 1816; J. Buffa, Travels through the Errpire of Morocco,
London, 1810; M. de Lesseps, "Notice sur 1'Empire de Maroc" ~Tn Journal 
des Voyages , 45° cahier, Juillet 1822 (written in the 1790's).
(64) J. Caille, La mission du Capitaine Burel, Rabat, 1953; J. Caille,
Une ambassade autrichienne au Maroc en 1805, Paris, 1957. A 
third embassy by the Briton William A'Court (1813) remains un­
published; cf. be lew.
(65) Sfdi Muhammad's reign is covered by 9 volumes as compared with 14 
volumes for Mawlay Sulayman's reign. Cf.State Papers 71, 102 and 
F.0.52 series at the P.R.O.
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historians (66). This attitude is based on the assump­
tion that consular reports were written by foreign agents 
who not only were motivated by mercantile and colonialist 
designs, but were also ill-disposed towards the local 
population and its culture. Their reports could also not 
be trusted because they lived on the periphery of the 
country spending most of their time among themselves and 
taking little interest in the social and political develop­
ments of the host country. There is, undoubtedly, an 
element of truth in all of this. Still, the historical 
value of these archives cannot be denied. Ill-disposed 
and scornful of Moroccans as he was, Louis Chenier has 
left precious reports and a valuable book on the history 
of Morocco, which still count among the few serious 
sources on Morocco in the second half of the eighteenth 
century.
After more than two decades of national independence, 
European archives are being discovered not to be as use­
less as was once thought. They can even contribute to 
national history in fields rarely investigated by Moroccan 
historians, particularly in economic, social and demo­
graphic fields. Recent studies, both of Tunisia and 
Morocco, have shown the value of European records— whether 
they be consular, commercial or private—  in describing 
the internal evolution of the Maghrib (67). R. Rosenberger 
and H. Trikl pointed out in 1973 that "foreign sources are 
usually more useful" for the study of such aspects as 
plague, epidemics and famines (68). They also underlined
it '(66) See Ayache, La question des archives historiques marocaines, in 
Hesperis-Tamuda, vol.II, 1961, fasc.2-3; and idem, G. Ayache,
"L1 utilisation des archives historiques marocaines'J in Hesperis- 
Tamuda, vol.VII, 1966, fasc. unique.
(67) L. Valensi, Fellahs tunisiens, Paris, 1977? R. Rosenberger, and 
H. Triki, "Famines et epidemies au Maroc", in Hesperis-Tamuda, 
vol. XIV, 1973, pp. 109-175 and vol. XV, pp. 5-103.
(68) R. Rosenberger et H. Trikl, "Famines et Epidemies", Hesperis-Tamuda, 
XTV, 1973, p. 111.
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that "les commergants ou les diplomates qui sejournent 
ou passent au Maroc sont attentifs aux evenements qui 
peuvent affecter les affaires ou le cours de la politique"
(69) .
Moroccan traditional literature is strikingly silent 
about economic and social developments. Nowhere are to 
be found, for instance, population estimates in Moroccan 
contemporary works. Al-Zayani, who travelled more than 
once to the Orient, described the major cities in Syria 
and Palestine not omitting to give the exact weight of 
the Aqsa Mosque dome or the number of prophets buried in 
Damascus (70) but never even considered giving a popula­
tion estimate of any country he visited. The plague 
which swept away at least one third of the Moroccan 
population between 1799 and 1820, did not receive more 
than *few sentences from the same author. Sometimes the 
reader has the impression that, had not the plague carried 
away some important prince or minister, it would have 
never been mentioned (71). Even al-Ducayf, whose chroni­
cle is more like a note-book or a diary, never gives a 
population estimate, not even of his native town. Only 
Europeans seem to have bothered about statistics of any 
kind.
European sources can also be very useful in revealing 
events which are mentioned nowhere in Moroccan sources. 
They also complement other information and provide the 
basis for a more accurate chronology for the period under 
study.
(69) Ibid.
(70) Al-Zayanl, al-Turjumana al-kubra, pp.270, 276.
(71) Al-Zayanl, al-Rawda, fol.181.
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A - British Archives
The Public Record Office at London contains valuable 
records relating to Mawlay Sulayman's reign. Unlike 
France or Spain, Great Britain maintained a closer contact 
with Morocco throughout the Napoleonic wars and succeeded 
in becoming Morocco's major commercial partner. French 
designs in the Mediterranean and Moroccan fears of a 
Franco-Spanish invasion also encouraged Moroccan rapproche­
ment with Great Britain.
(1) public_Record Office
F.Q. 52 includes the first series of consular 
archives covering the period 1760-1837. Fourteen volumes 
(F.0.52/10-23) deal with Mawlay Sulayman's reign. They 
consist of consular reports sent by three British consuls 
who resided at Tangier : J.M. Matra (1787-1805), James 
Green (1806-1817) and J.S. Douglas (1818-1829).
The first phase of Mawlay Sulayman's reign is extensi­
vely covered by Matra's reports which are of great help 
in filling in the gaps of Moroccan historiography. James 
Green also proved to be a well-qualified consul. He was 
in Morocco during a crucial period when the Napoleonic 
threat in the Iberian Peninsula encouraged closer coopera­
tion between Great Britain and Morocco. After 1812, how­
ever, Green's health deteriorated (72). His reports 
became less frequent, particularly after the end of the 
wars in Europe in 1814. J.S. Douglas who was appointed 
consul in Morocco in 1818 did not reach Tangier until 
1821 after the end of the plague.
F.Q. 8 - Volumes 5-10 of this series contain
instructions from the British government to British consuls 
in North Africa and cover the period 1801-1836.
(72) F.O. 52/16, 18 Feb., 1812.
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F.Q. 631 - This series contains the cor­
respondence of the vice-consul at Essaouira. Only the 
first volume is of interest for the period under study.
It covers the years 1813-1816.
F.Q. 174 - This series consists of the 
archives of the British consulate at Tangier, recently 
transferred to the Public Record Office in London. It 
mainly includes registers of out-letters sent by the 
consul general to various authorities in Morocco and 
Great Britain. It also includes copies of letters sent 
to other residing European consuls at Tangier. Further­
more, this series contains letters received from the 
British authorities in London and Gibraltar, or from the 
vice-consul at Essaouira. It is particularly rich in 
Arabic letters as it includes the correspondence of 
Moroccan authorities.
C .0. - During the Napoleonic wars, the 
Colonial Office (actually responsible for war and colonies) 
took a particular interest in Morocco. Owing to the 
strategic position of the Barbary States the diplomatic 
affairs relating to these countries were transfered in 
1804 from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office where 
they were to remain until 1836. The Colonial Office also 
followed Moroccan affairs closely because of the 
importance of provisions drawn from Morocco by the 
garrison of Gibraltar.
The material relating to Morocco in this series in­
cludes :
C .0. 2 - Volumes 3 and 4 contain the papers of 
William A'Court, British ambassador to the Barbary States 
in 1813. Volumes 6 and 10 contain documents relating to 
British and European efforts to supress piracy in the 
Western Mediterranean during the years 1816-1818.
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C .0. 91 - It contains despatches from the 
governors of Gibraltar. The period 1792-1822 is covered 
by volumes 36-80. This series includes valuable informa­
tion on Anglo-Moroccan cooperation over the blockade of 
Ceuta (1806-1810), the plague of 1818-1820 (vol.72-76 
give detailed statistics on casualties) and the Fes 
rebellion (R. Sillery's Report in vol.79).
W.O. - Volumes W.0.1/226, 275, 282, and 
W.0.6/152, 205 contain some information about the question 
of Ceuta and the Anglo-Moroccan efforts to invest it 
militarily during the years 1806-1810.
(2) !?!l!:_5ri£ish_Museum
Additional Manuscript 41, 512 includes the 
papers of William A'Court concerning his mission to North 
African States in 1813. Among these papers are detailed 
statistics about the trade of Essaouira in 1812.
The correspondence of Joseph Banks(1744-1820) 
who took a special interest in the exploration of Africa 
and was the founder of the African Association. He was 
instrumental in the nomination of J.M. Matra as consul 
general in Morocco and maintained a regular correspondence 
with his protege. Numerous letters by Matra are found 
among the correspondence of this famous British botanist, 
vol.33, 978 and 33, 979.
B - French Archives
The archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(Quai d'Orsay) constitute the bulk of French archives 
covering the period under study. The "Correspondence 
Consulaire et Commerciale" contains 9 volumes (vol.20-28) 
covering the period 1790-1824. . They consist essentially 
of consular reports drawn up by French consuls in Morocco
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( du Rocher, Antoine Guillet, Michel-Ange d'Ornano and 
Sourdeau). They become particularly important after the 
end of the Napoleonic wars in 1814 when the new royalist 
regime attempted to make up for the long French absence 
from the Moroccan scene owing to the British naval 
supremacy in the Straits zone between 1792 and 1814.
France was the only European country to maintain a consul 
in Morocco during the plague epidemic of 1818-1820 in the 
hope of taking advantage of the epidemic to regain its 
lost pre-war commercial position.
At a time when British consular reports become less 
frequent after the departure of James Green in 1816 and 
the confinement of the new consul at Gibraltar between 
1818 and 1821, the French consul provided useful informa­
tion about the political events which destabilized the 
country between 1819 and 1822. This correspondence 
describes the changes in commercial policy carried out by 
Mawlay Sulayman after 1817 when he was compelled by 
internal developments to resort to maritime trade as a 
substitute source of income.
We have also made use of the Archives Nationales which 
include the valuable journal of M. de Lesseps, chancelier 
at the French consulate in Morocco during the 179Q's(73).
Some French archival material relating to Mawlay 
Sulayman's reign has already been published by Jacques 
Caille in his abundant literature (74)
(73) A.F. IV, dossier no. 3. This journal was published in 1822 
under the title of "Notice sur l'Bnpire du Maroc" in Journal 
des Voyages, 45° cahier, vol. 15, July, 1822.
(74) For example, J. Caille, La mission du capitaine Burel au 
Maroc en 1808, Rabat, 1953; "le vice-consul Broussonet et ses
'm&noires' sur le Maroc'/ in Hesperis-Tamuda, vol. II, fasc. I, 
1961, pp. 5-42.
C - Spanish Archives
The most important archival source for the study of Mawlay 
Sulayman's reign is the consular archives deposited at the 
Archivo Historico Nacional at Madrid. As far as Morocco's 
internal situation is concerned, the Spanish consular 
correspondence tends to repeat other European archival 
sources. Our use of the Spanish archives has been, 
accordingly, very limited.
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CHAPTER II
MOROCCAN STATE AND SOCIETY 
AT THE TURN OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
I - The Land and its People
It is impossible to determine with any certainty the 
population of Morocco during the period under study. The 
absence of population censuses and statistics leaves us 
with only the estimate of foreign travellers. Nor does 
the abundance of travel accounts during the late eight- 
enb.h and early nineteenth centuries help us very much 
in working out a reliable estimate. Evaluations vary 
considerably from two million to about fifteen million 
inhabitants. The following figures given by European 
authors show clearly the disparity in population 
estimates:
Table 1 Population Estimates (1771-1825)
1771 2,000,000
1779 6,000,000
1787 5 to 6,000,000
1791 6,000,000
1793 8,000,000
1805 5,336,000
1808 14,886,000
1823 8,500,000
1825 5 to 6,000,000
Sources: Letters from Barbary, France, Spain, Portugal by 
an English officer who visited the country in 
1771, Dublin, no date; D. Noin, La population
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The earliest figure with any claims to accuracy goes 
back to the beginning of the twentieth century and lies 
somewhere between four and five million inhabitants. As 
the Moroccan population tended to be stable over time 
(periodic famines and epidemics erasing the gains of a 
high birth rate), we can assume that the estimates'made 
at the beginning of this century were valid for most of 
the nineteenth century (1).
The inhabitants of Morocco formed a relatively homo­
geneous population. There were two main linguistic 
groups, Arabs and Berbers, and only two religious commu­
nities, Sunni Muslims and Jews. If we exclude the Spanish 
presidios on the Mediterranean coast, the number of Christ­
ians in Morocco was insignificant and consisted exclusive­
ly of European residents. By 1806, the European population 
of Tangier"consisted almost solely of the families of 
foreign consuls"(2). At Essaouira, the number of Europe­
ans was still less important.
The Moroccan population was predominently rural.
Between 5 and 10% only lived in towns.(3). A sizable pro­
portion of this rural population was concentrated in
• • * Sources for Table 1 ( continued)
rurale du Maroc, vol.I, 1970; Lempridre, Voyage 
dans 1'Empire du Maroc et le Royaume du Fds fait 
pendant les annies 1790 et 1791, 1801; M. de Lesseps, 
Letter from Taroudant, 20 Oct.n 1793 in Archives 
Nationales (Paris), AF IV, dossier No.3; J.Cailie 
Une ambassade autrichienne au Maroc en 1805, 1957;
Idem, La mission du capitaine Burel au Maroc en
1808, 1953; J.G. Jackson, An Account of the 
Empire of Morocco, 1809 ; F. Charles-Roux and J. 
Caille, Missions diplomatiques frangaises A Fes , 
1955; Graberg de Hemso, Specchio goegrafico e 
statistico dell Imperio di Marocco,Genoa, 1834.
(1) D. Noin, La population rurale, I, p.30.
(2) J. Buffa, Travels through the Empire of Morocco, p. 22. In
1816 the French population of Tangier was made up of ten families 
(CCC, vol.24, fol.187-188).
(3) In 1926 more than 90% of the population continued to live in the 
countryside; cf. Martin et al, Geographie du Maroc, Paris, 1964. 
pp. 58, 76.
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mountainous areas, particularly in the Rif and the west­
ern High Atlas. The Atlantic plains, on the contrary, 
had a much lower population density. Louis Chenier, the
French consul in Morocco under Sfdf Muhammad b.*Abd Allah,
• w
did not fail to report the emptiness of the coastal 
plains (4). Similar observations were made by other 
contemporary witnesses. cAbd Allah b.al-Khayyat al-Qadirf, 
father of the author of al-Tuhfa al-qadiriya, reported 
that towards the middle of the eighteenth century most 
of the country between Fes and Meknes was uninhabited (5) . 
Lempriere, a British physician who visited the country 
in 1790 and 1791, observed that on his seven day journey 
from Sal§ to Marrakech, he did nb.t see a single habitation 
(6) .
A- The Countryside
(1) The_Tribal_Reality
For the immense majority of the Moroccan population, the 
tribe constituted the basic form of social organization. 
The individual belonged to a tribe and used to be identi­
fied on this basis by both other tribesmen and by the 
Makhzen.
Few tribes really believed that they constituted the 
descent group of a common ancestor. The name shared by a 
number of people residing within a limited territory had 
no consanguineous connotation. The tribe was by no means 
a closed or permanent structure . It was always ready to 
receive newcomers who accepted a common destiny with other
(4) D. Noin, La population rurale, I, p.13.
(5) (Abd al-Salam b.cAbd Allah al-Qadirl, al-Tuhfa al-q5diriya, Ms. 
K.2321, BGR, vol.II, p.103.
(6) Lempriere, Voyage, pp.84-85.
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tribal members. Tribes or tribal confederations could 
emerge or vanish, expand or shrink, depending on their 
internal evolution (co-existence among various segments) 
or on external action of neighbouring tribes or the 
Makhzen.
Tribal reality in Morocco was too complex to be 
accounted for by a single definition. Tribal organiza­
tion depended on whether the tribe was Arab or Berber , 
nomadic or sedentary, Jaysh (exempted from taxation in 
return for military service) or nayba (paying taxes).If 
in zones of sedentary life the tribe was reduced to its 
politico-military aspect, in areas of nomadism or trans- 
humance, on the other hand, it constituted not only a 
political reference and a defensive structure, but also 
a basic unit of economic production.
In zones of sedentary life, such as the Rif and the 
western High Atlas, the tribe maintained itself in spite 
of a number of factors which, in principle, excluded 
tribal organization. In these areas the tribe did not 
constitute a framework for social production since it 
was the family or the douar (village) which served as the 
basic economic unit. The tribe also continued to survive 
despite the development of private property which en­
couraged the emergence of familial exploitation of land. 
The nomadic or transhumant tribe, on the contrary, was a 
much more compact structure, its members being more 
dependent on each other for physical and economic sur­
vival. Unlike the sedentary tribe, it continued to serve 
not only as a defensive tool against outside danger, but 
also as an indispensable framework of economic production, 
the tribe having to move collectively from one pasture to 
another.
The existence of the tribe seems to have accommoda­
ted both the tribesmen and the central government. For the 
tribesmen, tribal structure offered the only possible
form of social organization, if not for economic reasons 
at least for defensive ones. In a fluid and insecure 
society in which the Makhzen never succeeded in establish­
ing a durable presence, the tribe offered the only re­
assuring structure. The Makhzen on the other hand, could 
not conceive of another form of political and administra­
tive organization within which the individual could be 
made accountable for taxes and military service. Far 
from weakening tribal structure, the Makhzen seems to 
have always encouraged it, not only for administrative 
purposes, but for politico-military considerations as 
well. The tribe constituted for the Makhzen an essential 
element for the preservation of the internal status quo 
and it constantly played off one tribe against another. 
Tribalism was maintained as a means of maintaining the 
Makhzen's authority over territories it would not have 
otherwise controlled without a reliable army and an 
efficient bureaucratic system. Thus the Makhzen enhanced 
the politico-military aspect of tribal organization which 
acquired more importance than other economic and social 
forms.
Another aspect of tribal reality was its mutability. 
Tribes and confederations were made and unmade for the 
purpose of self-preservation or in response to pressure 
exercised by another tribe or by the Makhzen. When 
during the early nineteenth century the Alt Idrassen was 
dismantled by the action of its neighbburs and that of 
the Makhzen, its segments (Alt Youssi, Ait Ayache, Ait 
Ouafella) became autonomous or completely dispersed, be­
coming segments of yet another structure (7). A tribe 
usually remained within a confederation only as long as 
it needed a defensive cover or was forced to do so by a 
dominant tribe. Makhzen politics were also responsible 
for the constitution and dislocation of tribal entities.
(7) Cf. fAbd al-Rahman al-Fasi, al-Uqnum, Ms.K. 15, BGR, p.525; Lt.de 
la Chapelle,''Le sultan Maul ay Ismail et les berbSres Sanhaja 
du Maroc^ in Archives Marocaines, XVIII, 1931, p. 30.
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Jaysh tribes, such as the Cheraga, Oudaya, or the 
Cherarda, were a pure creation of the central govern­
ment. The Ait Idrassen largely owed their influence 
to the (Alawid sultans who had encouraged some tribes 
(the Ait Immour and the Mejjate in particular)to join 
the confederation (8).
Tribes, therefore, were never closed communities 
or "circles which never cut across each other11, to use 
Gellner's term (9).The rural physiognomy was subject 
to perpetual change. We have already seen how the 
Makhzen contributed to the reshaping of the tribal 
structure, but there were other causes as well. Natural 
calamities, political crises, inter-tribal and intra- 
tribal conflicts, the infiltration of populations from 
the Saharan periphery in a perpetual movement towards 
the north-western plains, constituted important factors 
behind the dynamism of the tribal reality.
(2) Tribal_Mobility
Tribal mobility was first reflected in the nomadic and 
transhumant mode of life. North of the Atlas mountains, 
seasonal tribal mobility was limited to a restricted 
area. Tribal movements were generally governed by a 
customary agreement between the various tribes inhabiting 
a certain region. The Beni Mguild, for instance, spent 
the summer in the highlands of the Middle Atlas and 
descended at the beginning of the autumn to the plateaux
(8) Al-ZayanT, al-Rawda, fol.114; al-Nasirf, VIII, pp. 13,50. If the
Mejjate were integrated into the Alt Idrassen, the Ait Irrmour, on 
the contrary, always remained autonomous. n
(9) E. Gellner,'vTribalism and Social Change in North Africa, in W.H. 
Lewis, ed.,French Speaking Africa, New York, 1965, p.108. The 
segmentary model proposed by E.Gellner would at best provide a 
framework for the understanding of the tribal reality in what the 
author calls "the outer circle". Segmentarity weakens as we draw 
near to the centers of authority and urban civilization. Actual­
ly, universalist elements (Islam, religious orders, Makhzen 
politics) were always present even among the most remote tribes.
Far from providing a dynamic explanation of the North African 
social reality, the segmentary theory disregards the historical
dimension by presenting a static model for tribalism.
of the western Middle Atlas which, during the summer, 
were occupied by the Zemmour, Guerouane and Beni Mtir
(10). These contracted to fill lands situated further 
to the north or to the west, thus entering into contact 
with the transhumant Arab tribes of the Beni Hsen and 
Zaer. The whole process was reversed during the summer 
season when there was a general retreat towards the 
more favourable pastures of the highlands.
This seasonal mobility in quest for more favourable 
grazing lands was but one aspect of a long term tribal 
movement which concerned the whole area extending 
between the Ziz and upper Moulouya valleys and the 
Azghar— the north-western Atlantic plains. Indeed, one 
of the basic trends of Moroccan history has been the 
perpetual movement of populations from the desertic 
fringes to the more inviting lands north of the Atlas 
mountains. The low altitude of the Middle Atlas and 
the absence of sedentary populations there facilitated 
a constant flow of Saharan or pre-Saharan tribes to the 
other side of the Atlas watershed.
Behind this northward movement there were many 
factors. The most important was certainly the under­
population of the Atlantic plains. The demographic 
losses occasioned by famines and epidemics created a 
vacuum which was filled by outsiders. The phenomenon 
seems to have been acceleratated during the latter part of the 
Merinid dynasty (1258-1465) as a result of the ravages of the 
Black Death which carried away nearly two thirds of the 
Moroccan population (11) . This epidemic caused, accord­
ing to Moroccan sources, the depopulation of the coastal 
plains and facilitated the Iberian assault on the coastal 
towns (12). The implantation of the Zenata tribes
\
(10) W.B.Harris, The Nanadic Berbers of Central Morocco, in Tie 
Geographic Journal, 6, vol.IX, June 1897, p.639.
(11) Brignon et al., Histoire du Maroc, p. 153.
(12) Muhanrnai b. cAbd Allah al-Qaiiri, al-Tuhfa al-qadiriya, II, 
pp.415-416.
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(Chaouia) in the Atlantic plains dated, according tocAbd 
al-Salam b. al-Khayyat al-QadirT, from this period (13). 
During the same period, and most probably as a result of 
the same epidemic, the Saharan Arabs of the Beni Hsen 
who used to reside in the Sijilmassa and the Dra valley, 
made their first appearance in the Tadla (14). From the 
fifteenth century on, the Beni Hsen pursued t;heir slow 
progress to the north until they reached the Atlantic 
coast.
Severe famines led to important changes in the 
tribal map of the country. The famines of 1661-1662, 
on which we are well informed owing to ^Abd Allah al- I 
cAyyashr (d.c.1724 AD) (15), led to the northward migra­
tion of many ‘Saharan tribes. The Guerouane and Alt 
Immour made their first crossing to the depopulated Tadla 
in 1661, while the Alt Haddidou, another Saharan tribe, 
moved to the Moulouya valley (16). This famine also 
seems to have greatly weakened the northern part of the 
country and paved the way for the ^ Alawid takeover of the 
Azghar.
Another factor which contributed to the emigration 
of Saharan tribes may have been the progressive deserti­
fication of the Saharan fringes. Studies made by A.g .P. 
Martin on the Saharan oases of the Touat suggest that 
the volume of subterranean waters declined considerably 
after the fourteenth century (17). During the eighteenth 
century alone the taxable volume of water decreased from 
200,000 fingers in 1708 to less than 20,000 fingers in 
1796 (18). The steady drying up of the Sahara must be 
therefore, taken into account when considering the migra­
tions by Saharan tribes.
(13) Ibid.
(14) Ibn al- Acraj al-SulaymanX, Zubdat al-tarikh wa zahrat al- 
^amarlkh, Ms. D 3657f BGR, vol. I, pp. 451-452.
(15) cAbd Allah al-cAyyashT, al-Ifrya3 wa al-inticgsh, Ms. D.1433, BGR.
(16) Ibid, pp.251-252.
(17) A.G.P. Martin, Quatre sidcles d'histoire marocaine, Paris, 1923, 
p. 107.
(18) ibid.
Political factors were at least as important as the 
climatic ones in determining the tribal map of Morocco. 
Various dynasties proceeded to the transfer of tribes 
from one place to another for various political reasons.
The Almohad Yacqub al-Mansur (d.1199) transferred a 
number of Macqil Arab tribes from the Eastern Maghrib to 
the Atlantic plains. The sparsity of population in the 
western coastal plains of Morocco allowed easy resettle­
ment of the Sefiane, Khlott and Riyah tribes there (19). 
The Merinids carried out other tribal transfers. The 
most important of these was the transfer of Sefiane from 
the Tamesna to the Gharb (20). They also encouraged the 
Beni Hsen to leave their Saharan abodes in the Ziz valley 
when they entrusted them with a peace keeping task among 
the Atlas Berbers in return for the right to collect 
taxes over a wide region extending from Sijilmassa to 
the Tadla (21). The Sacadian andcAlawid dynasties, both 
of Saharan origin, relied on the Saharan Arab Macqil to 
subdue the northern provinces and, subsequently, to build 
their Jaysh. The Jaysh tribes stationed around Marrakech 
and Fes were transferred from the Sahara by the Sacadian 
Ahmad al-Mansur and later on by Mawlay IsmacII (22).
ThecAlawid sultans were particularly instrumental in 
facilitating the descent of the Fazaz Berbers (23)to the 
lowlands adjacent to the north western slopes of the 
Middle Atlas. Even if Mawlay IsmacIl succeeded in contain­
ing the northward flow of the Fazaz Berbers by building 
numerous forts around the Atlas mountains, his successors 
proved to be unable to prevent their irresistible advance 
The death of Mawlay Ismacil and the ensuing political in­
stability led to the breakdown of the status quo in the
(19) Muhanmad al- cAyyashi, Zahr al-bustan, Ms.D.2152, BGR, p.42.
(20) Ibid., p.20.
(21) ibn al-Acraj al-Sulaymanf, Zubdat,!, PP.451-452.
(22) Ahmad b. Khalid al-Na§irl, al-Istiqs5 li akhbar duwal al-Maghrib 
al-aqga, Casablanca, vol. VII, pp. 50-51.
(23) The term "Fazaz" used to be applied to the north-western part 
of the Middle Atlas or the territory laying south of Meknds 
and Fds extending between the upper courses of the Sebou and 
Oum er-Rbia rivers.
Fazaz and the acceleration of the northward trend of 
migration. The Guerouane who were residing in the Ziz 
valley at the end of the seventeenth century (24) made 
their appearance north of the Atlas mountains only ten 
years after Mawlay IsmacIl died (25). The Alt Immour 
who were maintained by Mawlay Ismacfl in the Moulouya 
valley burst into the Tadla after they were driven out 
by the Ait Oumalou (26). Being unable to control the 
advance of the Berber tribes into the Azghar, Mawlay 
Ismacil's successors increasingly made use of their 
military potential. Indeed, without the decisive back^- 
ing of the Ait Idrassen, Mawlay cAbd Allah (1729-1757) 
would have been unable to maintain himself in power(27). 
Sidl Muhammad b.cAbd Allah continued to rely on the 
Alt Idrassen, his father's allies (28). Upon his acces­
sion to the throne in 1757 he invited them to settle 
near Meknes. In 17 65 he transferred the Ait Immour to 
the Gharb and induced them to join the Ait Idrassen 
confederation which he hoped to use as a buffer against 
the troublesome Ait Oumalou. During the early 1780's he 
carried out further tribal adjustments. Thus, he trans­
ferred the Tekna, Mejjate and Dou Blal from the Haouz 
of Marrakech to the vicinity of Fes (29). He also 
brought back the Guerouane to the Fazaz and a fraction 
of the Ait Immour to the Tadla (30).
By the end of the eighteenth century, the lowland 
Berbers (31) on the northwestern slopes of the Middle 
Atlas formed an important strategic ally of the Makhzen.
(24) Al-Na?irl, VII, p.87.
(25) Muhammad b.al-Tayyib al-Qadiri, Hawliyat nashr al-mathani,
N. Cigar, ed., Rabat, 1978, p.46.
(26) Ahmad b.al-Haj (al-Salml), al-Durr al-muntakhab, Ms.Z.1875, R.L.
VIII, pp.197-198.
(27) Al-Nasiri, VII, pp.136, 163.
(28) Al-Na?irf, VIII, p. 13.
(29) Akansus, al-Jaysh, Ms.D.339, BGR, p.239; al-Nasirl, VIII, p.50.
(30) Al-Nasirl, VIII, p.50.
(31) Lowland Berbers (barabir lufa) included: Alt Idrassen, Zemmour, 
Guerouane and Ait Hakem. In Makhzen terminology, they were also 
referred to as Barabir al-dawla (State berbers) or Barabir al-taca 
(loyal Berbers). ~---
"The Beni Mtir, Ait Idrassen, Guerouane, Zemmour, Ait 
Immour and Ait Hakem", wrote al-Zayanl, "are State 
Berbers falling under the Makhzen1s might. These 
Berbers have been subjected for a long time to the 
oppression of the Ait Oumalou. Every year these used 
to invade their lands during seasonal migrations and 
progressively drove them away until they occupied almost 
all their territories" (32) .
B- The Urban World
French colonial literature has long upheld the view that 
there was a complete rupture between the countryside and 
the towns (33). Towns were seen as isolated fortresses 
premanently besieged by hostile tribesmen. However, 
recent studies tend to invalidate this view (34).
Despite the recurrent upheavals by tribesmen, the 
towns and the countryside never ceased to depend on each 
other. The prosperity of townspeople was intimately 
linked to that of the peasant. Towns constituted a 
permanent market where the peasant sold his agricultural 
produce and procured all kinds of commodities, whether 
locally made or imported. In the coastal towns export 
trade consisted mainly of the produce of the land. Any 
crop failures in the countryside led not only to a rise 
of food prices within the towns,but threatened to para­
lyse all economic activity. Since the peasant was an 
important customer of the urban artisan and merchant, a 
fall in his purchasing power was immediately felt by the 
urban economy.
Towns were also the seat of government. Many pro­
vincial qa3id-s or governors resided in towns from which
(32) Al-Zayani, al-Turjurnaha al-kubra, Rabat, 1967, p.75.
(33) Cf. for instance E. Michaux-Bellaire in Villes et Tribus du Maroc,
II, p.57.
(34) k . Brcwn, People of Sale, Manchester, 1976; M. Mezzine, Fes and its 
hinterland frcm 1549 to 1637, thesis for the DiplCme d'Etudes 
Superieures, Faculte des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines, Rabat. 
1979.
they ran the affairs of the neighbouring tribes. Thus 
Mawlay Sulayman's governor for Rabat and Sale also had 
under his command the neighbouring tribes of Zaer, Beni 
Hsen and cArab al-Widyan (35). Other examples included 
the governor of Essaouira who also commanded the 
neighbouring Chiadma, and the governor of Tetouan whose 
admininstrative prerogatives extended to the northern 
Jbala tribes. From the judicial point of view tribes­
men often fell under the jurisdiction of the town's gadi. 
The legal opinion of urban c alim-s was constantly 
solicited by tribesmen who contested the verdict of 
local judicial authorities.
The cultural influence of towns usually extended 
to areas far beyond the city walls. Fes, Tetouan and 
Marrakech were the seats of an intensive learning and 
sheltered an important proportion of rural students 
(afagiyun). Even minor towns such as Ouezzane, Boujad 
and Ksar el-Kebir used to serve as important centers of 
learning whose fruits were reaped mainly by the adjacent 
countryside. These towns were also the seat of religi­
ous orders which recruited their adepts among the rural 
population. On the other hand, rural zawiya-s and 
religious orders (the Darqawiya,for instance)had many 
disciples among the urban population and possessed im­
portant sites within the city walls.
Town and country were finally bound together by 
property relationships. Wealthy townsmen owned estates 
in the neighbouring country and entrusted their exploi­
tation to peasant sharecroppers. Reciprocally, many 
influential tribal notables owned houses in towns.Mawlay 
Sulayman's qaDid for the Chaouia, al-Ghazi, possessed 
important property in Rabat (36), while the qa3id of 
Beni Hsen, Abu cAzza al-Qustall, had a house in Sale (37) .
(35) cArab al-Widyan included the tribes of the Rabat-Said hinterland,
namely §abhah Arabs, the Dughma, the Sehoul and Hossain.
(36) Al-Du<ayf, p.514.
(37) Ibid., p.327.
Towns were traditionally distinguished as hadariya 
(seats of Islamic culture and civilization) and Makhzen 
towns (seats of government and garrisons). The first 
category included Fes, Tetouan, Rabat and Sale— towns 
which contained an important Andalusian colony as a 
result of the Christian reconquista of Spain. Within 
their walls they sheltered wealthy and refined merchants 
and scholars, as well as ingenious craftsmen. Makhzen 
towns, on the other hand, provided residence for the 
sultan and his military governors .and contained garrisons 
and storehouses. Sometimes, as used to be the case for 
some coastal towns (Tangier, Larache and Essaouira), most 
of the inhabitants were attached to the Makhzen.
The prosperity of a coastal town was intimately 
linked to the expansion or decline of commerce. The 
decline of export trade to Europe after 1800 greatly 
affected the coastal towns. "These ports", noted Jackson 
in 1809, "had but a limited commerce with foreign 
nations and were consequently neither very extensive nor 
populousn (38). They served mainly as garrison towns 
after Mawlay Sulayman closed many ports to trade follow­
ing the country's pacification in 1798. Some coastal 
towns, such as Tangier and Larache, were mainly inhabited 
by soldiers and seamen (39). Others, such as Sale,
Rabat and Essaouira, had importantcAbId garrisons and, 
with the exception of the latter, maintained negligi­
ble trade relations with the outside world.
Some inland towns were also on the decline at the 
turn of the nineteenth century. Marrakech was parti­
cularly affected by the diversion of southern trade to 
the port of Essaouira during the second half of the 
eighteenth century. Already in 1790-1791 Lempriere noted
(38) J.G. Jackson, An Account of the Eftpire, p.29.
(39) J. Buffa, Travels, pp.48-50.
that many of its houses were in ruin (40). Many years 
later, Jackson gave a similar description, stating that 
the town was "mostly filled with ruins of houses which 
had gone to decay"(41). At about the same time, al- 
Ducayf noted that trade was stagnating and many merchants 
from Marrakech had become bankrupt (42). The demo­
graphic losses of the Great Plague (1799-1800) were part­
ly responsible for this decline. Further to the north, 
Meknes seems to have shared the fate of Marrakech. To 
the British ambassador William A'Court "it had the 
appearance of a heap of ruins rather than of an inhabited 
city"(43).
Fes and Tetouan, on the other hand, seem to have en­
joyed an unprecedented period of economic prosperity.
Mathieu de Lesseps reported in 1794 that "Fes was the 
most populous, industrious , and enlightened as well as 
the wealthiest and the most civilized city in 'Morocco"
(44). Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Fes 
was undergoing considerable extension. A letter by 
Mawlay Sulayman to the people of Fes makes it clear that 
by 1797 building activity in the city had spread to 
hitherto uninhabited zones (45). The Great Plague must 
have affected this expansion but economic activity seems 
to have quickly recovered owing to the fiscal advantages 
granted by Mawlay Sulayman (46). According to the author 
of al-Ibtisam, never were the Fasi merchants more prospe­
rous than during the reign of Mawlay Sulayman (47).
(40) W.Lenpriere, Voyage, p.85; J.Caille, Mathieu de Lesseps au Maroc, 
in Hesperis-Tamuda, vol.II, 1961, p.287.
(41) J.G. Jackson, An Account of the Bnpire, p. 63.
(42) Al-Ducayf, pp.439-440.
(43) C.0.2/4, Meknes, 20 Aug., 1813. )(
(44) J.Caille,'1 Mathieu de Lesseps au Maroc, Hesperis-Tamuda, vol.II,
1961, p.288.
(45) Cf .letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to the people of Fes, dated 16 Hijja 
1211/12 June, 1797 in Ms.D.194, BGR, p.56.
(46) Among these advantages were the abolition of non-Quranic taxes, 
the reduction of import duties for Muslim merchants and the reduc­
tion of the military burden of maintaining the rumat (urban militia)
(47) Al-Ibtisam, p.67.
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Tetouan had common interests with Fes. It was the 
latter's outlet to the sea through which passed a major 
proportion of its trade with Europe. Tetouan had many 
merchants who maintained commercial relations with 
European and Mediterranean countries (48). Both Fes and 
Tetouan seem to have benefited from the decline of the 
Atlantic trade. Indeed, Fes had become "the greatest 
emporium of commerce with the interior parts of Africa"
(49) and Tetouan tended to serve as the northern outlet 
for that commerce as well.
C- Social Categories
In broad terms, the Moroccan society was divided into 
two main categories : the khassa, or elite, and the 
camma, or the common people. The khassa included the 
sharif-s, or those who claim descent form the Prophet, 
calim-s, or religious scholars, notables, Makhzen 
officials and wealthy merchants. The Q m m a , on the 
other hand, included the mass of the people: peasants, 
artisans, shopkeepers, itinerant traders and urban work­
ers—  all those whose opinion was never consulted in 
political matters and who, according to Mawlay Sulayman, 
"should rather count among the dead than among the living"
(50) .
(1) The_Kha5§>a
Texts of the bayCa (declaration of allegiance to the new­
ly appointed sultan) generally enumerated the main compo­
nents of the kha??a,or elite. In such documents, they
(48) A Tetouani merchant, such as fAbd al-Karim b.al-Talib, maintained 
canmercial relations with the Turkish regencies; cf .CC3C,vol.25,
1 Sept., 1817. Other Tetouani merchants who had ccnrnercial re­
lations with Europe included CA1F al-Bahy, Muhairmad al-Brubi and 
al-^Attar brothers.
(49) A. Brooks, Sketches in Spain and Morocco, London, 1931, vol.I,p.212.
(50) Cf. extracts from a khutba by Mawl5y Sulayman in al-Mashrafl,
Shari) al-shamaqmaqiyya, Ms.G 629, BGR, unpaginated.
were referred to as ahl al-hall wa al-^aqd, that is 
"the people of tying and untying". Their presence and 
opinion was required every time that the Islamic commu­
nity was confronted with an important political decision. 
There is no doubt that the hadariya towns, being the 
seats of Islamic civilization, harboured a greater pro­
portion of this elite and were, therefore, entitled to 
play a much more important role in the shaping of the 
country's destiny.
In a traditional Islamic society, religion played 
a major role in determining the nature of social 
differentiation. Sharlf-s claimed prominence over all 
other segments in society because they belonged to the 
holy lineage of the Prophet.
Sharif-s were respected and venerated by virtue of 
their nobility of blood and their — real or supposed—  
possession of a particular power of blessing (baraka). 
They were often called upon by lay people to settle dis­
putes and act as mediators in conflicts. The sultan, 
although a sharlf himself, did not hesitate to appeal to 
them for mediation.
The Calim-s also derived their influence from 
religion since they were considered to be the guardians 
of the holy law (sharT^a) and the spiritual inheritors 
of the Prophet. The acquisition of the holy sciences 
(al-cilm al-sharlf) was a substitute for the holy line­
age and ensured for its holder a prominent position in 
society. The Calim-s were the main referees in all im­
portant issues. Among "the people of tying and untying" 
they held a key position, and no bayca could ever take 
place without their participation.
Their social importance was further increased by the 
exercise of a wide range of judicial,educational and 
religious functions (judges, notaries, market provosts,
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administrators of pious endowments, preachers, prayer 
leaders, etc). However, calim-s did not constitute a 
social class nor did they represent specific interests. 
Their loyalty could very well be a function of their 
sharifian origin or their belonging to a particular 
religious order.
Religious groups and zawiya-s represented another 
socio-religious group the leader of which acquired a 
considerable influence in society. The importance of 
these religious orders was based on the moral authority 
of their shaykh-s (leaders) and the thousands of adepts 
that were to be found in every part of the country and 
at every level of the social organization. Their influ­
ence was not limited to the religious field. Sufi 
shaykh-s acted as arbiters in settling conflicts and 
their zawiya-s (lodges) served as shelters for the per­
secuted. They also extended their protection to travel­
lers and trade caravans which otherwise would be exposed 
to plunder, particularly in zones of weak Makhzen authori­
ty. By the turn of the nineteenth century, some religi­
ous orders had become so influential that their shaykh-s 
intervened openly in dynastic conflicts.
Besides religion, hereditary leadership provided an 
important means of social prominence. Some families,both 
rural and urban, acquired high social status by virtue 
of their service to the Makhzen or their military and 
political prowess within their own group. This often 
became hereditary. Thus, the Ibn*Abd al-Sadaq of north­
ern Morocco provided qa3id-s for the Jbala region for 
many generations under the^Alawid dynasty. The ^Ash^ash 
family of Tdtouan, though less prestigious than the for­
mer, provides another example. In Fes, such a hereditary 
nobility was mainly monopolized by the Andalusian families 
which supplied the greatest proportion of military and 
political leaders there.
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The social standing of this nobility (aCyan) was 
largely based on its military achievement. A group such 
as the Fasi Andalusians was distinguished less by its 
wealth or learning than by its ability to provide milita­
ry leadership during periods of political uncertainty . 
This role was best illustrated in the Fes rebellion of 
1820-1822 during which these influential families provi­
ded the leadership of the urban militia (rumat) (51).
Makhzen officials constituted another element of the 
khassa. Their social standing depended above all on the 
power conferred upon them by the sultan. Among them we 
find the sultan's ministers and katib-s, governors, 
ga3id-s, and army officers. They were not always chosen 
from among peple of wealth or noble descent. They were 
merely individuals who had proved their proficiency in 
their field and manifested enough literary skill or 
administrative know-how to attract the attention of the 
sultan (52). These individuals were highly influential 
and were often used as channels to reach the sultan's ear.
Finally, wealth was another means which allowed its 
holder to figure among the khassa. However, even if 
people of wealth counted among the wujaha3 (notables), 
they were not necessarily politically influential. Wealth 
conferred a high social standing but did not confer 
power which was the apanage of the Makhzen and its offici­
als. Indeed, recent studies on the social history of Fes 
(53) show that merchants as a social group never played 
any outstanding political role in society because politi­
cal power tended to be concentrated in the elite of the 
various "natural groupings" (sharlf-s, Bildiyyin, Andalus­
ians , etc...).
(51) Cf. chapter VII below,pp. 385-390.
(52) Cf. the case of A£imad al-Qus^ ali, Mawlay Sulayman's secretary, in 
Bujandar, al-Ightiba^, I, pp.42-49.
(53) N. Cigar, Socio-economic Structures and the Development of an 
Urban Bourgeoisie in Pre-colonial Morocco, 1980, typescript, 
(forthcoming in The Maghreb Review), pp.~9-10.
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Two reasons might explain the political insigni­
ficance of merchants in Moroccan society prior to 1830. 
First, there was the predominance of vertical loyalties 
according to which merchants tended to identify prima­
rily with their ethnic community and only secondarily with 
their interest groups. Secondly, there was the absence 
of an effective internal organization among merchants 
designed to further their commercial and political 
interests. This induced them to seek individual ways of 
promotion rather than collective ones. The most common 
way was to look for Makhzen protection either by accept­
ing governmental responsibilities (amln-s, customs 
collectors, qIPid-s), or by entering into commercial 
association with the sultan and thus, serve as his 
commercial agents. The most outstanding merchants of 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries had 
all, in one way or another, served the Makhzen (54). 
Mawlay Sulayman himself underlined this reality when he 
noted that merchants were above all faithful to their 
commercial interests and would readily accept government 
responsibility since it allowed them to further these 
interests (55).
(2) The_fAmma
The Jamma, or commoners, included all those who did not 
belong to the elite of the community: peasants, craftsmen, 
shopkeepers and workers.
In the countryside, the social map was to a large 
extent simplified by the predominance of the agricultural 
mode of production. With the exception of a minority of
(54) Among these we find al-Talib b. Jallun, cAbd al-Karlm b.al-Talib, 
Muhamnad Bejja, Muhamnad al-§affar and the Sf fra brothers of Fes.
(55) Letter frart Mawlay Sulayman to the people of Fes (1820) , in 
Akansus, pp.320-322.
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of tribal notables, the overwhelming majority of peasants 
were small landowners, who owned just enough land to 
sustain their families. Most of the time these peasants 
found it more, or at least equally, profitable to hire 
their labour out as khammas (a sharecropper for the fifth 
of the crop) rather than to cultivate their own parcels 
of land. In an agriculturally based economy, the peasant 
endured the main burden of taxation, particularly under 
the Quranic taxation system adopted by Mawlay Sulayman.
They also provided armed contingents to fight alongside 
the Makhzen army. The rural <-amma, however, had no place 
on the political scene and lived on the margin of society.
The urban ^amma was more diversified. Some segments 
of it could also play a more important role. It inclu­
ded petty officials, craftsmen, shopkeepers, peddlers 
and labourers. The first three categories constituted 
what can be called the middle rank which separated the 
khasga from the lower rank consisting of peddlers and 
labourers. While the middle strata enjoyed an urban style 
of life, the rabble on the other hand lived on the margin 
of urban civilization and represented, by virtue of their 
predominently rural origin, an extension of the country­
side into the town.
Craftsmen were, numerically, the most important seg­
ment of urban society. Artisanry is supposed to have pro­
vided the livelihood of more than half of all townspeople 
(56). Not all crafts were equally valued however.
The other important urban category of the (amma was 
formed by shopkeepers (ahl al-hawanft)and the itinerant 
traders (al-suwwaga). Because of the modest sources of 
capital at their disposal, the material condition of these
(56) K. Brown, People of Sale, p.129.
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merchants did not differ much from that of artisans.
Many of them specialized in the sale of artisanal 
products such as shoes and cloth. Some of them chose to 
move about the weekly country markets instead of waiting 
for the peasant customer to visit town.
Of all urban social categories, craftsmen and retail 
traders were the most inclined towards some form of 
social organization. The fact that artisans and traders 
belonging to the same occupation were usually located in 
the same place induced them to a certain type of corpora­
tive organization which was illustrated by the existence 
of hanf:a-s (guilds) .
The urban camma of the hadariya towns supplied the 
main body of the urban militia (rumat). Together with 
the city's tubjiya (artillerymen), this militia played 
an important role in the defence of the town in time of 
political instability. However, the military leadership 
of this urban force belonged to the local notables. 
Prestigious urban families, such as the Fasi Andalusians, 
usually provided leaders to officer the military force 
constituted by the ^amma.
(3) The_Jewish_Community
The Jewish minority constituted in many ways a society 
apart. Jews enjoyed freedom of worship but were tied
down to a special dhimma status. According to this status 
they were compelled to wear a distinctive costume and pay 
the capitation tax (al-jizya) which was intended to serve 
as a constant reminder of their degraded situation as long 
as they refused to embrace the Islamic religion.
The fact that Jews were forbidden to own land obliged 
most of them to live in towns where they were employed in 
artisanry and trade. However, some Jewish rural communi­
ties continued to live in the most remote places such as
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Wadi Noun, the Dra valley and Tafilelt (57). Their 
total number was estimated in 1806 at more than 100,000 
(58) .
If the great majority were employed as artisans, 
small shopkeepers and itinerant traders, many were big 
merchants who resided in the ports and conducted large- 
scale trade with European countries. While they found 
it difficult to engage in the eastern or southern caravan 
trade, they could always act as bankers by lending money 
to Muslim merchants who traded with the Sudan (59) . They 
also engaged in commercial associations with wealthy 
Muslim merchants and served as commercial agents for the 
sultan himself.
During the second half of the eighteenth century, 
Jewish merchants acquired a great importance by virtue 
of the encouragement given to maritime trade by Sidf 
Muhammad b. cAbd Allah. Many Jewish families emigrated 
from all parts of the country to settle in the newly 
founded port of Essaouira. SldT Muhammad entrusted Jew­
ish merchants with Makhzen monopolies over some products 
(60) and used them on political missions abroad (61).
"The condition of the Jews improved throughout the 
country"(62).
Under his successor, however, the Jewish community 
was exposed to the most severe hardships it had experi­
enced for many centuries. Mawlcly al-Yazid (1790-1792) 
allowed many Jewish quarters to be plundered and persecu­
ted many of those who had served his father. In fact, 
the persecution of Jews by Mawlay al-Yazid should be 
seen as a violent reaction against the Jewish ascendancy
(57) R. Caille, Journal d'un voyage a Tiirbuctoo et a Jenne dans 
l'Afrique centrale,Paris, 1965, vol. Ill, p.88.
(58) J. Buffa, Travels, p.183.
(59) R. Caille, Journal d'un voyage, III,pp.88-89.
(60) Al-pu cayf mentioned that Sldi Muhammad entrusted the monopoly of 
cochineal at Fes to Jewish merchants; cf.p.168.
(61) Encyclopaedia Judaica, XII, art. "Morocco", column 338.
(62) Ibid.
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which resulted from SIdi Muhammad's commercial policy(63).
The advent of Mawlay Sulayman in 179 2 came as "a 
certain delivrance" for the Jewish community (64). He 
resumed his father's policy by entrusting his commercial 
transactions to some wealthy Jews of Essaouira such as 
the Macnin-s and the Guidalla-s. He was even accused of 
partiality towards his Jewish subjects by European 
merchants((65). Indeed, during the early nineteenth cent­
ury most of the Essaouira trade tended to be concentrated 
in Jewish hands after many European merchants left the 
country as a result of the two epidemics of the plague 
and Mawlay Sulayman's restrictions on maritime trade(66).
However, relations between the Muslim and Jewish 
communities of Morocco at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century did not always run smoothly. The fact that many 
Jews travelled to Europe meant that many of them adopted 
European dress, European names and even European nationa­
lities. Many Gibraltar Jews were in fact Moroccans who 
changed their nationality while maintaining commercial 
links with their country of origin. For the Muslim com­
munity this represented a violation of the dhimma status 
and exacerbated tension between the two sides. The rising 
fears of European intervention in Morocco by the turn of 
the nineteenth century only worsened the relations between 
the two communities. In the eyes of the Muslim population 
the Jews came to represent the agents of European interests 
and were, therefore, looked upon with much suspicion. Did 
not they serve as commercial associates of Christians in
(63) Mawl&y al-Yazid's persecution of the Jews was not an isolated case. 
In 1792 a certain adventurer in the Sous, Abu Ihlas, was particular­
ly resentful to the Jews whan he killed and burnt in the Sous and 
Wadi Noun. Cf .al-Samlall, Nuzhat al-jullas,, Ms.46,25, R.L., p. 15; 
al-Mukhtar al-Susi, al-Ma<sul, 1961, vol.V, pp.142-144. Cf.also F.O. 
52/10, 4 Feb.,1792.
(64) Encyclopaedia Judaica, XII, art. "Morocco", column 338 .
(65) F.O./$74/124 April, 1805; F.O.52/29, Report on the trade of 
Essaouira, dated 3 June, 1828.
(64) Encyclopaedia Judaica, XII, art. "Morocco", column 338.
(65) F.O. 174/12, 4 April, 1805 and F.O.52/29, Report on the Trade of 
Essaouira, dated 3 June, 1828.
(66) Cf. belcw chapter III, p. 162.
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the ports and as the medium through which European consuls 
and travellers discovered the hidden weaknesses (^ awra)of 
the Muslim community ? The author of al-Ibtisam did not 
fail to underline their damaging role during the French 
occupation of Egypt when they assisted Napoleon in the 
translation of the Quran and other Islamic works (67).
As a result of the increased resentment against Jews 
isolated incidents between individuals from the two com­
munities became more frequent. In 1804 the Jews of 
Essaouira asked Mawlay Sulayman to take some measures of 
protection on their behalf and he ordered the building 
of the first millah (Jewish quarter) of the town (68).In 
180 6 Mawlay Sulayman prohibited the wearing of European 
dress by his Jewish subjects (69) and ordered the 2,000 
Jews of Larache to leave the town (70). There was also 
the pressure exerted upon the Sultan by religious groups
which in 1807 made him issue an order to build millah-s*__
for Rabat, Sale, and Tetouan (71). At the end of 1815 
Mawlay Sulayman renewed his order to Jews to wear the 
traditional Moroccan dress and pay the capitation tax.
Those who refused under the pretext thay they fell under 
the protection of European countries were asked to leave 
the country (72). Mawlay Sulayman's attitude should not 
be seen, however, as a manifestation of religious in­
tolerance. Jewish merchants continued to serve as "the 
king's merchants" (tujjar al-sul^an) and customs receivers 
(73). Mawlay Sulayman also proved to be an energetic
(67) Al-Ibtisam, p.27.
(68) D. Corcos, Studies in the History of the Jews of Morocco, Jerusalem, 
1976, p.121.
(69) cf. petition by Jewish merchants of Gibraltar in F.O. 174/10, 13 Nov., 
1806.
(70) In 1806 Mawlay Sulayman ordered the Jews of Larache to leave the 
town after sane Jewish merchants had been involved in the sale of 
wine to local sailors; cf.J.Buffa, Travels,p.44, and F.O.174/284, 
letter frcm al-Salawi to J.Green, 4 Rajab, 1221/17 Sept.,1806, 
(appendix 24).
(71) Al-Ducayf, p.448; al-Ibtisdm, p. 12.
(72) F.0.52/17, 6 Jan., 1816; CCC, vol.24, 1 Feb., 1816.
(73) D. Corcos, Studies, p.117.
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defender of the Jewish community. When Fasi merchants
attempted to prevent Jews from selling slippers in the
markets of Old Fes he opposed this arbitrary action (74)*
After the Zalan defeat, Mawlay Sulayman entrusted
Jewish merchants with the task of buying arms for his
disorganized army (75) and in 1820, when the Oudaya
attacked the millah of Fes, he condemned their action*- 9
and summoned them to return the Jewish property they had 
plundered (7 6). Jewish merchants were still entrusted 
with Makhzen commercial transactions and in 1822 they 
were solicited to assist in the reopening of El-Jadida 
to European trade (77). By confining Jews within special 
quarters and preventing them from wearing the European 
dress Mawlay Sulayman was just making clear that the 
Muslim community was not prepared to accept any altera­
tion in the traditional status of the ahl al-dhimma (the 
protected people).
II - The Moroccan State (Makhzen)
The Moroccan State, known as the Makhzen, was similar in 
its structure to the great Muslim empires of the Middle 
East. It was headed by a sultan who was assisted by an 
army and a bureaucratic apparatus.
The sphere of the sultan's authority expanded or 
shrank depending on the strength or the weakness of the 
Makhzen's military forces. Many tribes acknowledged the 
sultan's authority and agreed to pay taxes. These were 
usually those contiguous to the urban centers of the 
western plains and constituted what came to be known as
(74) Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to the people of Fes, no date, in al- 
Zayani,Alfiyat al-suluk, Ms.K.224, BGR, p.210.
(75) CCC, vol.26, 18 July, 1819; and OCC., vol.27, 31 May, 1820.
(76) COC, vol. 27, letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to the people of Fes 
dated 2 Shawwal, 1235/13 July, 1820,asking the Oudaya to return 
Jewish property.
(77) D.A.R., letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to Beloniel, 3 Safar, 1238/
20 Oct., 1822.
bilad al-makhzen, or the land of government. Others, 
while still recognizing the religious authority of the 
sultan, refused to pay taxes when they felt secure 
enough from the Makhzen's military reprisals. They 
constituted "the land of dissidence", or bilad al-slba. 
However, between full-fledged acceptance of Makhzen rule 
and open dissidence there was a wide range of intermedi­
ate relations between the tribes and the sultan. Many 
distant tribes over which the Makhzen could never hope 
to establish lasting control kept a regular exchange of 
letters with the sultan, sent periodic delegations to 
renew their allegiance and even requested the appointment 
of Makhzen qa^id-s. Thus, the Touat population in 1800 
agreed to pay their legal taxes to the bayt al-mal 
(treasury) at a time when Mawlay Sulayman granted them 
local autonomy, preferring to entrust the administration 
of their territory to a local council of notables (78).
A- The Sultan
The sultan's powers extended to almost every aspect of 
the religious and political life of the country. His 
religious influence was derived from the fact that he 
was both the commander of the faithful (amir al-muminin) 
and a descendant of the Prophet. At the same time, he 
commanded the army, ran the administrative apparatus, 
regulated the country's finance and supervised relations 
with foreign nations. The sultan's prerogatives tended 
to be even more extensive in Mawlay Sulayman's case 
because of the modesty of the administrative apparatus.
(1) R§ligious_and_Temporal_Duties
The sultan filled many functions within the Moroccan 
State. First of all, he was the head of the Islamic 
community. His main duty in this respect lay in guarding
(78) Letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to the people of Touat, 28 Safar, 1215/ 
21 July, 1800,in El-Ouataig, I, 1976, pp.446-447.
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and enforcing the shari^a, or Islamic law, and the 
defence of his subjects' faith against heterodox devia­
tions .
This role of the sultan as the guardian of the 
sharica is best illustrated by the case of Mawlay Sulayman. 
Indeed, one of his major concerns was the defense of the 
faith and his constant endeavours to rid the religion from 
culpable alteration.
The enforcement of the shari^a represented another 
aspect of the sultan's religious duties. The sultan 
filled the function of the highest judicial authority by 
appointing judges (ga<jl-s) and chief-judges. At the same 
time, he acted as the supreme court of appeal. His role 
of guardian of the sharica was also reflected in his en­
deavours to ensure its supremacy over customary law (curf\ 
Makhzen attempts to subdue tribal areas of dissidence, 
particularly in the Berber zones, was partly motivated by 
the sultan's eagerness to ensure the supremacy of Islamic 
law over the "law of barbarousness" (al-jahiliya). Sub­
duing zones of dissidence was regarded by the sultan as a 
religious duty which differed in no way from the jihad 
against the enemies of Islam (79).
The defense of Islam against outside threats figured 
among the most sacred duties of the sultan. This was best 
illustrated by the necessity to keep alive the tradition 
of jihad against Christian nations which did not have peace 
treaties with .Morocco. By 1800, this obligation tended to 
become merely theoretical because of the naval superiori­
ty of European countries. Nevertheless, when Mawlay 
SulaymSn decided to liquidate the Moroccan navy in 1817, 
the religious groups did not fail to see in this measure
(79) In 1819, following the Zaian defeat, Mawlay Sulayman called on 
his subjects to take part in a holy war against the rebellious 
Berbers who were considered to be "more worthy of jihad than 
the infidel enemy". Cf. letter from Mawlay Sulayman tocAbd al- 
Rahman ^ Ash^ ash, dated 2 Muharran, 1235/ 21 Oct., 1819, in 
D.A.R.
73
an abandonment by the sultan of one of his essential 
duties. The sultan refused also to endorse peace treat­
ies the clauses of which were in contradiction with the 
sharica . This was particularly made clear by the in­
sistence by sultans upon the fact that the judgement of 
cases involving Muslim subjects and Christians should 
always be in conformity with the Islamic law (80) .
However, the most important of all sultan's duties 
was the maintenance of internal peace and security. In­
ternal peace was not only a worldly requirement, but a 
religious one as well. By ensuring internal security the 
sultan made it possible for the Muslim community to 
exercise its religious duties. At the same time, the 
sultan had to see to it that his subjects were secure both 
in their lives and their property. In return for this, he 
was given absolute power. As long as he was able to main­
tain order the sultan could not be questioned even if he 
proved to be arbitrary and unjust. Under the terms of the 
sharlca, as in the Hobbesian concept of the social contract, 
priority was given to order and security rather than 
justice. The worst of situations for an Islamic State was 
not an unjust political system but a situation of sedition 
(fitna) which rendered the exercise of religious duties 
impossible.
The sultan was also the head of the army and the 
Makhzen administration. He supervised the recruitment, the 
equipment and the training of the army and led all major 
expeditions in person. He appointed ministers, governors, 
and qePid-s and kept a regular correspondence with each 
of them. In addition to this, he controlled the economic 
activity by appointing amtn-s (tax collectors) and 
muhtasib-s,by striking the currency and fixing its value, 
and finally by regulating the flow of foreign trade. In 
fact, there was hardly any field that was free from sultan- 
ian intervention.
(80) Cf. for instance article VII of the Anglo-Morocean treaty signed 
in 1801, in F.O.52/27.
This does not mean that the powers of the sultan were 
unlimited. The bayca was already a limitation in itself. 
Its conditions could be particularly restrictive if the 
sultan was in a weak position at the time of his investi­
ture. The bayca of Mawlay Ibrahim b. al-Yazid in 1820 
and that of his brother Mawlay Sa^fd in 1821, both pro­
claimed during the Fes rebellion, are evidence of this fact
(81). The powers of the -sultan were also restricted by 
the sharlca and those who represented it, namely the 
calim-s. The sultan had to refer to the guardians of the 
Islamic law especially when he was confronted with import­
ant decisions. Mawlay Sulayman, being a religious scholar 
himself, was more inclined than any of hiscAlawid predeces­
sors to abide by the sharlca . On crucial issues such as 
the sale of victuals and strategic materials to Christians 
or the attitude to be adopted towards the Wahhabi doctrine, 
the opinion of the cglim-s was always sought (82). These 
could also ask the sultan to implement a legal opinion 
(fatwa)they had pronounced independently of any request by 
the sultan. In 1799 for instance, the calim-s were of 
opinion that the country was in danger of a European inva­
sion and that the Makhzen had to allow the sale of milita­
ry equipment to his subjects who were to be put in a state 
of readiness to defend the land of Islam. Mawlay Sulayman 
could not oppose this fatwa despite the regrettable conse­
quences that such a decision was bound to have on internal 
order. In practice, therefore, the powers of the sultan 
were not as absolute and unlimited as they were usually 
depicted by European observers.
(81) Cf. texts of the two bayca-s in Dawud, III, pp. 250 and 264.
(82) In 1794 Mawlay SulaymSn requested the religious opinion of al- 
Tawdib. Suda regarding the sale of wheat to the Christians; 
cf. his letter in Mic. 3/HFMD, Fes , 1978. Later on, he con­
sulted the Calim-s concerning the sale of horses to Spain; cf. 
al-Mahdi al-Wazzanl, al-Nawazil al-jadlda, III, pp.35-36. For 
his consultation on the Wahhabi doctrine cf. chapter V below.
(2) MawlaY_SulaYman__( 1766 -1822)
The text of the bayca drafted at Fes in March 1792 
depicted the basic traits of Mawlay Sulayman's character: 
nobility, devotion, gentleness and clemency. The bayca 
also stressed his piety and his "assiduous study of the 
noble science"(83). Foreign observers underlined the same 
features of his character. Matra described him in 1792 
as "a respectable young man (...) but timid and unambiti­
ous, totally in the hands of the priests (calim-s)"(84). 
Other contemporary European officials were unanimous about 
his "mild and humane character"(85).
Mawlay Sulayman was born in the Tafilelt in 1766. His 
father Sidi Muhammad took a special interest in the 
religious education of his young sons after he had been 
disappointed with the behaviour of the elder ones, and 
particularly Mawlay al-Yazid. After he had memorized the 
Quran in a zawiya in Ahmar near Safi and studied the 
Prophet's biography at Ksar el-Kebir (86), Mawlay Sulayman 
was sent to the Tafilelt in 1783, together with two of 
his brothers. There, each one of them was placed in a 
separate fortress and given a private tutor. Abu al-Qasim 
al-Zayani, one of the highly trusted servants of Sfdf 
Muhammad, was purposely appointed governor of the Tafilelt 
in order to supervise the education of Mawlay Sulayman and 
his brothers. During his stay in the Tafilelt, Mawlay 
Sulayman had some of the most outstanding Calim-s of Fes 
for teachers: cAbd al-Qadir b. Shaqrun, Muhammad a. al- 
Tahar al-Hawwarf, Muhammad al-Trunbatl and IJamdun b. al- 
Haj. Mawlay Sulayman only resided in Fes for two years 
(1790-1792) (87) .
(83) Cf. Mawlay Sulayman's bayca in al-Na?iri, VIII, pp.87-90.
(84) F.0.52/10, 27 March, 1792.
(85) See observations made by the French vice-consul, L. Mure in CCC, 
vol.20, 10 April, 1792, the British vice-consul at Tetouan during 
1820's, W. Price, reproduced in Brooke, Sketches, I, p.359, and 
the British consul J.S.Douglas in F.0.52/23, 26 April, 1822.
(86) Al-Zayani, Alfiyat al-suluk, pp.166-167.
(87) Al-Na?irl, VIII, p.87.
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Mawlay Sulayman had a bent towards the study of 
religious sciences and manifested little interest in the 
country's political affairs before 1792. When Mawlay al- 
Yazfd was proclaimed in 1790 he asked him to reside at 
Marrakech as vice-regent, but after a short time Mawlay 
Sulayman deserted his post and returned to Fes to resume 
his studies (88). In March 1792 he was very reluctant 
to accept the throne offered to him by the head of the 
Alt Idrassen confederation and the people of Fes. Accord­
ing to al-Ducayf, he accepted only upon the condition 
that he would not take part in the fighting against his 
brothers (89).
Indeed, Mawlay Sulayman was little prepared to 
govern a country. He was above all a religious scholar 
whose education deeply marked his political behaviour. His 
great respect for the sharlca explains the fact that he 
sometimes placed God's prescriptions before the interest 
of the State. His rigid observance of the sharlca , 
together with his opinionated character, was responsible 
in part at least, for the inflexibility wich characterized 
his policy, and put him often in collision with groups 
such as the sharIf-s and the religious brotherhoods whose 
inherited privileges were not always in conformity with 
the Holy Law.
B- Makhzen Administration
The nature and extent of the administrative system 
differed widely from one sultan to another. With Mawlay 
Sulayman the administrative apparatus tended to be very 
modest. Apart from some objective factors which contribu­
ted to the weakening of the administrative apparatus left 
by Sfdf Muhammad b .cAbd Allah, there was also the authori­
tarian character of Mawlay Sulayman who followed a rigid 
policy of centralization.
(88) Al-Ducayf, p.247.
(89) Ibid., p.281.
(1) The _ Adm i  n. ± s t r a. t ± 3^. tu. s
Among the responsibilities of the Moroccan State were the 
political and administrative posts over wh»ch the Makhzen 
exercised a direct control. Others, on the contrary, were 
semi-autonomous being mainly religious in character. In 
traditional Morocco, the so-called "Makhzen service" was 
basically the palace domestic organization, the administra­
tive hierarchy and the army.
Immediately surrounding the sultan were a number of 
palace servants who carried out a wide range of daily 
tasks. They included tent pitchers, water-bringers, the 
kitchen master, the tea master, the pistol bearer, etc.
By 1790, they covered more than twenty different fields
(90). These palace servants constituted the permanent 
company of the sultan and moved with him wherever he went. 
Although forming part of the Makhzen, the above officers 
had no stake in the political or administrative affairs of 
the State. The sultan ran the country through his 
ministers, katib-s, qa^id-s and amln-s, or tax collectors.
At the central level, the Makhzen administration was 
very rudimentary and in running the affairs of the State 
the sultan was assisted by a limited number of officials. 
Louis Chenier, French consul in Morocco from 1767 to 1782/ 
noted that Sidi Muhammad b.cAbd Allah had no real govern­
ment in which responsibilities were divided among ministers
(91) . This continued to be the case until the second half 
of the nineteenth century when SidT Muhammad b.cAbd al- 
Rahman (1859-1873) and Mawlay al-Hasan (1873-1894) at­
tempted to introduce some administrative reforms. The 
sultan used to be surrounded by men of confidence rather 
than ministers. The most important individual among these 
trusted men usually acquired the title of "chief minister" 
(al-wazir al-acdl>am) . He directed, among other things,
(90) Cf. list of palace officers in 1791 given by the British consul 
Matra ub Add.Ms.41,512, British Museum.
(91) L. Chenier, Recherches historiques, III, p.164.
foreign affairs, and acted as the intermediary between 
the sultan and European consuls.
This responsibility of "chief minister" was en­
trusted between 1800 and 1815 to Muhammad b .cAbd al-Salam 
al-SalawI (d.1815), and afterwards to Ahmad b. M'barak 
(d.1819). In practice, government responsibilities were 
never clearly defined. Al-SalawF who signed his letters 
to European consuls as wazir al-bahr wa shu3un al-ajnas 
(minister of foreign affairs), performed many other duties 
at the same time. Thus, while still running foreign 
affairs, he was entrusted on various occasions with the 
local government of Fes, Sale and the neighbouring tribes^ 
Larache and the northern provinces. He was also entrusted 
with the leadership of military expeditions not only with­
in territories under his jurisdiction, but also in the 
Tadla, the Rif and the Fazaz. The scarcity of competent 
officials must have partly accounted for this concentra­
tion of responsibilities in few hands.
Indeed, never was the central administration so 
reduced as during the reign of Mawlay Sulayman. Whereas 
Sldi Muhammad used to be surrounded by more than 
thirty katib-s at any one time (92), the total number 
of secretaries who served Mawlay Sulayman during his 
reign did not exceed twenty according to al-Zayani (9 3). 
This fact cannot just be ascribed to Mawlay Sulayman's 
excessive tendency for centralization or to his authorita­
rian character. Other objective factors account for the 
modesty of the administrative apparatus at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century. One of these factors was the 
persecution undertaken by his predecessor, Mawlay al- 
YazTd, against his father's servants. When he came to 
the throne in 1790, Mawlay al-Yazid resolved that he would not 
rely on his father's "dogs" as he used to call them (94). 
Between 1790 and 1792, he launched a systematic search
(92) F.0.52/12, 3 May, 1802.
(93) Al-Zayani, Jawharat al-tljan, Ms.6778, R.L., pp.67-68.
(94) Al-Ducayf, p. 228.
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for all those who had gained th^eonfidence of Sfdf 
Muhammad b .<Abd Allah. Many were executed while others 
were imprisoned or left the country to save their heads. 
"As many of the Talbs he could catch were cut to pieces", 
wrote Matra in 1802, "the same fate attended the old 
alcaids or generals..."(95) .
There was also the Great Plague of 1799-1800 which 
was responsible for the death of many competent officials 
of the old administration. Mawlay al-Tayyib, the Sultan's 
brother, and Muhammad b. ^Uthman who were entrusted with 
foreign affairs, perished in the epidemic. In 1800 Mawlay 
Sulayman found himself compelled to entrust a twenty year 
old was?if (sultan's slave) with the running of foreign affairs
(96). In 1801, the Anglo-Moroccan treaty was negotiated on the 
Moroccan side by cAbd a 1-Rahman cAshcash, "a common muleteer" 
who could neither read nor write. "The man who negotiated 
the treaty", wrote Matra in 1802, "was ignorant; the 
plague had carried off all talbs used to foreign business"
(97) .
Finally, the conditions of Mawlay Sulayman's acces­
sion to the throne and the dynastic struggle which opposed 
him to many of his brothers made him very distrustful of 
the court princes. The rebellion of his cousin MawlaycAbd 
al-Malik b. Idris in 1796 while governor of the Chaouia, 
and the attempt made by Mawlay al-Tayyib to get himself 
proclaimed at Marrakech in 1799 (98) confirmed him in his sus­
picions. Among all princes, only MawlaycAbd al-Salam, 
the Sultan's brother, had some influence in the court of 
Mawlay Sulayman because, "being blind, he was less danger­
ous" (99). Mawlay Sulayman tended to rely above all on 
black slaves such as al-SalawI and Ahmad b. M'barak.
(95) F.0.52/12, 3 May, 1802.
(96) F.0.52/10, 6 Aug., 1799.
(97) F.0.52/12, 12 April, 1802. The same c Ash c ash. negotiated the treaty 
of 1803 between Morocco and Sweden; cf. Muhanrnad al-Hajwf, al- 
-^Ala^ iq al-siyasiya li al-dawla al-calawiya, n.p., n.d., p.15.
(98) Al-pucayf, p.394.
(99) F.0.52/12, 3 May, 1802.
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Muhammad b . cAbd al-Salam al-Salawf represented the 
most outstanding figure of Mawlay Sulayman's Makhzen. He 
served as chief minister in charge of foreign affairs for 
about fifteen years (1800-1815). When he was first en­
trusted with the royal seal in 1799, al-Salawf had behind 
him little administrative experience. He was a black 
slave brought up in the court and had previously served 
as secretary to Mawlay al-Tayyib while this one was 
governor of the northern ports (1794-1797). After the 
removal of Mawlay al-Tayyib to Dar al-Baygla in 17 97 al- 
Salawf acted as qaDid of Tangier and had the occasion to 
deal with European consuls. Following the death of Ibn 
^Uthman in 1799 he was entrusted with the royal seal and 
from 1800 onwards he directed most of the correspondence 
with European consuls (100). In 1802 he was appointed 
governor of Fes, and less than one year later he joined 
the sultan as katib. At the beginning of 1804, he was 
made qaDid of Rabat, Sale and the neighbouring Beni Hsen 
and cArab al-Widyan (101). In May 1805 he was entrusted 
with the government of Larache and the north-western Jbala 
tribes (102). Following the destitution of cAsh<:ash in 
1807, al-Salawf s prerogatives were extended to include 
the governorship of both Tetouan and Tangier. At one time 
the whole of northern Morocco, including the Rif, came 
under his authority, in addition to foreign relations 
which he exercised until his death in 1815. The passing 
away of al-Salawf came as a great loss for Mawlay Sulayman 
at a time when the country was entering a difficult period. 
"When the amir al-muminfn learned about his death", wrote 
al-Zayanf, "he regretted his loss as he was the pillar of 
his State"(103).
On the local level, the Makhzen exercised its control
(100) F.0.52/11, 6 June, 1797; F.0.52/12, 12 Aug., 1802; al-Ducayf,p.307.
(101) Al-Du<ayf, p.428.
(102) Ibid., p.442.
(103) Al-Zayani, Alfiyat al-suluk, p.182.
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over the population through governors and qa3 id-s. These 
were generally chosen on the basis of their administrative 
competence. A qaJid did not need to be a scholar but had 
to bean c aqil (wise man) with a sense of the practical. 
Qa-^id-s were chosen either from among tribal notables or 
among Makhzen servants, such as army officers. In the 
first case the sultan did nothing more than confirm the 
tribal leader in his position. The effective control of 
the Makhzen over such qa3 id-s depended to a large extent 
on the strength of the central authority, on the location 
of the tribe and on its military potential. The most 
efficient qa-^ id was the one who succeeded in gaining the 
trust of both his tribesmen and the sultan. The least 
efficient, on the other hand, was usually the qa3id ap­
pointed by the sultan from outside the tribe and who 
lacked the necessary coercive power to impose the Makhzen's 
will. Mawlay Sulayman, in particular, tended to disregard 
the realities of tribal politics and often appointed his 
own qaJid-s, chosen from among his slaves or from army 
officers. His attempts at imposing outsiders as qa 3id-s 
on the Berber tribes of the Middle Atlas were constantly 
rejected and constituted an important factor in the de­
terioration of Makhzen-Berber relations (104).
Besides ministers, katib-s and qaJid-s,there were 
the amln-s, or tax collectors, who played an important role 
in the running of the Makhzen administrative machinery . 
Amin-s were often described as the bankers of the Makhzen. 
They ensured the collection of taxes and supervised the 
farming of State monopolies. They served also as State 
accountants by keeping Makhzenian funds and executing the 
sultan's orders relating to the payment of officials and 
various other expenditures.
Finally, there were public sectors— the judicial 
system and the administration of pious endowments (ahb5s)—  
which, though autonomous, were not completely free from
(104) Al-Zayani, al-Rawja, fol.183.
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Makhzen intervention. Under judicial posts (al-managib 
al-sharciya) we find the muftT, the qadl-s (judges), the 
Cudul (pi. of cadl, or notaries) and the muhtasib-s 
(market provosts and supervisors of public morality).The 
judiciary also included the abu al-mawarlth(the master 
of probate and administrator of government property) and 
the kafil al-aytam wa al-gha^ibln (advocate for orphans 
and missing persons). Posts depending on the ahbas were 
also semi-autonomous. They included the nadhir (adminis­
trator of pious endowments), the mosque im5m-s and kha^ib-s 
(prayer leaders) as well as mosque and madrasa teachers.
(2) MawlaY_Sulayman_|_s_Administrative_Policy
The meagreness of the administrative apparatus at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century was not only a result 
of objective factors such as Mawlay al-YazId's persecution 
of his father's collaborators and the effects of the 
Great Plague. It was also a result of Mawlay Sulayman's 
centralizing and authoritarian character. Those who 
served as his katib-s, such as al-Zayani or Akansus, did 
not fail to remark on his authoritarian attitude and his 
obstinacy in running the affairs of the country. Mawlay 
Sulayman's greatest weakness accoring to al-Zayani, was 
"his obstinacy and reliance on inexperienced people"(105). 
He was so opinionated that he used to draft his own 
letters before he handed them over to his secretaries, 
without allowing the least alteration to the text. 
According to al-Ibtisam, Mawlay Sulayman forbade his 
secretaries even to correct grammatical or linguistic 
errors they might notice in the draft (106) . Little chance 
was given to his entourage to participate in decision mak­
ing and "no minister was offered opportunity to leave his 
mark on the country's policy"(107).
His inflexible tendency towards centralization was 
apparent in more than one aspect of his policy. In ap<*
(105) Ibid., fol.186.
(106) Al-Ibtisam, p.5.
(107) Muhammad Gharrit, Fawa?il al-juman fi anba* wuzara^  wa kuttab
al-zaman, Fes, 1921, p. 8.
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pointing qa°id-s, for instance, he gave little chance to 
local notables and religious dignitaries to express their 
opinion about such appointments. This discontented both 
traditional notables and local zawiya-s (108) and led to 
a continuous friction between the Makhzen and the loci 
of local power.
We touch here on the heart of Mawlay Sulayman's 
administrative policy. Indeed, Mawlay Sulayman showed 
little respect for traditional and tribal considerations 
in the appointment of local officials. In the Tadla, 
the appointment of alien qa3id-s was at the root of per­
sistent tension with the Sharqawiya religious order. The 
local government of Fes was often entrusted to outsiders 
which greatly discontented the Fasi traditional leadership 
and partly accounted for the deterioration of relations 
between Mawlay Sulayman and the influential notables of 
Fes (109). Mawlay Sulayman was also prone to disregard 
tribal antagonisms when extending the authority of a 
single governor over an explosive combination of tribes. 
Thus, the governor of the Chaouia, Ibn al-Ghazi al-Madanf, 
who commanded a territory extending from the banks of the 
Bouregreg river to those of the Oum er-Rbia, found his 
authority contested by the Tadla tribes on many occasions. 
The Sultan's attempt to impose a single qa3id for both 
highland and lowland Berbers was, according to al-Zayani, 
the reason behind the hostile attitude of the Alt Oumalou 
who disliked the governorship of Muhammad Waczlz of the 
Beni Mtir (110) and later on that of Ibn al-Ghazi of the 
Zemmour (111).
Mawlay Sulayman wanted above all to entrust govern­
ment responsibilities to individuals who could be easily 
controlled by the Makhzen. This explains why he resorted 
more often to black slaves and non-committed merchants.
(108) Cf. relations between Mawlay Sulayman and the zawiya-s of Ouezzane 
and Boujad in chapter VI below.
(109) Cf. chapter Vlr below.
(110) Al-Zayani, al-Raw^a, fol.183.
(111) Al-Zayani, Tarikh al-wilaya, Ms.13,009, R.L., p.3.
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John Buffa noted in 180 6 that many black qa Did-s "reckoned 
to be very loyal to the Emperor (were) at the head of the 
most important provinces and districts"(112). Al-Salawl 
and Ahmad b. M'barak, the only two ministers that Mawlay 
Sulayman had between 1799 and 1819, were both palace 
slaves (waslf-s). Merchants also enjoyed Mawlay Sulayman's 
favours and were sometimes entrusted with government 
responsibilities (113).
However, Mawlay Sulayman lacked the necessary means 
to carry out his policy of centralization. He lacked 
both a reliable army and a flexible tribal policy.Unlike 
his father who was able to tolerate tribal dissidence as 
long as it did not threaten his authority, Mawlay Sulayman 
showed a firm determination to extend his control to 
tribes and territories which the Makhzen had never 
been able to control since the death of Mawlay Ismacil. 
Sidf Muhammad avoided open confrontation with inaccessible 
tribes as much as possible. He preferred to spare his 
energies in order to tackle more important problems 
instead of being constantly at the head of his mehalla. 
Peaceful arrangements with dissident tribes were far more 
valued than costly and risky military campaigns which, 
even when successful, had but a limited effect. On the 
contrary, Mawlay Sulayman not only attempted to force the 
inaccessible mountain Berbers to submit, but also showed 
a political inflexibility which often made him reject 
peaceful solutions. The humiliating Za’ian defeat in May 
1819 was ascribed by Akansus to the rejection by Mawlay 
Sulayman of the peace proposals made by the Alt Oumalou 
(114). Sidf Muhammad.b . rAbd Allah, noted Akansus, had never 
rejected the enemy's appeal for forgiveness. He even in­
duced a third party to intercede on behalf of the enemy 
so as to arrange an honourable outcome for the conflict 
without risking a humiliating setback (115).
(112) J. Buffa, Travels, pp.108, 184.
(113) Letter fran Mawlay Sulayman to the people of Fes in Akansus,pp.
320-322.
(114) Ibid., p.317.
(115) Ibid., pp.317-318.
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Mawlay Sulayman's religious concept of the imamate 
might explain his administrative policy and his subsequent 
difficulties. The Quranic system of taxation adopted by 
Mawlay Sulayman implied a permanent control of the country­
side and a direct supervision by the central government 
of tax collecting. On the other hand, Mawlay Sulayman's 
sense of justice led him to revoke local governors on the 
least accusation made against them by their subjects. The 
author of al-Ibtisam reported that on one occasion the 
governor of Doukkala was arrested because he offered the 
Sultan a large sum of money, only a short time after his 
nomination (116) . The author of al-Ightiba^ mentioned
that it was customary for Mawlay Sulayman to leave 
officials in their posts only for a short period of time
(117). Muhammad b. cAlf al-Dukkall also confirmed that 
by following such a policy the Sultan intended to provide 
guarantees against the risks of corruption (118). These 
frequent changes in local government paved the way, 
however, for the eruption of conflicts among the local 
notables and considerably weakened the administrative 
apparatus at a time when Mawlay Sulayman had failed to 
build up a reliable coercive military force.
C- The Army
At the end of the eighteenth century, the Moroccan army 
consisted of a relatively small corps of professional 
soldiers ofcAbid and Oudaya, both of which had originally 
been formed by Mawlay IsmacIl, and the jaysh tribes which 
formed a sort of reserve army to be called upon for 
special expeditions.
(116) Mufranmad al-tfajwi, Ikhtigar al-ibtisam, Ms.H 114, BGR, p.360.
(117) Bujandar, al-Ightibat, II, pp.122-127.
(118) Muhanmad b. *A1I al-Dukkall, Ithaf ashraf al-mala , Ms.D.ll, BGR,
p. 101.
oUlJVI, ^ 1, 
*
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Sidf Muhammad b .cAbd Allah had reduced the power of 
both the cAbfd and the Oudaya who had been largely responsi­
ble for the civil strife that followed Mawlay Ismacil's 
death. He reduced the size of thecAbid corps to about 
15,000 men and dispersed them among the various sea ports. 
The Oudaya consisting mainly of cavalry, were reduced to 
only about 1,000 men and transferred from Fes, where they 
had been causing a great deal of trouble, to Meknes (119). 
On the other hand, the reserves furnished by the tribes, 
both Arab and Berber, became more important. The Arab 
tribes of the coastal plains alone could contribute, 
according to al-Zayani, about 150,000 men (120). The 
hadariya towns also contributed to the Makhzen's military 
effort by providing contingents of rumat (urban militia) 
and tubjiya(artillerymen) for major expeditions.
The essence of SIdi Muhammad's military reform was 
to curtail the power of the professional army and to rely 
on the military potential of the tribes with the aim of 
alleviating the financial burden on the Makhzen. The 
logical consequence of this policy with iegard to the 
army was to favour the unorganized strength of the tribes 
over the standing army of the Makhzen. In other words, 
tribal casabiyya acquired the upper hand over the janis­
sary type of organization sought by Mawlay Ismacil.
During his brief reign, Mawlay al-YazId attempted to revive 
and revitalize thecAb!d army by assembling them in the 
garrison of Meknes (121). The Oudaya were also brought 
back to Fes after thirty years of absence.
When Mawlay Sulayman came to power, the size of the 
professional army was negligible . Just before Mawlay al- 
Yazid died, it consisted of about 400 Oudaya and less than 
2,000cAbid (122). The political difficulties of Mawlay al-
(119) Al-Zayani, cIqd al-juman, Ms.G.40, BGR, p.15; al-Nasirf, VIII, 
p.115.
(120) Al-Zayani, cIgd al-juman, p.15.
(121) Al-Ducayf, p.228.
(122) Ibid., p.273.
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Yazld and the dynastic crisis which followed his death 
led to the dispersal of the professional army as many 
soldiers deserted Makhzen service under the pressures 
of survival. In these circumstances, Mawlay Sulayman 
had to rely on the Berber confederation of Ait Idrassen 
and the tribe of Beni Mtir in particular, in order to 
subdue the country and impose his rule. The pacifica­
tion of the northern provinces of Jbala, the Gharb and 
Tamesna was essentially an achievement of Alt Idrassen 
contingents commanded by Muhammad Waczfz and Ibn Na§ir 
al-Mtiri. As for the professional army, it hardly total­
led 4,000 men in 1793, according to the estimates of the 
British consul in Morocco (123) .
The task of providing the State with a reliable 
army was, therefore, one of Mawlay Sulayman's most urgent 
responsibilities. He could not remain for ever dependent 
on Berber contingents. In 1796 he decided to incorporate 
among the auxiliary jaysh the tribes of Cheraga and Oulad 
Jama and equipped at the same time 3,000 men from the 
Oudaya with horses (124). Mawlay Sulayman aimed in the 
first place at strengthening the Oudaya, greatly weakened 
by his father, so as to allow them to counter-balance the 
arrogant power of the (AbTd. In 1798 he deci'ded to re­
inforce the tribal jaysh with the recruitment of the Beni 
Hsen who were among the most powerful Arab tribes of the 
Azghar (125). In 1807 the jaysh organization was extended 
to the Guerouane who> after an unfortunate battle with 
their Beni Mtir rivals, asked Mawlay Sulayman to accept 
them into his army (126). According to Captain Burel who 
visited Morocco in 1808, the Guerouane supplied the Makhzen 
with 2,000 fighters (127). This tribe remained, however, 
only a short while within the Makhzen army since, in 1811, 
we find it among the allies of Abu Bakr Amhawish at the 
Battle of Azrou.
(123) F.0.52/10, 7 May, 1793.
(124) Al-pucayf, pp.318-319.
(125) Ibid., p.387.
(126) Ibid., p.448.
(127) J. Caille, La mission, p.59.
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By the end of the first decade of the nineteenth 
century Mawlay Sulayman realized how modest the result of 
his organizational efforts really had been. His major 
failure had been his inability to organize the various 
jaysh tribes into an efficient army endowed with the 
necessary discipline and capable of checking the military 
potential of the tribes. The Cheraga, Oulad Jama and the 
Beni Hsen tribes never rose to the organizational level 
of the Oudaya, as Mawlay Sulayman had hoped. They consti­
tuted nothing more than an auxiliary tribal force to which 
the Makhzen resorted every time there was a major military 
confrontation. Even in quantitative terms, Mawlay 
Sulayman was unable to recruit enough troops to balance 
the military strength of some of the powerful tribal con­
federations. In 1808 the army was evaluated at 36,000 
men (128) at a time when a single tribal confederation, 
such as the Beni Hsen or the Chaouia, could mobilize as 
much as 30,000 or 40,000 men (129).
Conscious of these deficiencies, in 1810-1811, Mawlay 
Sulayman attempted a solution along the lines of the janis­
sary model. On the one had, he ordered the recruitment of 
the harrat^In (descendants of black slaves) to reinforce 
thecAbid army (130); but this decision was apparently 
never carried out as a result of the controversy which it 
raised over the definition of a hartani (131). On the 
other hand, Mawlay Sulayman decided to recruit 2,000 men 
of the Beni Hsen— already made into a jaysh tribe— into 
the regular army (132). These measures, however, were no 
more successful than the earlier ones; The fall in Makhzen 
revenue during the second decade of the nineteenth centu­
ry and growing tribal agitation among the coastal plains 
after 1811 compromised all efforts designed to strengthen 
the army. More alarming was the spread of insubordination 
in the army itself as a result of the Makhzen1s inability
(128) Ibid.
(129) Al-pucayf, p. 388.
(130) Ibid., p.460.
(131) Ibid.
(132) Ibid., p.483.
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to curb tribal agitation. In 1815 thecAbTd army showed 
signs of dissatisfaction (133) and in 1816 the Oudaya 
openly defied Mawlay Sulayman's orders by refusing to be 
transferred from Fes to Meknes (134)* The plague epidemic 
of 1818-1820 and the military setback of Zalan dealt a 
final blow to the Makhzen army. Disorganized by the 
plague, routed by the Berber contingents of Abu Bakr 
Amhawish, the army became more restless and undisciplined 
than ever.
After the Zalan defeat, a reorganization of the army 
became necessary. In 1818-1819 Mawlay Sulayman ordered 
the recruiting of what had been saved from the epidemic 
and the military defeat (135). He particularly wanted 
to raise two Arab tribes in the vicinity of Fes, Oulad 
al-Haj and Himyan, to the jaysh status and incorporate 
them into the Oudaya (136) . However, the political in­
stability which characterized the latter part of his . 
reign, in addition to financial problems experienced by 
the Makhzen, rendered any efficient reorganization futile.
What was the nature of this army ? The Makhzen army 
consisted, as mentioned earlier, of two main groups: the 
standing army of cAbId and Oudaya, and the auxiliary force 
provided by the jaysh tribes. The Oudaya were stationed 
at Fes while the cAbid were garrisoned at Meknes as well 
as in the various ports. Men in the standing army were 
provided with accommodahcr) , a fixed monthly salary (one 
mithgal), two garments per year, a fixed amount of cereals 
for the maintenance of their families and horses, in add­
ition to their military equipment. They also received a
(133) F.0.174/20, 6 Sept., 1814.
(134) Al-Du(ayf, p.531.
(135) Cf. letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to cAyyad, commander of the 
Oudaya, ordering him to replace all soldiers who died in the 
plague epidemic, dated 7 Muharram, 1234/ 6 Nov., 1818, in D.A.R. 
See also another letter to cAyyad concerning the reorganization 
of the army, 1 Shawwal, 1234/ 13 Aug., 1819 in D.A.R.
(136) Letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to cAyyad, 21 Shawwal, 1234/ 13 Aug. 
1819, concerning the recruitment of Oulad al-Haj and Himyan in­
to the Oudaya, in D.A.R.
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ratib (allowance) for every military expedition (137).
The jaysh contingents, on the other hand, did not receive 
a salary as they represented the contribution from tribes 
which, in return for their military service, were exempted 
from taxes. For their livelihood, the tribal contingents 
depended on agriculture but received arms, equipment and 
clothing from the Makhzen.
While the cAbid consisted of infantry and cavalrymen, 
the Oudaya formed an exclusively mounted force. From both 
of these Mawlay Sulayman appointed 1400 men to serve as 
his tabaca, or royal guard (138). The Makhzen army was 
particularly deficient in the field of artillery. Indeed, 
the best artillerymen of the country belonged to the 
hadariya towns such as Tetouan, Sale, Rabat or Fes. They 
were often called upon to assist the army during its major 
expeditions.
The structure of the Moroccan army was rudimentary. 
The troops were officered by qa 3id-s and muqaddam-s. Every 
hundred men were placed under the command of a qa >id, and 
every twenty five under a muqaddam (139). In their appear­
ance, there was hardly any distinction between a soldier 
and a common tribesman as far as mount, dress, or military 
equipment were concerned . Within the army itself, there 
was only a slight difference in dress between soldiers 
and officers (140).
Once on the battlefield, Makhzen troops formed no­
thing but an incoherent multitude lacking both order and 
discipline. Al-Zayani ascribed Mawlay Sulayman's military 
defeats to the great number of troops that he led to the
(137) AHN, Estado, Leg.4327, Observations on Lempriere's A Tour from
Gibraltar to Tangier, p. 16.
(138) Al-Ducayf, p.318.
(139) Cf. letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to c Ayyad concerning the re­
organization of the army, dated 1 Shawwal, 1234/ 13 Aug., 1819, 
in D.A.R.
(140) Soldiers used to wear a red cap while officers added a white 
turban around; cf. J. Buffa, Travels, p.108.
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battlefield and which became impossible to control.
"Every sultan who fights with all his troops", he wrote, 
"is condemned to ruin, and every prince who entrusts the 
command of more than one thousand men to a single person 
is certainly leading his army to defeat"(141). Indeed, 
Mawlay Sulayman’s troops at the time of confrontation 
presented themselves like "a disorganized multitude and 
reckless hordes lacking order, discipline and restrain­
ing officers who should be strictly obeyed by their sub­
ordinates" ( 142) . This description of the Moroccan army 
by a Makhzen official was confirmed by a British surgeon 
who visited the country in 18 20 when he wrote: "A Moorish 
army is nothing better than a collection of people 
brought together and possessing neither order nor 
discipline"(143).
Mawlay Sulayman must have been aware of his army's 
weaknesses for the assistance of Christian renegades was 
often sought and artillerymen sent for training at 
Gibraltar. European instructors were also invited to 
Morocco for training purposes (144). Such attempts were, 
however, sporadic and isolated. They were intended to 
meet circumstantial needs rather than longterm programs 
of training. The Sultan had even proposed to send a group 
of Moroccan students to London to be trained in the art 
of gunnery and medicine (145). The British government was 
willing to receive these students, but the untimely 
death of al-Salawf together with the deterioration of the 
domestic situation in Morocco relegated this project to 
a secondary plan (146). Turkish and Egyptian military
(141) Al-Zayani, al-Rawda, fol.184.
(142) The ranark was made by Mawlay cAbd al-Ral^ man1 s minister, Mu^ ianmad
b. Idris al-cAmrawi (d.1847); cf .Muhanmad b. *Abd al-Salam al-Sa^ ih, 
al-Muntakhabat al-^abqariya, Rabat, 1920, p. 108.
(143) C.0.91/79, Robert Sillery s Report.
(144) F.0.174/124, letter frcm al-Salawi to Matra, dated 21 Hijja, 1210/ 
29 June, 1796; F.0.174/285, frcm al-Salawi" to J. Green, dated 23 
§afar, 1227/8 March, 1812; F.0.174/286, frcm Ahmad b. M1 Barak to 
J. Green, dated 29 Jumada I, 1231/28 April, 18i6.
(145) Letter frcm al-Salawf to W. A'Court, 26 Shacban, 1228/24 Aug.,1813. 
in C.0.2/4 (appendix 67).
(146) Ibid.
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reforms were well known in Morocco but did not seem to have 
made any impression (147) . The application of Western-style 
discipline (ganun) was simply discarded as being im­
possible (148).
(147) At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Moroccans were 
well acquainted with Middle Eastern military reforms. The 
author of al-ibtisam, for instance, gave a detailed descrip­
tion of Muhammad c All's reforms in Egypt. Cf. al-Ibtisam, pp.31-35.
(148) Al-Ibtisam, p.209.
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CHAPTER III
ECONOMY, FINANCE AND TRADE 
1792 - 1822
I - Bases of Moroccan Economy
The economic structures of Morocco at the end of the 
eighteenth century had undergone little or no change 
for centuries. Agriculture, which provided the over­
whelming majority of the population with its livelihood, 
continued to be practised according to the most 
rudimentary technological methods. Much the same could 
be said for crafts.and commercial techniques. Moroccans 
contented themselves with the heritage and ignored the 
technological changes that were taking place around 
them. Their proximity to Europe and their uninterrupted 
contact with Europeans left them indifferent to the 
growing efficiency of Western civilization. The peasant, 
the artisan and the merchant continued to provide their 
goods and services to satisfy the immutable needs of 
a predominently rural population. Morocco's acceptance 
of European trade during the second half of the eighteenth 
century no doubt placed the population in contact with 
new products and tended to develop new tastes, parti­
cularly among the urban khassa, but that was just the 
start of a process the full development of which 
remained for the distant future.
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A- Agriculture
Moroccan traditional agriculture remained heavily 
dependent on climatic variations and the hazards of 
natural calamities to which all Mediterranean countries 
were subject. Drought: and locust invasions were the 
most dreadful enemies against which the peasant could 
do nothing but lament and pray. When one or the other 
occurred, economic life was in jeopardy. Yet, in the 
absence of such calamities, the country produced enough 
not only to cover the needs of its inhabitants, but to 
permit exports as well. "The inhabitants", reported the 
British consul general in 1824, "have an ahundance of 
food, except after long droughts or when the vegetation 
is destroyed by locusts" (1) .
At the beginning of the nineteenth century Morocco 
still seemed to be an undercultivated country. Many foreign 
observers were struck by the immensity of the uncultivated 
lands (2). Despite the fertility of the soil, M. de 
Lesseps remarked, little land was ploughed (3). Towards 
the middle of the nineteenth century, Beaumier could 
still claim that cultivated lands hardly represented one 
third of the arable territory (4).
The rudimentary state of agricultural techniques 
did not fail to attract the attention of European 
travellers. "Despite the beneficient climatic influences", 
noted Beaumier, "agriculture made no progress for 
centuries" (5). The wooden plough and the sickle were the 
only tilling and harvesting instruments adopted by both 
sedentary and transhumant peasants. "They make use of
(1) F.O. 174/156, 4 Feb., 1824.  ^ #(
(2) Lempriere, Voyaae, p. 73, M. de Lesseps, Notice, p.17,
F.O. 174/156, 4 Feb., 1824.
(3) De Lesseps, "Notice", p. 17.
(4) A. Beaumier, Le Maroc, Paris, 1867, p. 54.
(5) Ibid., p. 52.
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small harrow and a pair of oxen for turning up the soil, 
which they instantly sow, and with another harrow of a 
finer construction they level the mould, and leave the 
rest of the operations to Nature"(6). Given the availa­
bility of fertile land and the relative underpopulation 
of the coastal plains, such a rudimentary technology 
seems to have been well suited for the country's require­
ments. The Moroccan peasant saw no need for a more 
advanced technology to satisfy his basic wants (7) .
However, agricultural techniques and cultures varied 
greatly from one region to another, depending on the 
nature of the soil and the degree of sedentarization. In 
hilly or mountainous country, such as the Rif, the Jbala, 
the Sous and the western High Atlas where sedentary life 
predominated, agriculture was based on an intensive 
utilization of the soil (8). The relative density of 
the population and the low fertility of the soil led to 
a fragmentation of family property and the adoption 
of terraced cultures, particularly in the Sous. In these 
regions cereal farming acquired a secondary importance 
as it was intended primarily to cover the needs of the 
local population. The country between Tetouan and Fes 
produced large quantities of olives, figs, and citrus 
fruits. In the Haha and the Sous the same produce could 
be found, in addition to almonds. "The Sus", wrote J.G. 
Jackson in 1808, "produces more almonds and olives than 
all other provinces together" (9). Sugar cane was also 
planted around Taroudant, but the sugar industry had been on
(6) J. Curtis, A Journal of Travels in Barbary, London, 1803, p.51.
(7) Observations made by A.G.Hopkins about west African pre-colonial 
societies apply to the Moroccan case as well. "A more advanced techno­
logy"/ wrote Hopkins, "will be used only if it is more profitable than 
existing methods, or if it is essential to ensure survival". Cf. A.G. 
Hopkins , An Economic History of West Africa, London, 1973, p.37.
(8) Saugnier, Relations, p. 154.
(9) Jackson, An Account of the Hop ire, p. 20.
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the decline for a long time and Morocco depended increas­
ingly on European imports (10). On the other hand, the 
coastal plains laying between the Jbala and the western 
High Atlas constituted a land of cereals par excellence.
The Gharb appeared to be in 1813 "perhaps the 
finest cornland in the world" (11). The Chaouia, the 
Doukkala and the Abda had long been known as the 
granaries of the Empire. Some industrial cultures were 
also practiced. Before its prohibition in 1800 by 
MawlSy Sulayman, tobacco used to be planted around Meknes 
and in the Doukkala. Enough was produced to allow exports 
to the western Sudan (12). Cotton of "a superior quali­
ty" was also cultivated in the environs of Rabat and Sale
(13) and was used by the workshops of these towns in the 
manufacture of a local cotton cloth known as al-kittan 
al-bildi (14).
In Morocco, as in other pre-colonial societies, 
agriculture was the matrix of all economic activities. Of 
all products from the land, cereals were by far the most 
important. A good harvest of cereals was not only a 
barrier against famine, but a motor for the whole 
economic system. With the exception of the famine years 
of 1817-1818, the period under study witnessed no major 
agricultural crisis. The early period of Mawlay Sulayman's 
reign (1792-1797) was a period of abundance during which 
agriculture did not suffer from either natural calamities 
or from the political instability. In fact, Mawlay 
Sulayman avoided as much as possible major military con­
frontations with the "coastal republics" of Safi, Tft and 
Dar al-Bayda ,preferring to consolidate his rule in the
(10) In a letter to the Earl of Liverpool dated 20 Sept., 1797, Jackson 
mentioned sugar and cotton as produces of the Sous; cf.Liverpool 
papers, Ms.38,231, British Museum. Cf. also Jackson, An Account 
of the Empire, pp.18-20.
(11) C.0.2/4, A'Court Mission to Morocco, 20 Aug.,1813.
(12) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p. 16.
(13) Ibid., p. 15. Cf. also IbncAlf al-Dukkall, Ithaf, Ms.Z. 13009, R.L.,
p.16.
(14) Letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman tocAbd al-RahmancAshcash, 24 ■Jumada II,
1233/1 May, 1818, in D.A.R.
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northern provinces. Wheat was so abundant and cheap 
during these years that it constituted the main item 
of export from both the northern and southern ports (15).
In 1798 the joint effects of a drought and a locust 
invasion put an end to this agricultural prosperity. In 
August 1798 the British consul reported that "the crops 
in Morocco had entirely failed"(16). The price of wheat 
became exhorbitant reaching 60 mithgal-s the wisq, or 12 
uqiya-s per mudd (17). The way was paved for the most 
disastrous plague since the Middle Ages. During the 
spring of 1799 locusts invaded the country reaching as 
far north as Tangier and "leaving not the least appearance 
of verdure on the face of the country"(18). Curiously 
enough, this locust invasion does not seem to have 
occasioned any significant damage to the crop of 1799 
which, according to both Moroccan and European sources, 
was abundant (19).
Agricultural activity suffered heavily from the 
plague of 1799-1800. This was mainly due to the decrease 
in population and the lack of manpower. "The crop( of 
1799.) was abundant", noted cAbd al-Salam b. Sulayman 
al-Fishtali, "but impossible to gather in" (20). European 
observers who travelled through the coastal plains short­
ly after the plague ended reported that wheat was left 
uncut in many places and herds of cattle were wandering 
in the countryside (21). Labour became so scarce and 
expensive that husbandmen preferred to abandon their 
crops, the value of which would be "insufficient to pay 
the expenses of reaping them"(22). Contrary to what
(15) Al-Ducayf, pp.324, 334.
(16) F.O.*52/ll, 15 Aug., 1798.
(17) Al-Fishtail, fol.125. The wisq makes 5 mudd-s, or 62.5 kilograms.
(18) F.0.52/11, 21 May, 1799.
(19) Al-Fishtali, fol.125; Jackson, An Account of the Bnpire, p. 105.
(20) Al-Fishtall, fol.125.
(21) F.0.52/11, 28 Nov., 1799; Jackson, An Account of the Bnpire, p.175.
(22) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.42.
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would have been expected, the period immediately after 
the plague was not one of abundance, but rather of 
scarcity. The dissemination of the rural population and 
the heavy rains of the winter of 1799-1800 did not 
allow the survivors to cultivate the soil (23). Accord­
ingly, little ground was tilled in 1800. At the end of 
the year the British consul reported that the price of 
wheat was "three times dearer than it ought to have been 
at that time" (24). It was precisely this scarcity which 
induced Mawlay Sulayman to impose restrictions on the 
export of victuals. "The plague made every kind of 
provision scarce", argued Makhzen officials, "and he 
(Mawlay Sulayman) must consult the interests of his own 
people" (25).
Once the immediate effects of the Great Plague were 
over, the country experienced an exceptional agricultural 
abundance. Neither the demographic losses nor the 
prohibition imposed on the export of grain seem to have 
resulted in a drastic fall of cultivated surfaces as 
alleged by Jackson (26). In fact, all those who visited 
the country between 1801 and 1813 conveyed a different 
picture of Moroccan agriculture. James Curtis who 
travelled to Fes in the spring of 1801 observed that "the 
country seemed better cultivated than might have been 
expected from the fatal effects of the plague" (27).
While travelling through the Gharb, Curtis also noted 
that "every part evinced a high state of cultivation"(28).
(23) F.0.52/11, 19 March, 1800.
(24) F.O.52/11, 2 Dec., 1800.
(25) F.0.52/11, 30 Jan., 1801.
(26) Jackson affirmed that after the prohibition of the export of wheat
" the soil here (in the Chaouia) and elsewhere has lain fallow" (An 
Account of the Bnpire, p. 42). In 1818 Jackson affirmed again that 
"many millions of acres of the finest and most productive land lies 
fallow for want of a market for its produce" (An Account of Timbuctoo, 
and Housa territories in the Interior of Africa, London, 1820, 
p. 211). The fact that the southern coastal plains were usually less 
extensively cultivated than the northern ones might explain the 
above assertions.
(27) J. Curtis, A Journal, p.32.
(28) Ibid., p.26.
99
Even "portions of the mountains were cultivated"(29). 
These observations were confirmed five years later by 
another British visitor. In 1806 John Buffa noted that 
the country between Tangier and Meknes was covered with 
"fine corn fields ... many mountains cultivated to the 
very summit"(30). In 1813 the British ambassador A'Court 
was also impressed by the agricultural abundance of the 
Gharb. "The whole country is one continued plain of 
perhaps the finest cornland in the world", he wrote(31).
The period extending between 1800 and 1812 was,in­
deed, one of agricultural prosperity. Cereal prices were 
extremely low. In 1808, the mudd of wheat cost less than 
2 uqiya-s (32). Famines such as those experienced by 
Algeria and Tunisia in 1804-1805 were unknown to Morocco
(33). At a time when eastern neighbours were having 
serious agricultural difficulties Morocco could afford 
to relieve their sufferings by sending cargoes of wheat 
to Tunis and Tripoli(34). Mawlay Sulayman also allowed 
the free export of 50,000 quintals of cereals "in 
assistance to the British army fighting the French in 
Lisbon and Cadiz"(35).
In 1812 locusts invaded the southern provinces causing 
"considerable damage in corn"(36). Rainfall was also
(29) Ibid.,p.53.
(30) J. Buffa, Travels, p.30.
(31) C.0.2/4, Meknes, 20 Aug., 1813.
(32) J. Caille, La mission, p.107.
(33) L. Valensi, Le Maghreb, p.24.
(34) Al-Zayanf, al-Rawda, fol.182; F.O.52/12, 25 Aug., 1804 and 23 June, 
1802.
(35) F.O.52/16, letter frcm Muhammad b.cAbd al-Sadaq, governor of 
Essaouira, to the British government, dated 6 §afar, 1228/8 Feb., 
1813. The Spanish junta of Seville was also allowed in 1809 to 
export 20,000 fanega-s of wheat (cf. CCC, vol.23, 26 Nov., 1809).
(36) F.O. 174/20, 21 April, 1812; F.O. 174/153, 9 March, 1812. The crops 
in the Doukkala and Tamesna were not affected by this locust 
invasion.
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insufficient. Towards the end of 1812 and early 1813 
wheat prices in the south suddenly rose to 20 ugiya-s 
for the mudd (37). "People have been in a great measure 
starving", wrote the British vice-consul at Essaouira 
in May 1813 (38) . That was the end of agricultural 
prosperity and a precursory sign of the economic and 
political difficulties that lay ahead.
Nevertheless, the 1812 scarcity seems to have been 
mainly limited to the southern part of the country. Until 
1815 Moroccan wheat continued to be illegaly drained 
off to European countries. From 1813 Mawl&y Sulayman 
mounted numerous military campaigns against the tribes 
of the Rif to stop illicit trade of wheat (39).
Evidently, the country continued to produce enough to 
cover the essential needs of the population before the 
major famine of 1817-1818.
Table 2 Evolution of Wheat Prices 1796-1822
1796 4 uqiya-s/ the mudd (12.5 kgs .)
1798-99 12 VI If
1808 1.5 ft ii
1812 20 " " (Essaouira)
1817 2 6 (Rabat)
1818 23 " (Rabat)
1819 4 » » (Rabat)
1820 4 " " " (Rabat)
1821 6 " (Rabat)
1822 3 " " II II
Sources: Al-Ducayf, p.321; al-Fishtali, fol.125; J. Caille, La mission 
p.107; F.0.531/1; CCC, vol.27-28.
(37) F.0.631/1, 16 May, 1813.
(38) Ibid. In 1813 the Moroccan government found itself in the impossibi­
lity of acceding to the request of the British ambassador who 
demanded, among other things, the authorization to export wheat.
Cf.letter fran al-SalawT to W. A1 Court, 8 Shacban, 1228/6 Aug.,1813 
in Add.Ms.41,512, British Museum.
(39) Al-ZayanI, al-Rawda, fol.190; al-Ducayf, pp.508, 512; F.0.52/16,
7 Aug., 1814.
101
B - Crafts
The prosperity of the artisan was intimately linked to 
that of the peasant. Years of drought or bad harvest 
had direct repercussion on both industry and trade.
During such years town dwellers would have to spend more 
of their income on victuals, and particularly on 
cereals. Crop failures also reduced the peasant's 
spendings on town-made products. The urban artisan 
supplied the tribesman with armament, saddlery, leather 
articles, part of his clothing and various tools and 
utensils (40). In the village there were blacksmiths, 
weavers and potters who satisfied the basic needs of 
the rural population. Nevertheless, it was in the urban 
market that the peasant could find more complex articles 
and a wider choice too.
Craftsmen were mainly concentrated in the haqlariya 
towns such as Fes, Tetouan, Rabat and Sale. In the south, 
Marrakech and Taroudant tended to play a role similar to 
that of the haqlariya towns in the north. It is impossible 
to determine exactly the proportion of artisans in the 
urban population but information about Fes at the 
beginning of the twentieth century (41) suggests that 
at least half the population of the major towns gained 
their living from crafts even in the early nineteenth 
century. They undoubtedly formed the majority of the 
urban labour force (42).
Within the urban social body artisans counted 
rather among the common people. However, the value 
attached to manual work differed greatly from one craft
(40) For sane artisans, such as saddlers and gunsmiths, the tribesman 
was, undoubtedly, the most important custoner. Cf. R. Le Toumeau, 
La vie quotidienne & Fes en 1900, Paris, 1965, p. 98.
(41) Ibid, p. 99.
(42) Kenneth Brown, People of Sale, p. 132.
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to another. Between "noble" crafts, such as shoemaking 
or the work of precious metals, and "dirty" crafts, 
such as rope making or horseshoeing there was an unbridge­
able gap. Crafts of the latter kind tended to be left to 
outsiders (barrani-s) while "noble" professions were in 
general the appanage of "the sons of the town". Very few 
artisans acquired enough wealth to join the kha?sa. 
Accordingly, they played no significant role in politics, 
except in times of instability when physical power 
became more important. Their esprit de corps allowed 
them to acquire a sudden importance at times when central 
authority was weak (43).
The list of the various activities involved was vast, 
but the most important were the leather industry (tanning, 
shoemaking and saddlery), the weaving of wool and cotton, 
pottery, the copper industry and the manufacture of light 
armament. The results of these activities covered not 
only the local needs but also used to be exported to the 
western Sudan and the Arab Middle East. Leather goods, 
woollens and copper utensils were the most well-known 
articles of Moroccan industry.
V7hile the arrival of Andalusian families from Spain 
during the fifteenth and early seventeenth centuries 
gave Moroccan crafts a new impetus through the intro­
duction of new skills, working underwent little change.
The basic unit of production remained the workshop which 
included, in addition to the master worker (mcallem), 
one or a few apprentices. Material conditions for the
(43) In 1873, for instance, the tanners of Fes rebelled against the tax 
collector (amln) as he attempted to raise the maks on leather, a 
few weeks only after the proclamation of Mawlay al-Hasan (1873- 
1894). Cf. details of the tanners' rising in El-Outaig, III, 1977, 
pp.280-296.
(44) A list of traditional Moroccan crafts is given by cAbd al-Rahman 
b. Zaydan, Ms.Z.3986, R.L., p.11.
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master worker differed only slightly from that of his 
journeymen(45). The use of machinery was unknown and 
even tools were rudimentary.
Outside the workshop the artisans belonging to the 
same profession were bound by the hanta, or corporation. 
The franca was a loose organization with no civil persona­
lity and was governed more by curf , or custom, than by 
a recognized set of rules. In their daily activities 
artisans manifested no real evidence of organization. It 
was only on the occasion of certain ceremonies or when a 
fellow artisan was placed in a difficult situation that 
mutual action came into play. Artisans of the same 
corporation usually collected money to make a joint 
present to the sultan, to the sharlf-s or to the shrine 
of the patron saint of the town. The same happened when 
an artisan was faced with an unexpected expense, such as 
funerals or in the case of serious damage to health or 
property. At the head of every corporation there was an 
amln (46) who acted as the representative of the profes­
sion before the Makhzen authorities and other corpo­
rations. In practice, his main task consisted in settling 
disputes which arose among the members of the corporation. 
The amln was chosen by artisans under the supervision of 
the muhtasib (market provost) (47).
Every corporation placed itself under the spiritual 
protection of a saint. The members of the corporation 
participated every year in the religious festivities 
organized in honour of the patron saint and contributed 
generously to collections for the sharlf-s.
(45) K. Brown, People of Said, p.132.
(46) The amln, head of the corporation, is not to be confused with 
the makhzen's amln, who is a custans officer or a tax collector.
(47) The muhtasib regulated most economic affairs (fixing of prices, 
checking weights and measures, repression of industrial fraud) 
and supervised public morality.
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In times of economic hardship artisans usually appealed
to the city's patron saint (Mawlay Idris of Fes, SidlcAbd
Allah b. Hassun of Sale and Abu al-cAbbas al-SabtT of €
Marrakech) imploring him to intercede in their favour 
before God (48). Of all the urban groups artisans were 
the most inclined to join popular tarlqa-s such as the 
cAysawiyai, the Hamadsha and the Darqawiya (49) .
Like all other economic sectors crafts suffered 
heavily from famines and plague epidemics experienced 
under the reign of Mawlay Sulayman. The Great Plague of 
1799-1800 was the most disastrous of all. The epidemic 
carried away many artisans in the major towns of the 
country. Members of the British embassy who were in Fes 
in 1801 noted the great loss in human lives among arti- 
sans(50). Some crafts suffered more than others. Matra 
reported the perishing of more than seventy stationers 
and embellishers that were in the city. Mawlay Sulayman's 
ceremonial letter to the king of Great Britain was orna­
mented by the only apprentice who was spared by the 
plague (51). The expense of labour rose considerably as 
a result of the demographic losses (52),and prices of 
manufactured cfoods necessarily followed suit. James 
Curtis noted in 1801 that the prices of locally manu­
factured articles had considerably increased as a result 
of the plague (53).
(48) Al-Ducayf mentions, for instance, that in 1804 craftsmen and 
traders of Marrakech appealed twice to Sidi Abu al-cAbbas al- 
Sabti because of the economic difficulties experienced by the 
town at that time. Cf.pp.239-240.
(49) In his Enquete sur les corporations, Massignon noted that popular 
tarlqa-s, such as the Hamadsha and the ^  Aysawiya, recruited their 
adepts mainly among bakers, porters, bath workers, tanners and 
blacksmiths. Cf. L. Massignon,"Enquete^ in Revue du Monde Musulman, 
LVIII, 1924, p.140.
(50) Curtis, A Journal, pp.83-84; cf. also al-Fishtalf, fol.125.
(51) F.0.52/12, 12 April, 1802.
(52) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p. 175.
(53) Curtis, A Journal, pp.83-84.
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However, like other economic sectors, crafts certain­
ly benefited from the agricultural abundance which 
characterized the middle part of Mawlay Sulayman's reign. 
Artisans were also favoured by the fiscal policy adopted 
by the Sultan. The abolition of non-Quranic taxes (maks) 
and State monopolies over a number of raw materials 
(leather, cochineal, raw silk, sulphur) provided unusual 
advantages for artisanry. The restrictions imposed on the 
export of wool after the Great Plague made that article 
abundant (54) and must have constituted a strong incentive 
for the woollen industry. High tariffs levied on the ex­
port of other raw materials, such as goat skins and cow 
hides, served also as a protection for the local leather 
industry. The supply of such articles seems to have been 
so abundant that despite a considerable increase in the 
volume exported between 1806 and 1812 (55), local 
markets remained well provided with all kinds of raw 
materials(56). This certainly allowed the industrial 
activity to recover from the harmful effects of the 
Great Plague.
The opening of Morocco to European imports during 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries does 
not seem to have seriously undermined local crafts (57) . 
Although the country received increasing quantities of 
European manufactured goods (linens, copper utensils, 
knives, razors,etc) the Moroccan artisan continued to 
produce not only to cover the needs of the overwhelming 
majority of consumers, but also to allow for exports to 
the Sudan and the Arab East. It is true that imported 
quantities of brass pans, razors and sewing thread, for
(54) F.0.174/13, 30 June , 1802.
(55) Cf. Table 12 below.
(56) J. Buffa, Travels, pp.25, 53.
(57) While Mawlay Sulayman attempted to limit exports he made no 
effort to obstruct imports. . .
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instance, considerably increased between 1804 and 1812 (58), 
but such imports were to some extent destined for reexport­
ation in the caravan trade and what remained in the country 
went mainly to an insignificant wealthy minority.
Until the middle of the nineteenth century, Moroccan 
artisans succeeded in withstanding European competition 
without much difficulty (59). Many products, particular­
ly leather articles and woollens, continued to find their i 
way to Middle Eastern and west African markets. In 
Timbuctoo slippers from Fes and foayk-s from Tafilelt could 
be found side by side with Manchester cloth (60). Indeed, 
despite a rudimentary technology, the Moroccan artisan 
produced superior quality articles. The woollen cloth 
of Tafilelt (al-hayk al-filalr) was "as thin as muslin"
(61). A British visitor noticed in 1826 that "some of 
the woollen manufactures were of superior strength and 
closeness" even to English woollens (62). Jackson also 
noted that gold thread manufactured at Fes was "much 
superior to that which was imported into Barbary from 
Marseilles"(63) and which was solely used to "make belts 
sold in the Sudan"(64). In the cutting and polishing of 
precious stones the Moroccan artisan also displayed an 
"equal sagacity"(65).
However, by the early nineteenth century the Moroccan 
artisan was already beginning to lose ground in many 
fields before the competition of European products.
European firearms, for instance, constituted a serious
(58) Between 1804 and 1812 inported brass pans, for instance, increased 
by as much as 47 times, and razors by more than four times. Cf.
Table 15 below.
(59) K. Brcwn, People of Sale, pp.120-121.
(60) Jackson, An Account of the Bnpire, pp. 289-290; Barth, Travels and 
discoveries in North and Central Africa, London, 1857, vol.V, pp.32-34.
(61) Jackson, An Account of Timbuctoo, p. 217.
(62) G. Beauclerk, A Journey to Morocco in 1826, London, 1828, p.239.
(63) Jackson, An Account of Timbuctoo, p. 126.
(64) Ibid., p.215.
(65) Ibid., p.216.
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competitor for the traditional musket. "Locally made 
firearms", wrote Jacques Caille in 1827 about the Fasi 
industry, "are far from European perfection"(66). By 
that time the Moroccan gunsmith had not only lost his 
traditional west African customer but was also threatened 
on the local market itself. European copper utensils, 
particularly copper kettles and tea boards, were 
progressively imposing themselves upon the taste of a 
wealthy minority for which tea had become by 1800 "a 
constant beverage at all hours"(67).
Moroccan cotton industry also showed the first signs 
of inferiority before European imports. According to 
Muhammad b.CA1I al-Dukkall, it was during the latter 
part of Mawlay Sulayman's reign that European manu­
facturers began imitating local cloth with the aim of 
gaining over the Moroccan clientele. "Europeans began to 
imitate Moroccan cloth", wrote the author of Itfraf ashraf 
al-mala, "and succeeded in offering a better product at 
a lower price"(68). Apparently, the cotton industry of 
Sale and Rabat was the first to suffer. The Makhzen it­
self preferred European cloth to provide for the needs 
of the army "because", wrote Mawlay Sulayman, "it was of 
a better quality than the local cotton cloth (al-kittan 
al-bildi)"(69) . Velvet also became an important article 
in the clothing of the Moroccan army. The artisan's out­
lets became more and more restricted as Morocco opened 
its doors to European trade.
(66) J. Caille, Journal, III, p.115.
(67) Curtis, A Journal, p. 16.
(68) IbncAli al-Dukkall, Ithaf, p.27.
(69) Letter from Mawlay Sulayman tocAbd al-Rahiran cAshcash, 12 Jumada II, 
1233 / 19 April, 1818, in D.A.R.
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C - Trade
In traditional Moroccan economy there was no clear 
cut distinction between crafts and trade. The artisan 
was usually the seller of his own produce. The dividing 
line ran, in fact, not between artisans and merchants, 
but rather between artisans and small merchants on one 
hand, and big merchants on the other. The material 
condition of the shop-keeper or the itinerant trader 
who moved from one rural market to another hardly differed 
from that of the artisan who relied on his manual work 
to earn his living. The tajir, or big merchant, on the 
contrary, indulged in wholesale trade and had often 
commercial interests outside the national borders.
Numerically, these t5jir-s represented a negligi­
ble minority and were concentrated in the haqlariya towns 
such as Fes and Tetouan. Marrakech once considered as 
the emporium of Saharan trade, was on the decline during 
the latter part of the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries (70). The maritime orientation of Moroccan 
trade by Sidl Muhammad b.cAbd Allah had diverted trade 
routes to the Atlantic coast and incited many merchants, 
particularly jews, to emigrate from inland towns to the 
sea ports.
This opening to Europe had far reaching consequences 
on big trade. It gave rise to a new type of cosmopolitan 
merchants who, instead of contenting themselves with the 
role of intermediaries for European interests, now travelled 
all over Europe. Another important development was the
(70) Lempriere who visited the town in 1790-1791 reported that many 
houses were in ruin (Voyage, p. 85). Jackson made similar remarks 
noting that "streets are mostly filled with ruins of houses which 
have gone to decay" (An Account of the Bnpire, p. 63). On the 
economic difficulties of Marrakech at the beginning of the nine­
teenth century, cf. al-Ducayf, pp.439-440.
109
adaption of merchants who had specialized in the caravan 
trade to maritime commerce. This was the case of al-Talib 
b. Jallun (d. 1844), the undisputed tajir of Fes who 
"acquired an immense wealth in the Nigrita trade" and who 
extended afterwards his activity to maritime commerce(71).
He gained "an unlimited number of estates in Fes and its 
vicinity consisting in orchards, irrigated lands and 
other properties" (72). The fact that Ibn Jallun was 
entrusted with Makhzen money being Mawlay Sulayman's amln
(73) did not prevent him from taking part in the Fds 
rebellion of 1820-1822. However, neither Mawlay Sulayman 
nor his successor reproached him for this involvement.
For the Makhzen he represented the appearance of a new 
class the cooperation of which was necessary to check the 
influence of the conservative religious forces. Mawlay cAbd al- 
al-Rahman, instead of liquidating him—  as he did other 
rebellion leaders (74)—  appointed him chief minister when 
he came to the throne (75).
Another typical example of the cosmopolitan merchant 
of the early nineteenth century was provided by cAbd al- 
Karfm b. al-Talib. After many years of trade with western 
Africa, Ibn al-Talib specialized in the export of wheat.
In 1804, he was described by the British consul as "a 
correct trader ... whose papers are as current as those 
of any banker of Europe"(76). He spent more than fifteen
(71) F.0.52/29, report on the trade of Essaouira drawn by the British 
consul in 1828. On the biography of al-Talib b.Jallun cf.cAbd al- 
Kabir b. Hashim al-Kattani, Zahrat al-as, pp.546-547.
(72)cAbd al-Kabfr al-Kattani, Zahrat al-5s, p.547.
(73) Al-Talib b. Jallun supervised, for instance, the construction of 
great works such as bridges; cf. Anon., Dhikr khilafat
mawlanS Sulayman b. Muhammad b.cAbd Allah b. IsmaCjjl al-cAlawI. Ms.
1892, fonds arabe, B.N., fol. 67.
(74) Upon his accession to the throne Mawlay (Abd al-Rahman ordered the 
execution of Muhammad b. Sulayman and Ibn al-Ghazf, two notables 
who had played an important role in the Fes rebellion. Cf .al-Na§irf 
IX, pp. 10-11; Muhanmad Gharrlt, Fawasil, pp. 92-93.
(75) F.0.52/24, 11 Feb., 1823.
(76) F.0.52/12, 21 Oct., 1804
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years abroad during which he travelled all over Europe. 
J.M. Matra reported that he could speak many European 
languages including English (77). In 1804 he was dis­
patched by Mawlay Sulayman to London, together withcAbd 
al-Khalaq cAshcash to arrange for the purchase of naval 
armaments(78). Following the British attack on Algiers 
in 1816 he was dispatched by the Sultan in 1817 on a 
political mission which led him to Algiers, Tunis and 
Constantinople (79). During the last years of Mawlay 
Sulayman's reign he was appointed by the Regency of 
Algiers as its consul in Morocco. This allowed him to 
orient his commercial activities eastward to the Ottoman 
regencies (80).
Muhammad Bejja (d.1820) was another example of these 
new enterprising merchants of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. He left his native town, 
Larache, towards the middle of STdi Muhammad's reign to 
settle in Cadiz. Later on, he moved to Gibraltar where 
he carried on his business for about twenty years. Bejja 
succeeded in gaining the confidence of Mawlay Sulayman 
for whom he concluded many commercial transactions abroad
(81). In 1815 he was appointed consul of Morocco at 
Gibraltar where he died five years later, leaving behind 
him a fortune of 25,000 pounds sterling which Mawlay 
Sulayman found most useful in the midst of the Fes rebel­
lion (82) .
(77) Ibid.
(78) Ibid.
(79) COC, vol.25, 1st Sept., 1817.
(80) Like al-Talib b. Jallun , he readily accepted to oppose his 
signature to the bayca proclaiming a rebel prince in 1821; cf. 
text of the bayca of Mawlay SacId in Dawud, III, p.261.
(81) AHN, Estado, Leg. 6232 (2), letter frcm al-SalawI to the Spanish 
junta at Cadiz, recommending Muhammad Bejja, dated 12 Rabic II, 
1228/14 April, 1813.
(82) C.0.91/79, memorial addressed by al-Haj al-cArbi Macnrnu and al- 
Haj Tahar al-^ayat to the governor of Gibraltar concerning the 
property of Muhammad Bejja. This sum was used by Mawlay Sulayman 
for the purchase of military equipment.
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There were many other merchants who traded directly 
with European countries. Among these we findcAir Barrada, 
al-Haj Idris Lahlu, al-Haj Ahunad Qardan, cAbd Allah al- 
Salmani, cAbd al-Rahman al-cAttar,^Abd 'al-Karim al-cA£tar 
and the Buhlal brothers whose names have been conserved 
in the European archives (83). However, few of these
on
merchants travelled abroad to carry* their private busi­
ness. They were more like commissioners who transacted 
various affairs either on behalf of the Makhzen or on 
account of fellow merchants who remained in the country. 
Thus, Muhammad Bejja provided a commercial antenna for 
Tetouani merchants while he resided at Gibraltar. The 
two sides exchanged commercial information on the availa­
bility of articles of trade, on their prices, as well 
as on the economic situation in general (84). Among 
themselves, Moroccan merchants created their own 
commercial circuit in order to avoid resorting to European 
or Jewish intermediaries as much as possible. This 
cooperation was made necessary by the modesty of the 
capital at their disposal. The fact that some of them 
travelled as far as Hamburg or Amsterdam should not 
create illusions about the extensiveness of their 
fortunes. "These merchants", wrote the French consul in 
1814, "do not have enough capital to carry this trade 
with their own means. To their own funds they often add 
capital belonging to their parents or friends. Sometimes 
they attend also to money belonging to a widow or an 
orphan which they fructify according to what they consider 
as the most advantageous way. After one year or two years 
of absence ... they return home in order to deliver to 
everyone the merchandise he ordered or the profit made 
during the voyage ... ’ contenting themselves with a small
(83) Cf. numerous petitions by Moroccan merchants in F.0.52/14, and 
CCC, vol.21-22. Sane names of preminent contemporary merchants 
can be found in Beauclerk , A Journey, p. 27.
(84) Cf. correspondence of Muhammad Bejja in D.A.R.
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commission"(85). Other obstacles impeded the develop­
ment of commercial capitalism. Religious scruples pre­
vented Muslim merchants from adopting modern commercial 
techniques. Banking services remained unknown in Morocco 
as well as the use of bills of exchange in the negoti­
ation of commercial deals. Commerce was done by barter 
and when a Moroccan merchant travelled abroad he had to 
carry with him hard cash consisting generally in Spanish 
dollars (86). Nor was the Moroccan merchant guaranteed 
against the risks of piracy, war danger or natural 
calamities, the taking of an insurance being contrary 
to religion.
Maritime trade was not the only source of wealth. 
Caravan trade, in spite of its obvious decline during the 
period under study, continued to play an important role 
in the activation of internal exchanges. The eastern 
pilgrimage caravan was not motivated solely by religious 
considerations. Besides devout believers who sought to 
accomplish their religious duties, there were a number 
of trading pilgrims ( al-hujjaj al-mutasabbibun) who, 
once in Egypt and the Hijaz, exchanged articles of 
Moroccan artisanry (leather goods, woollens) or African 
slaves for Asian spices, Indian muslins and silk. The 
most prominent pilgrim trader was the head of the caravan 
(shaykh al-rakb) appointed by the sultan among the wealth­
iest merchants of Fes (87). The caravan gathered at Fes 
and remained there for about two months before it departed 
for Egypt. It was also at Fes that the caravan disbanded 
upon its return. Its stay at this city for a number of 
months every year was the occasion for important 
commercial activity of benifit both to artisans
(85) CCC, vol.24, Memoire sur le canmerce des europeens au Maroc, 
presented by L. Mure en 1814, fol.120-126.
(86) F.O.52/15, 26 May, 1810.
(87) Sane of the prominent merchants of Fds who owed their wealth to 
pilgrimage caravan trade: the §fira brothers, Muhammad Mezwar, al-
cArbi al-Shraybl and^Abd al-Salam Buhlal. Mawlay Sulayman attempted 
to appoint as head of the pilgrimage caravan a merchant frcm an­
other town but met with the opposition of the people of 'Fes. Cf. 
al-Ducayf, pp.384-385, 387.
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and merchants of Fes. The cessation of this caravan in 
1830 with the French occupation of Algiers constituted a 
severe blow to the Fasi economy and necessarily oriented 
Moroccan trade towards the Atlantic ports.
The commercial ascendance of Jewish merchants was 
another important development of the late eighteenth 
century. This ascendance was a direct result of SIdl 
Muhammad's interest in the Atlantic. Many Jewish families 
moved to the Atlantic ports, particularly to Essaouira, 
where they specialized in the export-import trade. Under 
the reign of Mawlay Sulayman they continued to hold the 
greatest share of the maritime trade. Although affected 
by Mawlay Sulayman's restrictive commercial policy, they 
tended to suffer less than their European competitors. 
Indeed, they seem to have consolidated their position 
at a time when European merchants found it impossible 
to maintain themselves in the Moroccan trade. Thus, in 
1812 there were six Jewish trading houses in Essaouira 
as compared to two only in 1805. The number of European 
trading houses in this port decreased from six to four 
during the same period (88) . European consuls and merchants 
were constantly complaining about Jewish competition, 
accusing Mawlay Sulayman of partiality towards "Jews who 
trade with his money"(89).
In fact, Mawlay Sulayman chose his tajir-s not only 
among his Muslim subjects but among Jews as well. While 
his father decided in 1789 to withdraw his money from 
Jewish hands and place it in the hands of European 
merchants, Mawlay Sulayman, on the contrary, restored the 
privileges of his Jewish subjects by entrusting them with
(88) F.0.174/12, 4 April, 1805; Inventory of the trade of Essaouira in 
Add.Ms.41,512, British Museum.
(89) F.0.174/12, 4 April, 1805; F.0.52/29, Report on the trade of 
Essaouira drawn in 1828 by the British consul.
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his business (90) . The most trusted Jewish merchants 
belonged to the Macnin and Guidalla families of Essaouira. 
who had commercial interests in England (91) . Meir 
Macnin's business was essentially run with funds borrowed 
from the Makhzen treasury of Essaouira (92). In 1795 he 
headed an important firm at Essaouira with agencies at 
Marseille and London. From 1799 onwards, this agency was 
entrusted to his nephew, Salomon Sebag, the father of Sir 
Joseph Sebag Montefiore (93). Meir Macnin himself resided 
for many years in London where, in addition to running 
his private business, he negotiated Makhzen transactions 
and acted as a de facto consul of Morocco in Great Britain
(94). On MawlaycAbd al-Rahman's accession to the throne 
in 1822, Macnin was granted large export monopolies and 
dispatched afterwards as ambassador to some European 
capitals (95).
Despite adverse economic and political conditions 
of the latter part of Mawlay Sulayman's reign, the period 
under study can be considered as a prosperous one as far 
as domestic trade is concerned. Agriculture, the basis 
of all economic activities, witnessed no major setback 
if we except the crop failures of 1798, 1812 and 1817- 
1818. Politically, the country enjoyed a long period of
(90) Corcos, Studies in the History of the Jews of Morocco, p. 117.
(91) F.0.174/29, 1st March, 1811.
(92) Letter fran al-SalawI to Francis Nadler (merchant), 26 Muharram,
1217 / 29 May, 1802.
(93) E.J., vol. XI, column 675.
(94) Thus, Meir Macnin negociated the purchase of military equipment for 
the Makhzen and intervened on behalf of Moroccan nationals who were 
met with difficulties while in Great Britain. Cf. letter from 
Mawlay Sulayman to the governor of Essaouira concerning the purchase 
by Macnin of a warship in England in F.0.52/14, 28 Hijja, 1222 /
22 Dec., 1813; F.0.52/14, letters fran Macnin to British authori­
ties concerning sane Moroccan nationals.
(95) F.0.52/24, 29 Nov., 1823; E.J., vol. XI, column 675.
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peace. Even during the pacification period (1792-1798) 
economic activity went on unimpaired due to the strategy 
adopted by Mawlay Sulayman and which consisted in avoid­
ing military confrontation as much as possible. It was 
precisely during this early period that wheat export on 
a large scale permitted the enrichment of the coastal 
towns and provinces through the acquisition of large 
amounts of foreign gold and silver (96).
Mawlay Sulayman's fiscal and commercial policy also 
tended to favour internal trade. By the abolition of 
the' maks the taxation burden of the Moroccan merchant 
was reduced by more than 75%. Thus, the merchants of 
Fds who used to pay 22,000 mithqal-s under the reign of
C  — —Sidi Muhammad b. Abd Allah paid only 5,000 mithqal-s 
during the reign of Mawlay Sulayman (97). State mono­
polies over a number of products were also abolished . 
Moroccan Muslim merchants enjoyed, moreover, a reduced 
import taxation on sea trade (2.5% against 10% for Christ­
ian and Jewish merchants) (98). At one time imports 
through the eastern borders paid a 1% tax only (99).
Mawlay Sulayman's restrictions on exports during the 
middle part of his reign must have also favoured Moroccan 
merchants. Limitations on the export of agricultural 
products led to abundance on the internal market and 
consequently improved the purchasing power of the popula­
tion. This benefited both merchants and artisans.
Merchants were also favoured by Mawlay Sulayman's 
administrative policy. Government responsibilities were
(96) Al-puCayf mentions that the merchants of Rabat accumulated great
fortunes fran the wheat trade during this period; cf.p.337.
(97) Al-Ducayf, pp. 168, 387; al-Zayani, al-Raw^a, fol.116; al-Nasiri, 
VIII, p.16.
(98) Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to Mu^amnad al-Salawf, no date, 
concerning port duties for Moroccan merchants, in Alfiyat al- 
suluk by al-Zayani, p. 209.
(99) F.0.174/13, fran Jackson to Matra, 18 May, 1802.
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often entrusted to merchants in preference to other 
social groups. For Mawlay Sulayman, wealth meant a 
minimum of greed and temptation to take over other 
people's property (100). "The merchant ", he wrote to 
the people of Fes in 1820, "does not envy others' 
money and contents himself with his privileged social 
position in order to fructify his capital" (101) . This 
attitude led him to entrust the local government of
c
Fes to a number of wealthy merchants, such as Abd al- 
Qadir Sffra, Muhammad Mezwar and Muhammad al-Saffar.
The same principle led him to favour the Bildiyyin
(102) who were not only people of scholarship but of
wealth as well (103) .
It was only after 1815 that Moroccan merchants 
suffered from a series of distressing political and 
economic developments. During the second decade of the 
nineteenth century Makhzen authority became increasing­
ly weak. Lacking enough funds and a reliable army Mawlay
down of commercial activity. Merchants, both Muslim and
Jewish, were also subject to some restrictive measures in
1815-1816. In 1815 many Jewish merchants left the country 
after Mawlay Sulayman decided to impose on Jews the 
wearing of Moroccan dress and the payment of the capitation 
tax. Muslim merchants were also partly affected by the 
Sultan's decision in 1815 to raise import duties on maritime 
trade from 2.5% to 10%. Moreover, the travel abroad of
(100) Al-Zayani, Alfiyat al-suluk, p.214.
(101) Letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to the people of Fes (1919) in Akansus 
pp.320-322; al-Nasirl, VIII, pp.139-141.
(102) The term Bildiyyin (pi. of Bildi) designates Fasi converts frcm 
Judaism into Islam and their descendants. Since the thirteenth 
century, when many Jewish families were forced to embrace Islam, 
the Bildiyyin formed a distinct social group within the Fasi 
society. Despite their indefectible attachment to Islam', their *■ 
integration was constantly resisted by the other components of 
the Fasi society, particularly the sharlf-s. This resistance was 
to a large extent motivated by economic reasons as the Bildiyyin 
proved to be unbeatable in the fields of crafts and trade; they 
also excelled in the field of learning. Cf. Anonymous, Dhikr 
qigsat al-muhajirln, Ms.D.1115, BGR; N. Cigar, "Conflict and 
Carmunity in an Urban Milieu under the CAlawis (ca. 1666-1830",
in The Maghreb Review, Nov.-Dec., 1978, pp.3-13.
(103) On Mawlay Sulayman's relations with the Bildiyyin cf. chapter 
VII below.
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Moroccan nationals, whether for commercial or other 
purposes, was subject in 1816 to tight control. More 
dramatic, however, were the severe famine of 1817-1818 and 
the dynastic crisis which dominated the last years of 
Mawlay Sulayman's reign.
D - A Certain Prosperity
European literature, generally based on impressions formu­
lated by European consuls and merchants, tends to often 
convey a gloomy picture of Mawlay Sulayman's reign. Two 
erroneous concepts contribute to this unrealistic picture. 
The first one tends to depict this reign as a long chain 
of civil wars and military confrontations between the 
Makhzen and Berber tribes. The second concept over­
emphasizes the regression of European trade and the 
adverse effects this had on European interests. The 
implicit inference behind both these mythical concepts is 
an unstable reign, a disorganized economy and stifled 
commerce.
A closer view at the political and economic develop­
ments of the period under study shows, on the contrary, 
that Morocco under Mawlay Sulayman enjoyed not only a long 
period of peace but of prosperity as well. Politically, 
the country was not exposed to any serious danger of 
internal destabilization before 1819. During the dynastic 
crisis of 1792-1798, the country remained divided, but 
there were no devastating wars. The country continued to 
produce and export large quantities of agricultural 
products. During the middle part of Mawlay Sulayman's 
reign (1800-1811) the country was economically prosperous 
and politically peaceful. The second decade of the nine­
teenth century was undoubtedly disturbed by increasing
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tribal agitation but economic activity was not seriously 
affected until the catastrophic famine of 1817-1818. It 
was only after the financial means of the Makhzen were 
greatly reduced as a consequence of this famine that 
tribal dissidence acquired a threatening character.
Nor was the decline of Moroccan exports to Europe an 
indication of a degraded internal economy. In fact, Mawlay 
Sulayman's restrictions on the export trade were an 
important factor behind the prosperity during most of his 
reign, since it allowed lower prices of agricultural 
products and sustained the activity of all economic 
sectors.
The most evident indication of internal prosperity 
was the low price of victuals. At the beginning of the 
nineteenth century the price of bread reached its lowest 
level since the reign of Mawlay IsmacIl (104). Towards 
the end of the eighteenth century, the mudd of Moroccan 
wheat cost between 2 and 4 uqiya-s, whereas it cost 16 
uqiya-s in Algeria (105). In 1805 the Austrian ambassa­
dor to Morocco wrote that "cereals in this country are 
of a very low price"(106). Three years later Captain 
Burel reported that a quintal (118 English pounds) of 
wheat cost 2.50 francs, viz. 1.5 uqiya-s the mudd (107). 
During years of abundance the mudd of wheat which had 
cost 5 to 6 uqiya-s under the reign of Sidi Muhammad
(104) J. Brignon et al, His to ire du Maroc, p. 273.
(105) Compare wheat prices in Morocco given by a±-pucayf, p.321 with 
prices in effect in Algeria for the same period given by AJimad b. 
Muhanmad al-Fasi in his Rifrla; cf. extracts of this Rifrla Ms.G.88 
BGR, p.164.
(106) J. Cailld, Une ambassade, p.108.
(107) Idem., La mission, p.107.
119
was available at only 2 and 3 uqiya-s (108) . Much the same 
could be said of meat prices. The Gibraltar authorities 
noted that Moroccan cattle were far cheaper than either 
Algerian or Spanish livestock. Even when communications 
between Gibraltar and Spain were open, the pound of 
Moroccan meat still cost only one third of the price of 
its Spanish counterpart (109) .
During the last decade of the eighteenth.century 
the political divisions in the country and agricultural 
abundance made unrestricted export of cereals possible. 
This gave rise to a class of intermediaries in the 
Atlantic ports who accumulated enormous wealth. In Rabat 
and Sale, for instance, some wealthy individuals, such 
as^Abd Allah Bargash and his son al-Makki~, bought a 
number of vessels in Europe for mercantile purposes (110). 
"The people of Rabat", wrote al-Ducayf, "used to buy ships 
from Christians. Some of them bought an entire ship, 
others bought half, one third or one fourth of it. They 
gained a lot of money and began building houses with 
arched doors on the Western model"(111). The coastal 
tribes also benefited from this prosperity. Al-Ducayf 
was impressed in 1800 by the affluence of coastal tribes­
men, particularly by their admirable horses, their colour­
ful velvet garments, their delicate saddles and golden 
stirrups (112) .
(108) During the reign of STdi Muhammad b. cAbd Allah the mudd of wheat 
cost between 5 to 6 uqiya-s in time of abundance (cf .AHN,Estado, 
Leg.2327, Observations sur un livre anglais intilute A Tour frcm 
Gibraltar to Tangier, by Lempriere p.44). During the reign of 
Mawlay Sulayman the mudd of wheat cost between 2 and 3 uqiya-s 
according to the French consul; cf.COC, vol.26, 19 Feb., 1818.
(109) F.0.52/21, 21 Nov., 1820.
(110) F.0.52/10, 2 Aug., 1792; AHN, Estado, Leg., 4331(1), copy of a 
notarial act concerning the purchase of a vessel bycAbd Allah 
Bargash, dated 6 Shawwal, 1207/17 May, 1793.
(111) Al-pucayf, p.337.
(112) Ibid., p.409.
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The most prosperous period of Mawlay Sulayman1s 
reign was undoubtedly from 1800 to 1815. With the 
exception of the bad harvest of 1812, this period was 
free from any serious drought or natural calamity. "The 
tribes", wrote al-Zayani, "grew richer and their flocks 
became more extensive" (113). The plague, by reducing the 
population, had certainly contributed to to the enrich­
ment of those who were left. According to the testimony 
of Jackson, the period after the plague saw a beneficent 
"alteration of fortunes" (114). "When the epidemic ended 
in the Gharb (...), Fes, Meknes and their surroundings", 
wrote Akansus, "life became more pleasant and goods more 
plentiful as a result of the inheritance left by the 
dead" (115). J*. Buffa who travelled through the northern 
Atlantic plains in 1806 reported that the countryside 
was prosperous and "covered with immense flocks of 
sheep and herds of cattle" (116) . He also noted the 
availability in the markets of large quantities of agri­
cultural products (117). Moroccan sources tend 
to confirm the observations made by European travellers. 
"During these years", wrote al-NasirT, "the population 
experienced the utmost tranquillity, peace, low prices 
and happiness" (118). This was particularly true of 
the middle period of Mawlay Sulayman's reign. "We have 
had the occasion to meet many people who lived during 
the middle period of his reign", added al-Nasirl ,'and 
all are unanimous in their praise of it" (119)
113) Al-Zayani, al-Rawfla, fol. 204.
114) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p. 174.
115) Akansus, p. 288.
116) J. Buffa, Travels,
117) Ibid., p. 53.
118) Al-Nasiri, VIII, p. 114.
119) Ibid., p. 112.
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This prosperity also benefited to the urban population. 
"Trade expanded", wrote the author of al-Ibtisam, "and 
money became abundant with the abolition of the maks and 
the extension of security to both the individual and 
his property" (120). A similar impression is conveyed by 
al-Zayani. "During his (Mawlay Sulayman1s) days", he wrote, 
"people competed in the building of houses and palaces 
such as were never seen before" (121). An indication of 
this urban prosperity was the impressive expansion of 
Fes towards the end of the eighteenth century. In a letter 
to the people of this city in 1797, Mawlay Sulayman 
referred to the fafct that urbanization had spread to the 
periphery of the town and to hitherto uninhabited zones 
(122).
II - Makhzen Finance
A - The Taxation System
The origin of the taxation system in Morocco goes back 
to the establishment of Islam there. For the Islamic 
State the sharTca devised an ingenious system of 
taxation based on both capital and income. It consists
c —of the ushur and the zakat. The first one was a tax of
one tenth levied on the produce of the land. In principle,
(120) Al-Hajwi, Ikhtisar al-Ibtisam, p. 359.
(121) Al-Zayani, al-Rawda, fol. 202.
(122) Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to the people of F£s, 16 Hijja, 1211/ 
. 12 June, 1797 in Ms. D 194, BGR, p. 50.
^  4lU I * Lw ^  m <«« 11 C J ^ J I  I JLtfc I •
• • • d j -.it C w  I I ^ <jl*J I I. l-> 1 ■' « (j* 111 I 1^  /
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it was paid at once at the harvest. The zakat, on the other 
hand, was a tax of 2.5% paid on precious metals (money 
included), merchandise, as well as on livestock after 
one year's uninterrupted possession of a certain minimum 
(ni^ab). These Quranic taxes fell mainly on the 
countryside and their efficient recovery depended 
therefore on the Makhzen's ability to control the tribes.
Experience proved that these taxes were far below 
the necessities of the Islamic State. Various dynasties 
therefore attempted to supplement their revenue by 
arbitrary taxes, generally known as magharim (pi. of 
maghram) and mukus (pi. of maks).
The maks,being a non-Quranic tax, is outlawed by 
the sharl^a. It can be authorized only in extreme cases 
when the bayt al-mal is suffering an exceptional shortage 
of funds or when the imam needs urgent assistance to 
thwart a danger which threatens the Muslim community.
Only in such cases can the Calim-s authorize the imam to 
levy non-Quranic taxes (123). Sultans were usually 
able to convince the Calim-s of their urgent need for 
funds and only rarely was there any open refusal to a 
sultan's request (124) .
Upon his accession to the throne in 1757, Sidf 
Muhammad b. cAbd Allah deemed the legal taxes insufficent 
for the task of the reconstruction of the State after 
thrity years of devastating civil wars. The opinion of 
the Calim-s was Solicited and Sfdi Muhammad was able to 
obtain a fatwa which, without giving an unqualified 
approval, limited itself to the reiteration of the legal
(123) cAbd al-Rahman al-Fasi, Tagyid fi al-mukus, Ms. D 283, BGR, 
fol. 27; al-Mahdi al-Wazz&nl, al-Nawazil al-jadida,!, pp.348- 
349.
(124) The most famous instance on which a sultan's request to levy 
non-Quranic taxes was refused is when the qadi of Aimeria, Ibn 
al-Barra3, rejected Yusuf b. Tashfin's (1108-1143) demand for 
the macuna (assistance) . Cf. Akansus, al-Jaysh, p. 218.
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limitations and conditions of the shartc a regarding 
the maks (125). That was all that Sfdl Muhammad b. cAbd 
Allah needed to start his fiscal plans. After him, Mawlay 
al-Yazid decided to abolish the maks, most probably to 
satisfy the religious forces which were behind his 
proclamation (126). Mawlay Sulayman chose to rely ex­
clusively on Quranic taxes. In the light of available 
evidence, it is impossible to determine whether the 
decision of Mawlay Sulayman was motivated by his religious 
convictions or by the conditions imposed on him by the 
people of F§s in 1792 (127).
What exactly does the maks cover? For the calim-s 
it includes all arbitrary obligations which are not 
provided for in the Quran or the Prophet's tradition
(128). The maks, known sometimes as "the sultan's tax", 
covers a wide range of illegal taxes which differ with 
space and time. These taxes are generally levied on 
commercial transactions, and include gate duties, and a 
special tax paid on scales (129). The maks covers also 
monopolies held by the Makhzen over the exploitation 
of a number of products such as hides, tobacco, silk, 
cochineal and sulphur (130). This tax was not collected 
by the Makhzen but tendered out to a number of 
merchants who ensured its farming. Thus, Sfdi Muhammad 
b.cAbd Allah conceded in 1174/1760-1761 the maks of Fes 
to Muhammad al-Saffar for 12,000 mithqal-s (131).
(125) Al-NSsiri, VII, pp.7-9.
(126) Al-pu^ayf, p.226.
(127) Akansus, p.219. Akansus wrote in particular: "None of the pre­
ceding dynasties since the Almoravids until new respected the 
the opinion given by Ibn al-Barra3 including this Sharifian 
cAlawid dynasty, with the exception of Mawlay Sulayman, May God's 
mercy be upon him. Sane people say that the people of Fes 
insisted upon the abolition of the maks at the time of his 
bayca, others say he abolished it by personal motives of virtue 
and piety. Only God knows better".
(128) cAbd al-Rahman al-FasI, Fi al-mukus, fol.27.
(129) Al-Ducayf, p. 168.
(130) Ibid.
(131) Al-Zayani, al-Rawda, fol.116.
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The maks fell essentially on the urban population 
and was particularly resented by craftsmen and traders.
Its abolition by Mawlay Sulayman must have come as a 
great relief to these social categories. With the 
abolition of the maks the taxation burden was mainly 
borne by the peasantry. Under Mawlay Sulayman, the 
zakat and the ^ushur levied on agriculture provided the 
greatest share of Makhzen income. The most important 
implication of this return to the Islamic model of taxation 
was the increase in the proportion of the bill paid by the 
countryside. "The tribe which paid ten thousand mithqal-s 
by contract in the time of his father",wrote al-Zayanr, 
"paid(under Mawlay Sulayman)twenty or thirty thousand 
mithqal-s according to the ratio fixed by the sharlca"
(132). The burden was, therefore, increased twice or 
threefold. There is no doubt that the agricultural 
abundance and the absence of severe droughts before 1817 
contributed to the prosperity of the tribes the taxable 
wealth of which consequently increased. Al-Zayani's 
statement, however, leaves no doubt that the augmentation 
of the tribal contribution to the bayt al-mal was inti­
mately linked to the application of the religious ratio of 
taxation (al-nisab al-sharcI)and that the contract system 
(mugata£a) adopted by SIdl Muhammad imposed a lighter 
fiscal burden (133).
The contract system applied to taxes on both crops 
and livestock. Under this system an understanding was 
reached between the central government and each tribe, 
or confederation of tribes, over the contribution which
(132) Al-Zayani, al-Rawja, fol.204.
(133) Ibid. On the muqataca system al-Zayani wrote:
4—J Ju_£ O  I 0^5 ^ I 4* 1*1 IaJ I £ V • • •
4 J 11} SLfJobu 4yts. ^ l l l  iL^tJ 1 6 4 l T )
* • • • Uj1  ^V ^
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should go to bayt al-mal. This amount was fixed by 
contract most probably after the evaluation of the 
tribe's agricultural potential, and was not liable to 
rise and fall from one year to another. Although it 
used to be called fushur, the contribution hardly 
constituted a Quranic tax since it was not subject to a 
regular annual revision. The advantages of such a system 
were numerous. First, it reduced the chances of conflict 
with the tribes since there was a prior understanding 
between the two parties and an engagement by the qa 3id-s 
the tribe to secure the amount agreed upon. In other 
words, the sultan held his qa3id-s responsible for the 
farming of rural taxes without having to interfere direct­
ly with the tribes. Secondly, it considerably alleviated 
the military burden of the State. The collection of taxes 
alone necessitated an army under constant mobilization and 
consumed a sizable share of Makhzen income. By adopting 
the contract system, Sfdl Muhammad avoided being constantly 
on horseback seeking taxes. Thirdly, the muqataca system 
guaranteed the Makhzen a regular income which was liable 
to be affected only if there was an exceptionally long 
drought, such as the one experienced between 177 6 and 
1782. The amount agreed upon was certainly below the 
legal quota, but it had the advantage of being regular 
and easily recoverable.
This system was abandoned by Mawlay Sulayman, together
with non-Quranic taxes and State monopolies. In its place
che imposed the Quranic ushur and zakat on crops and 
livestock, relying almost exclusively on these agrarian 
taxes and thus shifting the burden of the fiscal system 
to the countryside. By doing so, he increased the chances 
of confrontation with the tribes. This fiscal choice was 
partly responsible for Mawlay Sulayman's political and military 
difficulties. A traditional taxation system necessitated not 
only a reliable army under constant mobilization, but also 
an efficient administrative apparatus to ensure regular
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and adequate collection. John Buffa reported that 
"detachments of troops were constantly employed in 
collecting taxes" (134). The Quranic taxation system 
implied the curbing of tribal dissidence and imposed on 
Mawlay Sulayman the need to be constantly at the head of 
his mehalla.
The merit of Sfdl Muhammad's taxation policy was to 
lessen Makhzen dependence on a countryside the control 
of which was never guaranteed and to rely on the urban 
based sectors of the economy (trade, crafts) as an 
important source of revenue. Mawlay Sulayman did just the 
opposite. By freeing the urban population from the maks, 
he placed his destiny in the hands of the tribes. His 
dependence on the countryside was further increased after 
the fiscal concessions made to the merchants, particularly 
by the reduction of import duties (135). The bayt al-mal 
was also deprived of the zakat on land trade which Mawlay 
Sulayman conceded to the sharif-s (136) . When during the 
latter part of his reign crops failed and tribes refused 
to pay taxes, Mawlay Sumayman was placed in, an untenable 
situation. It was only then that he realised the dis- 
advantanges of the traditional system of taxation and 
began, progressively, to restore some non-Quranic taxes 
(137). He also turned his attention to other sources of 
revenue, particularly the export trade which he attempted 
to encourage after 1817.
(134) J. Buffa, Travels, p. 185.
(135) Cf. letter fron Mawlay Sulayman to al-Salawi fixing inport 
duties for Moroccan Muslim merchants, no date, in al-Zayanl, 
Alfiyat al-suluk, p. 209.
(136) Letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to the people of Fes, no date (1821), 
in al-Zayanl, Tufrfat al-nubahcP, K 241, pp. 181-185, appendix 88.
(137) Cf. below evolution of Mawlay Sulayman's commercial policy.
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B- Sources of Income
The zakat and the cushur constituted the most important 
source of Makhzen revenue under Mawlay Sulayman. The 
fact that these taxes were mainly levied on agricultural 
produce made this source of revenue most irregular and 
uncertain.
The zakat and the cushur were essentially levied in 
kind. Cereals constituted the principal produce which 
supplied the Makhzen treasury. After its collection by 
Makhzen officials, the produce was conceded to merchants 
in return for cash. Sometimes, as had been the case with 
Mawlay Sulayman, the sultan permitted the export of this 
produce (138) . The zakat levied in towns was generally 
farmed by merchants. A large portion of these taxes never 
reached the sultan's treasury as they were used to pay 
local government officials and garrison troops. Sometimes 
Makhzen officials were directly entrusted to merchants 
who paid their salaries (139).
Trade was another source of Makhzen revenue, both 
directly through the employment of Makhzen money in 
commercial transactions,and indirectly through the 
collection of import and export duties. The sultan 
was himself an important merchant. Makhzen money, 
drawn from taxation and foreign trade, was handed over 
to a number of trusted merchants known as tujjar al- 
sulfian (king's merchants) in order to be fructified 
in trade. Many of them were Jewish. We have already 
mentioned the case of Meir Macnin who used the
(138) For instance, Mawlay Sulayman allowed in 1802 Portuguese merchants 
to export wheat collected as zakat. Cf.F.0.52/12, 2 May, 1802.
(139) Letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman tocAbd al-Rahman cAshcash dated 6 Qacda, 
1233/7 Sept., 1818, in D.A.R.
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customs income of Essaouira (140). ^Abd al-Rahman cAshcash 
also used the income of Tetouan's port to carry on 
commercial transactions on behalf of Mawlay Sulayman. 
cAshcash invested public money in the eastern caravan 
trade. He exported wheat, wax, saltpetre fullers earth and 
received in return Indian goods which, being sold duty free, 
could undersell all other imports (141) .
If duties on land trade were conceded to the sharif-s
(142), maritime trade duties continued to pass to Mawlay 
Sulayman. On imports from Europe he introduced no 
innovation. Christian and Jewish merchants continued to 
pay a uniform tax of 10% ad valorem. For Muslim merchants 
the import duty was revised in the light of the sharlca 
and reduced to 2.5% (143). Import duties were often levied 
in kind, particularly on linen and woollen cloth which was 
used for the clothing of the army. Export duties, on the 
contrary, varied considerably and were subject to no rule 
except the Makhzen's immediate interest (14 4). After the 
pacification period during which Mawlay Sulayman depended 
to a large extent on duties drawn from the export of 
cereals, the Makhzen fixed high tariffs for many articles. 
The export of many products was also prohibited. Owing to 
agricultural abundance, Mawlay Sulayman disposed of enough 
income between 1800 and 1815 to be able to dispense with 
foreign trade as an important source of revenue. It was 
only after 1815, when the economic and political situation
(140) In 1802, al-Salawi wrote to a European merchant about Meir Macnin 
in these words: "Meir Macnin is our Jew and all the funds with 
which he traded were money belonging to the public treasury
of Essaouira". Cf. F.0.52/12, letter dated 26 Muharram, 1217/
29 May, 1802.
(141) F.O.52/13, 10 March, 1805.
(142) Cf. Mawlay Sulayman's letter referenced in note 136 above.
(143) Cf. Mawlay Sulayman's letter mentioned in note 135 above.
Moroccan Muslim merchants continued to pay 2.5% on imports 
until 1815.
(144) The only regular export duty was the one levied on the annual 
contingent of 2,000 head of cattle exported under contract 
to the British garrison of Gibraltar. This continued at
5 Spanish dollars per head.
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deteriorated, that Mawlay Sulayman carried out a number 
of reductions in export duties to procure additional 
income. There is no doubt that Mawlay Sulayman's 
commercial policy, in addition to the effects of natural 
calamities, contributed to a decline in the volume of 
exchanges with the outside world and, as a result, reduced 
the customs income.
A further source of Makhzen income was provided by the 
inheritances of people who died without heirs. According 
to the sharica , the bayt al-mal is the heir of all estates 
and properties to which there is no legal claimant. ^Alawid 
sultans usually conceded part of this right to sharif-s 
or zawiya-s. Sidi Muhammad granted, for instance, the 
inheritance of Fes (mal irathat Fas) to the sharTf-s and 
Mawlay cAbd al-Rahmian granted later on a similar privilege 
to the Wazzani zawiya in Touat (145) . Mawlay al-YazTd and 
Mawlay Sulayman decided, however, to take over all of 
inheritances of the munqa^i^un, thus depriving the sharTf-s 
of a privilege bestowed on them by Sidi Muhammad. The 
succession of Mawlay Sulayman to the inheritances of 
heirless people after the end of the Great Plague procured 
"important revenues" for the Makhzen (14 6).
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Mawlay 
Sulayman continued to receive two taxes which seemed 
increasingly anachronistic to those who paid them, 
namely the capitation tax (al-jizya) levied on Moroccan 
Jewish subjects and the tribute traditionally paid by 
some Christian powers. Both of these taxes were originally
(145) Al-Zayanl, Tuhfat al-hadl, p. 13; Villes et Tribus du Maroc, 
vol. IV, p. 247.
(146) F.O.52/12.,4 May, 1803.
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justified by the superiority of Islam. The first one 
was paid by the ahl al-dhimma (Jews) as a symbol of their 
special status and was intended to serve as a permanent 
reminder to the Jews of their lowliness as long as 
they remained attached to their religion. With the 
opening of Morocco to European trade, this dhimma 
status began to be increasingly challenged, particular­
ly by wealthy Jewish merchants who travelled abroad 
and sometimes chose to reside on the other side of the 
Straits. Many of them adopted the European dress, 
changed their names once in Europe and refused to pay 
the capitation tax even if they maintained commercial 
interests in their mother country. In 1815 Mawlay 
Sulayman decided that all Moroccan Jews should pay the 
capitation tax and wear the customary Moroccan dress.
As a result, many Jews chose to leave the country for 
Europe (147) .
The Makhzen continued to receive an annual tribute 
from some European countries, such as Sweden, Denmark, 
Holland and the Republic of Venice. This tribute was 
initially intended as a guarantee against piracy. With 
Mawlay Sulayman, however, Morocco ceased to represent 
any significant threat for European trading vessels.
Some of these States simply ceased to pay their tribute. 
Holland, for instance, never paid any tribute to Mawlay 
Sulayman. Venice continued to pay its dues until the 
abolition of the Venetian Republic by Napoleon in 1797. 
Only Denmark and Sweden maintained their annual contribu­
tion of 25,000 and 20,000 Spanish dollars respectively 
(148) .
(147) CCC, vol.24, 1 Feb., 1816; F.0.52/17, 6 June, 1816.
(148) C.0.91/79, Robert Sillery's Report.
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Finally, MawlSy Sulayman received various types 
of conventional contributions known as hadiyy a-s, presents 
offered by the country's notables and tribes on the 
occasion of religious feasts, the macuna and sukhra, 
contributions for revictualling the sultan's troops and 
emoluments given to Makhzen officials for various services. 
The sharlTf-s and the murabitun were exempt from these 
contributions.
Undoubtedly, sources of revenue under Mawlay Sulayman 
were less diversified than they used to be under his 
predecessors. The abolition of non-religious taxes made 
him too dependent on the countryside at a time when the 
fiscal burden of the urban sectors of the economy was 
greatly alleviated. Any crop failure or inability of 
the Makhzen to control the countryside could have 
disastrous effects on the Sultan's finance. Urban arbitrary 
taxes—  which during the reign of Sidi Muhammad equalled the 
revenue drawn from legal taxation (149)—  could have 
constituted an important substitute, in times of difficulty, 
for the uncertain agricultural taxes.
C - The Monetary System
At the end of the eighteenth century the Moroccan monetary 
system retained the basic characteristics it had acquired 
during the reign of STdi Muhammad b. cAbd Allah. The system
(149) Al-ZayanT, al-Ravda, fol. 204.
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was based on a bi-metallism of silver and bronze,in 
which the bronze coins possessed an intrinsic value of 
their own and served as the most current medium of every- 
dya transactions among Moroccans (150). Gold coins 
became very rare during the latter part of the eighteenth 
century. The standard coin was the silver mithqal, weighing 
29 grms. In the mithqal there were 10 silver dirham-s, 
equalling in value 10 copper uqiya-s (ounces). The dirham 
was subdivided into 4 muzuna-s (or blanquils for Europeans), 
each being the equivalent of 24 copper fils.
Table 3 The Moroccan Monetary System Under Sidi
Muhammad b.cAbd Allah
Silver Coins Bronze Coins
Mithqal (29 grams)
Dirham (1/10 of a mithqal) = One uqiya (96 fils)
Muzuna (1/4 of a dirham) = 24 fils
The traditional system based on bimetallism operated 
properly as long as European influence remained limited. 
In an isolated Morocco bronze remained a relatively 
precious alloy, not far behind silver. Its relation to 
silver was very much like the relation that existed 
between silver and gold. The whole system began to
(150) G. Ayache, "Aspects de la crise finaciere au Maroc apres 
1'expedition espagnole de I860", in Etudes d'histoire 
marocaine, Rabat, 1979, pp. 97-138. Although it deals with 
the late nineteenth century developments, this study remains, 
nevertheless, the only attempt made until now to explore the 
mechanisms of a most difficult monetary system and gives 
useful insights into the situation which prevailed during 
the early nineteenth century.
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crumble under the effect of European penetration. Bronze 
coins continuously lost value to the advantage of silver. 
The correlation that existed between copper and silver 
was disrupted for two main reasons. First, there was a 
progressive decrease in the volume of coined silver. Both 
Moroccan purchases abroad and uncontrollable smuggling 
(151) drained off large quantities of silver. Secondly, 
the value of Moroccan bronze necessarily decreased under 
the effect of foreign market prices (152). In order to 
compensate for the disappearance of silver currency, the 
Makhzen was induced to put a greater amount of bronze 
coins into circulation. This inflation in bronze values 
formed the main feature of the Moroccan monetary system 
during the nineteenth century.
No doubt, the disappearance of precious metals cannot 
be solely blamed on European factors. The mining of gold 
and silver seems to have declined during the second half 
of the eighteenth century (153). Mines were either 
abandoned or located in mountainous areas which the Makhzen 
was not always able to penetrate. Gold arrivals from West 
Africa also diminished. In 1797 Mawlay Sulayman's qa*id 
in the Tafilelt, the main terminal of Saharan trade, was 
able to collect 2,500 kilograms of gold dust as part of 
the zakat (154) . However, gold and silver coins became 
very rare during the early nineteenth century. The 
diversion to Tripoli of most of the Sudanic trade after 
1795 (155) must have reduced the flow of gold dust into
(151) In 1809-1810 Jewish merchants, in particular, were suspected of 
exporting foreign specie; cf.F.0.174/17, letter from al-Salawi to 
J. Green, 26 Rablc II, 1224/10 June, 1809, appendix 46.
(152) Ayache, "Aspects de la crise financiered p.125.
(153) Brignon, p.283.
(154) Al-Ducayf, p.344.
(155) A.A. Boahen, Britain, the Sahara and the Western Sudan 1788-1881, 
Oxford, 1964, p. 45.
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Morocco. Gold and silver mines did exist in the Sous and 
the Atlas mountains, but, apparently were neither regularly 
nor adequately worked (156). An indication of the dis­
appearance of silver coins was the conversion by" the 
Makhzen of European silver currencies into Moroccan 
dirham-s (157) . As to the silver mithqal, it ceased to 
circulate and became a mere unit of account.
Behind this rarefaction of hard currency there were 
two possible reasons. First, there was Mawlay Sulayman's 
commercial policy which , by limiting exports and encouraging 
imports, led to a decline of Moroccan reserves in European 
specie. Even purchases arriving through Morocco's eastern 
borders were paid for in Spanish dollars (158). Secondly, 
there was the uncontestable outflow of precious coins to 
both Europe and the Middle East. Apart from the smuggling 
alluded to above, there was the flow of Moroccan coins to 
the Arab East through the annual pilgrimage caravan. In 
his study on the economic history of Cairo in the 
eighteenth century, Andre Raymond noted that every year 
Moroccan pilgrims used to sell large quantities of both 
precious and non-precious coins on the basis of their 
weight (159) .
Copper also became rare. In fact, Mawlay Sulayman 
was the first ^Alawid sultan to have allowed the incor­
poration of lead into bronze coins and put into
(156) Jackson reported that Moroccans were unacquainted with "the proper 
method of refining" precious metals and that, in consequence, 
mines were often abandoned .. Cf. Jackson, An Account of the 
Empire, p. 127.
(157) F.O.52/12, 3 Feb., 1804.
(158) Jackson mentioned that in 1802 about 4/5 of Moroccan imports 
through Algeria (evaluated at one million dollars annually) were 
paid for in the Spanish hard currency; cf .F.O. 174/13, Jackson to 
Matra, 18 May, 1802.
(159) A. Raymond, Artisans et canmergants au Caire au XVIII- siecle, 
Damascus, 1973-1974, vol. I, pp. 37-38. The author affirmed that 
among all Arab coins that ended in Egypt, the Moroccan ones were 
the most abundant.
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circulation a lead coin (160).
If daily domestic transactions continued to be 
negociated in terms of the bronze currency (ugiya-s and fils) 
foreign trade, on the contrary, was essentially carried 
out through the medium of the Spanish dollar (161). With 
the disappearance of the silver mithqal from circulation, 
the Spanish dollar, which weighed a little less the 
mithqal (25 grams), became the reference currency for 
the Moroccan monetary system. Since the chief money of 
account, the uqiya, was bronze, the Spanish dollar 
constantly gained in value while the uqiya depreciated.
Mawlay Sulayman attempted to restore the value of the 
bronze currency by an arbitrary measure. Upon his 
accession to the throne in 1792, he decided that the 
silver muzuna should equal 4 fils only instead of 24 fils 
(162) . Thus, the dirham (or the uqiya) now consisted of 
only 24 fils instead of 96. After this reevaluation of 
the bronze currency, the fils was worth four times as 
much as formerly. However, Mawlay Sulayman was unable to 
maintain this situation. Less than two years later, he 
devalued the bronze currency by one third of its value.
The muzuna became equivalent to 6 fils instead of 4 (163).
The Sultan's attempted reform in 1792 received a 
further blow at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
With the restrictions imposed on exports after 1800 and the 
decline in the entry of foreign money, people preferred
(160) Brethes, Contribution a l'histoire du Maroc par les recherches 
numismatiques, pp. 238-239; letter fran Mawlay Sulayman to SAbd al- 
Rahm5n cAshccfsh, dated 11 Hijja, 1227/16 Dec., 1810 in D.A.R. 
(appendix 64) .
(161) The Spanish dollar (piaster) was known in Morocco as al-riyal al- 
rumi.
(162) Afcimad al-Ruhunf, cUndat al-rawih, II, p.179; Dawud, III, p.198.
(163) "The currency", wrote Matra, " has been debased by 33% during 
his short reign" (F.O.52/10, 26 June, 1794). When Ali Bey 
visited Morocco in 1803, the muzuna was still worth 6 fils; cf.
Ali Bey, Travels, I, p.35.
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to bury their precious Spanish coins leaving only bronze 
coins in circulation (164). By 1802, gold and silver 
coins had become so rare that Mawlay Sulayman ordered his 
customs officers to accept nothing but silver in payment 
for import duties (165). The bronze currency was further 
depreciated when Mawlay Sulayman decided that the silver 
dirham should equal 6 muzuna-s instead of 4 (166) . By 
taking this decision he was, in fact, indirectly under­
mining the value of the bronze currency. On the basis of 
this new ratio the dirham (or the uqiya) could only be 
exchanged against 36 fils. The monetary system was 
progressively returning to its former state which pre­
vailed before 1792. The shortage of Moroccan silver 
coins at the beginning of the nineteenth century was 
such that Mawlay Sulayman was left with the only solution 
of minting dirham-s from the Spanish dollar (167) . By 
doing so, the Sultan contributed to the increased depre­
ciation of the Moroccan currency since the Spanish silver 
coin was used to make 13.5 dirham-s. The result was that 
people buried their old ditham-s, preferring to pay their 
taxes to the Makhzen in the new debased dirham. Mawlay 
Sulayman soon found himself overloaded with this currency 
and was, therefore,obliged to order the coining of the 
Spanish dollar into 10 parts only. Still, the dirham 
obtained weighed less than the standard dirham (2.5 grams 
instead of 2.9 grams). In reality, it usually weighed even 
less than the tenth part of a Spanish dollar because of 
the loss resulting from clipping. "Money being hammered 
and not melted", noted the British consul, "the loss 
would be considerable by clipping" (168). As the Spanish
(164) FiO.52/12, 25 May, 1802.
(165) F.O.52/12, 22 Nov., 1802.
(166) Al-pucayf, p. 424. "On the first of Muharram, 1218 (23 April, 
1803) arrived in Rabat the Sultan's order making the dirham 
into 6 awjuh (pi. of wajh, lit. face)".
(167) F.0.52/12, 3 Feb., 1804.
(168) Ibid.
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dollar which wieghed 25 grams replaced the mithqal (29 
grams) as the monetary reference, the way was opened 
for a rapid devaluation of the Moroccan currency.
Table 4 The Monetary System 
nineteenth century
at the Beginning of the 
(1803)
Silver iCoins Bronze coins
Mithqal (10 dirham-s) = 10 uqiya-s#
Dirham (6 muzuna-s) = 1 uqiya = 36 fils
Muzuna = 6 fils
1/2 muzuna ## = 3 fils
# The uqiya, unlike the dirham, did not exist as a coin.
As a unit of account it stood at 36 fils.
## The half muzuna was put into circulation,according to 
al-Ducayf, in 1797 (cf.p.348).
If the devaluation of the bronze currency was 
essentially an internal affair affecting only transactions 
among Moroccans, the devaluation of the dirham had a direct 
effect on the value of the Moroccan money in foreign 
dealings. The relationship between the Moroccan dirham and 
the European currencies constantly shifted to the dis­
advantage of the former. From 8.5 uqiya-s in 1782, the 
Spanish dollar rose to 12 uqiya-s around 1800 (169) . In 
1820, however, it was worth 13.5 uqiya-s (170). Over a 
period of twenty years the Moroccan currency suffered only 
slightly. This was partly due to the decline of commercial 
contact with Europe during the first two decades of the 
nineteenth century (171).
(169) F.O.174/6, 23 April, 1800.
(170) Graberg de Hemso, Specchio, p. 163; OCC, vol. 27, 8 Oct., 1820.
(171) Fran 1792 to 1800 the Spanish dollar changed fron 8.5 to 12.5 
uqiya-s and fran 1820 it changed from 13.5 to 18 uqiya-s.
The Moroccan mithqal was worth 3 shillings and 8 pence in 1808. 
Ten years later (1818), it was worth 3 shillings and 6 pence.
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III - Foreign Trade
A - Motives and Attitudes
(1) Moroccan calim-s
The question of trading with non-Muslim countries was an 
eternal issue of debate for Moroccan Calim-s ever since the 
extension of Islam northward to Spain and southward to 
western Africa. Trade with non-Islamic lands and residence 
among non-Muslims were either prohibited or subject to 
a number of restrictions under the sharlca . This applied 
not only to Christian countries, but also to the pagan 
peoples of Africa. A contemporary calim of Mawlay 
Sulayman, al-Mukhtar al-Kuntf (d.1811), called upon 
believers not to visit the western Sudan because its 
princes were still attached to pagan practices (172).
Since the fall of Muslim Spain and the beginning of 
European expansionism, Moroccan calim-s became increas­
ingly preoccuped with the lawfulness of maintaining commercial 
relations with Christian nations.
Maliki calim-s (173) considered the travel and 
residence of Muslims among non-believers as a great sin
(174). The religious justification is based on the superio­
rity of Islam which might be impaired by the presence of 
Muslims in non-Islamic lands. Residence among infidels 
puts the believer in a dangerous position for he is not 
only subject to non-Islamic jurisdiction, but might also 
be present at prohibited practices such as the drinking 
of alcohol and the eating of pork.
(172) Muhammad b. cUthman b. Fudf, Infaq al-maysur fi tarikh bilad al- 
takrur, Ms K 2384, BGR, p.9.
(173) The school of Malik b. Anas (d.795 AD) is dcminant in the Maghrib 
and is reputed to be the most formalist madhhab.
(174) Al-Wansharisl, Al-Micyar in Archives Marocaines, XII, 1908, pp. 
196-198.
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Believers are supposed to avoid the company of non- 
Muslims even on board of Christian ships. "Under such 
conditions", wrote al-Ruhuni, "travel even to the holiest 
places with the intention of accomplishing a religious 
duty is unanimously disapproved of by the Calim-s, let 
alone travel which is motivated by worldly interests"
(175). In a Christian country, a Muslim would be also 
tempted by non-Islamic practices such as usury or the 
taking of insurance, both prohibited by the sharlca .
The sending of money to non-Islamic countries is also 
prohibited under Muslim law (176).
Commercial dealings with Christians are particular­
ly disapproved of when they consist of supplying the 
enemies of Islam with strategic articles. The selling 
of every article which is liable to strengthen the 
military potential of the enemy is prohibited. This 
applies in particular to horses, metals and military 
equipment (178) . "The imam, may God bless him, assist 
him and make him victorious", wrote al-RuhunT, "is under 
the obligation of reminding his subjects of these pres­
criptions and then of punishing whoever transgresses his 
orders without any leniency in this respect" (179) .
(2) Mawlay_Sulayman_and_European_Trade
Religious considerations were the main motivations of 
Mawlay Sulayman's attitude towards European trade. The 
restrictions he imposed on travels to Europe by his
(175) Muhairmad al-Ruhunl, al-Risala al-mtiharraTa al-wajiza, p. 120.
(176) Ibid.
(177) Cf. fatwa by Muljammad b. Ibrahim al-Dukkalf concerning Mawlay 
Sulayman's proposal for the selling of horses to Spain in return 
for three Spanish occupied enclaves on the Moroccan Mediterranean 
coast, in al-Nawazil al-jadlfla, III, pp.35-36 (appendix 47).
(178) Ibid., p.35.
(179) Al-RuhunT, al-Risala, p.127.
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Muslim subjects were essentially designed to limit the 
prejudicial effects on religion (180). The measures taken 
by Mawlay Sulayman to reduce contact with "the land of the 
enemy" (ard al-hairb) were considered by Moroccan ^alim-s 
as a great achievement of his reign (181). "Merchants who 
travel to the land of the enemy", he wrote to al-Salaw3T, 
"indulge in business according to the law of the infidels, 
while this is prohibited by religion" (182).
The danger to which the faith of believers was exposed 
as a result of their contact with non-Muslims was another 
factor in Mawlay Sulayman's aversion to European trade. The 
contiguity of Moroccans and Europeans in some coastal towns 
led to the introduction of many reprehensible practices 
such as the consumption of alcohol and the use of tobacco. 
Ali Bey noted in 1803 that the taking of tobacco, despite 
its prohibition by Mawlay Sulayman, was more common among 
the people of the ports because of their contact with the 
Europeans (18 3). The presence of Europeans in the ports 
also led to the employment of Muslims as servants, a 
practice particularly injurious to the dignity of the 
Muslim community as a whole (184). "This very principle", 
wrote Ali Bey,'* is the cause of his being so averse to trade 
with Christians, as he is afraid that traffic with the 
infidels should vitiate or impair the true believers' 
faith" (185).
Fear of scarcity was another argument that was 
constantly evoked. Experience demonstrated that unlimited
(180) Muhairmad b. Jacfar al-Kattani, Salwat al-anfas, I, p.231.
(181) Ibid.
(182) Letter fran Mawlay Sulayman to Muhairmad al-SalawI, no date, 
fixing import duties for Moroccan Muslim merchants, in al- 
Zayani, Alfiyat, p.209 (appendix 91).
(183) Ali Bey, Travels, I, p. 173.
(184) F.O.174/20, 6 Dec., 1815.
(185) Ali Bey, Travels, I, p. 173; cf. also Brooks, Sketches in Spain 
and Morocco, I, pp.361-362.
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exports usually led to a rise in prices and scarcity of 
agricultural products on the local market (186).
European consuls tried in vain to convince Moroccan 
authorities of the benefits of liberalized commerce. 
The opening of the ports to all nations, explained 
Matra to Ibn cUthman in 1796, would make commodities 
cheaper and, by giving an impulse to production, would 
consequently increase the Sultan's revenue (187).
Makhzen officials were unable to perceive the benefits 
of such an approach. The practical effects of free 
exporting convinced them, on the contrary, that such 
a policy led only to scarcity and a rise in food prices.
Unrestricted exports also led to the disaffection 
of the population. Inland regions suffered not only 
from the consequent rise of food prices, but also from 
the diversion of economic activity to the coastal 
towns. In 1793 the people of Fes protested against the 
export of large quantities of wheat and Mawlay Sulayman 
was "obliged to yield to their clamours"(188). The 
following year, another violent protest against the ex-
(186) Al-Ducayf, reported that in 1796, when there were more than 50 
ships at Rabat to export wheat and other products, the price of a 
single bullock reached as much as 30 mithqal-s (three times the 
usual price) and dried fruits were not to be found on the 
occasion of the cAshuraa, cf.pp. 333-334. Al-Ducayf also noted 
the effect of unlimited export on the price of wheat: "the price 
of wheat reached seven uqiya-s and half, but the Christians 
still found nothing to export", p.333.
(187) F.O.174/124, 6 Feb., 1796. Cf. a similar advice by J.S.Douglas, 
British consul in Morocco (1818-1829) to al-T51ib b. Jallun, 
chief minister of MawlaycAbd al-Rahman, in F.O.52/24, 15 Oct., 
1823: "The more of every article is exported the more of that 
article will be produced in the country (...) the more that is ex­
ported, the greater will be the revenue of the State".
(188) F.O.52/10, 30 Sept., 1793.
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port of wheat occurred near Tetouan. To show their 
discontent against the export of 15,000 loaves of bread 
daily to the Spanish garrison of Ceuta, the Jbala tribes­
men attacked the port of Martil, killing a number of 
Makhzen troops and Spanish seamen and destroying five 
ships (189). The export of wheat created discontent even 
among the population of the coastal towns. At Rabat, 
where the export of wheat during the early period of 
Mawlay Sulayman's reign only profited a minority of inter­
mediaries, "most people were opposed to the sale of 
wheat to the Christians" (190). In 1795 the people of 
Rabat attacked a European merchant and destroyed his weights
(191). It is true that during the pacification period 
Mawlay Sulayman allowed the export of wheat despite 
popular protests because he urgently needed funds to 
consolidate his rule; but his attitude changed after 
1800 when he had unified the country and disposed of 
enough resources to dispense with the income frcm exports.
To insistent European demands for the export of 
wheat Mawlay Sulayman replied that "kings who are en­
trusted by God with the affairs of their subjects and 
the defense of their interests must not overlook this 
duty" (19 2). The argument was not merely a subterfuge to 
put off Christian demands. Mawlay Sulayman resorted to the 
same justification when ^Solicited by Yusuf Karamanli to 
allow wheat exports to Tripoli.. (193)..
(189) AHN, Estado, Leg.4331(l), letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to Salmon,
(190) dated 3 Sha^ ban, 1208/6 March, 1794; F.O. 52/10, 5 March, 25 May,
26 June, 1794. This attack was, apparently, made at the instiga­
tion of the people of Tetouan (appendix 7) .
(190) Al-Ducayf, p. 316.
(191) Ibid.
(192) F.O. 174/285, letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to J. Green, dated 6 Rablc 
II, 1222/13 June, 1807 (appendix 28).
(193) letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to Yusuf Pasha Karamanli, no date, in 
al-Damnatf, KunnSsha, Ms.3718, R.L., unumbered pages, where the 
Sultan apologizes for the impossibility of allowing wheat exports. 
It was written during the latter part of the Sulaymani reign.
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Another factor which contributed to Mawlay Sulayman's 
aversion for trade with Europe was the damaging role played 
by European interests in perpetuating the political 
division of the country from 1792 to 1798. During this 
period many European merchants moved to Safi and Tit where 
they were offered every encouragement by the rebels. In 
these ports, European merchants were exempt from any 
restrictions on exports and customs duties were very low. 
Without income from trade, the rebellious qa^id-s of Abda 
and Doukkala would have been unable to continue their 
rebellion for so long. "If these people were to remain 
without income from trade", wrote Ibn ^Uthman in 1796, 
"their supporters would soon desert them and their sub­
mission would necessarily follow" (194) . Immediately after 
the pacification of the southern coastal provinces, Mawlay 
Sulayman moved to close down European commercial interests 
there. The ports of Safi, Tit, Agadir and Dar al-Bayda 
were closed to commerce and European merchants ordered to 
move to Essaouira (195) . The Venetian Chiappe brothers, 
who were suspected of involvement in cAbd al-Rahman b. 
Nasir's rebellion, were ordered to leave the country in 
1800 (196). Nor could Mawlay Sulayman easily forget the 
active role played by Spain in the supporting of the 
rebellion. After he had secured control of the country, he 
cancelled all concessions he had made to the Spanish 
government. He particularly denounced the 1799 treaty 
which granted Spain important commercial privileges and 
refused to open Moroccan ports for the export of wheat as 
had been stipulated in the treaty (197).
(194) AHN, Estado, Leg.4345, letter frcm Ibn cUthman to the Spanish Prime 
Minister Godoy, dated 16 Muharram, 1211/22 July, 1796 (appendix 13)
(195) CCC, vol. 22, letter frcm al-Salawi to the French consul dated 2 
Rablc II, 1216/13 July, 1801 informing him of the closure of a 
number of ports. Cf. also letter frcm Hamdun b. al-Haj to the 
French consul Guillet dated 7 Jumada I, 1214/7 Oct., 1799 in E. 
Fumey, Choix de correspondances marocaines, Paris, 1903, p. 17.
(196) F.O.52/11, 17 April, 1800.
(197) F.O.52/11, 21 Nov., 1801. Cf. article 30 of the treaty in J.C. 
Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics,
New Haven and London, 1975, vol. I (European Expansion 1535-1914), 
p. 139.
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Finally, the European political situation convinced 
Mawlay Sulayman that trade with Europe was usually a 
source of trouble. Moroccan merchants trading with Europe 
were shown little respect at sea despite Morocco's 
neutrality during the Napoleonic wars. Vessels and cargoes 
belonging to Moroccan merchants were frequently seized and 
confiscated by both warring parties (198). Mawlay Sulayman 
intervened personally on behalf of these merchants, 
sometimes to no avail. In 1799, after numerous cases of 
disrespect shown to Moroccan colours at sea, he decided to 
call home all Moroccan vessels (199). During the first 
decade of the nineteenth century, he sent two embassies to 
Napoleon to request the return of Moroccan property, but 
without success (200). All this, together with a growing 
suspicion of European designs in the Islamic world and the 
fear that European hostilities would be extended to Morocco 
itself, encouraged Mawlay Sulayman to prefer an isola­
tionist attitude.
B - The Decline of Caravan Trade
For many centuries Morocco had served as the main outlet 
for Saharan and west African products. The implantation of 
European settlements on the west African coast, together 
with the increasing weakness of the Makhzen, necessarily 
led to the decline of commercial relations between Morocco 
and Western Sudan. Since the collapse of the Sacadian 
dynasty (mid-seventeenth century), the Moroccan political 
presence in the Sahara had become very intermittent. The
(198) Cf. numerous petitions by Moroccan merchants asking for redress in 
F.O.52/14, and GCC, vol. 21 and 22.
(199) F.0.174/6, 9 Dec., 1799.
(200) On the double embassy of Haj al-Ramf to France (1803 and 1807) cf. 
below chapter IV.
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c — cAlawid Mawlay Isma II was partially successful in restor­
ing Moroccan sovereignty over the western Sahara and 
the Touat, thus diverting a sizable part of the Sudan 
trade northward. His efforts were, however, vitiated by 
the political instability which followed his death.
Later sultans were unable to extend their authority 
beyond the Sous, although the Friday prayer continued 
to be said in the name of the Moroccan Sovereign over
most of the western Sahara. During the second half of
cthe eighteenth century, Sldf Muhammad b. Abd Allah 
showed complete disinterest in the Saharan provinces, 
preferring to orient the country towards maritime trade 
and the north.
Mawlay Sulayman succeeded in pacifying the southern
Saharan provinces and extended his authority to terri-
— ctories which, since the time of Mawlay Isma IT, had 
remained virtually independent. In 179 6 he pacified the 
Tafilelt, the main outlet for Saharan trade (201) , and 
in 1800 the people of the Touat recognized his authori­
ty and agreed to pay legal taxes (202). By 1801-1802, 
the Dra valley and trade routes, noted al-Zayanl, were 
opened to traders "who were able to move freely from one 
province to another"(203). Two years later, Mawlay 
Sulayman1s governor, al-Sarldl, pacified the Saharan routes 
again and appointed Makhzen qa3id-s for the Dra and Ziz 
valleys (204). Mawlay Sulayman even succeeded in extend­
ing his rule to Figuig where Makhzen authority had been 
non-existent for most of the eighteenth century (205) .
In 1807 he led a southward tour in person which took him
(201) Al-Ducayf, p. 339.
(202) Two letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to the people of Touat, dated ' 
respectively 23 §afar, 1215/16 July, 1800 and 28 Safar, 1215/21 
July, 1800, in El-Ouataiq, I, 1976, pp.444-447.
(203) Al-Zayanl, al-RawcJa, fol.181.
(204) Ibid.
(205) Ibid., fol.182-183.
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as far south as Goulimine, another outlet of Saharan 
caravans (206). However, these efforts to control 
Saharan provinces proved to be of no avail. The frequent 
campaigns that Mawlay Sulayman had to undertake showed 
how fragile the result of these attempts at pacification 
were.
The land trade consisted of two annual caravans.
The first one linked Fes to Timbuctoo and took place 
between September and April of each year (207) . The 
second caravan departed from Fes for the Arab East on 
the occasion of the pilgrimage. Both were exposed to 
the risks of attacks by roving bedouins and were some­
times interrupted because of the insecurity of roads.
Traditional Moroccan exports were largely based on 
artisan products such as leather articles, woollens, 
copper utensils, and tobacco. In return, the caravans 
brought back gold dust, slaves, elephant teeth, ostrich 
feathers and gum. Pilgrim merchants transported wheat, 
slaves received from the Sudan, saltpetre and articles 
of Moroccan artisanry to the Arab East. On their way 
back to Morocco, these pilgrims carried Indian muslins, 
silk, spices and perfumes with them. During the second 
half of the eighteenth century, Morocco's acceptance of 
European commerce led to the introduction of many European 
products among the commodities exported southward or east­
ward. Besides the slippers of Fes and the hayk-s of the 
Tafilelt, Moroccan merchants exported linens, muslins, 
sugar and tea (208) .
The volume of caravan trade with western Sudan de­
creased considerably since the sixteenth century. This 
was due both to the inability of Moroccan sultans to
(206) Al-pucayf, pp.445-446.
(207) Jackson, An Account of Timbuctoo, p. 282.
(208) Jackson, An Account of the Bnpire, p. 289.
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control the west Saharan tribes and to the political 
instability that prevailed in the Niger bend area 
following the fall of the Songhai Empire (209) . More­
over, the European settlements on the west African coast 
became the poles of attraction for an important share of 
Sudanic trade. By 1793, the whole Saharan trade did not 
exceed 1 million pounds sterling according to the 
estimates of the African Association (210). By the begin­
ning of the nineteenth century, the Atlantic traffic had 
already succeeded in gaining the upper hand over the 
caravan trade (211).
Among all trans-Saharan routes, the one linking 
Morocco to Timbuctoo seems to have suffered the most. 
Indeed, the most important share of Sudanic trade was 
directed to the North African regencies, and particular­
ly to Tripoli. This was mainly due to the political 
stability enjoyed by Tripoli under the long reign of 
Yusuf Karamanli who ruled unchallenged from 1795 to 1830. 
The Pasha of Tripoli succeeded in gaining control of 
the hinterland tribes and in 1811 conquered the Fezzan.
By 1818,more than half the route linking Tripoli to 
Bornu came under his control (212). Furthermore, Yusuf 
Karamanli entertained excellent relations with the 
rulers of Bornu and the Sokoto Empire. In 1825, the 
Tripoli route to Bornu was described by Laing as "a 
regular trading route ... along which a child might 
travel"(213). The security of this route necessarily
(209) A.A. Boahen, Britain, the Sahara and the Western Sudan,pp. 104-105.
(210) C.W. Newbury,'‘North African and Western Saharan Trade in the Nine­
teenth century : a Reevaluation'' Journal of African History,
VII, 2 (1966), p.234.
(211) J.B. Webster and A.A.Boahen, The Growth of African Civilization.
The Revolutionary Years. West Africa since 1800, London, 1967, p. 61.
(212) A.A. Boahen, Britian, the Sahara and the Western Sudan, p.45.
(213) Ibid., p.107.
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diverted the greatest share of Sudanic exports to Tripoli
and undermined at the same time Morocco's role as a
commercial intermediary between the Arab East and West 
African peoples.
All indications point to the decline of the caravan 
trade along the Morocco-Timbuctoo route. By 1788, James 
Matra reported that "the caravans to the south have de­
creased considerably for many years. Their decay origina­
ted in the great diminution in the number of slaves import­
ed" (214). Indeed, the arrivals of slaves— an important 
item of Sudanic trade— decreased considerably. Half of 
the 10,000 exported slaves were directed to Tripoli from 
which they were reexported to Turkey and the Balkans (215) . 
The number of slaves arriving in Morocco declined as the 
possibilities of reexport to the eastern regencies were 
reduced. In 1798 the Timbuctoo caravan returned to
Morocco with only 700 slaves (216). By 1817, the flow of
black slaves in Morocco had become so scarce that Moroccan 
merchants sought an attractive source of supply from 
Algiers (217).
Gold dust arrivals from western Africa seem also to 
have declined during the early nineteenth century. In 
1797 Mawlay Sulayman1s governor to the Tafilelt returned 
to Ffes with 50,000 mithqal-s of gold dust only (218) but 
four years later, the Sultan's governor to the Sous was 
able to collect "a great deal of gold dust" (219) . Hcwever, the 
rarefaction of precious coins after 1800 and the absence
(214) Ibid., p.106.
(215) Webster and Boahen, Ihe Growth of African Civilization, p. 67.
(216) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p. 287.
(217) OCC, vol.25, 16 Dec., 1817.
(218) Al-Du^ ayf, p.344.
(219) Anonvnous, Dhikr khilafat, Fonds Arabe, Bib 1 iotheque Nationale de 
Paris, fol.68. The governor was dispatched to the Sous in 1800; 
cf. Akansus, p.288).
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of gold dust among Moroccan exports between 1804 and 1812
(220) indicate that arrivals of African gold diminished in * 
the same proportion as other Sudanic products.
Among these let us mention some of the most 
important. The volumes of ivory, ostrich feathers and 
gum Senegal that were re-exported from Essaouira diminish­
ed steadily during the first decades of the nineteenth 
century. By 1814 ostrich feathers could not be found 
at Essaouira. The British vice-consul at that port 
spent many months trying to procure a small amount to 
satisfy a personal request(221). He finally wrote to.
James Green: "I am. sorry I have not been able to procure 
for Madame de Charmilly the remaining feathers which 
from their present scarcity cannot be procured suitable 
on any terms"(222).
Table 5 The Export of Sudanic Products from
Essaouira: Evolution in volume (1804-1812)
1804 . 1805 1812
 1------------ »- »-----------------
Gum Senegal 195,956 lbs. 123,509 lbs. 116,234 lbs.
Elephant teeth [ 800 " J 1,709 " J 35 "
• • m
Ostrich feathers 1 555 " 1 1,120 " 1 1,217 "
1 I 1
i i i
• • •
Sources: Jackson, An Account of the Empire, pp.241-251;
Add. Ms.41,512, British Museum.
Another indicator of the decline of the Timbuctoo 
trade was the number of camels employed in the trans- 
Saharan traffic. Figures provided by European observers
(220) Cf. Table 5 belcw.
(221) F.O.631/1, 17 Jan., 1814 and 8 April, 1814.
(222) Ibid., 17 Jan., 1814.
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show a steady decline in the size of the Timbuctoo
caravan.
Table 6 Size of the Morocco-Timbuctoo Caravan : 
Number of camels employed (1798-1827)
1798
1799 
1805 
1827
2,000 camels
1,700
1,800
1,400
Sources: Jackson, An Account of the Empire, pp.285, 287;
Idem., Ah Account of Timbuctoo, p.156; R. Caille, 
Journal, II, p.384.
The other caravan which annually linked Morocco to 
the Arab East was also seriously undermined during the 
period under study. The restlessness of Angad Arabs in 
eastern Morocco and the political instability of western 
Algeria exposed the eastern caravan to frequent attacks
(223). Political events of Egypt and the Hijaz also led 
to the interruption of the caravan (224). The French 
invasion of Egypt in 1798 resulted in the suspension of 
the pilgrimage caravan for several years. The emergence 
of the Wahhabi-s in the Hijaz also contributed to the 
disruption of this caravan during the early nineteenth 
century (225). After pilgrimage was officially resumed 
in 1811, Mawlay Sulayman decided again on its inter-
(223) Anon., Dhikr khilafat, fol.68; al-Zayani, al-Turjumana al-kubra, 
p. 140. In 1805 an eastern caravan proceeding to Fes was captured 
and plundered by the Darqawi rebels in western Algeria (cf. F.O. 
52/13, 10 March, 1805).
(224) In 1799 the Moroccan pilgrimage caravan turned back at Tripoli 
on the news of the French invasion of Egypt (cf. al-Fishtalf, 
fol.125). It was not resumed until 1802 (F.O.52/12, 3 Nov., 1802).
(225) Al-Ibtisam, p.31.
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ruption in 1815 for two years (226).
The development of maritime communications also 
helped to weaken the pilgrimage caravan by diverting the 
transport of people and goods from land to sea. Sea 
transport had the advantage of saving time (30 to 40 days 
from Morocco to Egypt by sea as compared to 4 to 5 months 
by land). It also reduced costs and, above all, offered 
a more secure medium of transport. Towards the end of the 
eighteenth century, an increasing number of Moroccan 
pilgrims chose to travel by sea. In 1798 there were nine 
ships at Essaouira for the transport of pilgrims to 
Alexandria (227). Muhammad b. CAbd al-Salam b. Nasir 
described the various dangers to which the traveller by 
land was exposed and regretted not having chosen sea 
transport (228) . He admitted that travel by land was more' 
arduous, more insecure because of the frequent attacks by 
highwaymen, and more onerous, the pilgrim having to pay 
various transit taxes, pay for his food, and ensure the 
maintenance of his mount at prices which varied from one 
country to another (229). In 1805 wealthy merchants from 
Sal§ were able to arrange for the transport of pilgrims 
on hired European vessels at only 18 Spanish dollars (21.6 
mithqai-s) per person (230).
By the end of the eighteenth century, the caravan 
trade seems to have lost its traditional lucrative appeal. 
Trade with Europe attracted instead an increasing number 
of merchants, including inland merchants such as the Fasi-s 
(231). Some outstanding tajir-s, such as*Abd al-Karim b.
(226) A.G.P. Martin, Quatre siecles d'histoire marocaine, p.127. Hie 
reasons behind this stoppage of the eastern caravan are not known. 
By that time Muharrmad cAli of Egypt was involved in a decisive 
military confrontation with the Wahhabi-s whan he defeated in 
1818.
(227) J. Caille, Une ambassade, p.111.
(228) Ibn Nasir, al-Rihla al-?ughra, p.59.
(229) Ibid., pp.59, 127.
(230) Al-DuCayf, p.532.
(231) In 1798 Mawlay Sulayman experienced a great difficulty in over- 
ccming the laxity manifested by Fasi merchants and their uncoope­
rativeness in setting off the pilgrimage caravan. According to
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al-TAlib, al-Talib b. Jallun, and the Buhlal brothers 
who made their initial fortunes in land trade, progressive­
ly diverted their capital to maritime commerce. A Fasi 
merchant, Muhammad Mezwar who accumulated much of his 
wealth as shaykh of the eastern caravan, had by 1816 
important stakes at sea (232) . James Grey Jackson 
mentions another example, al-Haj Shbani, who shifted 
his commercial interests from land to sea (233). Despite 
unfavourable international circumstances maritime trade 
was still more profitable, particularly with the advanta­
ges conceded by Mawlay Sulayman to Moroccan merchants.
C - Maritime Trade ; An Era of Uncertainty and
Hesitations
The fact that most of Mawlay Sulayman's reign coincided 
with the Napoleonic wars determined to a large extent 
the fate of Morocco's commercial relations with Europe.
Until 1814 sea communications, particularly near 
the strategic Straits of Gibraltar, became extremely 
hazardous. The activity of European privateers, the 
frequent harassment of trading vessels and the seizure 
of property belonging to the enemy by the contending navies 
rendered any maritime commercial enterprise very risky.
Even a neutral country like Morocco suffered from these 
damaging war risks and was accused of partiality by both 
belligerent parties (234).
al-Ducayf. Mawlay Sulayman addressed the merchants of Fes in the 
follwing terms: "I appealed to you to go on pilgrimage but you 
refused (...) preferring to it the land of the Christians. I leave 
you, therefore, to the land of the Christians until you become 
Christians yourselves1", p.385.
(232) Ibid., p.532. Cf. note 216 in chapter IV below.
(233) Jackson, An Account of Timbuctoo, pp.V-VTI.
(234) On French accusations against Morocco cf. CGC, vol.21, fol.54. 
For Great Britain, cf. F.O.174/3, 24 Dec., 1797 and F.O.52/11, 
1st Oct., 1797.
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The Napoleonic wars deprived Morocco of some import­
ant customers in Europe. The commercial interests of 
Marseille in Morocco were irremediably damaged by British 
naval supremacy in the Mediterranean and the Straits zone. 
The French invasion or annexation of some European 
countries made them enemies of Great Britain. Their 
merchant vessels, being exposed to reprisals from the 
British navy, could no longer venture on the seas, parti­
cularly in the Straits zone.
The isolationist orientation of Mawlay Sulayman is to 
be explained by the rising aggressiveness of Europe.
Makhzen fears of a European invasion led to frequent stop­
pages of exports while the war was raging in the Iberian 
Peninsula (235) .
Acute rivalry between France and Great Britain over 
export privileges also led to the same negative attitude 
from the Makhzen. When confronted by pressing demands for 
supplies from contending parties, the most convenient 
attitude was often a general refusal. "If we accede to 
your request, or even grant you a proportion of what you 
are demanding", wrote Mawlay Sulayman to James Green in 
1811, "they (the French) will certainly renew their appli­
cation as it cannot be kept secret from them. Therefore, 
we cannot acceed to both "(236). Mawlay Sulayman wanted, 
in fact, to avoid falling into an interminable chain of 
concessions which would lead to scarcity on the local 
market.
Nor can we appraise the full extent of the decline 
of commercial relations with Europe without taking into
(235) On Moroccan fears of a European invasion cf. belcw chapter IV.
On stoppages of exports following alarming rumours cf. F.O.52/13, 
12 May, 1807 and 18 Jan., 1808; cf. also F.O.52/15, 22 Feb., 1810 
and 20 Sept., 1811.
(236) F.O.52/15, letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to James Green, dated 
16 Shacban, 1226 / 4 Sept., 1811.
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account the natural calamities that Morocco experienced 
during Mawlay Sulayman's reign. The Great Plague of 1799- 
1800, the famine of 1817-1818, and the plague of 1818- 
1820 deeply affected the Moroccan economy and contributed 
to the slow down of commercial exchanges with the outside 
world. Many European and Jewish merchants left the 
country to escape the plague and never returned after­
wards. Isolation measures taken by European countries 
whenever epidemics occured also led to the interruption 
of normal commercial exchange. From 1818 to 1821? for 
instance, Great Britain, Morocco's first commercial part­
ner, suspended all contacts with the North African States. 
Natural calamities also weakened the economic potential 
of the country, dispersed the population and disrupted 
traditional economic relations (237) .
(1) Nature_and_Extent_of_European_Trade
Moroccan trade with Europe can be divided into two main 
categories: an official trade negotiated between the
Makhzen and the representatives of the European powers, 
and a general trade conducted by merchants on a private 
basis. The first dealt with the export of provisions the 
returns of which served to cover the costs of government 
purchases,mainly military equipment. At the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, this provision trade essentially 
concerned the British garrison of Gibraltar and the 
neighbouring Cadiz and Lisbon. General trade, however, 
tended to be long distance trade and was carried on mainly 
with the British Isles. This distinction was reflected 
at the geographic level as well. The northern ports of 
Tangier and Tetouan specialized in the export of pro­
visions (238) , while the southern port of Essaouira
(237) On the departure of European and Jewish merchants frcm Essaouira 
following the Great Plague cf.F.O.52/11, 26 Sept., 1799.
(238) "Tout le catmerce de Tanger consiste 5 envoyer des comestibles a 
Gibraltar et Cadiz", CGC, vol.20, fol.179.
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where the major trading houses were located, was ex­
clusively restricted to private transactions. Indeed, 
Mawlay Sulayman never allowed provisions to be export­
ed from Essaouira, arguing that "the country roundabout 
is poor and not cultivated and many times the inhabitants 
themselves do not find sufficient to eat, much less can 
they supply others"(239).
The export of provisions included, among other 
things, livestock, vegetables, poultry and fruits. After 
the signing of the Anglo-Moroccan treaty of 1801, Mawlay 
Sulayman had allowed a regular annual contingent of
2,000 head of cattle to the British garrison of Gibraltar 
This contingent was exported at a low duty of five 
Spanish dollars instead of the usual 26 dollars per head. 
Other European nations, such as Spain and Portugal, 
obtained the same concession when they asked for it, but 
Great Britain was the only country to benefit regularly. 
Above this fixed contingent, the Sultan usually granted 
additional exports when he was in need of funds to 
finance the purchase of arms and military equipment(240). 
Being negotiated on a governmental level, this type of 
trade was not subject to any significant alteration 
during Mawlay Sulayman's reign. The duty on cattle ex­
ports was never increased and continued to be in force 
even after Mawlay Sulayman's death.
General trade, on the other hand, was subject to 
great fluctuations, especially after 1800. Having uni­
fied the country under his authority and disposing of 
enough income to dispense with foreign trade, Mawlay 
Sulayman prohibited the export of many articles while 
he subjected others to prohibitive tariffs.
(239) F.O.52/13, letter fran al-Salawf to J. Green, 2 Rabic I, 1222/
9 May, 1807.
(240) C.0.91/79, Robert Siller's Report.
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At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the 
make up of Morocco1s exports and imports had undergone 
little change. In 1808, Jackson wrote that "nearly the 
whole of the exports to Morocco consists of manufactured goods and 
that the returns for these are entirely raw materials"
(241). Morocco exported hides, wax, almonds, gum and 
some African imported commodities, such as ostrich 
feathers and ivory. In return, the country received a 
wide range of cloth, glassware (the manufacture of glass 
being unknown in Morocco), firearms, iron bars, copper 
sheets, paper and increasing quantities of sugar and 
green tea (242) .
The trade was carried out according to the most 
rudimentary methods. Bills of exchange were not negoti­
able and commerce was accordingly carried out by barter, 
the excess being paid for in Spanish dollars (243) . Control 
on credit facilities were also tightened by Mawlay 
Sulayman and this greatly curtailed the merchants' free­
dom of action (244),
The volume of the European trade had always been 
modest. After the open door period (1792-1800), Mawlay 
Sulayman's restrictions on exports, together with the 
effects of European hostilities and the departure of 
many European merchants during the 17 99-1800 plague, led 
to a decrease in the volume of trade. Despite the lack
(241) J.G.Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.256.
(242) The use of tea by Moroccans is quite recent. According to the 
author of Tadhkirat al-muhsinln, it was under SIcLT Muhammad b. 
QAbd Allah that the consumption of tea became popular. After his 
death, tradition of tea was firmly established. Both Mawlay al- 
Yazld and Mawlay Sulayman had "masters of tea" (mul atay) in 
their courts. In 1802, Ali Bey reported that "there is no 
Musulman in any tolerable circumstances who has not at all hours 
of the day tea ready to offer to everyone who may visit him"; cf. 
his Travels, I, p.22. In reality, this was the case of wealthy 
townsmen and an insignificant rural minority. Figures of imports 
at Essaouira show that in 1812 Moroccans still drank more coffee 
than tea. Cf. table 15 below.
(243) F.O.52/15, 26 May, 1810.
(244) F.O. 174/13, Jackson to Matra, 18 May, 1802.
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of detailed statistics, the number of trading vessels which 
called at Essaouira still gives an approximate idea of 
its size (245).
Table 7 Number of European Vessels at the Port of 
Essaouira (1798-1822)
1798 60 trading vessels
1804 23 II
1805 21 It
1812 24 II
1822 25 II
Sources: CCC,
Add.
vol. 21; F.O.52/13; F.O.52/24; 
Ms. 41,512, British Museum.
The same decline is illustrated by the fall in the
number of European trading houses at Essaouira.
Table 8 Trading Houses at Essaouira (1790-1828)
1790 12 trading houses
1800 8 II II
1805 6 II II
1812 4 IV it
1822 2 It IV
1828 1 IV II
Sources: LempriSre, Voyage, p.66; F.O.52/11, 1st Dec.
1800; F.O.52/13, 4 April, 1805; Add.Ms.41,512, 
British Museum; F.O.52/23, 23 Nov.,1822; F.O. 
52/29.
(245) Unfortunately, there are no trade statistics for the port of 
Tetouan, the use of which was exclusively limited to Moroccan 
merchants. Tetouan served as an important outlet for Fasi 
merchants trading with Europe.
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The port of Tangier which specialized in the export 
of provisions to Gibraltar, was less affected by the 
decline of European trade. In 1812, Tangier received 
122 vessels from Gibraltar (246). By 1822, the number 
of vessels employed in the provision trade had only 
slightly increased to about 156 voyages per year (247) .
(2) Trading_Interests
The Napoleonic wars brought about a complete change in 
the commercial roles of Morocco's European partners.
British supremacy on the seas led to the interruption of 
trade with France and her allies, while Great Britain 
consolidated her position and became Morocco's first 
commercial partner.
c —During the reign of Sfdr Muhammad b. Abd Allah, 
Moroccan trade with Europe was carried with Holland,
Hamburg and Genoa. The most important trading partner 
by far, however, was Marseille. Before the French 
revolution, Marseille alone controlled more trade than 
all other competitors put together (248). The war 
changed the situation . "Depuis le commencement de notre 
malheureuse revolution", wrote in 1814 the French vice- 
consul Mure, "notre commerce a dti. se ressentir de 
1'abandon que nos troubles et nos guerres perpetuelles 
apportaient A toutes nos relations commerciales. La 
perte totale de notre navigation a laisse ce commerce 
entre les mains des anglais"(249). At the beginning of 
1805 there was a single French commercial establishment 
at Essaouira (250). After the battle of Trafalgar,
French commercial presence in Morocco simply ceased to 
exist. The little trade with France between 1805 and 
1814 that remained was carried by Moroccan merchants,
(246) Cf.list of arrivals and departures of vessels at Tangier in 1812 
in Add. Ms. 41,512, British Museum.
(247) F.O.52/23, 26 April, 1822.
(248) De Lesseps, Notice, p.53. „
(249) COC, vol. 24, "Memoire sur le camerce des europeens au Matoc(l8l4), 
by L. Mure, fol. 120-126.
(250) F.O.52/13, 4 April, 1805.
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mainly from Tetouan, who hoped to take advantage of 
the exemption granted by Great Britain to the subjects 
of neutral countries in trading with her enemies (251).
Progressively, almost all foreign trade began to 
be carried on with England and Gibraltar. In fact, it 
was during the Napoleonic wars that the British 
commercial supremacy in Morocco was confirmed. Until 
1912, the French were unable to regain the privileged 
position they had acquired during the second half of 
the eighteenth century. The identity of the trading 
vessels that visited the port of Essaouira between 1804 
and 1822 makes British dominence clear.
Table 9 Trading Vessels at Essaouira According to 
Nationality (1804-1822)
,Great Britain ,Denmark Portugal ,Others ,Total
1804 7
i
; 6 4
i
; e
i
; 23
1805 7 ! 6 - ! 8 i 21
1812 17
i
i ” -
1
3i J ; 20
1822 23
i
! 2 
i
i 25 
1
Sources;F.O.52/13; F.O.52/24; Add.Ms.41,512, British 
Museum.
Whether British or not, the commercial establishments 
of Essaouira traded almost exclusively with the British 
Isles. Almost all European houses belonged to British 
nationals. In 1812 the four European trading houses which 
carried out some significant trade with England were all 
British (252) .
Once the war was over, French commercial interests 
found it extremely difficult to regain the position they 
had lost to the English. "Le gout que les habitants du
(251) C.0.91/79, Robert Sillery's Report.
(252) Cf. trade statistics for the port of Essaouira in Add.Ms.41,512, 
British Museum.
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Maroc auront contracte depuis plus de vingt ans pour les 
objets d 'Angleterre", wrote Mure in his report, "les 
empechera de reprendre celui des marchandises que nous 
leur fournissions autrefois"(253). So attached had 
Moroccans become to English products, that after 1814 
even French merchants ordered their supplies of cloth 
at Gibraltar instead of Marseille. By doing so, the 
French merchants disobeyed an ordinance by the king of 
France (1815) under which French nationals should only 
sell French products (254). In Morocco the French consul 
Sourdeau was unable to enforce this royal decree (255).
The interruption of communications between Morocco 
and Great Britain during the plague epidemic of 1818- 
1820 seemed to offer a golden occasion for French traders 
to penetrate the Moroccan market anew. Sourdeau who was 
the only European consul to remain in the country during the 
epidemic, attempted to divert Moroccan trade to Marseille. 
"Point de doute, Monseigneur", he wrote to Richelieu in 
1818, "que le mal qui inflige les maures en ce moment ne 
tourne au profit de notre commerce"(256). The refusal of 
British authorities to establish any contact with the 
Barbary States during the epidemic confirmed Sourdeau's 
hopes. Since it became impossible to gain admittance to 
Gibraltar, many British vessels began to load Moroccan 
products for delivery to Marseille. This revival of 
French trade was, however, only temporary and was based 
solely on the momentary absence of British competition. 
With the end of the epidemic, Sourdeau's hopes proved to 
be an illusion. In 1822 the port of Essaouira was not 
visited by a single French vessel, against 18 from England 
and 5 from Gibraltar (257).
(253) COC, vol. 2 4 Memoire sur le cctimerce des europeens au Maroc, 
fol.120-126.
(254) COC, vol.26, 29 Dec., 1819.
(255) Ibid.
(256) COC, vol.26, 6 Oct., 1818.
(257) F.O.52/24, 23 June, 1823.
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Trade with other powers was generally reduced.
Spain, being mainly interested in Moroccan wheat, was 
prevented by Mawlay Sulayman from carrying on any ex­
tensive trade with Morocco. The treaty of 179 9 was 
never implemented (258). Mawlay Sulayman refused to 
ratify the treaty, maintaining that his minister, Ibn 
cUthman, had gone beyond his prerogative in granting 
Spain important concessions, including that of export­
ing wheat from Dar al-Bayda (259). Having failed to 
persuade Mawlay Sulayman to respect the treaty, in 1805 
the Spanish government decided to freeze all its commercial 
interests in Morocco.
Portugal, Denmark and Holland continued to figure 
among Morocco's commercial partners until 1806-1807 
when the Continental System, the Danish alliance with 
France and the French invasion of Portugal put a 
complete stop to their relations with Morocco.
Besides the preponderance of British commercial 
interests in Morocco, the other major feature of maritime 
time trade during the period under study was the progres­
sive replacement of departing European merchants by 
Moroccan Jewish nationals. At the death of Sfdf Muhammad 
in 1790, this trade was concentrated in the hands of 
12 European houses and about ten Jewish merchants (260). 
Under Mawlay Sulayman, the decline of European presence 
seems to have benefited Moroccan merchants. Indeed, 
Mawlay Sulayman was often accused by European merchants 
and consuls of partiality towards his Jewish subjects.
In 1805, the British consul affirmed that "the Emperor 
was determined to have all the commerce in the hands of
(258) Cf. treaty in Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa,!,
in World Politics, New Haven and London, 1975, vol. I, pp. 134-140.
(259) C.0.91/79, Robert Sillery's Report.
(260) Lempriere, Voyage, p.86; M.Abitbol, Les Corcos et l'histoire 
du Maroc contenporain, Jerusalem, 1977, p. 22.
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his Jews who trade with his money"(261). The British 
consul at Essaouira, in a report on trade there in 1828
(262), also noted Mawlay Sulayman's abolition of the 
privileges conceded by his father to the European 
merchants which meant that Jews could trade with the 
outside world (263). This policy, noted the report, 
led to the progressive concentration of foreign trade in 
the hands of Moroccan Jews at the expense of Europeans.
There is no doubt that the departure of European 
merchants as a result of the plague and the French 
revolutionary wars left the way open for a take over by 
Moroccan Jews of foreign trade. The number of Jewish 
commercial houses at Essaouira increased in inverse 
proportion to the decline of their European counterparts. 
On the other hand, Moroccan Muslim merchants were granted 
enough fiscal privileges to be able to handle a signi­
ficant share of the import trade.
Table 10 Evolution of Jewish Trading Interests at 
Essaouira (1806 - 1828) (264)
European Trading 
Houses
Jewish Trading 
Houses
1805 6 2
1812 4 6
1828 1 9
Sources: F.O.52/13; F.O.52/29 and Add.Ms. 41,512, British
Museum.
(261) F.O.174/4, 4 April, 1805.
(262) Report on the trade of Essaouira drawn by the British vice-consul 
there in 1828, F.O.52/29.
(263) According to the above mentioned report, neither Jewish nor Muslim 
merchants were allowed to trade with the outside world during the 
reign of Sfdl Muhammad. Only Europeans had this privilege. The 
author of the report noted that Guidalla was the only exception in 
this respect.
(264) The Jewish ccmmercial houses of Essaouira were in the hands of: 
David Macnin, Solanon Macnin, Salem Abitbol, Abraham Cohen, Haim 
Guidalla and Mordecay Lagury.
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(3) Evolution_of_Mawlay _Su layman^s
Commercial_PolicY
Under Sidi Muhammad b.cAbd Allah, trade with Europe 
occupied a key position in the global policy of the 
State. Maritime commerce was encouraged by the Makhzen 
as an important source of revenue which Sfdf Muljammad 
used to fulfil the goals of his internal policy.
Commerce with Europe was therefore promoted by all 
possible means and religious considerations were often 
overlooked to further this trade. Unlike his father,
Mawlay Sulayman did not conceive of maritime trade as 
a tool which might serve his domestic policy. Contact 
with the Christians was looked upon as "an unavoidable 
evil" the injurious effects of which should be kept at 
a minimum. Up to 1817 at least, recourse to trade with Europe 
was only circumstancial and dictated by contingent difficulties.
a) The_Export_Trade
Upon his accession to the throne Mawlay Sulayman mani­
fested his intention to curtail the export trade, parti­
cularly by prohibiting the sale of wheat, wool and oil 
to Chrisitans (265). However, during the early period 
of his reign (1792-1798) Mawlay Sulayman was in no posi-^ 
tion to lead a restrictive policy for a number of 
reasons. In the first place, there was the political 
division of the country and the need of the Makzen for 
funds to achieve the pacification of the southern 
provinces. At a time when many tribes remained in­
dependent, the Sultan found in exports a most valuable 
source of income. Secondly, a restrictive policy at this 
stage would have only diverted maritime trade to his 
southern opponents, particularly the rebellious q5^ id-s 
of Abda and Doukkala, who were ready to give all encourage­
ment to European traders. This would have necessarily
(265) F.0.52/10, 27 March, 1792; COC, vol.25, 29 Sept., 1817.
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strengthened the southern rebels and made their submission 
even more difficult to achieve. Thirdly, Mawlay Sulayman 
needed to convince Spain, whose role in sustaining the 
southern rebellion was crucial, that her commercial in­
terests would not be affected in a country united under 
his authority.
A liberal policy was, therefore, tactically necessary. 
Mawlay Sulayman soon repudiated the promises he had made 
to the people of F§s in 1792 and allowed wheat to be ex­
ported on a large scale. Internal opposition did not 
prevent him from opening his ports to Christian merchants. 
"Vessels exported wheat from Tetouan, Tangier, Larache, 
Rabat, Dar al-Bayda and Essaouira with the approval of 
Mawlay Sulayman"(266). On such exports, he received a 
modest duty of one Spanish dollar, or even eight uqiya-s 
per fanega (267). Commercial rivalry between Mawlay 
Sulayman and his southern opponents led to an unpreceden­
ted rush for the export of cereals. In 179 6 there used 
to be between 50 and 60 ships at Rabat all loading wheat
(268). During the month of January 1796 alone, Essaouira 
received 24 English vessels — more than the yearly average 
for the first two decades of the nineteenth century —  
to load wheat for Europe (269) .
Since this open door commercial policy was only 
tactical, it was doomed to evaporate once the country had 
been unified. After the independent "coastal republics" 
of Abda, Doukkala and the Chaouia were subdued in 1797, 
Mawlay Sulayman changed to a completely different attitude.
(266) Al-Ducayf, p. 334.
(267) The Spanish fanega is the equivalent of 1.58 bushels or 4 mudd-s 
Cf. AHN, Estado, Leg.4331 (1), letter fran al-Tahar FannTsh to A. 
Salmon, 20 Junada I, 1208/23 Jan., 1794; letter fran Mawlay 
Sulayman to A. Salmon dated 3 Shacban, 1208/6 March, 1794.
(268) Al-Ducayf, p. 334.
(269) Cf. above table 7.
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Export duties were raised twice or fivefold (270) and the 
ports of Dar al-Bayda, Tit, Safi and Agadir closed to 
European trade. This tendency towards a restrictive policy 
was enhanced by the repercussions of the Napoleonic wars. 
Vessels navigating under Moroccan colours were seized by 
both belligerent parties. In 1799, Mawlay Sulayman decided 
that, because of "the little respect paid to his subjects 
and colours on sea", Moroccan vessels were to return home 
(271). They could no longer sail abroad "on any considera­
tion" unless entrusted with a particular business by the 
Sultan (272). The plague epidemic of 1799-1800 which 
greatly reduced contact with the outside world seemed to 
offer a golden opportunity for the inauguration of a 
restrictive policy.
There is no doubt that the European political context 
was not favourable to the development of normal trade 
relations. The few Moroccan merchants who ventured on sea 
were often subject to harassment by warring navies and 
their property confiscated (273).
However, a restrictive policy Would not have been 
possible if the Makhzen had not disposed of enough income 
to dispense with the revenue from maritime trade. The 
early years of the nineteenth century witnessed a number 
of restrictions which complemented those adopted since 
the end of 1797. In 1801, al-Salawf notified the European 
consuls of the Makhzen's decision to close to trade the 
ports of Mehdia and Asila (274) . The export of some tradi­
tional articles of trade was prohibited. Wheat, in parti­
cular, was no longer regarded as an article of common trade. 
The export of wool was suspended in 1802 because, argued 
Mawlay Sulayman, "it made clothing too dear for his own 
people"(275). The duty on cattle was increased threefold, a
(270) F.0.52/11, 20 Dec., 1797.
(271) F.0.174/6, 6 Dec., 1799; F.0.52/11, 15 Dec., 1799.
(272) Ibid.
(273) COC, vol.21 and 22; F.O.52/14.
(274) COC, vol.22, letter frcm al-Salawi to A. Guillet, 2 Rabic I, 1216/ 
13 July, 1801.
(275) F.O.52/12, 22 July, 1802.
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decision which persuaded Spain to ban all imports from 
Morocco (27 6).
For Mawlay Sulayman general trade with Europe was no 
longer considered a vital source of revenue. Nor did he 
consider the presence of European merchants in his ports 
a commercial necessity. "All are welcome to leave the 
country", he declared in 1801, "as one of my Jews can 
import whatever commission I order" (277).
The evolution of tariffs between 1801 and 1806 shows 
clearly Mawlay Sulayman1s determination to suffocate 
European trade.
Table 11 Evolution of Export Duties 1801-1806 
(in Spanish dollars)
1801 ,1806
Figs, almonds, raisins, 
oil , olives and honey
i
i 2 per quintal(#) , 12
Bees wax ! 14 ft VI | 26
Ivory, copper and gum 
Arabic
i
! 5 II If 1 15
Goat skins
i
* 4
|
VI IV • 8
Common tanned leather , 1 VI VI 5
Ostrich feathers 1 2 per pound ! 16
Slippers
i
• 4
i
per 1,000 10
Hayk-s , 1 each 3
Source: J. Buffa, Travels, pp.89-90 .
(#) Moroccan quintal = 118 English lbs.
(276) F.0.52/11, 30 Jan., 1801 and 22 Feb., 1801.
(277) Ibid., 23 Jan. ,1801.
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In 1807, Mawlay Sulayman added new articles to his 
list of prohibitions. The export of almonds, raisins, 
slippers, hayk-s and carpets was banned (278). In 1812 
duties on goat skins and calf hides were further in­
creased (279). By 1815, such duties had increased almost 
four times since 1801. The prohibitive taxes imposed on 
exports led to the decline of this trade and convinced 
many European merchants to close down and leave the 
country (280) .
Table 12 Evolution in the Volume of some Articles of
Export at Essaouira ( 1804-1812 )
1804 18121 1
Bitter almonds [362,606 lbs. 488,260 lbs. [ 73,093 lbs
Sweet almonds [321,717 VI 505,458 VI [ 39,337 "
Promegranate
peel [ 46,281 VI 65,040 IV
i
[ 16,219 "
Bees wax [ 194,859 VI 52,348 I [ 79,270 "
Wool [ 97,896 VI 29,731 I
i
[ prohibited
Olive oil [ 57,236 IV 45,489 II
i
[ prohibited
Gum Arabic [335,436 II 492,350 IV [ 12,266 lbs
Gum Senegal [ 95,956 II 31,556 II [ 16,234 "
Cow hides [120,483 II 259,961 IV [1,036,562 "
Goat skins [ 12,726 dbz. 10,037 dbz. [ 27,999 doz
Sources: F.O.52/13; Jackson, An Account of the Empire,pp 
236-254; Add.Ms.41,512, British Museum.
The end of the wars in Europe could have led to a re­
activation of maritime trade but the high duties imposed
(278) F.O.52/13, 20 Nov., 1807.
(279) F.O.174/153, 3 March, 1812.
(280) However, such high tariffs did not prevent an increase in the 
exported volumes of sane articles such as goat skins and calf 
hides. Cf. Table 12.
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by Mawlay Sulayman and the decline of provision sales to 
the armies of Great Britain and her Peninsular allies as 
a result of the peace rendered such a prospect illusory. 
Moreover, Mawlay Sulayman adopted a number of measures 
which gave the impression that the country was heading 
towards complete isolation. In 1815, he abolished the 
privilege enjoyed by Moroccan Muslim merchants trading 
with Europe until then,and which consisted in the pay­
ment of a reduced duty of 2.5% on imports instead of the 
10% paid by Christian and Jewish marchants (281) . At 
the end of the same year, a Makhzen decision imposing 
the wearing of the traditional Jewish costume on Jews 
and the payment of the capitation tax by them, led to the 
departure of many Jewish merchants (282). In 1816, a 
sultanian decree forbade the travelling of Moroccans to 
Europe (283) . Even pilgrimage to the Holy Places needed 
special permission from the Sultan (284). For a time, 
Mawlay Sulayman believed that he could dispense with the 
outside world. "I have no need for trade and would 
rather not receive a single blanquil from my customs", 
he declared in 1816 (285).
Never was the outlook for maritime trade so desperate. 
The French consul expressed his despair in the following 
terms : "La France ne doit songer a entretenir aucun
(281) CCC, vol.24, 26 Oct., 1815. Contrary to what is ascerted by J.L. 
Miege in Le Maroc et 1*Europe, II, pp. 21-22, and Brigon et al. in 
Histoire du Maroc, p.281, Mawlay Sulayman did not impose a tax of 
50% on imports in 1815. What he did was to raise the contribution 
paid by Muslim merchants fran 2.5% to 10%. In 1819 the import tax 
was still fixed at 10% (CCC, vol.26, fol.234-235).
(282) F.0.52/17, 6 Jan., 1816; CCC, vol.24, 1st Feb., 1816.
(283) R. Thomassyf Des relations politiques et commerciales de la 
France avec le Maroc, Paris, 1842, p. 294; al-Du^ayf, pp; 531-532.
(284) Cf. an example of this special permission in D.A.R., 15 Shawwal, 
1232/ 28 Aug., 1817. According to A.G.P. Martin (Quatre siecles 
d'histoire, p. 127) pilgrimage to the Holy Places was suspended 
between 1815 and 1817.
(285) CCC, vol. 24, 26 March, 1816.
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commerce avec cette puissance i droits enormes r prohi­
bitions presque generates, tout s'y oppose"(286). Yet, 
in February 1817, the whole prohibition system began to 
crumble.
The decrease in Makhzen revenue following the scarci­
ty of 1816 and the prospects of a disastrous crop for 1817 
induced Mawlay Sulayman to look for a new source of revenue. 
Thus in February 1817 he agreed to allow the export of
10,000 quintals of wheat to France despite the scarcity 
of cereals on the local market. By taking this decision, 
Mawlay Sulayman wanted to respond favourably to the 
first request made by the new royalist regime in France. 
Nevertheless, it was clear that the Sultan was desperately 
looking for sources of income. This was confirmed when 
during the same month he consented to important reductions 
in the duties of some basic export articles.
Table 13 Tariff Reductions of February 1817
Old Duty 
(in Sp. 0)
New Duty 
(in Sp. 0)
V7a x 14 per ql. 10 per ql
Gum 5 If 3 If
Sweet almonds 8 If 5 ff
Bitter almonds - - 3 fl
Goat skins 15 per 100 10 per 100
Source: CCC, vol.27, fol.100.
The political difficulties of Mawlay Sulayman, 
especially after the unfortunate Battle of Zaian (May 
1819) and the subsequent spread of tribal agitation, were 
further inducements for him to encourage exports. Thus, 
on the eve of the Fes rebellion, Mawlay Sulayman allowed 
the export of cereals (September 1820) and lifted the 
prohibition imposed on wool and olive oil (287).. Duties 
on other products, such as almonds, goat skins, leather
(286) CCC, vol.25, 27 Jan., 1817.
(287) COC, vol.27, 1 Oct. , 1820.
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and gum, were subject to further reductions. These 
measures gave a real hope for a commercial opening.
Table 14 Export Duties Between 1817 and 1820
(in Spanish dollars)
» Before 1817 , 1817 , 1820
1
Sweet almonds*
i
8 per ql.
i
5 per ql.*
i
2 per ql.
Bitter , | i
almonds
| |
3
i
2 ft
Gum , 5 ” | 3 " i 2
fl
Wax ! 14 " ! 10 " ! - -
i
Leather
|
i
|
i
5
|
3 VI
Wool , prohibited f prohibited, 3 II
Oil I prohibited I prohibited! 4 II
i
Goat skins 15 per 100
i
10 per 100* 8 per 100
1 1 1
Source: CCC, vol.27, fol.100.
Indeed, without trade revenues Mawlay Sulayman would 
have been unable to meet the expenses of the war he was 
engaging against internal dissidents at a time when he 
lacked the coercive power to collect tribal taxes. Progres­
sively, maritime trade emerged as a useful alternative 
source of income which allowed the Makhzen to reduce its 
dependence on the ever uncertain countryside. It enabled 
Mawlay Sulayman to resist effectively the conservative 
coalition of the zawiya-s, the sharTf-s and the Berber 
tribes.
b) The_Import_Trade
Mawlay Sulayman's restrictive policy did not affect imports. 
He continued to receive a uniform import duty of 10% . He
even encouraged traders to bring more goods into the
country. Consequently, far from regressing, the volume of
many imported articles increased during his reign.
171
Imports, though they resulted in the draining of 
valuable specie, were not regarded by the Makhzen as being as im­
poverishing as exports. On the contrary, they were always wel­
come in so far as they satisfied the needs of the population. 
Mawlay Sulayman, by principle opposed to the travel of 
Muslim merchants to Christian countries, took no coercive 
measures before 1816 to prevent them from trading with 
Europe (288). Nor did the Makhzen take into considera­
tion the long term effects such imports could have on 
local industry and crafts.
Mawlay Sulayman's encouragement to Moroccan Muslim 
merchants led to the concentration of a sizable portion 
of the import trade into the hands of the latter. Indeed, 
the privileges granted by the Sultan to these merchants 
made it extremely difficult for European traders to 
impose themselves on the local market. While Europeans 
had to pay 10% in kind or ad valorem on all imported 
goods, Moroccan Muslim merchants paid only the zakat or 
2.5%. According to Jackson, merchandise entering Morocco 
by land was subject to an even lower duty: 1% ad valorem
(289). Thus, goods arriving at Fes from Algiers were 
far more competitive than those offered by European 
traders at the sea ports (290). Moroccan merchants were 
further encouraged in 180 3 when they were allowed to 
travel to Europe and purchase goods within the limits of
2,000 Spanish dollars without having to pay any duty at 
all(291). European merchants at Essaouira were greatly 
alarmed by this measure. Matra saw in it a blow to 
European interests and "a resolution to oblige them to 
leave the country and confirm his foreign commerce to his 
own subjects"(292).
(288) Thanassy, Des relations, p. 294.
(289) F.O. 174/13, fran Jackson to Matra, 18 May, 1802.
(290) Ibid. Jackson affirmed that "the Fez traders are enabled to 
undersell the European merchants established at this port 
(Essaouira) and the other ports of the Dnpire".
(291) F.O.52/12, 31 Jan., 1803.
(292) Ibid., 27 Feb., 1803.
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This trade tended to be carried on through the port 
of Tetouan for which we, unfortunately, do not have any 
statistics as it was exclusively used by Moroccan 
merchants. Available figures about the Essaouira trade 
show a steady increase in the volume of imports during 
the two first decades of the nineteenth century.
Table 15 Import Trade Through Essaouira 1804 - 1812
1804 1805 1812
Sugar i 65,419 lbs. ! 32,532 lbs. ! 118,131 lbs.
Coffee t - i 3,600 1 | 2,480 I
Tea i 1,510 " ! 1,770 I | 2,031 I
Cloves i 7,504 " ! 13,576 I | 15,850 I
Brass pans i 550 " ! 1,000 I | 26,114 I
Steel i 2,500 " ! 7,000 I | 93,725 I
Razors i - i 500 doz. ! 2,400 doz.
Knives i 13,738 doz. ! 12,874 I | 9,893 I
Sewing thread! 1,000 lbs. ! 1,480 lbs. ! 2,842 lbs.
Cotton i 2,400 " ! 5,400 II | 21,220 II
Copperas (for 
dyeing) i 91,061 ! 147,882 II | 118,317 II
Copper tea 
kettles i 119 p. ! 255 p. ! 150 P-
Sources: Inventories of exports and imports at Essaouira 
for the years 1804, I805and 1812 in F.O.52/13, 
Jackson, An Account of the Empire, pp.236-254, 
Add.Ms.41,512, British Museum.
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CHAPTER . IV
MAJOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
1792-1822
At the death of Sidi Muhammad b. cAbd Allah in 1790, 
Morocco seemed ready for a repeat of the long period 
of instability it had experienced after the death of 
Mawlay Ismacri. The two years-long reign of Mawlay al- 
YazTd (1790-1792) were enough to undo the achievements 
of thirty years of stability and throw the country back 
into a state of civil war which endangered all the 
organizational efforts of his father.
In the official version as presented by al-ZayanT 
and Akansus, Mawlay al-Yazid appears as an adventurer or 
an insane fanatic who led the country into disorder and 
chaos. Yet, in reality, despite his impulsive and 
adventurous temper, Mawlay al-Yazid did reflect the 
aspirations of large sectors of the population (1). The 
support he enjoyed from the sharif-s, the Berber tribes 
and the army, together with his unanimous proclamation 
on the morrow of his father's death— despite this latter's 
public disavowal of his son— showed to what extent the 
country had become hostile to Sidi Muhammad's policies and 
ready for a change. Mawlay al-YazTd's declaration of war 
on Spain, his persecution of the Jews, expulsion of 
Christian missionaries, liquidation of his father's
(1) Compare al-Zayanl's attitude with that of al-pucayf who did not 
conceal his sympathy with Mawlay al-Yazfd, seen as the hero of 
the jihad (al-pucayf, p.269).
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collaborators and the changes he proposed for the organi­
zation of the army and the taxation system (2) constituted 
a reaction against every aspect of the previous reign. The 
endorsement given to his candidature for the throne by all 
the major groups in the country proved that Mawlay al- 
Yazid was more than just an isolated adventurer.
However, the coalition of these groups around Mawlay 
al-Yazid was based on a negative attitude of rejection 
rather than on a clear and concrete vision of an alterna­
tive; his popularity was then bound to evaporate. First 
of all, the coalition which brought him to power was not 
homogeneous. The new sultan could not possibly satisfy 
the army, the Berber tribes, the sharTf-s and the zawiya-s 
simultaneously. Secondly, Mawlay al-Yazid very quickly 
succeeded in making enemies. His brutality alienated 
the administrative apparatus left by his father. By 
abolishing the maks (non-Quranic taxes) and granting 
considerable fiscal privileges to the sharlf-s (3), he 
deprived himself of the revenue necessary to finance his 
war effort against Spain and ensure the support and 
fidelity of the army and the tribal contingents.
Indeed, the support of the sharif-s, the army and the 
Berbers dissipated as fast as it had emerged. His original 
supporters— the Idrisid sharTf-s of northern Morocco—  
became less enthusiastic for his cause and gave refuge to 
his brother Mawlay Maslama who promised to be a less 
adventurous and more malleable prince. The passionate 
theme of jihad lost its mobilizing effect when the siege 
of Ceuta was abandoned at the end of 1791. The Berber 
contingents became less reliable because of irregularities 
in pay (4). The‘Abld army refused to obey Mawlay al-
(2) On these changes, see al-£ucayf, pp.226, 232 and 233.
(3) Al-Zayani, Tufrfat al-hadi, Ms.2471, R.L., p. 13.
(4) Al-Qucayf, p.243.
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Yazld's orders for the same reason (5). With these in­
creasing difficulties, the reign of Mawlay al-Yazid 
became one of terror. To obtain the necessary funds to 
run the country, he had to have recourse to extortion 
and plunder. Extremely impulsive and authoritarian, he 
did not hesitate to persecute and physically liquidate 
important officials and notables on the least suspicion. 
This created an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty among 
his entourage and led to the defection of many gaHd-s 
and members of the royal family (6). Most important of 
all, however, was the active intervention of Spain in 
Moroccan internal politics to hasten his downfall.
I - Internal Developments
A - The Struggle for Power (1792-1798)
The evolution of Moroccan internal politics during the 
early 1790's was greatly influenced by the Spanish hosti­
lity to Mawlay al-Yazid. To divert his attention from 
the siege of Ceuta, the Spanish government attempted to 
encourage rebellion in the southern part of the country 
by all means available. In the execution of these plans, 
the governor of Safi and the Abda,*Abd al-Rahman b. Nasir 
al-MkhiznT, played an important role. Owing to the 
financial assistance received from Spain (7), Ibn Nasir 
was able to rouse the Abda, the Doukkala and the Haouz 
tribes against Mawlay al-Yazid and, on 10 December 1791, 
proclaim another son of Sidi Muhammad b.^Abd Allah:
Mawlay Hisham. This proclamation occurred at a time when
(5) Ibid., pp.258-259.
(6) Ibid., pp.250-251, 260.
(7) Cf. Arribas-Palau, Cartas Arabes de Marruecos and idem , Arabic 
letters about Morocco during the reign of Mawlay al-Yazid in 
Majallat Titwan, 3-4, 1958, pp. 109-151. On Spanish assistance to 
the southern rebels cf. also al-Du<ayf, p.257.
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Mawlay al-Yazid was the uncontested Sultan of Morocco 
and can, therefore, only be seen as an attempt by the 
southern provinces to maintain their independence under 
the fictive sultanate of Mawlay Hisham.
When Mawlay al-Yazid died at Marrakecb on 17 February 
1792, the power contest between the sons of SidT 
Muhammad had already began. Besides Mawlay Hisham who 
ruled over the country extending from Marrakech to the 
Atlantic coast, there was another prince, MawlaycAbd al- 
Rahman, who succeeded in setting up an independent princi­
pality in the Sous. The latter prince, however, had no 
ambition of claiming the imamate and his position was 
really the consequence of political vacuum in the extreme 
south of Morocco. By February 1792, only Mawlay Hisham 
and Mawlay Maslama appeared to be viable candidates for 
the Moroccan throne.
(1) The J^nitial_Phase_of_Mawlay_Sulayman^s
This phase was characterized by the contest between Mawlay 
Sulayman and his brother Mawlay Maslama for the control 
of northern Morocco.
Mawlay Maslama, who had taken refuge in the sanctuary 
of Mawlay rAbd al-Salam b. MashTsh in 1791, was proclaimed 
on 28 February 179 2 wrth the active support of the Raysuni 
sharif-s (8). Within a short time, he succeeded in rally­
ing most of the Jbala tribes as well as the towns of 
Tetouan, Tangier, Chaouen and Ksar el-Kebir (9). Having 
secured the northern ports, he moved to Ouezzane where 
the head of the Wazzaniya religious order, SfdrcAlI b. 
Ahmad, promised him every assistance. Sidi'All b. Ahmad
(8) To cement this alliance with the Raysuni sharif-s Mawlay Maslama 
married a Raysuni sharifa shortly after his proclamation. Cf. al- 
pufayf, p.277.
(9) Ibid.
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whose influence in the country was far more important 
than that of the Raysuni zawiya took upon himself Mawlay 
Maslama's cause and became his main advisor. He repeated 
the proclamation at Ouezzane on 23 March 1792 and wrote 
to his adepts everywhere in the country to secure their 
backing for Mawlay Maslama (10).
Owing to the support of the Wazzani sharlf-s, Mawlay 
Maslama rapidly extended his influence over most of the 
country north of the Sebou river. During his short reign, 
he chose to reside at Ouezzane where, according to the 
observation of the British consul, "he depended entirely 
on the advice and guidance of the sheriff" (11). Sidt 
al-Tuhami b. al-Hasani, another Wazzani sharif, served 
as de facto minister for Mawlay Maslama (12). Never before 
had the Wazzaniya religious order participated so openly 
in the political struggle. However, Mawlay Maslama's 
chances of success slackened by the middle of March 1792 
when an unexpected candidate emerged— Mawlay Sulayman.
Mawlay Maslama and his Wazzani protectors had under­
estimated the importance of two major groups, thecAbld 
army and, particularly, the lowland Berbers (barabir 
lu£a),whose military intervention in the dynastic contest 
proved to be decisive. By attempting to physically 
liquidate Sacid b. al-Ayyashi, head of thefAbid army, and 
Mufyammad Wacziz, leader of the Alt Idrassen confederation, 
Mawlay Maslama alienated both these groups (13). The 
refusal of the cAbld to join Mawlay Maslama was also motiva­
ted by the latter's determination to transfer them back 
from Meknes to the various coastal garrisons, as used to be 
be the case before the reign of Mawlay al-Yazid (14). The
(10) F.0.52/10, 22 April, 1792.
(11) F.O. 52/10, 5 April, 1792.
(12) Al-pucayf, p.278.
(13) Ibid., p.277.
(14) D.A.R., letter from Mawlay Maslama to the Spanish governor of 
Ceuta dated 21 Shacban, 1206 AH/14 April, 1794 (photostatic copy 
from an original kept at the A.H.N., Madrid) .
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cAbid naturally wanted to remain together in a single 
place, preferably in their traditional residence at 
Meknes. Mawlay Maslama's intention to scatter them 
apparently encouraged their chiefs to seek the alliance 
of the Ait Idrassen and start looking for their own 
candidate to the throne. Despite their differences , 
the cAbfd and the Ait Idrassen were both determined to 
avoid falling under the tutelage of the Wazzani sharTf-s. 
Neither could they accept the proclamation of Mawlay 
Hisham who was equally dependent on the qa^id-s of Abda 
and Doukkala. Whether they proclaimed Mawlay Maslama 
in the north or Mawlay Hisham in the south, they risked 
being left with very little say in the country's political 
affairs.
The fact that thecAbid and the Ait Idrassen control­
led the middle regions of the country, and particularly 
Fes, the seat of legitimacy, gave them an undeniable 
advantage over both their northern and southern adversa­
ries. Indeed, without the <alim-s of Fes, no prince 
could claim nationwide recognition. A bayca was binding 
for the whole Moroccan community only if it received the 
approval of the principal holders of religious legitimacy—  
the calim-s of Fes.
The first move of Muhairmad Waczfz and SacId b. al- cAyyashT 
was, therefore, to approach al-Tawdi b. Suda (d.1795), 
the dean of the Fasi calim-s (shaykh ;al-jamaca) . This 
latter acted not only as a spokesman for the scholarly 
elite but was also empowered by the people of Fes to decide 
on the choice of a sultan on their behalf (15).
(15) Cf. notarial act dated 10 Rajab, 1206 AH / 4 March, 1792 AD 
whereby the people of Fes delegated pcwer to al-Tawdi b. Suda 
to be their spokesman in the choice of a new sultan, in Mic. 
2/70, H.P.M.D., Fes, 1978.
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Muhammad Wacziz and al-Tawdi b. Suda agreed not to 
proclaim any of the contesting princes. Instead, al- 
Tawdi proposed to the leader of the Ait Idrassen to 
convene a general congress of " the people of tying and 
untying" (ahl al-hall wa al-^aqd ) to look into the 
dynastic issue. This congress would include the <■ alim-s f 
the army chiefs, the heads of the Wazzaniya and Sharqawiya 
religious orders, and the main tribal notables (16). Other­
wise, al-Tawdi b. Suda insisted, the imamate should go 
to Mawlay Hisham because he was proclaimed in the land 
where the previous imam had died (17). Apparently, this 
last argument was little appreciated by Muhammad Wacziz.
Nor did he appreciate the idea of a congress of notables 
who, by deciding between Mawlay Maslama and Mawlay Hisham, 
would leave the A'it Idrassen out of the power game. He 
therefore resolved to act quickly and present the ^alim-s 
of Fes with a fait accompli. Together with Sa^id b. al- 
cAyyashT and the chiefs of thecAbid army, he proclaimed 
Mawlay Sulayman at Meknes on 10 March 1792. Two days 
later, the newly proclaimed prince was conducted to Fes 
in order to receive the formal bayc a from the  ^alim-s.
The people of Fes, who had already expressed their 
opinion through al-Tawdf b. Suda, were placed in an embaras- 
sing situation. They could not possibly reject the 
candidature proposed by the army and the A’it Idrassen 
without risking aggravating the dynastic crisis. The 
approval of Mawlay Sulayman1s candidature by the talim-s 
of Fes on 12 March 1792 was actually nothing more than the 
result of a carefully prepared coup de force. The only 
consolation of the c alim-s was the fact that the new sultan 
was a man of learning and devotion and, above all, a prince 
who promised to be of a mild character.
(16) Al-pu^ ayf, p.277.
(17) Ibid., p.278.
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However, the proclamation of Mawlay Sulayman at Fes 
did not succeed in putting an end to the dynastic crisis.
On the contrary, it seemed to have complicated it by 
adding another prince to the list of pretenders. In the 
north, SidicAli b. Afymad was more determined than ever 
to defend the candidature of Mawlay Maslama. He rejected 
the bay*a of Fes and refused Mawlay Sulayman's proposal 
of submitting the matter to the sharlca (18). To refute 
the bayc a of Fes, Sidi<Ali b. Ahmad brought out an old 
f atwa going back to the post-IsmacH i  dynastic crisis. 
According to this fatwa, the imamate is the right of the 
first proclaimed imam, or, in case of a deadlock, to the 
most valorous one. Both arguments, were, of course, in 
favour of Mawlay Maslama. Moreover, this fatw5 gave 
priority to the prince who was proclaimed by the mujahidin 
and the people of the thughur (places of confrontation 
with the enemy), whence the importance of the northern 
provinces which had always constituted the stronghold of 
the j ihad (19) .
It was military force rather than the confrontation 
of legal opinions which determined the outcome of the 
succession contest. The support of the army, and parti­
cularly that of the powerful Ait Idrassen confederation, 
was to be decisive. Indeed, in the coalition which 
brought Mawlay Sulayman to power, the cAbT*d tended to be 
the weaker partner. The*AbTd chiefs realized very soon 
that real power belonged to Muhammad Wa^zTz and his tribes­
men. Only a few days after the formal proclamation of 
Mawlay Sulayman at Fes, the‘Abid attempted to shift the 
balance to their advantage by seeking an alliance with 
the Guerouane, the Alt Idrassen's rivals, some of whom 
had already proclaimed Mawlay Maslama (20). Relations 
between Sa^id b. al-^AyyashT and Muhammad Wa^zTz
(18) Ibid., pp.282, 291.
(19) Cf. text of the bayca invoked by Sidi <Ali b. Ahmad in al-Ducayf,
pp.292-294.
(20) Ibid., pp.281-283.
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deteriorated rapidly, reaching a point at which the 
latter was forced to transfer his family from Meknes 
to Fes (21). The dissatisfaction of thecAbfd army became 
such that in early April 1792, they threatened to join 
Mawlay Maslama at Ouezzane (22) and,had they abandoned 
Mawlay Sulayman, Mawlay Maslama's chances of success 
would have certainly improved.
However, lacking an organized military force, Mawlay 
Maslama depended essentially on disparate tribal contin­
gents whose number and enthusiasm necessarily decreased 
with time. He also lacked the necessary funds to sustain 
his military effort. In April 1792 he was so desperately 
short of money that he wrote to European consuls at 
Tangier requesting their financial assistance (23). Ap­
parently, SfdlcAli b. Ahmad— whose coffers contained 
more gold and silver than was to be found in the Makhzen 
treasury (24)—  was not ready to pursue his backing for 
a cause which had little chance of success after the 
central regions of Morocco lent their support to Mawlay 
Sulayman. On 22 April, Mawlay Maslama decided to abandon 
the struggle momentarily after he suffered two military 
defeats which ended with the desertion of his two most 
reliable supporters, the Alt Immour and the Hayaina 
tribes (25). In all, his reign lasted a little less than 
two months. He retreated to the Rif, and later on to 
Algeria, but never ceased to nourish hopes of taking 
revenge upon Mawlay Sulayman.
(21) Ibid., p.282.
(22) D.A.R., letter from Mawlay Maslama to the governor of Ceuta, ref. 
in note 14 above.
(23) F.O. 52/10, 22 April, 1792.
(24) <Abd Allah b. al-Tayyib al-Wazzani, al-RawcJ al-munlf, II, Ms.K.
2304, BGR, fol.77.
(25) Al-Zayanl, al-Rawfla, fol.166.
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The withdrawal of Mawlay Maslama from the northern 
provinces in April 1792 was an important political success 
for Mawlay Sulayman and represented a crucial step in the 
pacification of the country. Henceforth, Mawlay Sulayman 
became the uncontested ruler of northern Morocco. He 
appointed governors to the various tribes and towns 
falling under his control and inaugurated a policy of 
rapprochement with the Raysuni sharif-s (26) who assisted 
him in consolidating his rule over the Jbala. On the 
other hand, STdlcAli b. Ahmad ceased his opposition to 
Mawlay Sulayman. To atone for his past support for Mawlay 
Maslama, he offered his mediation for bringing about the 
submission of the southern rebels.
The most recalcitrant zone was the Tamesna where the 
Chaouia tribes were not completely subdued unti 1797. In 
May 1793, Mawlay Sulayman, whose rule was by that time 
firmly established north of the Bouregreg river, made his 
first move against the Chaouia. He succeeded in reaching 
Dar al-Bayda without much difficulty but the Chaouia, who 
had withdrawn their forces southward, inflicted a heavy 
defeat on the Sultan's troops in June 1793 (27). The 
royal army, composed of 7,000 men from the^Abid, Oudaya 
and Ait Idrassen, was forced to retreat. ThecAbid were 
particularly affected as many of them were killed or 
captured (28). Deeply upset, Sa^ -fd b. al-cAyyashT threat­
ened, once again, to abandon Mawlay Sulayman (29).
This major military setback in the Chaouia helped to 
delay Mawlay Sulayman's pacification program and gave a 
respite to Mawlay Hisham and his military backers,cAbd 
al-Rahman b. Na§ir and Muhammad b. al-^ArusT, qsPid-s of
(26) In 1793 Mawlay Sulayman granted the Raysuni-s a funduq (caravan- 
serae) in Tetouan where they established a branch of their zawiya. 
Cf. letter fron Mawlay Sulayman to Sidf *Air b. Raysun dated early 
Sha^ ban, 1207 AH/ March, 1793 AD in Muhammad al-Amln al-Raysuni, 
Haga3iq tarikhiya can zawiyat Ta^rut, 1966, p.26.
(27) F.O. 52/10, 1 Aug., 1793.
(28) Ibid.
(29) F.O. 52/10, 19 Oct., 1793.
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the Abda and Doukkala tribes respectively. The disobe­
dience of the Chaouia tribes acquired an even more 
threatening character when, in October 1793, they called 
on Mawlay Maslama to serve as their prince (30).
Since he left Ouezzane in April 1792, Mawlay Maslama 
had made several attempts to destabilize Mawlay Sulayman's 
government. In September 1792, he attempted, in vain, to 
rouse the Hayaina tribe north of Fes. After a short stay 
in Algeria, he returned to the Tafilelt and from there 
crossed to the Middle Atlas mountains to seek th£.help of 
the Amhawish maraboutic family. According to contemporary 
Jewish sources, Mawlay Maslama succeeded in rallying to 
his cause Abu Bakr Amhawish who proclaimed him in the 
summer of. 179 3 and provided him with 4,000 men to attack 
Meknes (31). This attempt also failed and Mawlay Maslama 
was desperately looking for assistance in the Tadla when 
he was invited by the Chaouia to join them (32).
By proclaiming Mawlay Maslama, the Chaouia were only 
seeking a cover of legitimacy to maintain their in­
dependence. A handful of wealthy notables, among them 
a cousin of Sfdi^Ali b. Ahmad (33), were particularly 
interested in ensuring for themselves the control of wheat 
exports from Dar al-BaycJa. The Chaouia notables made it 
clear to Mawlay Maslama that, in return for his services, 
he was to receive half the export duties (34).
(30) Ibid. $ i,
(31) G. Vajda, Recueil de textes historiques judeo-marocains, in 
Hesperis, 36, 1949, p.184.
(32) F.O. 52/10, 10 Oct., 1793.
(33) Al-pucayf, p.297.
(34) F.O. 52/10, 19 Oct., 1793.
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(2) The_Second_Phase_of_Pacification_£
Mawlay_SulaYman^s_New_Strategy_^1793-1795)
By the end of 179 3, the whole of the coast south of Rabat 
was in the hands of autonomous ga3id-s or princes. Mawlay 
Sulayman lacked the necessary military and financial 
means to embark upon a large scale confrontation with 
the rebellious provinces. The unfortunate campaign of 
May-June 1793 against the Chaouia showed how harmful 
such military failures could be to the army's morale and 
discipline.
Moreover, the army was neither well organized nor 
trustworthy. ThecAbTd officers, in particular, accused 
Mawlay Sulayman of being partial to the Oudaya and the 
A*it Idrassen Berbers (35). The cAbid looked unfavourably 
upon the Sultan's attempts to strengthen the Oudaya army 
greatly weakened by Sidi Muhammad b.*Abd Allah and which 
Mawlay Sulayman wanted to strengthen to keep the arrogance 
of the cAbId in check (36) . In Odtober 179 3, when Mawlay 
Sulayman had decided to march against the Chaouia, the 
(Abfd troops refused to move and Sa^Id b. al-^AyyashT 
openly threatened to proclaim Mawlay Maslama (37).
Confronted with these difficulties, Mawlay Sulayman 
adopted a new strategy of pacification based on three 
principles : a greater recourse to efforts at mediation, 
the weakening of the rebellious coastal provinces by 
intercepting their maritime trade, and the courting of 
Spain in an attempt to bring about a change in her 
attitude towards the political division of Morocco.
(35) F.O. 52/10, 1 Aug., 1793.
(36) On the strengthening of the Oudaya cf. al-Ducayf, pp. 318, 335. 
In 1796 Mawlay Sulayman raised the cavalry force of the Oudaya 
frcm 400 men that were in 1792 to 3,000 men.
(37) F.O. 52/10, 19 Oct., 1793.
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After 1793, Mawlay Sulayman resorted increasingly 
to the good offices of important religious figures, such 
as Sidi CA1I b. Ahmad and al-cArbi b. al-Macti, heads of 
the Wazzaniya and Sharqawiya religious orders respecti­
vely. In 1794 , he called upon Sidi CA1I b. Aljmad to 
exert pressure on his cousin SidicAbd Allah b.*Abd al- 
Qadir to put an end to his commercial activities at 
Dar al-Bayda (38). The Wazzani sharif finally left the 
Chaouia in October 1794 following the repeated interven­
tion of Sidi*Ali b. Ahmad (39). The mediation efforts 
of the latter as well as those of the  ^alim-s of Fes 
were also used by Mawlay Sulayman in 179 5 in an attempt 
to obtain the submission ofcAbd al-Rahman b. Nasir (40).
Mawlay Sulayman's strategy also involved avoiding 
destructive warfare as much as possible directing his 
efforts instead to a blockade of the rebellious ports.
The Sultan had realized that the basis of the whole 
crisis was commercial. Since the death of Sfdl Muhammad 
b.*Abd Allah, coastal tribes had established direct 
trade relations with European merchants and embarked 
upon unrestricted export of wheat. In and around the 
ports of Dar al-Bayda, Tit and Safi, a minority of 
wealthy intermediaries emerged whose interests depended 
closely on maritime trade. Mawlay Sulayman decided,there­
fore, to strike at these interests by setting up a naval 
blockade around these ports.
In October 1793, just after Mawlay Maslama esta­
blished himself at Dar al-Bayda, Mawlay Sulayman intima­
ted to the European consuls his determination to blockade 
all ports which did not recognize one of the two ruling 
sultans, himself and Mawlay Hisham (41). Consequently, 
European countries were notified that all vessels trading 
with Dar al-Bayda would be seized. Spain, whose merchants
(38) Al-Ducayf, p.297.
(39) Ibid., p.299.
(40) Ibid., p.311.
(41) F.O. 52/10, 28 Oct., 1793.
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had important trading interests at Dar al-Bayda, could 
not raise any objection to this decision since it had 
recognized that the country north of the Oum er-Rbia 
river fell within the dominions of Mawlay Sulayman (42).
In 1794, some vessels were refitted and ordered to 
cruise off the Chaouia coast. Many boats loaded with 
wheat were seized. The naval blockade proved to be so 
effective that in July 1794 the Chaouia notables asked 
Mawlay Maslama to leave their territory (43).
At the beginning of 1795, Mawlay Sulayman was 
presented with an unexpected pretext to extend the naval 
blockade to Safi and Tit— the abdication of Mawlay 
Hisham at Marrakech. Having realized that he was nothing 
more than a political tool in the hands of *Abd al-Rahman 
b. Nasir, Mawlay Hisham abandoned the throne in January 
1795 (44). The fact that the tribes of Abda and 
Doukkala were left without a prince induced Mawlay 
Sulayman to intercept the trade of 'pit and Safi, on the 
grounds that these ports were refusing allegiance to both 
courts— Fes and Marrakech— and were, therefore, to be 
reduced to the obedience of one prince or another (45).
Furthermore, Spain could no longer uphold its argu­
ment according to which the territory south of Oum er-Rbia 
lay outside the sovereignty of Mawlay Sulayman. Three 
important developments undermined this argument. First, 
there was the proclamation of Mawlay Sulayman by Essaouira 
in April 179 4 because of the influence of the important 
fAbid garrison stationed in that port (46) . Secondly,
(42) The Spanish government recognized Mawlay Sulayman's right to 
intercept the trade of Dar al-Bay$a but made it clear that it 
would not allcw its trade with Tit and Safi to be disturbed.
Cf.F.O.52/10, 29 Aug., 1794.
(43) Ibid.
(44) F.O. 52/11, 16 Feb., 1795.
(45) F.O. 52/11, in a letter to European consuls dated 29 Sha*ban,1209 
AH/21 March, 1795, Mawlay Sulayman expressed his intention to 
forbid the trade of the Abda and Doukkala following the abdica­
tion of Mawlay Hisham.
(46) Al-Ducayf, p.308.
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there was the political division of the Doukkala between 
Muhammad b. al-cArusi and his brother al-Hashmi at the 
end of 1794 and the decision taken by the latter to pro­
claim Mawlay Sulayman (47). Although al-Hashmi b. al- 
cArusi threw off his allegiance to Mawlay Sulayman in 
the summer of 1795 (48), the Sultan was nevertheless 
able to make use of this temporary submission to present 
himself as the legitimate sultan of the whole country.
The third development was the proclamation of Mawlay 
Sulayman in June 1795 by the notables of Marrakech and 
Rehamna (49).
All these gains, though precarious and temporary, 
greatly improved Mawlay Sulayman's political position 
vis-a-vis his opponents. The renewed proclamation to 
Mawlay Hisham at Marrakech in October 1795 bycAbd al- 
Rahman b. Nasir and al-Hashmi al-cArusI— by then the 
uncontested leader of Doukkala— did not prevent Mawlay 
Sulayman from proceeding with the blockade of Safi and 
Tit. In June 1796, he had five vessels cruising off the 
coast of Abda (50) and during the summer of 1796, many 
ships loaded with wheat were seized and sold at Rabat 
(51) .
Parallel to the blockade of the rebellious ports, 
Mawlay Sulayman attempted to influence Spain's attitude 
towards the dynastic crisis by granting her important 
commercial privileges. Indeed, the policy of rapproche­
ment with Spain constituted one of the major principles 
of Mawlay Sulayman's policy during this phase of pacifi­
cation. The first step in this respect had been the 
appointment in November 1792 of Muhammad b. cUthman, well 
known to be the man of Spain, as minister for foreign
(47) Ibid. , p.306.
(48) Ibid., p.310.
(49) Ibid., p.311; F.O.52/10, 30 July , 1795.
(50) F.O.52/11, 16 June, 1796.
(51) Al-Du^ ayf, p.334.
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affairs (52) . . In May 1793, immediately after his first
entry to Dar al-Bayda, he notified the Spanish government 
that it could send its nationals to exercise their trade 
at that port from which they were allowed to export 
wheat on the same conditions granted to them by his 
father (53). A further concession to Spain was made in 
1795 when Mawlay Sulayman conferred upon her the exclu­
sive right of using the port of Larache (54).
The commercial liberalism which characterized Mawlay 
Sulayman's policy in the 1790's was, to a large extent, 
motivated by his Spanish policy. By encouraging wheat 
exports during the pacification phase, he not only sought 
to strengthen the Makhzen finances, but also anticipated 
the advantages that were to be expected from a change in 
Spanish attitudes. Spain, being mainly interested in 
the purchase of wheat, realized that it could export from 
the northern ports on almost the same conditions as those 
offered by the rebels (55). Ultimately, Mawlay Sulayman 
succeeded in convincing Spain that her interests could 
be better served by a united and peaceful Morocco.
(3) The_Third_Phase_of _Pacif ication 
the _R eunificatiori_
The abdication of Mawlay Hisham in January 1795 and the 
voluntary submission of the Chaouia to Mawlay Sulayman 
two months later gave real hopes for a rapid reunifi­
cation of the country. The arrival in northern Morocco 
of a delegation from Marrakech to present its bayc a to 
Mawlay Sulayman in June 1795 confirmed these hopes.
(52) AHN, Estado, Leg.4328, letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to the European 
consuls dated 6 RabIcI, 1207/lst Nov., 1792, notifying them of Ibn
U^thman's appointment.
(53) AHN, Estado, Leg.4330 (2), letter frcm al-Ghazi b. Salama to A. 
Salmon dated 2 Shawwal, 1207/13 May, 1793, reproduced in 
appendix 6.
(54) F.O.52/11, 31 Oct., 1795.
(55) Cf. Mawlay Sulayman's cormercial policy in chapter III pp. 163-164.
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The political situation, however, progressively turned 
against Mawlay Sulayman during the second half of the 
year.
In July 1795, al-Hashmi b. al-cArusT disavowed his 
bayca and joined‘Abd al-Rahman b. Nasir. In the Jbala, 
Mawlay Maslama threatened to destabilize Mawlay Sulayman's 
control when he laid a siege to Tetouan during most of 
the summer (56). In October 1795, Mawlay Hisham was pro­
claimed again at Marrakech b y cAbd al-Rahman b. Nasir and 
al-Hashmi b. al-^rusT. With the exception of Essaouira, 
the whole country south of Oum er-Rbia rose again in 
rebellion. Even Spain,which had suspended her commercial 
relations with Safi and fi/t: on account of Mawlay 
Sulayman's naval blockade of these ports, made it known 
that after the renewed proclamation of Mawlay Hisham in 
October 179 5 she had the intention of resuming her normal 
relations with the qa^id-s of Abda and Doukkala (57). "Cet 
empire", wrote the French deputy consul, L. Mure, "parait 
devoir rester longtemps divise en deux royaumes"(58).
During the year 1796, no progress could be made to 
solve the dynastic crisis. For Mawlay Sulayman, new 
difficulties arose. In the Tadla, the head of the 
Sharqawiya religious order turned to Mawlay Hisham after 
he suspected Mawlay Sulayman of ordering the killing of 
his affine, Abu cAzza al-Qustall, qlPid of the Beni Hsen 
(59). In the Sous, MawlaycAbd al-Malik al-Zayzun, Mawlay 
Sulayman's nephew and governor of Agadir and Taroudant, 
became virtually independent. Further to the south,
Mawlay cAbd al-Ratjman, another son of Sidi Muhammad b.cAbd
(56) Al-Ducayf, pp.312-315. Mawlay Maslama was compelled to abandon the 
siege of Tdtouan in Oct. 1795 owing to the intervention of Ibn Nasir 
al-Mtlrl. This was his last attempt after which he retreated to 
Algeria.
(57) AHN, Estado, Leg.4345, letter frcm IbncUthman to the Spanish prime 
minister Godoy, 16 Muharram, 1211/22 July, 1796; cf.appendix 13.
(58) Archives Nationales (Paris), A.F. IV, frcm L_ Mure to the Ccmite du 
Salut Public, Sale, 16 Vendemaire, year IV (7 October, 1.795)
(59) Al-Ducayf, pp.328-329, 341.
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Allah, set up an independent principality in Wadi Noun.
More serious, however, was the renewed rebellion of the 
Chaouia.
Upon the submission of the Chaouia in March 1795,
Mawlay Sulayman had appointed his cousin^Abd al-Malik b. 
Idris governor for this province. MawlaycAbd al-Malik 
took over a large share of the trade returns of Dar al- 
Bayda and, by November 1796, had succeeded in rallying 
local notables to his autonomist plan. On 21 January 
1797, he was formally proclaimed by the Chaouia tribes.
This rebellion took a more threatening character when, 
in March 1797 ,cAbd al-Malik declared his allegiance to 
Mawlay Hisham (60) , thus giving the southern prince a 
pretext whereby he could claim sovereignity over a terri­
tory which, until then, had remained an uncontested part 
of the northern kingdom. Only internal dissensions among 
the southern rebels allowed Mawlay Sulayman to neutralize 
the serious implications of such a development.
In March 1797, just after MawlaycAbd al-Malik b. Idris 
proclaimed his allegiance to the court of Marrakech, Mawlay 
Hisham abdicated for the second time in protest against 
the control of all political power by the qa*id-s of Abda 
and Doukkala (61). *Abd al-Rahman b. Nasir and al-Hashmi 
b. al-cArusT could not afford a new dynastic vacuum which 
would impair the legitimacy of their pretentions and give 
Mawlay Sulayman a valuable opportunity to resume his naval 
blockade against their ports. This second abdication by 
Mawlay Hisham was, therefore, immediately followed by the 
proclamation of his brother Mawlay al-Husayn on 30 March, 
179 7 (62). The new sultan was supported by the Abda, 
Doukkala, Chaouia and the Charradi zawiya (63). Marrakech
(60) Ibid., p.348.
(61) Ibid.
(62) Ibid., p.349.
(63) The zawiya used to be located about one day's journey west 
of Marrakech. It was founded by Abu al-cAbbas al-Charradi, 
disciple of Afcimad al-Khallfa (d. 1717), second shaykh of 
the Nasiriya religious order. Its influence, however, was 
limited to the Cherarda tribes including the Zirara, Chebanat, 
Tekna, Oulad Dlim and Dou Blal. Cf. Dr ague, Esquisse 
d'histoire religieuse du Maroc, Paris, 1951, pp. 91-92.
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and the adjacent Rehamna, on the other hand, remained 
attached to Mawlay Hisham (64)who engaged in a fierce 
fight with his brother for the control of the southern 
capital. Finally, Mawlay al-Husayn entered Marrakech 
in May, while Mawlay Hisham took refuge in the mountains.
It was precisely at the moment when the two princes 
were battling for the control of Marrakech that Mawlay 
Sulayman decided to march against the rebellious Chaouia. 
MawlaycAbd al-Malik b. Idris succeeded in raising 11,000 
fighters amongst the Chaouia tribes but Mawlay Sulayman 
had with him 60,000 men the great majority of them belong­
ing to the Ait Idrassen and other lowland Berbers (65).
The rebellious prince was driven back to the Oum er-Rbia 
river and defeated on 20 May, 1797 (66) . The following 
day, not only the Chaouia but also a number of Doukkala 
notables submitted to the rule of Mawlay Sulayman. The 
Chaouia, the key to the reduction of the southern 
provinces, was now definitely pacified and placed under 
the command of Mawlay al-Tayyib. The port of Dar al-Bayda 
was immediately closed to maritime trade and European 
merchants transfered to Rabat (67). Henceforth, the 
southern rebels already divided and weakened could no 
longer hope to maintain their independence.
Mawlay Sulayman's victory over the Chaouia in May 
1797 and the struggle between Mawlay Hisham and Mawlay 
al-Husayn induced many southern tribes to proclaim Mawlay 
Sulayman. The mawlid (the Prophet's birthday) of 1797 
which coincided with 4 September, was the occasion for 
the Doukkala and Rehamna tribes to present their allegi­
ance to Mawlay Sulayman (68). At about the same time, 
the head of the Wazzaniya religious order was dispatched 
to Safi in an attempt to obtain the peaceful submission 
ofcAbd al-Rahman b. Nasir. This latter already abandoned
(64) Al-pucayf, pp. 350, 353.
(65) C.C.C., vol. 21, fol.117.
(66) Al-Ducayf, pp.358-359.
(67) Al-Zayani, al-Rawda, fol. 171.
(68) Al-Ducayf, p.366.
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by al-Hashmi b. al-cArusi, could not resist any longer.
On 2 3 September, Sidi CA1I b. Alimad succeeded in inducing 
him to recognize Mawlay Sulayman as the legitimate and 
only ruler of the country (69). At Marrakech, the news 
of the bayca of Ibn Nasir spread and was immediately 
followed by the expulsion of Mawlay al-Husayn and the 
proclamation of Mawlay Sulayman. The reunification of 
Morocco was formally achieved with the triumphal entry 
of Mawlay Sulayman to Marrakech on 26 November 1797(70).
The Sultan remained at Marrakech for the winter in 
order to consolidate his rule in the southern provinces.
He still had to overcome the desperate resistance offered 
by Mawlay al-Husayn and Muhammad al-Charrad! who refused 
to hand in the artillery left in his zawiya by Mawlay 
Hisham (71). In December 1797*Abd al-Rahman b. Nasir 
could no longer conceal his sympathy for al-Charradl in 
his conflict with Mawlay Sulayman and offered to assist 
him militarily. He even threatened to proclaim Mawlay 
al-Husayn (72). However, the submission of this prince 
to Mawlay Sulayman and his transfer to Rabat at the 
beginning of 1798 foiled any secessionist attempt. In 
February 1798, Mawlay Sulayman received the allegiance 
of his nephewcAbd al-Malik al-Zayzun who ruled independent­
ly at Agadir (73), and in March of the same year, a 
deputation from the Dra populations came to present its 
bay ca and request the appointment of a Makhzen governor 
(74). Thus, on 19 March 1798, Mawlay Sulayman celebrated 
the end of the holy month of Ramadan in the presence of 
delegations from most tribes of Morocco. He was the 
uncontested ruler of Morocco.
(69) Ibid., p.367; F.O. 52/11, 1 Oct., 1797.
(70) Al-Ducayf, p.372.
(71) Ibid., p.373.
(72) Ibid.
(73) Ibid., pp.378-379.
(74) Ibid., p.379.
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B - The Great Plague of 1799-1800
No sooner was Mawlay Sulayman generally accepted as 
sultan than the country suffered the first of two major 
outbreaks of plague. The epidemic which ravaged the 
country in 1799-1800 had important social and political 
consequences.
(1) Evolution_of_the_Epidemic
Morocco seems to have been spared the recurrent out­
breaks of plague which afflicted North African countries 
during the second half of the eighteenth century. From 
1750 to 17 99 the country enjoyed almost half a century 
without the disease (75). The plague invasions of 1784- 
1789 witnessed by Tunisia and Algeria did not apparently 
reach beyond Tlemcen and Mascara (76). Yet, by the end 
of the century, the country experienced the most devast­
ating epidemic since 1350.
Those who survived the epidemic called it "the big 
plague" (al-tacun al-kabir) in order to distinguish it 
from other less important disorders (77) . The extent of 
ravages was far greater than that of the last plague of 
1750. A simple indication of its effect is that the 
number of dead at Fes reached a maximum of 300 per day 
during the 1750 outbreak whereas in 1799 the number was 
eight times as much—  2,500 according to Moroccan con­
temporary estimates (78).
What was the nature of the epidemic? Was it really the 
plague or another disorder among the frequent calamities 
which ravaged societies at that time? Contemporary 
witnesses, both Moroccan and foreign, leave no doubt that 
the disease in question was the bubonic plague. The
(75) Al-Qadiri, Hawliyat, p.74.
(76) L. Valensi, Le Maghreb avant la prise d1 Alger, Paris, 1969, p.21.
(77) Al-Ibtisam, p.7; <Abd al-Kabfr b. al-Majdhub al-Fasi, Tadhkirat al- 
muhsinln, p.343.
(78) Al-Ibtisam, p.7; al-Qadiri, Ijawliyat, p.74; al-Ducayf, p.144.
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description given.by al-Ruhuni (d.1815), one of the 
most eminent <alim-s of the Sulaymani period, was most 
explicit. It was '"a very painful tumor accompanied by 
high temperature, shivering and vomiting" (79) . These 
symptoms coincide perfectly with the definition of the 
bubonic plague given by Encyclopaedia Britannica (80). 
Contemporary Moroccan sources are also specific about 
the terminology used. We are dealing with tacun and 
not just wabiP '(81) .
The plague, already present in Algeria in 1798, 
penetrated the country from the east. Mawlay Sulayman 
refused to comply with quarantine regulations set by 
the European consuls at Tangier (8 2) and considered any 
preventive measures to be a great sin (83). The bad 
harvests of 1798 had prepared the way for the epidemic.
In August 1798 the British consul general noted that 
"the crops had entirely failed" (84). The crops in 1799 
were more promising but were partly destroyed by locusts. 
"In the course of twenty four hours", noted Matra, "they 
left not the least appearance of verdure on the face of 
the country" (85). It was precisely in the spring of 1799, 
during the bridging months of the agricultural year, 
when the individual is at his most vulnerable to epi­
demics, that the plague took hold on the country.
(79) Muhaircnad b. Ahmad al-Ruhuni, Jawab fi al-tacun, Ms.D.2251, BGR, 
p.4.
(80) Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1958, pp. 992-996.
(81) Cf. al-Ibtisam, p.7; ‘Abd al-Salam b. Sulayman al-Fisht31i,
Taqyid, Ms.D.283, BGR, fol.125. The term wabaf is general and 
used to cover a wide range of ill-defined diseases (cholera, 
malignant fever, etc) which attacked populations on a large scale.
(82) European consuls constituted frcm 1792 a kind of health council 
to supervise quarantine regulations which, for religious conside­
rations, the Makhzen was never ready to carry out by itself.
(83) F.O.52/11, 26 April, 1799.
(84) F.O.52/11, Tangier, 15 Aug., 1798.
(85) F.O.52/11, Gibraltar, 21 May, 1799.
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Before it appeared in the vicinity of Fes, the plague 
had already been reported in the Rif; but it was at Fes 
and its surroundings that the epidemic firmly entrenched 
itself during the month of April 1799 (86). The 
movement of royal troops under Mawlay Sulayman to­
wards Rabat and the southward hastened the spread of the 
disease. After having completed the pacificaton of the 
country, the Sultan decided to visit Safi and Abda in 
April 17 99. He wanted, in particular, to receive the 
allegiance of cAbd al-Rahman b. Nasir whose sub­
mission still remained uncertain (87). In this south­
ward tour, Mawlay Sulayman was accompanied by a large 
corps of (AbId and Oudaya who were already affected by 
the plague. "Everyday a certain number among the army 
died from the plague" (88) . In this southward expedition 
Mawlay Sulayman "was dragging behind him two armies : 
the troops and the epidemic", wrote al-Qucayf (89). The 
British consul also noted that Mawlay Sulayman had carried 
the disease with him from Fes to Rabat and the coastal 
plains (90) .
There is no doubt that the Sultan's movement across 
the southern Atlantic plains was responsible for the quick 
spread of the plague during a season which was particularly 
favourable to the extension of the malady. "There was no 
sign of the epidemic in the Doukkala, Abda, Ahmar and else­
where until the royal army entered these places", added
(86) For both al-Zayani and the author of al-Ibtisam, the plague made 
its appearance in 1212 AH/1797-1798 AD. All the evidence drawn 
frcm British and French archives as well as from Moroccan contempo­
rary sources proves that the epidemic reached Fes in the spring of 
1799. Cf. al-Ducayf, p.399;cAbd al-Salam b. Sulayman al-Fishtali, 
Taqyld, fol.125; al-Zayani, al-RawcJa, fol.181; al-Ibtisam, p. 7;
F.O.52/11, 15 March, 1799; CCC, vol.22, fol.54-55.
(87) Al-£ucayf, p.403.
(88) Al-pucayf, p.402.
(89) Ibid.
(90) F.O.52/11, 6 Aug., 1799. On the responsability of the sultanian 
expedition in carrying the disease southward, cf. also F.O. 52/11, 
21 May, 1799.
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al-Ducayf (91). Commenting on Mawlay Sulayman's untimely 
expedition, al-Fishtali noted that "his movement had no 
reason or justification whatsoever"(92).
The plague made its major ravages between April and 
July, reaching its apex at F&s and Marrakech during the 
spring of 1799. According to Moroccan contemporary 
sources, the number of victims at Fes: reached as much as
1,000 per day. "At one time", wrote al-Fishtali, "people 
used to bury more than one thousand a day" (93). The 
author of al-Ibtisam mentioned the figure of 2,500 per 
day (94). Whatever the exact figure is, it is clear that 
the losses were considerable. At Marrakech, daily losses 
reached as much as 1,800 according to French consular 
sources (95). By September, the British consul general 
reported that "not one human creature ... is left in 
Morocco (Marrakech) and the whole face of the country to 
the summits of the Atlas mountains is covered with dead 
bodies**(96).
During the months of August and September 1799, the 
epidemic witnessed a general regression. At the end of 
the summer, it was even believed to have ended. However, 
it was "just a temporary calm occasioned by the decrease 
in population and the heat" (97). By October, the malady 
reappeared again in the central and southern provinces 
but the mortality rate was very low.
The northern part of the country was not seriously
affected until the spring of 1800. In Tetouan, the plague 
did not appear before February 1800 (Ramadan 1214 AH) 
according to local sources (98). In March, the number
(91) Al~9ucayf, p.402.
(92) Al-Fishtali, fol.125.
(93) Ibid.
(94) Al-Ibtisam, p.7.
(95) J. Caille, "Le vice-consul Broussonet et ses mdnoires sur le
Maroc", in Hesperis-Tamuda, II, 1961, p. 16.
(96) F.O.52/11, 13 Sept., 1799.
(97) F.0.52/11, Safi, 25 Aug., 1799.
(98) Dawud, III, p.234.
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of victims rose to 20 per day, reaching the record figure 
of 130-150 per day in April (99). In two months, the 
town lost, according to contemporary Tdtouani sources,
8,000 souls (100). At Tangier where the population was 
less important, the maximum number of dead does not seem 
to have exceeded 30 per day (101). The number of victims 
diminished steadily during the summer of 1800 and, by 
the end of the year, the country was entirely free from 
the disease.
(2) S22i5i_52§_E2litical_Conseguences
The Great Plague of 1799-1800 had important social , 
economic and political consequences. The first major 
consequence was obviously demographic. Between one 
fourth and one half of the population perished during 
this epidemic according to British and French consular estimates
(102). Moroccan sources, usually silent about such 
estimations, convey the impression of a sweeping calami­
ty which"almost led to annihilation"(103). Among the 
indicators of the heavy losses that had been incurred 
during the plague was the inability of the rural 
population to ensure the gathering of the 1799 harvest 
or to attend to agricultural activities in 1800. "The 
crop was abundant", noted al-FishtSU in 1799, "but 
impossible to gather in, so few were the survivors"(104).
(99) F.O.52/11, 29 July, 1800.
(100) Dawud, III, p.234.
(101) F.O.52/11, 29 Julay, 1800.
(102) British consular services estimated the loss at half the popula­
tion (C.0.91/41, Gibraltar, 14 Dec., 1800). Jackson believed 
the epidemic to have carried away between one third and half the 
population (An Account of the Empire, p. 17]^ . The French vice- 
consul at Essaouira assessed the losses at one fourth or one 
third (Thamassy, Des relations. p. 262).
(103) Al-Fishtali, fols.125-126.
(104) Ibid.
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Losses among the urban population were generally 
more important. Towns lost between half and two thirds 
of their population (105). In Fes, the most populous 
city of Morocco, many houses were emptied (106). James 
Curtis who visited the city in 1801 reported that 15,000 
people perished in one single street in which only 
thirty individuals were left (107). Among the victims 
were thousands of artisans, merchants and men of learn­
ing .
However, the demographic losses of the Great Plague 
seem to have been compensated by a rapid population 
growth after 1800. The agricultural prosperity which 
characterized the first decade of the nineteenth century, 
aided by the absence of epidemics and a high birth 
rate, tended to attenuate these losses (108).
The Great Plague was also responsible— partly at 
least—  in determining the Makhzen's fate during the early 
decades of the nineteenth century. Politically, the 
Great Plague favoured Mawlay Sulayman's efforts at pacifi­
cation by weakening the remaining rebellious tribes of 
Abda and Doukkala. Heavily depopulated and deprived of 
their maritime trade after the departure of many 
European merchants and the interruption of communications 
imposed by the epidemic, these coastal provinces could no 
longer hope to maintain their independence (109).
(105) Rabat lost, according to Broussonet, about 20 of its 30,000 in­
habitants. Cf.H.P.J. Renaud, "La peste de 1799" - Hesperis, T.l, 
1921, p.162. Ksar el-Kebir lost 10 out of its 20,000 inhabitants. 
Cf. Curtis, A journal, p.36. Jackson gives the following figures 
for the main towns: Fes, 65,000: Marrakech, 50,000; Essaouira, 
4,500 and Safi, 5,000 (An Account of the Empire, p.174). T^touan 
lost in two months only about 8,000 souls according to Tetouani 
sources quoted by Dawud, III, p.234.
(106) Al-Fishtali, fol.125.
(107) Curtis, A Journal, p.83.
(108) Cf. above chapter III, pp. 98-99.
(109) F.O.52/11, 13 Sept., 1799.
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By weakening the southern coastal provinces, it rendered 
any significant tribal upheaval impossible. The plague 
also took away most of his former opponents. His two 
brothers, Mawlay Hisham and Mawlay al-9usayn, who, for six 
years had contested his power south of the Oum er-Rbia 
river, died in the epidemic. cAbd al-Rahman b. Nasir 
and al-Hashml! b. al-<ArusI, .qa^id-s of Abda and Doukkala, 
also perished jfrom the plague. "Mawlay Sulayman is now 
in perfect control of the country", wrote Matra after 
the plague ended,"the coastal provinces are so depopulated 
that no insurrection of consequence is possible" (110) .
The Great Plague also helped to solve the 
Makhzen's immediate financial problems. The succession 
of Mawlay Sulayman to the inheritances of deceased persons 
(munqati^un) assured him of important revenues and allowed 
him, according to Jackson, to gain "an incalculable acces­
sion to wealth" (111). From the province of Sous alone, 
the inheritance was so considerable that Makhzen officials 
were incapable of collecting all of it. (112) ., This unexpected. 
source of revenue allowed Mawlay Sulayman to dispense 
with the returns of maritime trade and encouraged him to 
put restrictions on commercial relations with Europe.
On the other hand, the plague helped to weaken 
the Makhzen. The administrative apparatus, in particular, 
was greatly eroded by the death of many competent 
officials and princes who had acquired previously an 
administrative experience under the reign of Sidi Muhammad 
After the death of Ibn ^Uthman and Mawlay al-fayyib in 
1799, Mawlay Sulayman could hardly find a person to take 
charge of foreign affairs.
(110) F.O. 52/11, 23 Jan., 1801.
(111) Jackson, An Account of the Bnpire, p. 169; under Islamic law 
the property of persons who die without heirs passes to the 
bayt al-mal (State treasury).
(112) Al-ZayanT, al-Rawja, fol.181.
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Mawlay Sulayman also lost in the Great Plague 
some of his best supporters among the <alim-s. Eminent 
scholars such as Muhammad b.*Abd al-Salam al-Fasi, ^11 
b. Awls al-Hu§ayni, Muhammad b. Ahmad Bannis, Muhammad 
b. Mascud al-TrunbatT and others who supported his bay<a 
in 179 2 and had served as his teachers died in the 
epidemic (113). Al-Ducayf, who was a.student at Fes. in 
1799, noted the the devastating effects of the plague on 
the world of learning. "Most < alim-s from F£s and 
Meknes. died" he wrote (114). The passing away of marry 
scholars of the old generation paved the way for 
important changes among the,Calim-s during the first 
two decades of the nineteenth century (115).
C - A Precarious Truce (1800-1811)
Natural calamities played an important role in furthering 
tribal instability. This is particularly true of epi­
demics which, by affecting coastal areas more than' 
Saharan or mountainous regions, created favourable condi­
tions for the movement of tribes (116). Indeed, Saharan 
and mountainous regions in Morocco always tended to - 
constitute an eternal "reservoir humain" from which the 
western Atlantic plains were constantly supplied with 
population reinforcements. For Saharan tribes, the 
plague was referred to as "al-khayr" (the good), most 
probably because it allowed them to move to more fertile
Cf. the names of sane-of these in Jacfar b. Idris al-KattanT, 
al-Shurb al-mufrtadar, lith,, Fds, 1891, part I, pp. 4-6.
Al-Duc-ayf, p. 401.
Cf. evolution of the corps of the calim-s under Mawlay 
Sulayman in chapter VI below. (,
J.N. Biraben and Le Goff,”La peste du haut Moyen Age, in 
Annales Econatde Soci§t§s, Civilisations, 6, Nov.-Dec., 1969, 
p. 1488; B. Rosenberger and H. Triki," Famines et epidemies, 
HeSp^ris-Tamuda, XV, pp. 40-41.
Saharan regions are less affected by plague epidemics because of 
dry and hot weather which impedes the survival of the flea, the 
main transmission agent. The plague bacillus itself is not very 
resistant to heat. The extreme cold and the lew degree of humidity 
in mountainous areas also stop the reproduction of the flea. More­
over, the inhabitants of desertic and mountainous regions are less —  
exposed to contagion because of the relative isolation and inacces­
sibility of human agglomerations.
(113)
(114)
(115)
(116)
202
lands (117) . Jackson reported that after the Great 
Plague of 1799-1800 many tribes from the Saharan fringes 
emigrated and "took possession of the country contiguous 
to the river Draha, as well as many districts in Suse"
(118).
Epidemics should be regarded, therefore, as a 
crucial factor in the perpetuation of nomadic life and 
the disruption of the tribal status quo. In fact, one 
of the major aspects of Mawlay Sulayman's reign was the 
growing pressure by the mountain Berbers of the Middle 
Atlas on their lowland neighbours (119).
(1) The End of the Makhzen-Berber Alliance
Under thecAlawid dynasty, the Makhzen's Berber policy 
has always been based on a distinction between the un­
ruly mountain Berbers (Barabir al-jabal) and the lowland 
Berbers (Barabir luta)who tended to serve as strategic 
allies of the central government.
The predominant group among the mountain Berbers 
was the powerful Ait Oumalou confederation. These "people 
of the shade" included Berber dwellers of the northern 
slopes of the Middle Atlas as compared to "the people of 
the sun", such as the Saharan Alt Atta. Geographically, 
they covered the territory extending from Azrou to the 
Assif Melloul river south of Wadi el Abid (120).
(117) Al-Mashraff, Kunnasha, p. 103; Jackson, An Account of the 
Empire, p. „ 106.-
(118) Jackson, An Account of the Bnpire, pp. 175-176.
(119) Early in 1800, when the plague was caning to an end in the central 
and southern regions, "people began talking about Amhawish who 
wanted to lead a Berber rising" (al-pucayf, p.407). In May 1800 
Mawlay Sulayman suffered a major defeat in his first confronta­
tion with the mountain Berbers.
(120) The composition of the Alt Oumalou, like that of other tribal 
groupings, has always been subject to change. By the end of the 
seventeenth century they included the Beni Mguild, Ichkem, Alt 
Haddidou, Ait Isehak and Alt Lahsen (cf .(Abd al-Ra^man al-Fasi, 
al-Uqnum, p.526) . At the beginning of the nineteenth century al-
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Owing to the inaccessibility of their territory and 
their pastoral mode of life which induced them to make 
incursions on the more inviting grazing lands of the 
"Makhzen Berbers", relations between the Ait Oumalou and 
the central government were usually tense. Mountain 
Berbers often rejected the jurisdiction of Makhzen qaaid-s 
chosen most of the time among lowland Berbers— and proved 
to be very reluctant in the paying of taxes to the bayt-al 
mal.
The weakness of Makhzen authority among mountain 
Berbers opened the way for the rise of maraboutic figures 
whose religious charisma ensured them a wide popularity. 
Since the eighteenth century this role was filled by the 
Amhawish family from the Ait Sokhman.
The ascendency of this family was initially based on 
a religious affiliation to the Na?iri tariqa. ^Ali U-IJScfyin 
Amhawish was a disciple of Ahmad al-Khallfa (d.1717), 
second shaykh of the Na§iriya religious order. His son, 
Muhammad U-Nasir— thus surnamed in glorification of the 
founder of the ^ a r iqa— gained a reputation of sainthood, 
whence his immense prestige among mountain Berbers(121).
Abu Bakr, the elder son of Muhammad U-Nasir, inherited the 
charismatic qualities of the Amhawish and continued to 
lead Berber opposition to the Makhzen. In 1800, he led 
mountain Berbers in his first encounter with Mawlay
... ZayanI mentioned as components of the Alt Oumalou the following 
groups: Zai'an , Ichkem, Beni Mguild, Alt Isehak, Alt Ihannd and 
Alt Lahsen (al-Rawda, fol.207). By early twentieth century, the 
Beni Mguild had broken away from the Ait Oumalou (Drague, Esquisse, 
pp. 147-148, note 15). On the other hand, the Alt Seri and the Alt 
Sokhman— who according to al-Zay3nI belonged to another confedera­
tion—  seem to have joined the Ait Oumalou during the nineteenth 
century.
(121) According to al-Zayanl this prestige was based on his prophetic 
inspiration in which "he might have been assisted by sarie demon" 
(al-Rawja, fol.208).
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Sulayman1s armies. Despite a two front attack (Tafilelt 
and Tadla), Abu Bakr Amhawish gained a crushing victory 
over Makhzen forces. Later military successes (1811 and 
1819) added to his prestige and made of him the most 
irreducible - enemy of the cAlawid dynasty.
To bring mountain Berbers to submission or to keep 
off their incursions, the Makhzen found it necessary to 
rely on their lowland consanguineous brothers. Indeed, 
ever since the death of Mawlay Ismacil in 1727, lowland 
Berbers had increasingly intervened in the political life 
of the country. For thecAlawid sultans who succeeded to 
Mawlay Ismacil, the Ait Idrassen, Guerouane and Zemmour 
represented a useful support which not only balanced the 
power of an often insubordinate professional army, but 
also served as an important tool in containing the unruly 
mountain Berbers. These Berber groupings of the lowlands 
were also used by the Makhzen to control each other,this 
tactic being a general principle of Makhzen tribal policy.
Among the lowland Berbers the Ait Idrassen were by 
the end of the eighteenth century the most important 
military force of central Morocco. According to al-pu^ayf 
"they cwned more money, cattle, horses and equipment than 
any other tribe, being the most powerful and the most 
numerous" (122). This enabled them to become the ihcontes 
table leaders among the lowland Berbers.
When the succession contest between the various sons 
of Sidi Muhammad b .cAbd Allah began in 1792, the Ait 
Idrassen were in a position to play a leading role in this 
dynastic crisis. The Oudaya army had been greatly
(122) Al-pu<ayf, p. 421. Originally the Alt Idrassen were located in 
the upper Moulouya valley. With time, they changed both in their 
emplacement and their components. At the end of the seventeenth 
century the confederation included according tocAbd al-RaljmSn 
al-Fasi: Alt Youssi, Beni Mtir, Beni Hanmad, Ait Sadden, Alt 
Ouallan and Ait Ayache (al-Uqnum, p. 525). At the beginning of 
the nineteenth century it started to disintegrate. Apart frcm 
its nucleus, the Beni Mtir, it included Alt Ouallan, Alt Sadden 
and Mejjate (al-pucayf, p. 448).
205
weakened by Sidi Muhammad and thecAbid had, to a large 
extent, disintegrated as a result of Mawlay al-YazTd's 
financial difficulties. At the latter's death, the 
Oudaya consisted of no more than a few hundred men, while 
thecAbid amounted to less than two thousand men (123). 
Under these circumstances, the Ait Idrassen, led by 
Muhammad Wacziz of the Beni Mtir, served as the main 
military support of Mawlay Sulayman.
We have already seen how instrumental Muhammad 
Waczfz had been in the bayca of Mawlay Sulayman in March 
1792. Later on, when the fAbid threatened to join Mawlay 
Maslama, the Ait Idrassen proved to be an essential 
deterrent force which frustrated destabilization 
attempts by*AbTd officers. More important was the role 
played by the Ait Idrassen in the pacification of the 
country from 1792 to 1798. The submission of provinces 
north of the Oum er-Rbia river was mainly their achieve­
ment. During the pacification period, Berber contingents 
headed by Muhammad Wacziz and Ibn Nasir al-M^iri, were to 
be found among all major military expeditions. Ibn Nasir 
al-M^IrT who assumed the leadership of his tribesmen after 
1794, was the effective commander-in-chief of Mawlay 
Sulayman's forces whether in the Jbala or in the coastal 
plains (124). The Sultan himself had a great respect for 
Ibn Nasir al-Mtiri and made of him one of his closest 
advisors. He was not only entrusted with the military 
operations, but also with the task of reorganizing the 
army (125). The Berber leader became so essential that 
he supervised even the appointment of Makhzen qa^id-s (126) .
(123) Al-Na^ irl, VIII, p.15; al-Qu^ ayf, p.273.
(124) Al-Du<ayf, pp.313,316,333, 338-339. In 1795 Ibn Nasir al-Mtirr 
succeeded in ending the siege of Tetouan by Mawlay Maslama and 
in May 1797 he participated actively in the military operations 
against the Chaouia which led to the submission of this province.
(125) In 1796 Ibn Nasir al-Mtlri supervised the recruitment of Cheraga 
and Oulad Jama tribes and their incorporation into the Makhzen 
jaysh (al-Di^ ayf ,p.319) as well as the purchase of horses for 
their equipment (al-Qucayf, p.335) .
(126) Al-Ducayf, p.322.
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Ibn Nasir al-MtfriT succeeded in becoming— to use al-Qucayf's 
terms— "the pillar of Mawlay Sulayman's State" (127).
However, with the end of the pacification, a number 
of factors contributed to undermine the entente which 
existed between Mawlay Sulayman and his Berber allies. 
First, there was the completion of the pacification itself 
which lessened the Makhzen dependence on Berber military 
support. Secondly, Mawlay Sulayman succeeded by 1798 in 
diversifying his military force. During the first six 
years of his reign he reorganized the^AbTd army and, to 
check its arrogance, reinforced the Oudaya cavalry with 
new recruits (128). He also strengthened his military 
potential with the incorporation into his jaysh of new 
tribes, namely the Cheraga, Oulad Jama and Beni Hsen(129). 
The extension of military organization to these tribes 
greatly enhanced the Arab character of Mawlay Sulayman's 
army and, above all, tended to involve him in the tribal 
antagonism which opposed some of the Arab tribes to low­
land Berbers.
Indeed, by 1798 Mawlay Sulayman inaugurated a new 
tribal policy which openly favoured the Beni Hsen. Follow­
ing his decision to incorporate them into his jaysh,they 
tended to become the Makhzen's main military support 
outside the regular army (130) . This development was not 
to be viewed favourably by the Zemmour who were locked 
up in a long standing struggle with the Beni Hsen over 
the coastal plains of the Azghar. Mawlay Sulayman further 
contributed to the deterioration of his relations with 
the lowland Berbers when in September 1798 he incited his 
new Arab allies to drive away the Zemmour from lands
(127) Ibid., p.316.
(128) Cf. army organization in Chapter II,pp. 85-92.
(129) Al-Qu<-ayf, pp.318-319, 387.
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that he considered as belonging to the former (131). By 
doing so, the Sultan stirred up tribal antagonisms and 
favoured the crystallization of Arab and Berber loyalties
(132). Voluntarily or not, Mawlay Sulayman had placed 
himself in an intricate and delicate situation.
Finally, relations between Mawlay Sulayman and the 
lowland Berbers deteriorated because of internal develop­
ments inherent to the Ait Idrassen themselves. The 
transfer of Ait Idrassen leadership to a new generation 
of young leaders following the death of Ibn Nasir al-M^irf 
(1798-1799) was full of implications for the future of 
these relations. The fact that the sons of Muhammad 
Wacziz and their cousins, the sons of Ibn Nasir, competed 
for the leadership of the confederation greatly weakened 
the credibility of the traditional leadership of the Beni 
Mtir among other segments of lowland Berbers. Mawlay 
Sulayman found it increasingly difficult to control the 
young Alt Idrassen leadership which was disputed between 
Muhammad b. Muhammad Wa( ziz and Abu cAzza b. Nasir (133). 
Muhammad Waczfz junior was more inclined to cooperate 
with the Makhzen while Abu cAzza tended to represent a 
hard line trend Within the Beni Mtir (134). These inter­
nal cleavages within the Ait Idrassen after 1800 turned 
the confederation towards open confrontation with both 
the Makhzen and its lowland neighbours.
(131) Ibid., p.393.
(132) Ibid. Al-pu<ayf mentioned that in 1798 all Arab tribes of the 
AzghSr sided with the Beni Hsen, while all Berbers manifested 
their sympathy for the Zenmour.
(133) Muhammad Waczfz who died in 1794 left three sons among whcm 
Muhanmad who served as Mawlay Sulayman's qaJld for Fes frcm 1807 
to 1810. For the sake of simplicity, we shall refer to the son 
as Muhanmad Wacziz. The reader will knew that we are dealing 
with the father for events preceding 1794, ard with the son for 
those after this date.
(134) Mawlay Sulayman was on bad terms with Abu^Azza b. Nasir whom he 
held under surveillance at Fes until he escaped in 1802. Cf. al- 
Du(ayf,pp.378-379; F.0.52/12, 15 April, 1802.
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The most important consequence of these changes was 
the rapid disintegration of the lowland Berber front and 
the increased pressure of the Ait Oumalou on the Makhzen 
and its traditional allies. This became particularly 
true after the major defeat suffered by Makhzenian troops 
in May 1800 in their first encounter with the Ait Oumalou 
since Mawlay Sulayman's accession to the throne. The 
military incapacity of the Makhzen and the absence of a 
united lowland Berber front induced some segments of 
the latter to seek the more reassuring alliance of the 
mountain Berbers. This was the case of the Ait Youssi 
who traditionally belonged to the Ait Idrassen confedera­
tion and,to a lesser extent, of the Guerouane.
During the first decade of the nineteenth century 
the military potential of the lowland Berbers was progres­
sively eroded under the joint action of the Makhzen and 
the Ait Oumalou. In April 1802, Mawlay Sulayman inflicted 
a major defeat on the Beni Mtir and allowed the Guerouane, 
their rival neighbours, to take possession of their lands
(135). In October 1807, the Guerouane were assaulted by 
both lowland and highland Berbers at the instigation of 
Mawlay Sulayman, after which they were transferred to 
the country between Meknes and Sefrou (136) .
Nevertheless, Mawlay Sulayman did not sever all 
relations with the traditional Berber allies of the 
Makhzen. Muhammad Wacziz continued to be Makhzen qa3 id 
over his tribesmen and, from 1807 to 1810, he also filled 
the functions of governor of Fes (137). The Guerouane 
were also— though for a brief period— incorporated into 
the Makhzen army after their defeat in 1807.
(135) Al-Qucayf, pp.419-421.
(136) Ibid. , p.448.
(137) Al-Zayani, Jamharat man hakama bi Fas, Ms.2348, R.L., p.7.
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However, Mawlay Sulayman lacked a coherent Berber 
policy which would have strengthened his lowland allies 
and guaranteed their support for the Makhzen. His play­
ing off of lowland Berber tribes against each other 
proved to be harmful to his strategic interests in the 
long run. By 1810, the Ait Oumalou renewed their pressure 
on lowland Berbers and succeeded in rallying the Guerouane 
and the Ait Youssi who became the docile allies of Abu 
Bakr Amhawish. Relations between Mawlay Sulayman and 
Muhammad Waczfz further deteriorated in 1810 when this 
latter was accused of intriguing with mountain Berbers.
The Sultan revoked him in April 1810 and shortly after­
wards put him in irons (138) . When Mawlay Sulayman 
decided to lead a military expedition against the Ait 
Oumalou in April 1811, the lowland Berbers had never been 
so divided in their loyalties.
The Battle of Azrou was hardly a military success 
for Mawlay Sulayman. The Sultan's armies were thrown 
into confusion during the first day of the battle (28 
April, 1811) but the intervention of the Ait Immour and 
the Ait Idrassen the following day saved them from 
complete destruction (139). Despite their differences 
with Mawlay Sulayman, the Ait Idrassen were not ready to 
accept a victory of the Ait Oumalou. Thereafter, their 
support to Mawlay Sulayman was dictated more by an instinct 
of preservation than by their sympathy for the Makhzen.
(2) The_Pacification_of_the_Peripheral_Zones
Despite the steady deterioration of Makhzen-Berber rela­
tions during this intermediary period, the country was 
prosperous and peaceful. The inheritances of the plague 
victims and agricultural abundance allowed Mawlay Sulayman
(138) Al-Ducayf, pp.456, 462.
(139) Akansus, p.296; al-Du<ayf, p.465; al-Na§iri, VIII, p.117.
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to easily overcome most of his political difficulties.
With the unsubmissive Ait Oumalou there was no direct 
military confrontation between 1800 and 1811. The re­
current embroilments with lowland Berbers fitted into 
the traditional pattern of tribal unrest and were neutra­
lized without much difficulty. Moreover, the restless­
ness of the lowland Berber zones remained essentially an 
intra-Berber affair and at no time was the Makhzen direct­
ly endangered. Mawlay Sulayman therefore directed his 
efforts to consolidate his rule and extend his authority 
to peripheral zones which, during the dynastic crisis, 
had either fallen under foreign rule or simply lost 
contact with centralized authority and remained auto­
nomous .
In 1798, immediately after the submission of the 
southern rebel princes, Mawlay Sulayman organized a 
military expedition into the eastern Rif and Oujda on 
the Algerian border. Since 1792, these territories had 
been under the control of the Algerian Turks. Upon the 
proclamation of Mawlay Sulayman, the Bey of Mascara who, 
in 1792, succeeded in liberating Oran from Spanish occupa­
tion, crossed into Moroccan territory under the pretext 
of preparing the siege of Melilla. Later developments 
proved, however, that the siege of this fortress was but 
a cover for the territorial ambitions of the Bey of Mascara 
who withdrew to Algeria as soon as he had appointed his 
qa3id-s for the eastern provinces (140). Mawlay Sulayman's 
mehalla headed by the Oudaya chief, ^Ayyad, and by Ibn 
Khadda al-Sharql, encountered no difficulty in recovering 
the eastern provinces from the Turks in May 1798 (141).
(140) This eastern expedition was dispatched in Shawwal, 1212 AH/March- 
April, 1798 AD and not in 1211 as mentioned by al-Zayanf. Cf.al- 
pucayf, p.380; al- ZayanI, al-Rawja, fol.180.
(141) Al-Ducayf, pp.380, 383.
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Between 1800 and 1802, Mawlay Sulayman directed his 
attention to the southern and south-eastern provinces.
The Touat oases in particular had been completely auto­
nomous since Mawlay Isma^Il's death. A military presence 
in a distant territory such as the Touat was certainly 
out of the Makhzen's reach. All that Mawlay Sulayman 
could hope to establish there was a relationship of 
allegiance based on the granting of autonomy to the local 
populations (142). In 1800, the Sultan resumed contact 
with the districts of Touat. The populations agreed to pay 
their legal taxes to the bayt al-mal and obtained in return 
the right to appoint their own local officials (143).
This measure guaranteed the extension of Makhzen authori­
ty southward and allowed the Sultan to increase his 
revenue at the same time.
In 1801-1802, Mawlay Sulayman organized two military 
expeditions with the view of pacifying the southern and south­
eastern fringes. The first one was headed by the Sultan's 
katib, Ahmad Ashaghras, and succeeded in pacifying the 
Dra valley between the Sous and the Tafilelt. Following 
this tour, noted al-Zayani, trade routes on the Saharan 
fringes were again open to caravans (144) .
The second expedition was entrusted to the governor 
of Tafilelt, Muhammad al-Saridi, who pacified the Moulouya 
valley, the Ziz and Gheriss country and the upper Dra 
valley. Makhzen governors were appointed to all these 
places (145).
(142) Cf. two letters fran Mawlay Sulayman to the people of Touat dated 
23 Safar, 1215 AH/ 16 July, 1800 and 28 §afar, 1215 AH/21 July, 
1800 n El-Outaiq, I, 1976, pp.443-449.
(143) Ibid.
(144) Al-Zayani, al-Rawja, fol.181.
(145) Ibid. For this expedition, al-Raw^a gives the date of 1218 AH 
(1803-1804) . Al-Zayani conmitted the same error regarding the 
defeat of the Beni Mtir by Mawlay Sulayman and the cession of 
their lands to Guerouane and which took place in 1802 and not in 
1803-1804 as mentioned in al-Rawda. Cf. al-Ducayf, p.421/ al- 
Raw^a, fol.181.
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The political events which took place in Western 
Algeria in 1805 drew Mawlay Sulayman's attention to the 
necessity of consolidating Makhzen authority and rule on 
the eastern borders of his kingdom. During that year, 
an adept of the Darqawiya religious order,cAbd al-Qadir 
b. al-Sharif, rebelled against the Bey of Oran and 
called upon the people of Tlemcen to proclaim the Sultan 
of Morocco. Mawlay Sulayman refused the bayCa presented 
to him by the people of Tlemcen and sent a Makhzen mehalla 
to assist the Turks in the re-establishment of their 
authority over the Tlemcen area (14 6). These events seem 
to have provided Mawlay Sulayman with the opportunity to 
strengthen his military presence in the eastern marches 
of the country with the aim of preventing any possible 
spread of Darqawi agitation. Taking advantage of Algerian 
internal difficulties, the Sultan sent in 1806 his qacid 
Abacqll al-Susi to inspect the eastern provinces and 
recover the oasis of Figuig which, since 1727, had re­
mained virtually independent (147). However, Mawlay 
Sulayman proved his self-restraint when he chose not to 
aggrandize his eastern provinces at a time when his Turk­
ish neighbours were in no state to oppose any resistance. 
Indeed, Mawlay Sulayman, who personally believed that 
Morocco extended eastward as far as the Tafna river, did 
nothing to alter the eastern borders of his kingdom (148).
Having secured his eastern provinces, the Sultan 
turned his attention to the south-western zones. In 1807, 
he headed an expedition which led him to Taroudant, Agadir, 
the zawiya of Tazeroualt and Goulimine. During this tour
(146) F.0.154/284, letter fran al-SalawI to Matra, 13 Jumada I, 1220 AH/ 
9 Aug., 1805. Mawlay Sulayman sent at the same time his brother 
Mawlay Musa to Oujda to prevent the spread of Darqawi agitation
to Morocco (Ibid.) .
(147) Al-Zayani, al-Rawja, fols. 182-183.
(148) Muhammd Abu Ras al-Mucaskari, Fath al-Ilah wa minnatuh, Ms.K.2332, 
BGR, p.103. The author reported that, while he was in Morocco, 
Mawlay Sulayman asked him about the eastern limits of Morocco. Abu 
Ras answered that, according to Ibn Khaldun and the agreement con­
cluded between the Turks and Mawlay Isrna*il, Oujda was Morocco's 
eastern boundary post. Mawlay Sulayman did not agree and remarked 
that Moroccan territory extended as far as the Tafna river between 
Oujda and Tlemcen.
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in the far Sous, he appointed qa^id-s and qadi-s and 
arrested the autonomous ruler of Goulimine,cAbd Allah 
U-Salim who owned a private black army of 1,500 men and 
commanded Saharan territories as far as al-Saqiya al- 
Hamra (149). On the same occasion, Mawlay Sulayman 
arrested his brother Mawlay(Abd al-Rahman who, ever since 
his father's death, had ruled independently over the Wadf 
Noun (150).
During the following year, Mawlay Sulayman led an­
other tour through the Rif and penetrated deep into the 
mountains where no^Alawid sultan had ever ventured before. 
Thus, he reduced the Na^iri zawiya of Beni Touzine and 
subdued the tribes of Beni Ouriaguel, Beni Said and 
Temsaman (151) .
At about the same time, he entered into diplomatic 
negotiations with Great Britain and Spain with a view 
to recovering the Spanish holdings on the Moroccan 
Mediterranean coast. However, the vicissitudes of European 
politics frustrated Mawlay Sulayman's hopes in this 
respect.
Nevertheless, during the first decade of the nine­
teenth century, Mawlay Sulayman succeeded in extending 
Makhzen authority to territories which had lost all contact 
with the central government. By recovering the Touat, 
Figuig, the far Sous and the Rif, he achieved what had 
proved to be unrealizable for many of his predecessors. 
However, these pacification efforts remained without last­
ing effect. In 1810, Makhzen rule in the Sous was again 
challenged by the zawiya of Tazeroualt (152) and the Rif 
necessitated many other military compaigns. Following the
(149) Al-Ipucayf, p.446.
(150) Ibid., p.447.
(151) Ibid., p.450.
(152) Ibid.,p.459.
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Battle of Azrou, Mawlay Sulayman's efforts were mainly 
directed to the pacification of the coastal plains which 
became the principal hotbed of agitation.
D - The Collapse of Makhzen Authority (1811-1822)
(1) The_Unrest_of_the_Coastal_Plains
One of the consequences of the Battle of Azrou was the 
spread of tribal agitation to the coastal plains. After 
the military shortcomings of the Makhzen were unveiled, 
it became extremely difficult for Mawlay Sulayman's 
governors to impose respect for Makhzen authority.
Attempts by Mawlay Sulayman to introduce some 
administrative adjustments on the morrow of the battle 
only made things worse. Deeply disappointed by the 
military performance of his gaHd-s at Azrou (153), Mawlay 
Sulayman proceeded with the replacement of some of them, 
while he curtailed the administrative prerogatives of 
the others (154). At the end of 1811, he did the same 
in the coastal zones where a number of officials were 
replaced (155). The newly appointed governors, however, 
were unable to impose respect for order at a time when 
they lacked the necessary military backing.
(153) Al-pu^ayf reported that following the battle, Mawlay Sulayman "lost 
faith in all his governors" and insulted them publicly at Fes.
Cf. p. 446.
(154) The governor for the Chaouia, for instance, was deprived of the 
governorship of Rabat, Sale and^Arab al-Widyan. This must have been 
regarded by his tribesmen as a sultan's condemnation and encouraged 
therefore latent opposition among the various factions of the 
Chaouia to well up to the surface. Cf. al-pucayf, pp.463-464.
(155) Ibid., p.480.
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The economic situation also encouraged the spread of 
tribal unrest. In 1812 the southern provinces, in parti­
cular were seriously affected by a locust invasion and an 
insufficient rainfall . It was the first agricultural 
crisis since 1798. In the spring of 1813, wheat prices 
reached as much as 20 uqiya-s at Essaouira (156) . This 
not only affected the Makhzen's income based on agricultu­
ral revenues, but led also to the dissatisfaction of 
coastal tribesmen who found it difficult to honour their 
taxation obligations (157).
The destabilization which affected the Chaouia, the 
Doukkala and Abda became Mawlay Sulayman's main internal 
preoccupation between 1811 and 1815. The recall in July 
1811 of the Chaouia governor, al-Ghazi, who had been in 
office since the pacification of the Tamesna in 1797, was 
followed by an upsurge of tribal feuds which Mawlay 
Sulayman found hard to repress. Al-GhazT's successor 
failed in rallying the notables of the various segments 
of the Chaouia confederation to him and, in October 1811, 
the old governor was called back to his office. Owing to 
the backing of the Makhzen, al-Ghazi succeeded in quelling 
tribal agitation in the Chaouia until he was finally re­
called in 1815.
Further to the south, the Doukkala attacked their 
governor cUmar Abu Sitta in February 1815 and freed all 
prisoners that were in his jails. The Abda and the
(156) F.0.631/1, 16 May, 1813. In years of abundance, wheat cost between 
2 and 3 uqiya-s for the mudd.
(157) In 1812 Mawlay Sulayman acknowledged his financial difficulties 
which prevented him fran ensuring a regular pay to the army. Cf. 
his letter tocAbd al-Raljran Ash^ash, 2 Jumada II, 1227/13 June,
1812 in DAR. Cf.also P0 174/20, 19 July, 1815.
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neighbouring Chiadma also rebelled in 1815 against their 
governor, Muhammad b.cAbd al-Sadaq,and forced his resigna- 
tion(158). "All the tribes of Morocco were in peace with 
the Sultan", wrote al-Ducayf in 1815, "excepting the 
Chaouia, Doukkala and Abda" (159).
Actually, by that time, insubordination had spread to 
other parts of the country, and even to the army. In the 
Rif, tribes engaged in the illicit export of wheat. In 
the Tafilelt, the Ait Atta Berbers resumed their expan­
sionist drive in the Ziz valley (160) . The cAbId army showed 
signs of disaffection and the Oudaya refused to obey the 
Sultan's orders (161).
Towns were no exception to this generalized insubor­
dination. In the summer of 1815 the artisans of Rabat 
threatened to kill their ga-Hd cAbd al-Rahman cAshcash (162) 
and in December of the same year the people of Tetouan 
rejected the nomination of ^Ash^-ash as governor of their 
town (163). On the eve of the catastrophic Zaian defeat, 
Mawlay Sulayman was assailed from all sides.
(2) The_Mountain_Berber Threat
Between 1811 and 1819, Makhzen-Berber relations were 
characterized by three main developments. First, there was 
the accentuated weakening of lowland Berbers and particular­
ly the Ait Idrassen confederation which was, until the 
beginning of the nineteenth century,the most powerful com­
ponent among lowland Berbers.
(158) Al-Zayani, al-Rawja, fol.190; F.0.631/1, 2 June, 1815; cf. also 
letter fran Mawlay Sulayman to<Umar AbJ Sitta dated 23 Rajab, 1230/ 
1st July, 1815 in Mic.4, H.P.M.D., 1978. (appendix 69).
(159) Al-pucayf, p.525.
(160) Al-Zayani, al-Rawda, fol.70; al-Qucayf, p.527.
(161) F.0.174/1, 6 Sept., 1815; al-Du<ayf, p.531.
(162) Al-Qucayf, p.522.
(163) Ibid., p.528.
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Secondly, the leadership of lowland Berbers was no 
longer controlled by Ait Idrassen after 1814, but passed 
into the hands of the Zemmour leader, Muhammad b. al-Ghazi.
The third development was the implantation of the 
Darqawi tariqa among the Fazaz Berbers and its role in 
widening the gap between these and the Makhzen.
On the morrow of the Battle of Azrou Mawlay Sulayman 
adopted an openly hostile policy to all Berbers whom he 
held collectively responsible for his military disappoint­
ment. The policy he adopted after April 1811 was clearly 
one of revenge. It was particularly manifested in his 
political alignment with the Beni Hsen whom he attempted 
to set up against their Berber neighbours. In October 
1813 he renewed his appeal to the Beni Hsen to expel the 
Zemmour from what he considered as the former's lands(164). 
At the beginning of 1814 he called again on the Beni Hsen 
to attack the Zalan Berbers (165). Such a policy necessa­
rily gave a racial dimension to the Makhzen-Berber conflict 
and encouraged Fazaz Berbers to make common cause.
MawlSy Sulayman's policy during the second decade of 
the nineteenth century was also based on weakening the 
lowland Berbers by refusing to assist the traditional 
allies of the Makhzen in resisting Ait Oumalou military 
pressure. The Ait Idrassen were the first to suffer from 
this policy of abandonment. Without Makhzen support they 
proved to be unable to resist the Ait Oumalou and their 
Guerouane and Ait Youssi allies.
The most significant event in this respect was the 
major confrontation of April 1814 between Abu Bakr Amhawish 
and Muhammad Wacziz to which official historiography makes
(164) Ibid., pp.501-502.
(165) Ibid., pp.502-503.
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no reference. During an attempt to prevent Abu Bakr 
Amhawish from attacking Meknes, Muhammad WaczTz was over­
whelmed by the military might of the Ait Oumalou (166).
In this confrontation, the Beni Mtir leader was assisted 
by Ait Immour and part of the Zemmour whose loyalties were 
divided between their Idrassen neighbours and the menacing 
Ait Oumalou (167) . The Makhzen, though directly concerned 
with the outcome of this battle, preferred not to inter­
vene. Muhammad al-SalawI, who was then at Meknes, 
contented himself with dispatching an ^ Abid patrol to 
follow the developments in the struggle (168). The 
Zemmour abandoned the battlefield and Ait Idrassen were 
left on their own. The battle ended with a crushing 
victory of the Alt Oumalou and the death of Muhammad Waczfz.
The consequence's of this decisive battle were far- 
reaching for Makhzen-Berber relations. With the weakening 
of the Ait Idrassen, lowland Berbers could no longer resist 
Ait Oumalou pressure and, consequently, the way was open 
for a direct confrontation between the Makhzen and the 
mountain Berbers.
The defeat of the Ait Idrassen had. other repercussions 
on Berber politics. It dangerously upset the balance in 
favour of the mountain Berbers whose influence among their 
lowland neighbours became increasingly important at a 
time when the Makhzen had chosen to abandon its strategic 
allies.
Relations among lowland Berbers were also upset by this 
defeat. The Zemmour emerged as the most powerful confedera­
tion, a position which they were to hold for the rest of 
the nineteenth century. Muhammad b. al-Ghazi became the
(166) Ibid., p.506.
(167) Ibdi., p.507.
(168) Ibid.
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uncontested leader of the lowland Berbers. After the 
death of Muhammad Wacziz, Ibn al-Ghazi was appointed qa^id 
not only for his tribesmen but for all Fazaz Berbers (169). 
He was to play a leading role in the Fes rebellion of 1820 
and even hoped to serve as the main advisor of Mawlay 
Ibrahim when this one was proclaimed in November 1820(170). 
The special treatment reserved by Mawlay cAbd al-Rahman 
(1822-1859) upon his accession to the throne for the 
Zemmour leader attested to Ibn al-GhazT's importance among 
lowland Berbers (171) .
However, the importance acquired by the Zemmour 
during the second decade of the nineteenth century cannot 
be explained solely in terms of military superiority. The 
implantation of the Darqawi tarIqa among the Fazaz Berbers
(172) was another factor which contributed to Berber 
politics during this period. The Darqawi j^ariga, which 
was based on austerity and rejection of all forms of luxu­
ry, adapted to the rural mode of life more than any other 
Sufi doctrine. The new tarlqa rapidly succeeded in extend­
ing its influence to the countryside and particularly to 
Berber zones. Muhammad b. al-Ghazi was "one of the most 
intimate adepts of Mawlay al-cArbi al-DarqawI"(173). Abu 
Bakr Amhawish, though never formally a member of the 
tarlqa, nevertheless sympathized with the teachings of 
Mawlay al-^Arbi. The sharifdom and ascetism of the Darqawi 
shaykh made him highly respectable in the eyes of Amhawish 
who claimed Idrisid sharifdom himself (174).
(169) Al-Zayani, Tarikh al-wilaya, p.3.
(170) Al-Zayani, Tufrfat al-nubaha3, pp.194-196. According to Akansus, 
Ibn al-Ghazi was by then "the most influential among Berbers"
(al-Jaysh, p.315).
(171) Al-Nasirf, IX, p.7.
(172) Cf. below chapter VI, p. 338.
(173) Akansus, p.330.
(174) Apparently, Abu Bakr Amhawish did not abandon the Na^iri tarJga to 
beccme a Darqawi. His successors,however, joined the Darqawi 
tarlqa cf. Drague, pp. 152-153.
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Undoubtedly, the implantation of the Darqawi religious 
order among Fazaz Berbers contributed to ease friction 
between lowland and highland Berbers and paved the way for 
the crystallization of a united Berber front under the 
leadership of Abu Bakr Amhawish. This was particularly 
the case following the Battle of Zaian (May 1819) which 
greatly enhanced the prestige of the Amhawish among all 
Berbers (175). In 1820 Abu Bakr Amhawish joined his 
efforts to those of religious arid traditionalist forces 
to hasten the downfall of Mawlay Sulayman.
II - Foreign Preoccupations
Morocco's relations with the international environment 
between 179 2 and 1822 were largely determined by the 
tension which characterized the political situation in 
Europe. Mawlay Sulayman acceded to the throne just at 
a time when the French Revolution was leading Europe to­
wards generalized war. By virtue of its position on the 
southern shores of the Straits of Gibraltar, Morocco 
acquired an additional importance during the Napoleonic 
wars. Throughout the long series of wars, Mawlay 
Sulayman attempted by all means to keep the country out 
of the European conflict. He progressively dismantled 
the Moroccan navy to reduce the risks of confrontation 
with the Christian powers and avoided taking sides in the 
war which opposed the two European blocks. His endeavours 
to observe a strict neutrality were, however, made arduous 
by the fact that Morocco itself was, for a time, threat­
ened by Napoleonic expansionism.
(175) The Battle of Zaian and its consequences will be discussed in 
chapter VII belcw.
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A- An Impossible Jihad
The peaceful relations Mawlay Sulayman entertained with 
Europe from 1792 to 1822 would not have been possible 
without the curtailing of the corsair activity on the 
part of Morocco. Sfdl Muhammad b.^Abd Allah had already 
succeeded in controlling it by making the fleet State 
property. Mawlay Sulayman liquidated the Moroccan navy 
altogether when it became apparent that the country 
lacked both the necessary means to match the technolo­
gical superiority of Christian countries and the concert­
ed expansionism which Europe embarked upon after 1815.
(1) The_Technolq2ical_Gap
Despite efforts made by SldT Muhammad to build up a strong 
navy during the second half of the eighteenth century, 
the superiority of European navies remained unchallenged. 
This had been particularly evident during the siege of 
Melilla in 1771 when Sid! Muhammad declined to fight the 
Spanish at sea (176). Conscious of the deficiency, he 
made the navy one of his major preoccupations. Before he 
died, his naval force consisted of about sixty vessels 
and 4,000 seamen (177).
His successors were too busy with internal difficulties 
to pay attention to the maintenance of the navy. The sea­
men, one fourth of whom were recruited in the Ottoman 
regencies, were disbanded after 1790 (178) while the - 
vessels were abandoned to the inclemency of weather. During 
the first two years of Mawlay Sulayman's reign, noted Matra 
in 1794, vessels had been exposed to rain and sun without 
maintenance (179).
(176) Al-Nasirf, VIII, pp.40-41.
(177) Al-Zayani, cIqd al-juman, Ms.G.40, BGR, p. 15; Lempriere, Voyage,
p.210.
(178) Al-Zayani, al-Turjumana al-kubra, p. 165.
(179) F.O.52/10, 26 June, 1794.
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It was only at the end of 1793 when he realized the 
importance of the navy in subduing the coastal provinces 
that Mawlay Sulayman directed his efforts to the refitting 
of his naval vessels. In October 1793 he intimated to 
the European consuls his intention of blockading the port 
of Dar al-Bayda and all ports which did not recognize one 
or other of the two sultans (180).
The interception of vessels dealing with the rebellious 
port of Dar al-Bayda played a major role in hastening its 
submission. This decided Mawlay Sulayman to extend the 
naval blockade to Safi and Tit in 1795. In the summer of 
1796 Mawlay Sulayman had five cruisers off the coast of 
Safi (181) .
The Moroccan navy remained, nevertheless, very modest. 
By the end of the eighteenth century it consisted, accord­
ing to an official of the French legation,of three or four 
corvettes and a small number of xebecs, galleys and 
galliots, all very poorly equipped (182). Many of these 
were lost in February 1800 as a result of a storm which 
destroyed all vessels that were in the port of Larache (183).
The feeling of insecurity which resulted from 
Napoleonic expansionism encouraged Mawlay Sulayman to pay 
a greater attention to his fleet. In 1800, he ordered the 
reactivation of the Rabat-Sale shipyards (184) and in 1804 
he decided to buy two war vessels in England (185). The 
Austrian ambassador, visiting the country in 1805, reported 
that the Moroccan fleet consisted then of about twenty 
units but "all of a very bad construction"(186). In 1807-
(180) F.0.52/10, 28 Oct., 1793 and 16 Aug., 1794.
(181) F.0.52/11, 16 June, 1796.
(182) De Lesseps, "Notice", pp. 20-21.
(183) F.0.52/11, 6 March, 1800. Cf. also letter frcxn Mawlay Sulaymn to 
Matra dated 23 Ramadan, 1214 AH/18 Feb., 1800, asking for the re­
placement of lost ships (same FO series).
(184) Al-Ducayf, p.407.
(185) F.0.52/12, 16 Sept., 1804 and 27 Sept., 1804.
(186) J. Caille, Une ambassade, p.111.
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1808 Mawlay Sulayman ordered two new war vessels in England 
and sent two old frigates to be repaired and armed at 
Gibraltar(187). Other ships were sent to Lisbon to be 
refitted (188). Captain Burel evaluated the Moroccan fleet 
in 1808 at about a dozen units manned with about 850 seamen 
and harboured mainly in Larache and Sale (189) .
With the end of the Napoleonic wars, the Moroccan 
naval force rapidly disintegrated. Many vessels were given 
as presents to the Deys of Algiers and Tripoli. By 1816, 
the Moroccan fleet was reduced to four vessels, among 
which two only were armed (190). In 1818, the French 
consul reported that there was only one vessel left at 
Rabat (191). Two years later, the Moroccan navy ceased to 
exist when the last vessel was given as present to the Dey 
of Algiers (192) .
Quite apart from its size, the Moroccan navy under 
Mawlay Sulayman hardly deserved the name. It possessed 
neither the equipment nor the organization enjoyed by con­
temporary European navies . At the beginning of the nine­
teenth century, the docks of Rabat, Sale and Martil 
only built small ships which could not venture safely on 
the high seas outside of the spring and summer seasons. 
Vessels bought in Europe or received as presents were
(187) F.0.174/17, letter fran al-Salawi to J. Green, Qacda, 1222/Jan., 
1808; F.0.52/13, 7 Octo., 1808.
(188) F.O.52/13, 7 Oct., 1808.
(189) J. Caille, La mission, p;105. Local inventories of the naval force 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century gave the following 
figures concerning the number of seamen at Sale:-
1804..... 400 men
1806..... 378 men
1812..... 352 men
Cf. Kunnasha fr umur al-bahr, Ms.D. 1409, BGR, and a list of sea­
men at Sale, Mic.43, BGR.
(190) CCC, vol.24, 3 Oct.,1816; F.O.52/17, 25 Dec., 1816.
(191) CCC, vol.25, 19 Feb., 1818.
(192) CCC, vol.27, 18 March, 1820.
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generally old (193) . Once acquired, they were inadequate­
ly used and negligently maintained. Moroccan vessels, noted 
Matra, are "so crowded on the quarter deck and fore-castles 
that they are rendered useless" (194). Moreover, these 
vessels were equipped with heavy guns which were suitable 
only for land use. In 1795, Matra found it hard to con­
vince Moroccan authorities that 14 and 16 pounder guns 
could not be mounted on vessels . Mawlay Sulayman finally 
realized the mistake over the size of the guns ordered by 
the Makhzen (195) and Matra could write to Ibn cUthman:
"I am very glad the mistake about the size was discovered.
I have always thought that the naval system in this country 
rested on wrong principles. The Moors in my opinion do not 
sufficiently attend to the navy of their country and the 
state of their harbours" (196). Other foreign observers, 
such as de Pouilly, John Buffa and Captain Burel, all under­
lined the decayed state of the Moroccan fleet (197) . "All 
is rotten and out of order", noted Burel in 1808 (198).
The same attitude of neglect characterized the recruit­
ment of seamen and their organization. Sailors were not 
full-time professionals. They really constituted a naval 
reserve force among which the ra:^ Ts (commander) of a ship 
chose his crew when he was sent on a special mission (199). 
Most often, sailors joined the ra^ I~s on a voluntary basis 
in the hope of some material gain. The salary allocated to 
the seamen was very modest and irregular (200). Judging by
U93) In 1800 the governor of Gibraltar proposed to his government the sale 
to Morocco of two sloops of war requested by the Sultan to be "of the 
most inferior in H.M.'s arsenals"; cf.C.0.91/40, 18 Dec., 1800.
(194) F.O.52/11, 6 March, 1800.
(195) F.O.174/124,6 Ramadan, 1209 AH/28 March, 1795.
(196) F.O.174/124, 22 April, 1795.
(197) J.Caille, Une ambassade,p.lll; J.Buffa, Travels,p.51; J.Caille,La 
mission,p. 105. The vessel which was destined to carry back Captain 
Burel in 1809 broke into two halves as it was leaving the port of 
Larache. Cf.CCC, vol.23, 26 Nov., 1809; F.O.52/15, 27 Jan.,1810.
(198) J. Caille, La mission, p.105.
(199) J. Caille, Une ambassade, p.111.
(200) De Lesseps, "Notice", p.21.
the general state of the navy, de Pouilly estimated in 
1805 that five or six European vessels would be more than 
enough to reduce the Moroccan naval force (201).
(2) The_Anachronism_of_the_Jihad_at_Sea
The technological inferiority of Muslim countries made it 
increasingly difficult for them to maintain the traditional 
principles which governed their relations with Christian 
nations. The jihad at sea became more and more a source 
of trouble and continuous conflict with Christian nations.
Mawlay Sulayman attempted to remove all possible 
issues of confrontation with European countries. He 
abolished enslavement of European seamen (202) and ransomed 
all crews whose ships were wrecked on the Moroccan coast 
so that they were immediately delivered to their consuls
(203). More important was his determination to abandon 
the j ihad at sea.
Mawlay Sulayman had realized very early that it had 
become impossible to enter into a confrontation with 
European countries without exposing the country to heavy 
reprisals. The superiority of European navies rendered 
illusory any hope of maintaining the privateering activi­
ties of Moroccan corsairs. Appeals to Muslim solidarity 
addressed to Mawlay Sulayman by the Ottoman Sultan in 1798 
following the invasion of Egypt had no chance of being 
answered (204).
(201) J. Caille, Une ambassade, p. 112.
(202) L. Godard, Description et Histoire du Maroc, Paris, 1860, II, p. 583.
(203) F.0.52/16, 6 April, 1815; CGC, vol.26, 19 April, 1819; Thcmassy,
Des relations, p.298.
(204) Cf. letter frcm Selim III to Mawlay Sulayman, 3 RabIc I, 1213 AH/
15 Aug., 1798, in F.0.174/2 and F.0.174/124, asking for the use 
of Moroccan fleet against French vessels (appendix 14). Although 
profoundly concerned about the French invasion of Egypt, Mawlay 
Sulayman was not in a position to intercept French vessels in the 
Straits zone. "The letter of the Grand Signor", wrote Matra in 
1799, "seems to have made no impression on the Elrperor's mind"
F.0.52/11, 13 Sept., 1799).
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All attempts by Mawlay Sulayman to reactivate priva­
teering were energetically countered by Christian nations. 
The major incident in this respect was one with the United 
States of America at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. In 1803, Mawlay Sulayman issued orders to the 
Ra3Is Ibrahim Lubaris to seize vessels belonging to the 
United States of America, Venice, Holland, the northern 
German States and all countries which had no peace treaties 
with Morocco (205) . The capture of an American vessel in 
June 1803 brought about an immediate reaction on the part 
of the United States of America. Lubaris and about a 
hundred sailors from Sale were intercepted before they 
could reach the coast and made prisoners (206) .
The incident created great embarrassment for Mawlay 
Sulayman. The Americans:' refused to liberate Lubaris and 
his crew unless there was a formal engagement by Mawlay 
Sulayman not to harass their vessels in the future. They 
even threatened to blockade Moroccan ports until such an 
engagement was obtained (207). Lubaris and his crew 
remained in detention for about three months during which 
negotiations went on between the two sides with the active 
mediation of British authorities at Tangier and Gibraltar. 
Finally, in September 1803, Mawlay Sulayman arrived in 
Tangier to sign a peace treaty with the United States of 
America and to obtain the release of his imprisoned men in 
return.
The 1803 crisis with the United States showed clearly 
that the Moroccan navy could not match the superiority of 
the Christian nations. The American show of force proved 
to be so successful that many European countries thought 
of using the same means should a conflict with Morocco 
occur (208).
(205) Cf. order of Mawlay Sulayman in F.0.52/12, no date (1803) .
(206) Cf. story in al-pucayf, pp.424-426.
(207) J. Caille,Une ambassade, p.113.
(208) Ibid. Cf. also F.0.174/285, 23 Ramadan, 1222/24 Nov., 1807 about a
similar incident with Sardinia.
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Open confrontation being impossible, Mawlay Sulayman 
sought other forms of j ihad, particularly the redemption 
of Muslim captives detained in Europe. Immediately follow­
ing the incident with the United States, the Sultan 
requested the British consul, Matra, to assist him in 
redeeming ten Muslim captives held at Malta (209). In 1806 
another initiative was taken by the Makhzen to free Muslim 
captives at Leghorn (210). Mawlay Sulayman's endeavours 
to recover the Spanish presidios can also be seen as being 
intended to compensate for the impossibility of carrying on 
the j ihad at sea (211) .
The end of the Napoleonic wars inaugurated a new era 
of relations between the northern and southern shores of 
the Mediterranean. If during these wars European countries 
had not been in a position to adopt a common strategy to­
wards the Barbary corsairs, this was no longer the case 
after the Congress of Vienna in 1815. European countries 
began intensive consultations with the aim of uniting 
their efforts to repress privateering in the Mediterranean
(212) . Though unable to agree on a common formula, :■ 
European countries were, nevertheless, determined to put 
an end to what they regarded as a humiliating and ana­
chronistic practice. In 1816, the Spanish ambassador in 
London presented a formal protest to the British govern­
ment against the delivery of military equipment to Morocco 
despite its non-offensive character (213) . The British
(209) F.0.174/284, frcm Mawlay Sulayran to Matra, 23 Shacban,1218/8 Dec. 
1803.
(210) F.0.174/284, frcm al-Salawi to J. Green, 14 Shawwal, 1221/25 Dec. 
1806.
(211) Cf .El Mansour, Mawlay Sulayman’s endeavours to recover Ceuta, in 
Majallat Kulliyat al-Mab, Rabat, No.5-6, 1979, pp.29-44, and idem
"Ceuta in Anglo-Morocc an Relations", The Maghreb Review, July-Dee. 
1979, pp.129-133.
(212) C.0.2/6,"Projet d'alliance contre les pirateries barbaresques" .
(213) The military equipment consisted of gun carriages, gunpcwder and 
cannon balls. Cf .P.G. Rogers, A History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations, 
London, no date, p. 133.
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action was judged by the Spanish government as "dis­
pleasing to the powers of Europe and at variance with 
the efforts actually made by them for reducing those of 
Barbary to the usages established among civilized nations"
(214) .
The most worrying incident for Mawlay Sulayman was 
the joint Anglo-Dutch attack on Algiers in August 1816
(215) . The destruction of the Algerian fleet on 27 August 
1816 by Lord Exmouth had a profound psychological impact 
on Moroccans (216). Mawlay Sulayman who was preparing
a punitive expedition against the Ait Atta delayed his 
departure preferring to remain in the north until more was 
known about the outcome of the Anglo-Dutch action. Lord 
Exmouth did not fail to acquaint the Sultan of Morocco 
with the motives that lay behind’ the naval expedition 
against Algiers.
In his reply, Mawlay Sulayman seemed to agree with 
Lord Exmouth about the erroneous attitude of the Algerian 
people. "The people of Algiers", he wrote, "were unable 
to foresee the injurious consequences of their conceptions" 
(217). In fact, the Algiers expedition was intended as a 
warning to all those who had not yet been reduced to "the 
usages of civilized nations". Mawlay Sulayman fully 
understood the lesson to be drawn from it.
To express his solidarity with his suffering Algerian 
neighbours Mawlay Sulayman decided in June 1817 to make a 
present of three vessels to the Dey of Algiers (218) . At
(214) FO.52/17, letter of protest frcm the Spanish ambassador Feman 
Minez to Viscount Castlereagh, 21 Sept., 1816.
(215) Cf. C.0.2/6, "Lord Exmouth's expedition to the Barbary Powers".
(216) Al-Qucayf, p.532. Among those who suffered in Lord Exmouth's 
attack on Algiers was a Fasi merchant, Muhanmad Mezwar, a former 
ga^id of Fes. He lost a vessel in the port of Algiers carrying 
100,000 mithgal-s worth of merchandise.
(217) F.0.174/286, letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to Lord Exmouth, 26 
Shawwal, 1231/19 Sept., 1816.
(218) CCC, vol.25, 4 July, 1817.
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the same time, he made it clear that by giving what 
vessels remained in his ports he intended to avoid being 
constantly tormented by his own people about the necessity 
of privateering in the Straits zone (219) . By ceding the 
last vessel he had to the Algerian Regency in 1820, Mawlay 
Sulayman completely abandoned the j ihad at sea.
B- Moroccan Fears
Morocco's isolationist tendencies during the period under 
study were determined, to a large extent, by the menace 
of European expansionism. During Mawlay Sulayman's reign 
Moroccans, both on the official and popular levels, were 
constantly obsessed with the spectre of a Christian in­
vasion .
The invasion of Egypt by Napoleon's armies in August 
1798 was seen in Morcco as a great calamity for all 
Muslims (220). Its effects on Moroccans was intensified 
because Egypt was not only part of dar al-Islam (the land 
of Islam) but also the bridge leading to the Holy Places 
of the Hijaz. The image of mounted French soldiers 
desecrating the Azhar Mosque was humiliating and revolting 
at the same time (221). If on the official level Mawlay 
Sulayman proved to be unresponsive to appeals from the 
Sublime Porte for the interception of French vessels in 
the Straits zone (222), on the popular level, the reaction 
was immediate and spontaneous. Indeed, the Moroccan 
colony in Egypt and in the Holy Places, as well as 
Moroccan pilgrims passing through Egypt, played an active 
role in organizing resistance to the French occupation of 
the country (223) . In 1800, a Moroccan ascetic, Sfdf al- 
Jilali al-Sibacf, who had been residing in Mecca since 
1787-1788, raised an army of volunteers and led the j ihad
(219) Ibid.
(220) Mul^ anmad b^Abd al-Salam b. Nasir,al-Rihla al-sughra, P. 107.
(221) Al-Ibtisam, p.24.
(222) Cf. letter fran Selim III to Mawlay Sulayman referenced in note 
204 above.
(223) A. al-Jabartl, cAja^ib al-athar fI* al-tarajim wa al-akhbar, 
Cairo, 1880, vol. Ill, p. 94.
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against the French invaders (224) . He succeeded in 
assembling many of his compatriots and particularly 
distinguished himself by opposing the truce concluded 
with Napoleon and insulting the Egyptian c alim-s who 
gave their consent to it (225) .
In Morocco itself the invasion of Egypt was seen 
not as an isolated happening, but as part of a plan 
which aimed at the subjugation of the whole Islamic 
world. Sulayman al-Qawwat warned his Moroccan contempo­
raries of the Christian danger by drawing a parallel 
between the loss of Muslim Spain and the conquest of 
Egypt (226). Al-Hawwat called upon Mawlay Sulayman to 
fortify the ports and put his people in a state of 
readiness to confront the Christian danger (227) . He 
attacked sceptics who regarded a similar assault on the 
western part of the Muslim world as impossible because 
of the alleged invincibility of Moroccan armies. "Did you 
forget the recent invasion by the infidels of the land 
of Egypt whose people were so ruthlessly oppressed, 
plundered and killed that most of them were threatened 
by apostasy, were it not for God's Mercy and favour ?
How can a wise man, therefore, be misled by those who say 
that the Christians would not dare attack Morocco (al- 
Gharb) because they know it is well defended and that
(224) Al-^ucayf, p.519; al-Jabartf, III, p.94.
(225) Al-Jabartf, III, pp.99-100.
(226) Sulayman al-Hawwat, As3ila wa ajwiba, Ms.2710, R.L., fol.94.
(227) S. al-Hawwat, Dfwan, fol.23. The author addressed Mawlay Sulayman 
in the following verses: r
He also warned the Sultan against the French danger:
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Islam is always victorious ? This saying can only emanate 
from those who take their wishes for an object of worship 
and stop just short of polytheism "(228).
Muhammad al-Ruhunf, another outstanding c alim of 
the Sulaymiani period, also called for vigilance, affirm­
ing that "the great outrage experienced by Egypt could 
very well take place anywhere" in the lands of Islam(229).
The evolution of the political situation in neighbour­
ing Spain and the feverish movements of European navies 
in the Straits zone made the Christian danger a real one. 
Indeed, after 1795, Spain became the most docile continent­
al ally of Napoleon and a tool for the execution of the 
latter's ambitions in the Peninsula. The attack made by 
Spain in 1796 on Portugal, already at war with France, came 
as clear evidence of this docility. By 1799-1800,rumours 
were circulating about the existence of a secret arrange­
ment between France and Spain by virtue of which the 
former would receive the Spanish fortress of Ceuta (230) .
The incessant movements of European fleets near the 
Moroccan coast became a subject of great concern for the 
populations of the northern ports during the last years 
of the eighteenth century. In 1799 , the c alim-s of the 
northern ports expressed their worries about the fact 
"that the sea was full of Christian vessels" at a time 
when the coastal populations lacked all means of defense 
as a result of Mawlay Sulayman's prohibition of the private 
carrying of firearms (231). These concerns were brought
(228) Al-Hawwat, As^ila wa ajwiba, fol.94.
(229) Al-Ruhunl, al-Khufrab al-manbariya, Cairo, 1936, vol. I, p. 11.
(230) C.0.91/40, 8 April, 1799; C.0.91/41, 30 Aug., 1800. The governor 
of Gibraltar, O'Hara, and the British consul at Tangier, Matra, 
were in favour of a British take over of Ceuta as early as 1799.
(231) Al-pucayf, pp. 398-399. According to al-pucayf, Mawlay Sulayman 
had limited the carrying of firearms, as well as the purchase 
of gunpowder, to Makhzen officials.
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to the attention of the Sultan who found himself 
compelled to lift the ban on the sale of firearms and 
amunitions despite the injurious consequences that such 
a decision was to have on internal security (232).
By 1800, Mawlay Sulayman became extremely uneasy 
about rumours of a probable Christian invasion from 
Ceuta (233) . At the same time, his brother Mawlay 
Maslama, who met Napoleon in Egypt (234), was reported to 
be in western Algeria preparing his entry to Morocco
(235). By the end of the year, the simple appearance of 
a British fleet near Tangier created a great panic among 
the population and the Makhzen officials. Mawlay Sulayman 
immediately issued an order for a general mobilization 
of the army and requested Sidi CA1I b. Ahmad, head of the 
Wazzaniya religious order, to lead the mujahidin to 
Tangier (236). Nor did assurances given by Spain to 
Mawlay Sulayman in 1801 about the non-existence of a 
secret treaty ceding Ceuta to the French dissipate his 
apprehensions (237) . The arrival in Cadiz of French 
troops and armaments was seen as a serious threat to 
Morocco's security (238)
James Matra reported the general alarm of Moroccan 
officials about a possible French invasion of their country 
when he was at Fes to sign the Anglo-Moroccan treaty in 
1801. The French danger, he noted, was daily debated in 
government circles (239). Moroccan officials, he added, 
did not hide their fears and told the British consul that 
in case of a French attack, Morocco would look to Great 
Britian "as the only nation who could protect them from
(232) Ibid., p.400.
(233) Ibid., p.412.
(234) Ibn Zaydan, Itljaf, VI, p.354.
(235) Al-Ducayf, pp.409, 412-413.
(236) F.ol174/8, 1st Dec., 1800.
(237) F.0.52/11, 1st July, 1801.
(238) F.0.52/11, 1st July, 1801; F.0.174/284, letter from al-SalawI to
Matra dated 8 Shacban, 1216/14 Dec., 1801.
(239) F.0.52/11, 16 Sept., 1801.
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such a disaster" (240) . British authorities played an 
important role in arousing Moroccan fears. To ensure the 
flow of supplies to the garrison of Gibraltar, the British 
government missed no opportunity to stress the gravity 
of French designs. Matra received instructions from 
London to "apprize the Emperor of Morocco of the danger 
to be justly apprehended from these designs ... and to 
represent to him the treachery and insidious policy of 
the French in the strongest terms"(241).
In 1801 Matra wrote to Muhammad al-Salawi warning 
him that the Franco-Spanish coalition would direct its 
armies to Morocco as soon as they had completed the 
conquest of Portugal (242). The British consul was also 
ordered to make considerable use of the Egyptian example 
and the role played by Great Britain in "freeing Egypt 
and restoring it to its lawful sovereigns"(243). James 
Green who succeeded Matra in 1806 followed the same policy 
in order to convince the Makhzen that Napoleon was "the 
enemy of all crowned heads"(244).
The evacuation of Egypt and the reestablishment of 
peace in 1802 temporarily thrust aside the danger of a 
French invasion. However, the Peace of Amiens (1802), 
by mentioning the Barbary States (245), caused some 
anxiety to the Makhzen. On reading the translation of 
the treaty Moroccan officials tended to believe that the 
settlement reached between the belligerent parties could
(240) Ibid.
(241) F.0.8/5, Whitehall, 18 July, 1801, Secret and Confidential.
(242) F.0.174/284, letter frcm Matra to al-Salawi, 15 Aug., 1801.
(243) F.0.8/5, 18 July, 1801.
(244) F.0.174/151, letter frcm Green to his agent at Tetouan, no 
date.
(245) Cf. article X of the Peace of Amiens in Bulletin des Lois
de la Republique Frangaise, 3eme serie, vol.VI,l802, pp.336-344.
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only lead to the division of the Ottoman Empire and the 
rest of the Islamic world (246).
The Moroccan government felt much more secure after 
British naval domination was achieved in the Mediterranean^ 
particularly after the decisive Battle of Trafalgar 
(October 1805) . The destruction of the combined fleets 
of France and Spain and the emergence of Great Britain 
as the uncontested master of the seas greatly reduced the 
risks of an invasion of Morocco. Mawlay Sulayman felt 
secure enough to begin contemplating plans for the recover­
ing of the Spanish fortress of Ceuta and other presidios 
which his predecessors had been unable to liberate (247) .
However, the French danger reappeared again by 
November 1807 when Portugal was invaded by the Napoleonic 
armies. Rumours about an eventual occupation of Ceuta 
by France circulated again (248). The invasion of 
Portugal was taken by the Moroccan government as a pre­
lude to a French attack on Morocco itself. Mawlay Sulayman 
realised that the best way to thwart the possibility of 
a Franco-Spanish invasion was to take over Ceuta, the 
only place from which a major attack could be launched.
Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1808 and the enthrone­
ment of his brother Joseph in the place of the destituted 
Ferdinand VII was even more alarming. Al-Ducayf reported 
that after taking hold of Spain, Napoleon was determined 
to invade Morocco (249). According to rumour, Napoleon 
had even succeeded in building a wooden bridge to be used 
in crossing the Straits and that the only obstacle which
(246) F.0.52/12, 6 June, 1802 and 13 June, 1802.
(247) Cf. note 211 above.
(248) F.0.52/13, 20 Nov., 1807.
(249) Al-Ducayf, p.446.
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prevented him from executing his plan was the British 
threat to obstruct the return of French forces to the 
Peninsula (250) .
False reports about French landing on the Moroccan 
coast enhanced popular excitement. In the spring of 1808 
imaginary Christian landings were reported near Agadir 
and even at Rabat and Sale (251) . Mawlay Sulayman who 
was by then on a tour in the far Sous hastened his return 
to the northern provinces and in April 1808 issued a 
general order for mass mobilization. Governors of the 
coastal towns were to remain alert and tribes were asked 
to send contingents to the nearest ports. In May 1808, 
there were about 40,000 men from the Chaouia andcArab al- 
Widyan ready for any contingency at Rabat (252) .
Never in modern times had Morocco's fate been so 
closely dependent on that of the Iberian Peninsula. The 
general retreat of French armies in Spain and Portugal 
during the summer of 1808 and the establishment at Seville 
of a "Junta Central" to organize resistance against 
French occupation brought a certain psychological relief 
to Moroccans who were closely following military develop­
ments on the other side of the Straits. The military 
success of Sir Arthur Wellesley in the Peninsula during 
the years 1808-1813 reduced Moroccan fears to a large 
extent and nullified Napoleon's threat to Mawlay Sulayman 
that he intended to invade Morocco with 200,000 French and 
Spanish soldiers (253). Even the French siege of Cadiz 
at the beginning of 1810 does not seem to have aroused 
Moroccan apprehensions after it became clear that Napoleon 
could never overcome the fierce resistance of the Spanish
(250) Ibid.
(251) Ibid.,p.450.
(252) Ibid. ,p.449. On Moroccan fears of a French invasion in 1808 see 
also F.0.52/13, 26 April, 1808.
(253) F. Charles-Roux, La France et l'Afrigue du Nord avant 1830, 
Paris, 1932, p. 455.
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people who, moreover, enjoyed the military and naval 
support of Great Britain (254) .
The expulsion of French forces from Spain in 1813 
came as a great relief to Mawlay Sulayman who sent a 
message congratulating Ferdinand VII for having been 
saved from the hands of the "arrogant traitor"(255) .
The restoration of the monarchy in France in 1814 was warmly 
received by the Moroccan government. "His Majesty", 
wrote al-Salawi to Fournet, the French acting consul,
"was greatly pleased with this change. I think that at 
present, your nation can live in peace as well as the 
whole world"( 256) .
C - A Difficult Neutrality
Morocco's relations with Europe during the Napoleonic 
wars were characterized by two major developments. There 
was an unprecedented rapprochement with Great Britain as 
a result of French expansionist policy in the 
Mediterranean and, by the same token, relations with 
France and her Spanish ally steadily deteriorated.
(1) The_An2lo~Moroccan_Ragprochement__ (1800-1814 )
After 1800 Mawlay Sulayman and his minister for foreign 
affairs, Muhammad al-Salawi, moved Morocco towards closer 
cooperation with Great Eritain. The death in 1799 of
(254) The news of the French siege of Cadiz was mentioned by al-Ducayf 
in a calm and passive manner. Apparently, there was no sign of 
panic on the part of the Makhzen or the populations as there had 
been in 1808. Cf. al-Ducayf, p. 456.
(255) AHN, Estado, Leg.4348, letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to Ferdinand 
VII in which the former expressed his satisfaction at the restora­
tion of the monarchy in Spain and the downfall of "the perturba- 
tor of wcrld peace"; cf.CCC, vol.25, 17 Feb., 1817.
(256) CCC, vol.24, 3 Jumada II, 1229/25 May, 1814. Cf. also letter of 
congratulations frcm al-Salawi to the British consul dated 15 
Jumada I, 1229/5 May, 1814 in F.0.174/286.
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Muhammad b. cUthman, widely known to be Spain's advocate 
in the Moroccan Court, the decisive British role in 
thwarting Napoleon's occupation of Egypt, and the threat 
of French expansionist designs in the Mediterranean 
offered a favourable background for a closer cooperation 
between Morocco and Great Britain.
The resumption in 1800 of Anglo-Moroccan negotiations 
concerning a British establishment at Ksar el-Seghir, 
east of Tangier,was in indication of improving relations 
between the two sides. Ever since 1790, Matra had been 
striving to obtain from Morocco the exclusive use of this 
port. As it was nearly opposite to Gibraltar, it would 
have allowed the British to supply their garrison there 
without the risk of being intercepted by enemy war 
vessels (257). Mawlay al-YazId was, apparently, the first 
to have promised Ksar el-Seghir to Matra, a place, he 
said, whence the British "might take milk warm from the 
cow to Gibraltar"(258). Mawlay al-Tayyib, while governor 
of Tangier (1794-1797) made the same promise to the British 
consul (259). In 1800, Matra raised the issue again with 
the Moroccan authorities who showed their readiness to 
concede the place to the British but asked Matra to 
exercise patience until the end of European hostilities
(260). In 1802, al-Salawi promised the British consul the 
said port or the port of Beliounech, near Ceuta, but his 
promise never materialized, most probably because such a 
concession on the southern shore of the Straits was no 
longer necessary after 1805 when the supremacy of the 
British fleet in the region became uncontestable (261).
(257) Add.Ms.33,978, British Museum, letter frcm Matra to J.Banks, 27 
Sept., 1801.
(258) F.0.174/12, 27 Feb., 1801.
(259) Ibid.
(260) F.0.174/8, letter frcm al-Makkf al-Ghazf to Matra, 5 Muharram, 
1215/29 May, 1800.
(261) The secret negociations that were going on between Morocco and 
Great Britain, about Ksar el-Seghir were well kncwn to the French 
and Spanish governments. Cf.AHN, Estado, Leg.4341, 12 July, 1799.
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Undoubtedly, the British naval supremacy was in it­
self an important factor in the preponderance of British 
influence in Morocco at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. Great Britain was, in fact, the only European 
country which was able to maintain a continuous contact 
with Morocco and, until the end of the war in 1814,
British commercial supremacy in Morocco was unrivalled. 
France and her European allies were not in a position 
to ensure the continuity of their interests in Morocco. 
Following the Battle of Trafalgar, the French consul in 
Morocco could do nothing but observe, report and formulate 
vain protests against Mawlay Sulayman's "complaisance" 
with the British (262). In a sense, Morocco was condemned 
to cooperate with Great Britain which was able to impose 
her presence in the region.
Yet, Great Britain also depended on Moroccan supplies 
for her troops in Gibraltar and the Iberian Peninsula. 
Following the signir^ of the 1801 treaty between the 
two countries, Mawlay Sulayman consented to allow the 
export of an annual contingent of 2,000 head of cattle 
to the garrison of Gibraltar at a reduced rate of duty. 
Great Britain was also able to obtain additional supplies 
when the Moroccan government needed to pay for military 
equipment ordered in Gibraltar or England. Moreover, 
Mawlay Sulayman granted the British government the 
authorization to export wheat destined for the use of 
British troops fighting in Spain and Portugal (263).
Military cooperation was another aspect which illustra­
ted the prevalence of British influence in Morocco during 
this period. Morocco received most of its armament from 
Great Britain and British authorities also agreed to train
(262) R. Thanassy, Des relations, p. 289.
(263) In 1810-1811 Mawlay Sulayman allowed Great Britain to export 
75,000 quintals of cereals. F.0.52/16, 29 July, 1812.
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Moroccan artillerymen either in Gibraltar or in Morocco 
itself. This military cooperation reached its apex when 
both countries joined forces in 1807 over the possible 
siege of Ceuta. During that year, the Moroccan govern­
ment allowed the British army to use the islet of Tawra 
and proposed the landing of British troops on the Moroccan 
mainland to organize the siege of Ceuta (264). The end 
of European hostilities reduced the importance of Morocco 
for Great Britain, but preponderence of British influence 
in Morocco was firmly established for the rest of the 
nineteenth century.
(2) Franco-Moroccan_Tensions__( 1800-1814)
Relations with France and her allies deteriorated continu­
ously during the same period. Napoleon not only never 
thought of renewing the Franco-Moroccan treaty of 1767, 
but showed little courtesy to the Sultan of Morocco. In 
1803 Mawlay Sulayman was deeply offended by the behavior 
of the French government towards his ambassador, Haj 
Idris al-Rami. The Moroccan envoy who was dispatched to 
claim property belonging to Moroccan merchants whose 
ships or cargoes were confiscated by the French navy , 
was shown little consideration and returned empty-handed
(265). On the return of al-Rami, the French commissioner 
in Morocco notified al-Salawi that all correspondence 
with the French government was to be conveyed through him 
and that "failing to this formality, such correspondence 
would receive no consideration"(266). In 1804, when 
Napoleon was proclaimed Emperor, Mawlay Sulayman refused 
to congratulate him. In reply to Fournet, the French 
consul in Morocco, the Sultan made it clear that it had
(264) Cf. letters from al-Salawi to British authorities concerning 
Anglo-Moroccan efforts at blockading Ceuta in appendices 33,35, 
37,38, 39, 40 and 48.
(265) COC, vol.22, fol.100, letter from al-Rami to the French govern­
ment, no date, concerning the property of Moroccan merchants.
(266)OCC, vol.22,frcm the French ccmnissionner to al-Salawi, 14 Nivose, 
year XII of the Revolution calendar (4 Jan., 1804) .
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never been customary for a Muslim Sultan to be first 
in addressing a Christian ruler and that Bonaparte had 
not until then sent any letter or present to the sultan 
of Morocco. Fournet was reminded that he himself needed 
a letter of accreditation (267) .
Mawlay Sulayman refused also to accept the French 
conquest of Italy. In 1806 he prevented the French 
consul in Morocco from hoisting the Italian flag affirm­
ing that he would only permit the colours that were 
hoisted during his father's lifetime (268); and by 1807 
d'Ornano was to acknowledge his failure in inducing the 
Moroccan government to recognize French conquests in 
Italy. Moreover, Mawlay Sulayman refused to comply with 
Napoleon's Continental System and continued to allow 
traditional exports to Gibraltar(269).
In 1807, Mawlay Sulayman decided to send al-Rami 
on a second embassy to France in an attempt to obtain 
redress for the Moroccan merchants. This mission to the 
Napoleonic court was no more successful than the first 
one . Al-Rami's demands for compensation received no 
attention. Napoleon's letter of reply to Mawlay Sulayman 
made no mention of the issue al-Rami was sent to resolve 
(270) .
(267) CCC, vol.22, letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to Fournet, 14 Hijja, 
1219/ 16 March, 1805.
(268) F.O.52/13,(10 Dec., 1806. „
(269) J. Caille,1 Le consul de 1'Qnpereur au Maroc, Revue de l'Institut 
Napoleon, 93, Octbbre 1964, p.175.
(270) CCC, vol.23, two letters from al-Rami to the French minister for 
foreign affairs, the first bearing no date, and the second dated 
27 Oct. , 1807. Cf. also Napoleon's reply dated 11 Nov., 1807 in 
J. Caille,1 Deux lettres de Napoleon ler au Sultan du Maroc^  in 
Revue de l'Institut Napoleon, 90, January 1964, pp.13-14.
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The Franco-Moroccan tension reached its height in 
1807 when Mawlay Sulayman allowed British forces to occupy 
the islet of Tawra so as to blockade Ceuta. D'Ornano 
protested vehemently against this occupation and requested 
al-Salawi to expel British tropfps from the islet, to which d 
the latter replied that the Moroccan government had not 
experienced any injury from the British presence in Tawra 
and did not, therefore, deem it necessary to take any 
action against them (271).
Napoleon took this event so seriously that he decided 
to dispatch a special envoy to Mawlay Sulayman in 1808. 
Captain Burel was chosen for this embassay and was en­
trusted with a double mission. On one hand, he was to 
protest against Mawlay Sulayman1s "complicity" with the 
English, and on the other, to draw a reconnaissance of 
the country's defenses in view of an eventual invasion
(272). Napoleon's letter delivered by Burel to Mawlay 
Sulayman was by no means friendly. The French Emperor 
summoned Mawlay Sulayman to stop supplies to the British 
garrison of Gibraltar and demanded the immediate with­
drawal of British troops from the Tawra islet. He also 
warned against any eventual landing of British troops on 
the Moroccan mainland which would threaten Ceuta. "If 
you favour their (the British) views against us, we will 
be under the obligation of considering you among our 
enemies", wrote Napoleon,"because we cannot tolerate for 
ever a situation in which we are neither enemies nor 
friends ... The Spanish forces are now united to those 
of France and, relying on these, we will be able to check 
any offense and avenge any injury done to us either openly 
or under the cover of a treacherous neutrality"(273).
Mawl5y Sulayman was greatly offended by this letter. 
Captain Burel had no hope of success in the mission he was
(271) CCC, vol.23, frcm al-Salawi to d'Omano, 9 Rablc 1,1223/6 May,1808.
(272) J. Caille, La mission, p. 28.
(273) Letter frcm Napoleon to MawlSy SulaymSn, 16 May, 1808 in 
CCC, vol. 23.
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entrusted with, especially since he only delivered the 
letter in August 1808, at a time when the news of the 
French debacle at Baylen in Spain and the emergence of a 
junta government at Seville had turned the situation 
completely to the disadvantage of Napoleon. The difficul­
ties of the French army in Spain after 1808 had rendered 
Burel's mission to Morocco useless.
Between 1808 and 1814, d'Ornano lacked all means of 
exerting any significant pressure on Moroccan authorities. 
In 1808 Mawlay Sulayman accepted the accreditation of a 
consul sent by the Seville Junta against which the French 
consul protested energetically. Al-Salawf explained to 
d'Ornano that European quarrels did not concern Morocco 
and that if King Joseph Napoleon sent his consul he would 
be received with the same honours (274). In 1809, 
d'Ornano protested again, but in vain, against the arrival 
in Morocco of Count de Tilly as ambassador of the Seville 
Junta. "We are neutral", answered al-Salawi, "and we are 
free to receive whoever comes to us" (275). D'Ornano 
also protested against the authorization granted to the 
Spanish junta government to export cattle and wheat (276). 
"You Frenchmen are always complaining about the fact that 
we do nothing for you", replied al-Salawi, "but you never 
ask for anything. Request something and you will be 
served in the same way as others"(277).
The end of hostilities in 1814 came as a relief not 
only to Europe but also to the Moroccan government. The 
post-war period was characterized by a clear European 
disinterest in Morocco, particularly on the part of Great 
Britain whose dependence on Moroccan provisions was
(274) J. Caille, La mission, p.54.
(275) CCC, vol.23, from al-Salawi to d'Ornano, 8 Muharram, 1224/23 
Feb.,1809.
(276) CCC, vol.23, 26 Nov., 1809.
(277) Ibid.
greatly reduced. Only France attempted to restore her 
commercial interests almost completely destroyed by the 
British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean (278).
(278) Cf. evolution of Morocco's carmercial relations with Europe 
after 1814 in chapter III .
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CHAPTER V
MAWLAY SULAYMAN AND RELIGIOUS REFORMISM 
AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
One of the most obscure aspects of the period under study 
is constituted by the religious ideas of Mawlay Sulayman 
and the impact on Morocco of the contemporary Wahhabi 
reformist doctrine. Indeed, this period is characterized 
on one hand by the ascendance of religious forces and 
their open intervention in the political sphere, and on 
the other, by the insistent appeal of Mawlay Sulayman for 
a return to the sources of Islam and his obstinate 
militancy to eradicate detestable religious innovations. 
The Wahhabi doctrine, which appeared in the Arab East at 
the turn of the nineteenth century, seems to have gained 
the sympathy of Mawlay Sulayman and contributed to worsen 
his relations with the Sufi orders and the sharif-s. Al­
though differing with the Wahhabi-s on some important 
ideological issues, Mawlay Sulayman appreciated, never­
theless, the reformist character of the doctrine. Only 
the quasi-unanimous hostility of the Moroccan religious 
forces to Wahhabism can explain why Mawlay Sulayman 
refrained from openly adopting the doctrine. Religious 
forces, however, were not unconscious of his hidden 
sympathies and did not fail to accuse him of Wahhabism.
To what extent, then, was Mawlay Sulayman reformist in 
his religious ideas and what was his real attitude towards 
the Wahhabi doctrine?
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I- The Reformist Tradition in Morocco
In the Islamic world, reformism was always identified with 
an attempt to restore the primitive purity of Islam. It 
did not mean the rejection of the old and its replacement 
by the new. Reformism was intimately linked to the Islamic 
conception according to which the best of times was the 
time of the Prophet and his immediate successors. The 
more remote we are from the pious ancestors (al-salaf al- 
?alifr) the more corrupt we become. The ideal, therefore, 
is behind and not ahead and no modern reformist movement 
ever attempted to challenge this truism.
If in the Arab East the profusion of religious 
doctrines was at the origin of numerous reformist theo­
ries, the monopoly of the Maliki rite in Morocco seems 
to have crippled, to a certain extent, the religious 
speculative activity. Indeed, the salient feature of 
Maghribi Islam has been the predominence of one school 
of jurisprudence —  Malikism —  and the absence of all 
others. Since the ninth century, Malikism progressively 
imposed itself as the undisputed madhhab (rite) all over 
North Africa, mainly as a result of the work of the high­
ly esteemed scholar of Kairouan, cAbd al-Salam b. SacId 
Sahnun (d. 854 A.D.). His Mudawwana became the funda­
mental reference for legislation (1).
The only Moroccan dynasty which ever attempted to 
challenge Malikism was that of the Almohads (1130-1276). 
During this period attempts were made to introduce the 
doctrine of Abu al-Hasan al-Ashcari (2) through the works 
of his disciple Abu Hamid al-Ghazzall (1058-1112) who 
happened to be the teacher of the dynasty's founder,
(1) Eater on an Egyptian c alim, Khalil b. Ishaq (d.1374) produced an 
abridgement (mukhtagar) which acquired the character of a code for 
Maliki rite and used to be memorized by every Moroccan student who 
had passed elementary education.
(2) The Ashcari school was founded by Abu al-I^ asan al-Ashcari. (d. 935 AD) 
who tried to use rational arguments to defend orthodox Islam. This 
school became identified with the theory of al-kasb according to
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Ibn Tumart (d.1128). The hostility of the Almohads to 
Malikism was best illustrated by their burning of Sahnun's 
Mudawwana, while al-Ghazzall's Ihya3 was widely distributed.
The Almohad ideological rebellion against Malikism 
produced, however, no lasting effect. Malikism proved to 
be deeply rooted in the country. Almohad Ashcari ideas had 
no alternative but to cohabit with the doctrine of Malik 
b. Anas. After the Almohads, Malikism was restored as the 
official madhhab but Moroccan calim-s could no longer 
dispense with the Ashcari dogma. Maliki jurisprudence and 
Ashcari dogma became two indissoluble aspects of the 
Moroccan religious tradition (3).
The earlycAlawid sultans were concerned more with the 
military and political consolidation of their power than 
with ideological problems. Sfdl Muhammad b.cAbd Allah was 
the firstcAlawid sultan to deal with such doctrinal issues.
Sldi Muhammad b.cAbd Allah was a great admirer of the 
Sacadian Ahmad al-Mansur not so much for his religious 
ideas as for the pompous etiquette of his court. Indeed, 
Sidi Muhammad attempted to copy many of al-Mansur's 
political military and even religious institutions. Follow­
ing the example of this illustrious predecessor, Sfdf 
Muhammad made hadith reading and commentary an established
• ••which man creates his deeds in conformity with God's will. Cf.
E.I., 1960, vol. I, pp.694-696.
(3) The best illustration of this successful symbiosis is the urjuza 
(poem) of cAbd al-Wahid b.cAshir (d.1631) in which the author brings 
together the fiqh (jurisprudence) of Malik, the dogma of al-Ashcari 
and the sufism of al-Junavd (d.910 AD) . This urjuza summarized the 
basic tenets of religion and used to be memorized by every ^Moroccan 
student. It was abundantly ccmrented during Mawlay Sulayman's ~~
reign, particularly by al-Tayyib b. Kiran (d. 1812) , Badr al-Dln al- 
Hammumf (d.1849) and Muhammad al-Murabit al-Samlall (d.1806).
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custom of his court (4). He brought in from the Arab East 
many foadith collections, particularly the musnad-s of al- 
Shafici, Abu Hanlfa and Ahmad b. Hanbal, which he was the 
first to introduce to Morocco (5). The study by Sfdf 
Muhammad of these three musnad-s led him to adopt a more 
conciliatory and open attitude towards the madhhab-s of 
their authors. In his seminars SIdl Muhammad gave equal 
importance to the hadith collections of the four iroam-s 
whom he considered to be equal in orthodoxy (6).
However, Sidl Muhammad was attracted above all by
Hanbalism (7) because of the simplicity of its dogmatic
views which he judged as "most conformable to the belief
of the four imam-s and the pious ancestors" (8). In fact
Sidl Muhammad was no man of erudition. He abhorred
complex speculative controversy and for this reason found
the Hanbali madhhab suitable to his simple thinking. Along
the lines of Ibn Hanbal's doctrine, Sidf Muhammad advocated
reliance on the self-evident meaning of the Quran and the
hadfth, rather than complex theological interpretations.
Doqmatic theology (cilm al-kalam) and philosophical' *
(4) Al-Zayani, al-Rawja, fol.125-126; al-Na$irf, V, p.153, VIII, p.67. 
Al-ZayanI mentioned that upon his accession to the throne, Sidf 
Muhairmad abandoned the reading of history and literature books 
and devoted all his time to the reading of hadith to which he 
appointed fixed hours in imitation of Ahmad al-Mansur. Sfdl 
Muhairmad never missed the occasion to declare that “al-Mansur is 
our teacher and exanple". Cf.al-Rawqla, fol. 125-126.
(5) Sidf Muhairmad b. cAbd Allah, al-Futufrat al-ilahiya f l ahadith 
khayr al-bariya, Rabat, 1980, p. 1.
(6) Ibid., p.459.
(7) IJanbalism is the doctrine founded by the celebrated theologian,
Ahmad b. Hanbal (780-855) which claimed to restore the Quran, the 
Prophet's tradition and the consulta (fatwa) of the rightly guided 
ancestors as the main sources of Islamic jurisprudence. Ibn Hanbal 
advocated a strict adherence to the text of the Quran and the Sunna 
without any allegorical exegesis. In case of disagreement, reliance 
on the Quran was preferred to personal effort of opinion; cf.
"Ahmad b. Hanbal" in E.I., vol. I, 1960, pp. 272-277.
(8) Sidl Muharrmad b.cAbd Allah, al-Futuhat, p.458.
speculation were unknown to the Prophet and his companions 
and were therefore considered as "detestable innovations"
(9) .
For this reason the teachings of al-Ashcarf and al- 
Ghazzali were discarded because both engaged in the refuta­
tion of erroneous ideas, thus preserving these injurious 
concepts in their books (10). As far as ideological 
attacks against Islamic orthodoxy were concerned, the best 
approach consisted, according to Sidl Muhammad, in abstain­
ing from all debate about dogma (11).
Dogmatic inflexibility was, indeed, the main grievance 
Sidl Muhammad had against the Maliki calim-s of Morocco.
For him, the search for truth should not be confined to 
one single madhhab, since all the four imam-s —  al-Shafici, 
Abu Hanifa, Malik and Ibn IJanbal —  were worthy of respect 
and glorification (12). Everyone who adheres to one of 
the four doctrines", he wrote, "is sure to be on the right 
path, because they all relied on God's Book and his 
Prophet's tradition" (13). To show his independence vis- 
a-vis all doctrines, Sidl Muhammad declared to his contempo­
raries that he was Maliki in rite but Hanbali in dogma (14).
Sidl Muhammad's open challenge to the Maliki-Ash^ari 
tradition led him to adopt some original ideas on the teach­
ing of religious disciplines. For him, the Islamic religion
(9) Sfdl Muhammad b.cAbd Allah, Ta3lif fl ifoya3 culum al-din, Ms.9593, 
R.L., pp.130-131; al-Na^irf, VIII, p.68.
(10) Ibid., pp.112-113.
(11) Sidf Muhairmad b. <Abd Allah, al-Futufrat, p.457; Cf. also his Tariff 
p.129.
(12) Sidf Muhairmad b.cAbd Allah, al-Futufrat, p. 459.
(13) Ibid.
(14) Ibid., pp.457-458. Sidf Muhairmad often repeated this statement. Cf 
notice entitled "On the clarification of my saying 'Maliki in rite 
and Hanbali in dogma' "in al-Futuhat, pp.457-458.
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was very simple and was to be sought in its primary 
sources. He advocated, therefore, the return to the 
source of the sharlca, the Quran and the Prophet's 
tradition, and the abandonment of fossilized manuals, 
such as the Mukhtagar of Khalfl b. Ishaq (15), which, 
by their complexity, often hid the simplicity of the 
religion. These abstracts, argues Sfdl Muhammad, often 
conceal the true nature of Islam and complicate what, in 
fact, is clear and intelligible (16). During his reign 
the study of Khalil's Mukhtagar was to be largely 
abandoned by many calim-s who did not want to antagonize 
the Sultan (17).
Sidi Muhammad's reformist attempts were obstinately 
resisted by the Moroccan calim-s. Those who complied with 
his instructions regarding the teaching of certain Maliki 
manuals did so more from fear than from conviction (18). 
After his death, his Hanbali ideas were completely forgot­
ten.
Mawlay Sulayman was a fervent adept of the Maliki 
school. Owing to his religious education, however, he 
remained faithful to the reformist spirit of his father. 
His loyalty to the Maliki-Ashcari school did not prevent 
him from advocating the return to the sources of Islam in 
order to restore the original purity of the religion.
(15) Cf. note 1 above.
(16) Sidi Muhammad b.cAbd Allah, al-Futuhat, cf .introduction by 
Muhairmad Rashid Mulfn, p. ; al-Nasirf, VIII, p. 67.
(17) Al-Ducayf, p. 235.
(18) Cf. case of Muhammad b. Abu al-Qasim al-SijilmasI who resumed the 
teaching of Khalil's Mukhtagar and its commentaries immediately 
after the death of Sidf Muhammad b.cAbd Allah, in al-Ducayf,
p. 235. Moroccan c. alim-s remained unanimously hostile to the 
Hanbalist tendencies of Sfdl Muhammad. They expressed their 
attachment to the Mukhtagar in the following terms:
" L-
Cf.al-Futuhat, introduction , p. (5 .
250
II - The Religious Reformism of Mawlay Sulayman
It would be impossible to appraise in its full extent the 
nature of the conflict which opposed the Makhzen to the 
religious forces within Morocco at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century without, first, shedding some light 
on the religious ideas of Mawlay Sulayman.
A- His Education and Religious Scholarship
Mawlay Sulayman was deeply influenced by his religious 
education. This education was mainly accomplished out­
side the big centres of learning. His father, being 
eager to isolate his young sons from the political 
turmoil of the major urban centres, preferred to send 
Mawlay Sulayman first to a small zawiya near Safi. When 
he memorized the Quran, he pursued his religious education 
at Ksar El-Kebir. In 1783, Sidi Muhammad sent him to 
Tafilelt at the age of seventeen (19). It was in the 
latter place that he acquired his basic education and 
was introduced to the main religious sciences, such as 
the fradith, the exegesis of the Quran and Sufism. It was 
also in the Tafilelt that he was acquainted with the funda­
mental work of al-Ghazzali, Ihya3 culum al-dln, the study 
of which he encouraged later on, as well as some works of 
the Hanbali theologian Ibn Taymiyya (20). His stay in Fes 
was apparently very brief but allowed him, nevertheless, 
to meet some of the most prominent c alim-s of his time, 
namely al-Tawdi b. Suda, his son Ahmad b. Suda, al-Tayyib 
b. Kiran, cAbd al-Qadir b. Shaqrun and Hamdun b. al-Haj 
(21) .
(19) Al-Zayani, Alfiyat al-suluk, Ms.K.224, BGR, pp.166-168.
(20) cAbd al-Karim al-FIlali, al-Tarikh al-muftara clayh fi al-Maqhrib, 
Rabat, 1969, pp. II9-I20.
(21) Al-Zayani, Alfiyat, p.168.
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Until he assumed the responsibility of the sultanate 
in 1792 Mawlay Sulayman gave himself completely to the 
acquisition of the religious sciences showing little 
interest in worldly attractions (22). Nor did he have any 
political motivation. During the short reign of Mawlay al- 
Yazfd he refused the post of vice-regent for Marrakech and 
preferred, instead, to devote himself to learning (23). 
According to the author of Tadhkirat al-mufrsinln, Mawlay 
Sulayman "was never a candidate to the throne, nor did he 
have any such ambition. His interest was so oriented to­
wards religious studies that people used to believe he 
could not even ride a horse" (24) . Indeed, when sultan, 
Mawlay Sulayman governed more like a calim than a states­
man, referring constantly to the sharica and the calim-s 
before taking any important decision. "He never conclu­
ded any business which related to his kingdom without 
first consulting them (the ^-alim-s) ", wrote Muhammad b. 
al-Haj, "nor did he accept from them anything but an 
explicit reference to the text (of the Quran and the 
Sunna)" (25). The abolition of non-religious taxes or 
the prohibition of tobacco plantation — which both used 
to secure important revenues for the treasury —  are 
typical examples of the supremacy of faith over State 
interest.
Nothing illustrates the religious orientation of Mawlay 
Sulayman better than his cultural activity and his numerous 
writings. His court used to be a meeting place for the 
outstanding calim-s of his time, particularly during the 
holy month of Ramadan. He supervised religious seminars 
in person and recommended the study of some works, such as
(22) Al-Zayani, al-Rawgla, fol. 157.
(23) Al-ZayanT, Alfiyat, p. 159; al~5ucayf, p.247.
(24)cAbd al-Kabfr b. al-Majdhub al-Fasi, Tadhkirat al-Mufrsinrh, Ms.K.270 
BGR, p.342.
(25) Muhammad al-Talib b. Hamdun b. a-Haj, al-Ishraf cala bacd man 
bi Fas min al-ashraf, Ms. D 653, BGR, p. 80.
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the Ihya3 of al-Ghazzalf or the Musnad of Ibn Hanbal (26). 
His political responsibilities never prevented him from 
contributing actively to the theological debate of his 
time. In this respect he wrote numerous works which bear 
the marks of a distinguished scholarly talent (27).
Mawlay Sulayman was also known to be an active promoter 
of religious learning. He provided for students who memo­
rized the Mukhtagar of Khalil and attended lectures given 
by the c alim-s at the Qarawiyin in person (28) .
B- His Religious Ideas
Mawlay Sulayman inherited his father's religious reformism 
but without its Hanbalist orientation. Like his father, 
Mawlay Sulayman was in favour of a return to the tradition 
of the Prophet and his companions by extricating all 
"detestable innovations" and restoring the primitive 
purity of Islam. This, however, he wanted to achieve 
within the well-established tradition of the Maliki-Ashcari 
school.
(26) Al-Zayani, Jawharat, Ms.6778, R.L., p.84; al-pucayf, p.390;
Sulayman al-^ awwat, al-Rawgla al-maqguda, Ms.K.2351, BGR, p.43; al- 
Hawwat's Diwan, Ms.D.753, BGR, pp.17-20; Hamdun b. al-Haj, Dlwan,
Ms.222, R.L., p.39.; Muhammad al-HajwT, Ikhtigar al-ibtisam, Ms.
H.114, BGR, p.359.
(27) The works of Mawlay Sulayman include in particular:-
- Carmentary of Khalil's Mukhtagar, the first volume is available 
at the Royal Library, No. 1323;
- Carmen tary of the Muwafta0 of Malik b. Anas;
- cInayat*uli al-raajd li dhikr a 1-Fas I ibn al-jadd, written in 
gratitude to his shaykh (teacher) Muhammad b.cAbd al-Salam al-Fasi, 
printed at Fes in 1928;
- Annotations (frashiya) on al-Zarqanl's cormentary of al-Mawahib al- 
ludniya;
- Essay on pilgrimage, Ms.K.963, BGR, pp.237-264;
- Essay on the kasb(Jawab fi mas°alat al-kasb) Ms.D. 1838, BGR, pp. 
253-270. This essay was revized by al-Tayyib b. Kfrah;
- Two essays on the use of music by Sufi brotherhoods:
# al-Samac: ma huwa muttafaqun cala foirmatih, Ms.652, Sblhi 
library (Sale), pp. 1-59.
# Imtac al asmac bl tahrir ma iltabasa min bukm al samac, 
mentioned by Qamdun b. al-Haj in his Dlwan, p.241: ^
- Risala fi al-radd cala man gala bi afcjaliyyat barii isra II cala 
al-carab, Ms.D.2600, BGR, pp.34-42;
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His essay on the acquisition of human actions 
(al-kasb) (29) sheds some light on his dogmatic con­
victions. Mawlay Sulayman adopted the basic principles 
of the Ashcari school, particularly with regard to man's 
freedom of action and the problem of al-takffr 
(excommunication). Abu al-Hasan al-Ashcarr had devised 
the notion of kasb in order to avoid the extremism of 
two theological schools, the Qadariya and the Muctazila 
which maintained that man is totally free and capable of 
inventing his actions, and the Jabriya for which man is 
nothing but a tool in the execution of the divine will
(30). According to the theory of al-kasb, which 
characterized the Ashcari school, man has the power to 
create his actions but in conformity with God's will. 
This interpretation was adopted by the Moroccan calim-s
(31) and by Mawlay Sulayman to avoid the abuses of both 
the Qadariya land the Jabriya, and also because it fits 
perfectly well the position of Malik b. Anas on this 
particular issue (32).
The second point of convergence between Mawlay 
Sulayman and the Ashcari school relates to the problem 
of al-takffr. For Ashcari theologians such as al- 
Ghazzall, a grave sin (kabira) does not justify
- Tagyid fi al-tabkhir zaman al-gawm, Ms.653, SbThi Library,
9 pages;
- Numerous khut±>a-s attacking popular detestable innovations 
relating to the cult of saints. Cf. in particular his khufba 
on the mawsim-s printed at Fes, without date; cf. also extracts 
from other khu^ba-s in al-Mashraff, Sharh al-shamaqmaqiyya, Ms. 
G.629, BGR, unpaginated; and al-NSsirl, VIII, p. 123.
(28) Al-Ducayf, pp.364-391.
(29) Jawab fi mas3alat al-kadp, Ms. D 1838, BGR, pp. 253-270.
(30) Ibid., p.254.
(31) Cf. al-Tayyib b. Kfran, Sharh tawhfd al-murshid al-mucIn, lith. 
1889, p.’6.
(32) Ibid.
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excommunication as long as its author does not contest 
the oneness of God and accepts his Prophet's message .
A person does not incur infidelity as long as he recogni­
zes some basic tenets of the religion (^ aruriyat, pi. of 
flarura) . Both Abu al-Hasan al-Ashcari and al-Ghazzalf 
called for the greatest prudence in excommunicating "the 
people of the qibla" (Muslims). Mawlay Sulayman defended 
the same principle. "Excommunication", he wrote, "should 
be pronounced only against an infidel about whom there 
can be no ambiguity because it means the condemnation of 
a Muslim to perpetual hell when the Day of the last 
judgement comes" (33). It was on this particular point 
that Mawlay Sulayman expressed his greatest reticence 
on the Wahhabi doctrine.which was highly predisposed to 
excommunicate ideological opponents.
The mere fact of participating in such dogmatic 
debate would have been considered inadmissible by Sfdr 
Muhammad b.cAbd Allah. Mawlay Sulayman, on the contrary, 
did not share his father's Hanbali convictions as far 
as speculative theology was concerned. His reign was 
characterized, in fact, by the restoration of Maliki 
supremacy and the return to Ashcari dogmatics. Mawlay 
Sulayman rehabilitated the Mukhtagar of Khalil and en­
couraged the study of al-Ghazzali's works. He remained, 
however, deeply convinced of the necessity to restore the 
original purity of Islam.
The reformist ideas of Mawlay Sulayman reflected a 
deep personal conviction and were not dictated solely by 
political considerations. They also reflected his pious 
character and his natural hostility to heterodox practices.
(33) Mawlay Sulayman and al-Tayyib b. Kfran, Jawab fi masDalat al- 
kasb, p. 264.
255
Mawlay Sulayman wrote numerous essays to discredit 
popular customs which are contrary to the sharX ca (34) .
He incited at the same time the ^alim-s to imitate his 
efforts. Thus, on Mawlay Sulayman's demand, the gaglX 
of Rabat, Muhammad b. cAshur (d.1844-45) wrote a pamphlet 
reproving some festive amusements celebrated at Marrakech 
on the occasion of the ^AshurlP (tenth day of Muharram)
(35). Another &alim,cAbd al-Salam Harakat of Sale 
criticized,in an essay written by order of the Sultan, 
twenty five"detestable popular practices" (36).
Mawlay Sulayman hardly missed an occasion to reaffirm 
his reprobation of such practices. Religious fairs 
(mawsim-s) were declared illegal not only because they 
constituted blameworthy innovations in themselves but 
also because of their allowing a number of indecent 
practices, such as chanting, dancing, the mingling of 
men and women, extravagant celebrations and illegal 
spendings (37) .
Another manifestation of Mawlay Sulayman's salafism
(38) was his hostility to the ornamentation of holy 
places and the erection of sumptuous buildings over tombs 
and shrines. In 1805, for example, he ordered the re­
moval of a dome built on his father's shrine and placed 
it instead on a mosque (39). Four years later he removed 
the tombstone (nagfr) placed on his father's tomb because
(34) Cf. works of Mawlay Sulayman above, footnote 27.
(35) Muhanmad cAshur (known as al-Rashshay) , essay reproving festive 
amusements celebrated at Marrakech on the occasion of cAshura? 
in Ms.Z.3772, R.L., pp. 1-35. Cf. also Bujandar, al-Ightibat; bi 
tarajlm aclam al-Ribat;, Ms.D.1287, BGR, vol.I, pp.196-197.
(36) Muhaimad b. cAlf al-Dukkalf, Itfraf, Ms.D.ll, BGR, p.75.
(37) Mawlay Sulayman, Khu^ba on the mawsim-s, pp.5-6.
(38) Salafism advocates the return to the pious men of old (al-salaf 
al-?alih) , that is the Prophet's ccnpanions, as a means to 
restore the original purity of the religion.
(39) Al-Ducayf, p.442.
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he argued, it was a bidca contrary to the Sunna (40). 
Among the^Alawid sultans Mawlay Sulayman was in fact the 
one who devoted the least effort to the building and 
restoration of shrines (41).
C- Mawlay Sulayman and Sufism
Those who approached Mawlay Sulayman, whether Moroccan or 
foreign contemporaries, were impressed by his piety and 
ascetism. He disdained luxury and contented himself with 
the strict minimum. "His court", wrote Ali Bey, "had no 
splendor and his dress was very simple, not to say plain"
(42). A Moroccan contemporary, quoted by al-Nasiri, 
reported to have seen the Sultan wearing patched trousers 
and in possession of a watch on a cord of wool (43).
His austere nature, his ascetism and his religious 
education made him very inclined to contemplative life. 
Mawlay Sulayman was not hostile to Sufism as it is often 
assumed. His hostility was not directed against Sufism 
as such but against Sufism as it came to be practised by 
common people and certain zawiya-s. After all, Mawlay 
Sulayman himself was an adept of the Nasiriya religious 
order (44).
(40) Al-Ducayf,pp.441-445. The word bid^a (detestable innovation) is 
used to mean any alteration or addition to the religion which 
contradicts the tradition of the Prophet and his companions.
(41) Among the architectural achivements of Mawlay Sulayman al-Zayani 
mentioned 16 mosques but only 2 shrines. One of these shrines 
was renovated because the Sultan wanted to erect a separation wall 
between men and women visitors.Cf.al-Rawda, fol.204; al-Nasiri, 
VIII, pp.172-173; al-Ducayf, p.173.
(42) Ali Bey, Travels, I, pp.51, 173.
(43) Al-Nasiri, VIII, p. 171. Another mark of Mawlay Sulayman's ascetism 
was his refusal to use articles which contained gold. In 18Q3 he 
declined an umbrella presented to him by the French consul because 
it was decorated with gold threads. Such articles were usually sold 
and their value distributed to ^alim-s and sharif-s. Cf. letter 
from al-Salawf to A. Guillet, 10 Rajab 1218/23 Oct. 1803 in Eugene 
Fumey, Choix de cor re spondance s marocaines, p.19.
(44) cAbd al-Raljman b. Zaydan, Itfraf, II, p. 21; cAbd al-Hayy al-Kattani,
Fihris al-faharis, II, p.331. Cf. also text of an ijaza delivered
The most outstanding feature of Moroccan Sufism has 
always been its popular orientation. This popular 
dimension is to be seen in both its historical and social 
context. Since the fifteenth century, indeed, the local 
zawiya-s have played a determinant role in the military 
resistance against frequent attempts of Iberian expansio­
nism and needed for this purpose a constant popular 
mobilization. Being essentially a rural movement operating 
within an overwhelmingly illiterate population, the simpli­
fication of Sufi principles became a necessity. This was 
also made imperative by the missionary function of the 
zawiya in a milieu where islamization remained rudimenta­
ry and superficial. The popular success of the zawiya-s 
in the countryside was, in a sense, the result of the 
spiritual vacuum which in the town was filled by <■ alim-s.
This popularization of Sufism led to the emergence of 
numerous heterodox practices which tainted the true nature 
of Islam. Among these practices there were the gathering 
of adepts in exciting dhikr sessions, the cult of saints 
and the annual celebration of mawsim-s. Another by-product 
of this popularization was the degradation of Sufism as a 
science. Moroccan Sufis tended, according to Sulayman al- 
Hawwat, to neglect the original works on Sufism and con­
centrate instead on a number of popularizing books and 
stereotyped formulas such as the maxims of IbncA t a ? Allah(45)
... by Mawlay Sulayman to Ahmad b. al-Nadi al-Hamduni,dated 1 Shawwal 
1236/2 July, 1821 in D.A.R., year 1236 AH.
(45) Ibn cAta-;> Allah (d. 1308 AD) belonged to the mystic school founded 
by Abu al-Hasan al-Shadhill (d. 1258 AD) . His most important work, 
al-gikam al-cafa*iya,was abundantly caimented by Moroccan mystics. 
E.I.,III, 1971,pp.722-723jQn the degraded state of Moroccan Sufism 
at the beginning of the 19th century Sulayman al-Hawwat wrote in 
al-Rawqia al-maqguda, p.43:
of n - - ’
<-_J ^  Yfj*. j v_.bUI ^
<. >L V. 1. 1*1^ I Cw I j 4 I > <i L y I
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For similar Sufi works Mawlay Sulayman had little sympathy. 
He even remonstrated against their being read(46).
The ambition of Mawlay Sulayman was, according to 
al-Hawwat, to renovate mysticism by going back to the 
sources of Sufism, and particularly to the doctrine of al- 
Ghazzali (47). Mawlay Sulayman had clearly a great 
admiration for al-Ghazzali. Upon his accession to the 
throne he prescribed the teaching of his Ifrya3 and re­
commended its reading for his own sons (48). He also 
supervised its discussion within the religious seminars 
that he held frequently and which included the most eminent 
c alim-s of the country (49) .
Al-Ifrya0 is al-Ghazzali's greatest work in size and 
in importance. It is a comprehensive guide for the devout 
Muslim covering almost every aspect of religious life : 
worship, conduct in the daily life, purification of the 
heart and advance along the mystic way (50). Al-Ghazzali had 
the advantage of being an outstanding theologian and a 
great mystic at the same time. Without departing from 
Sunnism or orthodox Islam, his Ihya° provided an answer 
to all mystic preoccupations of the devout believer.
(46) A. al-FIlall, al-Tarikh, pp. 122-124.
(47) Al-Hawwat, Diwan,pp. 17-20; al-Rawfla al-maq?uda, p.43.
(48) Al-Ibtisam, p. 6. Cf. also letter frcxn Mawlay Sulayman to his son 
Mawlay Ibrahim recommending the reading of al-Ifrya ° , no date, 
in al-MashrafI's Sharfr al-shamaqmaqiyya, unumbered pages.
(49) Sulayman al-frawwat, al-Raw^a al-maqguda, p. 43; cf. also his 
Dlwan, pp. 17-20. Al-Hawwat praised Mawlay Sulayman's efforts
to revive the "science of Sufism by encouraging the study of al- 
Ghazzall Ls Ifrya3 ". In this respect he wrote in al-Rawcja .. ,p. 43:
• • • J  Ji-*J I $ jJLJ I 1 A\ I J^LLl U "
a 1 > L J  L# aJ I k ?  y ^ U.J..* «»J I a L  L«w ^  I  4 d J  j  ^  L U I  ^
0 JLmJ I jiaj} L
(50) Cf. E.I., 1965, II, pp.1038-1041.
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Mawlay Sulayman's preference for the mysticism of al- 
Ghazzali was in fact a preference for a "Sunni mysticism" 
or a "mysticism of the legalists"(tagawwuf al-fugaha) as 
defined by a fifteenth century Maghribi mystic, Ahmad 
Zarruq (d.1493 AD) (51). The objective of Sunni mysti­
cism is to place the believer on the mystic way and 
provide him with the necessary tools to ensure his salva­
tion without the need for a spiritual intermediary. In 
other words, it is a mysticism in which the shaykh, or 
spiritual guide, occupies a secondary role (52).
This kind of mysticism is elitist by definition and 
therefore less open to popular deviations. Mawlay 
Sulayman advocated a mysticism for the enlightened few 
to the exclusion of the camma , or common people,"this 
group of people which", in his own terms, "should count 
rather among the dead than among the living" (53). This 
is because the common people were unable to lead a 
contemplative life in conformity with the tradition of 
the Prophet and his companions. Orthodox mysticism
Presupposed the ability to recite the Quran and invoke God
\
in a discreet manner, instead of resorting to ecstatic 
dhikr sessions as was the case with some popular 
religious orders (54) .
Mawlay Sulayman was fully conscious that the replace­
ment of popular mysticism as advocated by the zawiya-s
(51) S. Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam, Oxford, 1971, p. 242.
(52) The adoption of a shaykh was essential to all Sufi orders and 
particularly to the Shadhili tarlqa-s. "He who pretends to be 
able to dispense with the shaykh", wrote Mawlay al-cArbi al- 
Darqawi, "has missed the gate and faced the wall. Had we 
remained faithful to the Prophet's message we would have 
certainly been able to content ourselves with God and the 
Prophet without the need for a shaykh; but after all the altera­
tions we have introduced to the religion, until our hearts and 
senses have become soiled, hew can we do without a shaykh?" .
Cf. Mawlay al-cArbI al-Darqawi, Rasa3il, Ms.K.3095, BGR, p. 30/ 
personal translation.
(53) Al-^Arbl al-Mashraf:T, Sharfr al-shamaqmaqiyya, unpaginated.
(54) Mawlay Sulayman, Khufba on the mawsim-s, pp.5-6.
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with a "Sunni mysticism" according to the doctrine of al- 
Ghazzali, would only be achieved if the prevailing Sufi 
practices were discredited and eradicated. He applied 
himself therefore to the task of combatting innovations 
with an untiring perseverance. His essays and khutba-s 
were mainly directed against popular religious brother­
hoods which recruited heavily among the lower strata of 
the C amma, such as the cAysawiya and the Hamadsha orders. 
They were also directed against the new Darqawiya order 
which succeeded within a relatively short time in becoming 
the most popular religious order in the country and whose 
practices — such as the dhikr sessions and the wearing 
of patched garments—  were often repugnant to orthodox 
c alim-s.
Among the unorthodox practices of the zawiya-s, the 
samac (the use of musical instruments for worship 
purposes) was ah eternal subject of controversy between 
the calim-s and the Sufis. In two essays devoted to 
this question, Mawlay Sulayman elucidated religious 
attitudes with this respect (55). To cut short the 
controversy on the samac he proposed to go back to "the 
mother of sources" — the Quran and the Prophet's tradi­
tion. He also supported his arguments condemning the 
samac by extensive quotations from the works of famous 
Maliki theologians. Mawlay Sulayman wanted to prove in 
particular that:-
1. the worship of God is incompatible with any form of 
amusement;
2. Sufism as practiced by the camma is a fallacy and 
an innovation which does more harm to their belief 
than any other sin they might commit;
3. the adepts of Sufi t;arlga-s are superfluous and an 
unproductive element in society. By their retreat 
from active life they necessarily constitute a 
burden for the rest of the social body from which
(55) Cf. note 27 above.
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they should be discarded (56) .
Mawlay Sulayman's attack on Sufi heterodox practices 
found its expression also in his numerous khu~t;ba-s (57) 
in which he denounced the celebration of mawsim-s . These 
annual gatherings of adepts and sympathizers of a religious 
order gave rise to a number of illegal practices. The 
mawsim-s, argued Mawlay Sulayman, constituted an innovation 
because they were unknown to the pious ancestors (58). 
Moreover, these annual fairs were usually the occasion for 
the immolation of animals and their dedication to dead 
saints in order to implore their power of intercession. 
This practice, Mawlay Sulayman claimed, could be perilous 
for the belief of the common people who, by imploring the 
saints, often tended to ascribe to them divine attribu­
tions (59). Mawlay Sulayman decided, therefore, to ban 
these annual celebrations and maintained this interdiction 
even during the most critical periods of his reign (60).
By discrediting these practices Mawlay Sulayman was 
in fact launching a direct attack on the zawiya-s for 
whom the mawsim-s represented not only an important 
religious manifestation but also a vital source of in­
come (61). The decision to prohibit such fairs affected 
directly the moral and material privileges of both the 
zawiya-s and the sharif-s. No wonder that these forces 
adopted an openly hostile attitude towards Mawlay Sulayman 
and accused him of Wahhabism.
(56) This is a clear attack on the Darqawi-s who preached al-khumul, or 
the neglect of means of livelihood. Cf. Mawlay Sulaymian, al-Samc, 
pp.44-46.
(57) Cf. Note 27 above.
(58) Mawlay Sulayman, Khu^ba on the mawsim-s, p.5.
(59) Al-cArbi al-Mashrafi, Sharh al-shamaqmaqiya, unpaginated.
(60) In 1235 AH/1819-1820 AD, on the morrow of the Zaian defeat and in 
the midst of a critical political crisis, Mawlay Sulayman still 
maintained a firm position on religious fairs and opposed the 
celebration by the cAysawa of their mawsim. Cf. Ibn Zaydan, Ithaf, 
I, p.351 and al-Mashrafi1s Sharh   unpaginated.
(61) The mawsim-s took place usually during the summer or the autumn 
seasons after the end of harvests. The adepts of the Wazzaniya
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II - The Winds of Eastern Reformism : the Moroccan 
Response to Wahhabism
The Wahhabi doctrine was almost unanimously rejected by 
the Islamic world. In the Ottoman Empire hostility to 
Wahhabism was motivated, to a large extent, by political 
reasons since the movement represented not only a 
religious but also a political threat. This was not the 
case in Morocco whose Sultan was one of the rare rulers 
if not the only one, who not only refrained from attack­
ing the doctrine, but sympathized with many of its ideas. 
However, the conservatism of the religious forces and 
the predominance of the Sufi-sharifian ideology in 
Morocco made impossible its implantation in this country.
A- The Wahhabi Doctrine
Wahhabism is a modern form of Hanbalism. The founder of 
the doctrine, Muhammad b.cAbd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), 
received a religious education in conformity with the 
Hanbalist rite and was particularly impressed with the 
ideas of Ibn Taymiyya (d.1328 AD) who was one of the most 
eminent theologians of the Hanbali school (62). In 1744 
Ibn cAbd al-Wahhab concluded an alliance with the prince 
of Najd in the Hijaz, Muhammad b. Sacud, for whom the new 
ideas of IbncAbd al-Wahhiab presented a precious occasion 
to shake off the Ottoman rule. Thereafter, the movement 
acquired a political character, gained new followers and 
extended progressively to most of the Hijaz. In 1805-1806 
the Wahhabi*s took over the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina. 
It was indeed under the reign of Sacud b.^Abd al-cAzfz 
(1803-1814) that the movement reached its culmination.
. . . religious order , for instance, brought all kinds of offerings to 
SidicAlI b. Ahmad: agricultural products, slaves, gold and silver. 
Cf. A. al-Wazzanl, al-Rawl al-munlf. II, pp. 76-77.
(62) On Ibn Taymiyya, cf. E.I., m ,  1971, pp. 951-955.
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Being unable to stop the progress of the Wahhabi threat 
the Ottoman sultan, Mahmud II, called on the Pasha of 
Egypt, Muhammd CA1I, to check the spread of this 
politico-religious danger. The successor of Sacud , 
rAbd Allah, suffered a decisive defeat in 1815 and was 
finally taken prisoner and executed at Istanbul in 1818.
As a doctrine, Wahhabism attempts, along the lines 
drawn by Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya, to restore the 
original purity and simplicity of the religion by combat­
ting all suspect innovations. The Wahhabi doctrine is 
based on a strict adherence to the unicity of God (al- 
tawfrid). The cult of saints is energetically opposed as 
well as the visitation of shrines and tombs of saints, 
considered to be forms of idolatry. Even the ritual 
visitation of the Prophet's tomb was placed under heavy 
restrictions and prohibited to the common people in order 
to prevent idolatrous practices, such as asking for the 
Prophet's intercession. Books of prayers dedicated*to the 
Prophet, such as the Dala^il al-khayrat by the renovator 
of Maghribi Sufism, Muhanmad b.cAbd al-Rahman al-Jazuli (d. 1460), 
were forbidden (63). Prayers, argued the Wahhabi theo­
logians, should be directed to God alone to the exclusion 
of all creatures, be they prophets or saints, alive or 
dead (64). All those who did not conform to this view 
were considered as idolatrous (mushrikun, pi. of mushrik) 
and therefore liable for jihad as infidels.
The Wahhabi fight against innovations and idolatrous 
practices also manifested itself in intransigent opposi­
tion to all deviations which had corrupted religion. Among 
these there were the ornamentation of tombs of saints and 
mosques,the consecration of sacrifices to the awliya3
v(63) Al-Ibtisam, p. 28.
(64) cAbd Allah b. Muhammad b.cAbd al-Wahhab, An Account of the Tenets 
of the Wahhabis of Arabia, Ms.Or.6631, British Museum, fol.20.
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(pi. of wali, or saint) and all forms of saint cult.
Upon their entering Mecca and Medina, the Wahhabi-s 
destroyed the domes erected on the tombs of the Prophet 
and his companions and all ornamental edifices they 
considered as detestable innovations. In so doing, their 
aim was to restore the primitive purity and simplicity of 
Islam as lived under the Prophet and the Right-guided 
califs.
The Wahhabi-s distinguished themselves in particular 
by their hostility to Sufism and the Sufi tarfqa-s. Al­
though they were not opposed to mysticism in principle, 
the Wahhabi-s were , nevertheless, suspicious of Sufi 
practices which they condemned as being contrary to 
religion (65). This attitude provoked the hostility of 
most of the Islamic world because of the spread of Sufi 
ideology, particularly among the common people. The 
condemnation of Sufi.heterodox practices by the Wahhabi-s 
was accompanied by a very austere and ascetic way of life. 
They forbade the use of tobacco, the wearing of silk and 
abstained from all forms of luxury (66). Their attachment 
to the primitive purity of Islam and the tradition of the 
Prophet's companions also reflected itself in their stress 
on equality among all believers. They abolished 
distinctive titles and forbade prostration before princes 
or other dignitaries. "They addressed their prince by 
his name", noted the author of al-Ibtisam, "and greeted 
him in the same way they used to greet each other"(67).
B- The Moroccan Response
A number of factors militated against the success of the 
Wahhabi reformist doctrine in Morocco. If, on one hand 
the popular attitude was mainly motivated by the
(65) Ibid., pp.7-8.
(66) Al-Ibtisam, p.28; al-Na^ iri, VIII, p.120.
(67) Al-Ibtisam, p.28; Anon. Histoire des Wahhabis depuis leur, origine 
jusgu'a la fin de 1809, Paris, 1810, p. 21.
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predominance of the Sufi-sharifian ideology, that of the 
5alim-s, on the other hand, is to be explained by the 
deep-seated Maliki-Ashcari tradition which proved to be 
incompatible with Hanbali dogma. However, Mawlay 
Sulayman while remaining faithful to Ashcari dogma, did 
not make secret his sympathy with the reformist character 
of Wahhabism.
(1) The_Popular_Response
The Hanbali doctrine was well known in Morocco but 
remained confined to the speculative field since Malikism 
had always been the official and undisputed rite, and 
Ahmad b. Hanbal was respected more for his contribution 
to the study of the hadith than for his theological 
ideas (68). It was only during the second half of the 
eighteenth century that IJanbali ideas were openly adopted 
by the ruling sultan, Sidi Muhammad b.cAbd Allah. This 
coincided with the emergence of Wahhabism in the Arabian 
peninsula, but there is nothing to show that Sidi 
Muhammad's sympathy with Hanbalism was a result of 
foreign influence. The existence of the Wahhabi movement 
passed apparently unnoticed until the beginning of the 
nineteenth century when it had spread to the Holy
Places. Moroccan travel accounts (rifrla-s) written by 
returning pilgrims during the latter part of the eight­
eenth century make, in fact, no reference to this 
emerging religious movement. Muhammad b.cAbd al-Salam 
b. Na§ir who went twice on pilgrimage— in 1782 (1196 AH) 
and 1797 (1211 AH)—  wrote two detailed rifola-s neither
of which mentioned the Wahhabi-s (69). Afymad b. Muhammad 
al-Fasf who accompanied him during the second pilgrimage 
did not refer either to the Wahhabi movement in his 
rifola (70).
(68) E. Micheaux-Bellaire, Le Wahhabisme, Casablanca, 1928, p.9.
(69) Cf. Muhanmad b.cAbd al-Salam b. Na?ir, al-Rifrla al-kubra, Ms.D. 
2651, BGR, and al-Rihla al-?ughra, Ms.121, R.L.
(70) Cf. extracts frcm his rifrla in Ms.G.88, BGR, pp. 164-181.
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The first reference to the Wahhabi movement by al- 
Ducayf goes back to 1803 (71). The information provided 
by Ahmad b.cAbd al-Salam Bannani (d.1819) also confirms 
that it was at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
that Moroccans became acquainted with the existence of 
Wahhabism (72). Bannani affirmed that before 1803 there 
had never been any mention of the Wahhabi-s in Morocco
(73). This was no doubt due to the interruption of 
contact with the Arab East for a number of years. From 
1798 to 1802 the Moroccan pilgrimage caravan was sus­
pended because of the French invasion of Egypt (74) .
This suspension, apparently, left Moroccans unacquainted 
with the events that were taking place in the Arabian 
peninsula. Moreover, the attention of the Islamic world 
was directed to the Christian threat which hung over 
Egyptr until the evacuation of French troops in 1802.
Ahmad b.cAbd al-Salam Bannani was among the pilgrims 
who left the city of Fes in October 1802. "We had never 
heard of the Wahhabi or his followers", he wrote (75). 
It was only upon their arrival in Egypt in February 1803 
that Moroccan pilgrims became acquainted with the exist­
ence of the Wahhabi movement (76).
(71) Al-Ducayf, p.423.
(72) Atimad b. cAbd al-Salam Bannani, al-Fuyu<jat al-wahbiya fr al-radd 
cala al~taJifa al-wahbiya, Ms. 170, private library of'Abd al- 
Karim al-FIlall.
(73) Ibid., pp.10-11.
(74) The Moroccan pilgrimage caravan was temporarily interrupted follow­
ing the French invasion of Egypt. It was in 1802 that Mawlay 
Sulayman authorized this caravan upon the assurances given to him 
by the British consul on the security of the land routes through 
Egypt. Cf. FO.52/12, 3 November, 1802.
J ■ .>xl 1 j iujl ^  L ^  ^ Iv A *-«■*«> ^  It 1 ^ I I (^4
£  j V ^  Lh, Ia jl (^<uJ ^  j  14 j o  1 ^  ^ 4
Jlj lrU I  y * J I ll ^  I LlL^   ^( ♦ • • ) V J
(Js" y L. 1  ^ y L*> L»» i I v i i ^  ^  Cj* LfJbbl ^  L j
(76) Ibid., p.ll. . U u Ll^  j U
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The news about the existence of the Wahhabi-s in the 
Hijaz and the prohibition they imposed on the visitation 
of the Prophet's tomb spread fear and confusion among 
Moroccan pilgrims, but the pilgrimage caravan succeeded 
in reaching Medina without being disturbed. After the 
pilgrims had fulfilled their religious duties there, 
however, they were attacked by the followers of Muhammad 
b.cAbd al-Wahhab. Some of them were plundered and some 
even lost their lives (77).
The returning pilgrims were the first to popularize 
the news about the Wahhabi movement. The information 
conveyed by these pilgrims, many of whom had suffered 
or witnessed Wahhabi brutality, was in general biased, 
inaccurate and distorted. In Morocco, the Wahhabi 
doctrine was thus judged on the basis of false rumours 
or in terms of excesses committed by Wahhabi followers. 
For the common people, the doctrine came to be identified 
with the desecration of the Holy Places , the hostility to 
the visitation of saints, and the prohibition of the 
Dala5il al-khayrat (78)f a highly venerated book of 
prayers in Morocco. Al-Ducayf , who reflected popular 
opinion better than any other contemporary author, 
claimed that"the Wahhabi" was seeking to found a new 
religion (79).
The attitude of the Moroccan people to this eastern 
reformist doctrine was overwhelmingly hostile. The pre­
dominance of the Sufi-sharifian ideology represented the 
main obstacle to the spread of Wahhabism in Morocco.
(77) Ibid., pp.16 and 19.
(78) Al-Ducayf, pp.424 and 500; al-ZayanT, al-Turjumana, p.389; al- 
Ibtisam ,p.28.
(79) Al-Ducayf, p.500.
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The Wahhabi doctrine is in its essence opposed to the 
cult of saints which is the very basis of Moroccan popular 
religion. It is also hostile to the adoption of spiritual 
intermediaries between the believer and God. This was in 
open contradiction with the whole sufi ideology according 
to which mystic shaykh-s , or spiritual guides are supposed 
to lead the believer on the path of God. The Shadhili 
school of Sufism, from which derived most of the Maghribi 
tariqa-Sjmaintained in fact that it was impossible to 
restore the original purity of Islam as lived under the 
Prophet and his companions because of the corruption of 
the age, whence the necessity for spiritual guidance for 
the devout Muslim (80). The adoption of a "spiritual 
way" (tarlga) becomes, therefore, a necessity. The 
Wahhabi doctrine upheld, on the contrary, that religion 
was accessible by its sources to all believers without 
distinction.
The Wahhabi doctrine could not just antagonize Siufi 
brotherhoods without,at the same time, coming into 
collision with sharifism. Indeed, Moroccan Sufism had 
been interwoven with sharifism ever since the revival of 
the Shadhili mystic school in the fifteenth century under 
the influence of the celebrated Muhammad b .rAbd al-Rahman 
al-Jazuli . . The worship of saints, the veneration of 
the Prophet and his descendants and the advocation of 
social and religious differentiation which places the 
awliya^ and the sharff-s at the top of the socio­
religious pyramid, were as dear to the sharTf-s as they 
were to the Sufi shaykh-s. The Wahhabi doctrine, however, 
rejected the intercession of saints and the necessity of 
intermediaries between man and God, thus attacking the 
foundation of both popular Sufism and sharifism at the 
same time.
(80) Mawlay al-cArbI al-DarqawI, Rasa^il, Ms K 3095, BGR, p. 30j
cAbd al-Hafidh al-FasI, al-Turjurrian al-mucrib can ashhar furuC al- 
shadhiliya bi al-Maghrib, Mic. 14, HPMD, Rabat, 1976, no 
pagination.
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Anti-Wahhabi propaganda found in Morocco most favour­
able ground. The common people readily adopted a hostile 
attitude to this reformist movement. Many thousands of 
Moroccans volunteered to fight the Wahhabi-s under the 
banner of MuhammadCA1I (81). The spirit of the jihad 
remained by no means confined to the common people. As 
eminent an calim as Ahmad b.cAbd al-Salam BannSnl thought 
in fact that it was also the duty of amir al-muminln to 
send the mujahidin, money and military equipment to sup- 
ress the Wahhabi threat (82) .
(2) The_Official_Response£_^Alim-s_and_Makhzen
Apparently, the Wahhabi leaders never attempted to recruit 
the Moroccan sultan or the Moroccan c alim-s to their 
religious cause. Their preaching effort remained con­
fined to the Ottoman Empire, most probably for political 
reasons, as they needed to overcome first of all resist­
ance within the Empire itself. There is, in fact, no 
evidence of any direct correspondence from the Wahhabi-s 
to the Moroccan ^alim-s or to Mawlay Sulayman. Indeed, 
among the written documents through which Moroccans 
became acquainted with the Wahhabi doctrine there is none 
addressed to them directly.
Contrary to what is asserted by al-Zayani and al- 
Nasirf, Moroccan calim-s did not first come into contact 
with the Wahhabi doctrine in 1811-1812 (83) when they 
received a copy of the letter addressed by Sacud b.cAbd 
al-cAz!z to the Tunisian ^alim-s. The information 
provided by the author of al-Fuyudat al-wahbiya leaves 
no doubt that the introduction into the country of 
the first Wahhabi documents goes back to 1803.
(81) Al-Ducayf mentioned that Muhairmad CA1I had with him a Maghribi 
contingent of 8,000 men. Cf. al-Ducayf, pp.477, 500. The 
Egyptian historian al-Jabartf noted the existence of Maghribi 
fighters among the Egyptian army; cf. cAja3ib al- athar fr al- 
tarajim wa al-akhbar, Cairo, 1880, vol.IV, p.305.
(82) A. BannSnl, al-Fuyu^at, p.151.
(83) Cf. al-Zayani, al-Raw<ja,fol.185; al-Na^ irT, VIII, pp.117-120.
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Indeed, Ahmad Bannani affirmed that upon his return from 
the Hijaz he brought with him two letters exposing the 
tenets of the Wahhabi doctrine (84). The first letter 
was a long one, while the second which fell into the 
author's hands at Constantine during the return journey 
amounted to a few pages only (8 5). After having circula­
ted among the c alim-s of Fes, these two documents finally 
reached Mawlay Sulayman.
This version of events is confirmed by al-Tayyib b. 
Kiran. In his essay in the refutation of Wahhabism, Ibn 
Kiran affirmed that he was entrusted by Mawlay Sulayman 
with the examination of two letters which "fell into his 
hands" (86). They consisted in a long one of about forty 
pages, and a short one of four pages, neither of which , 
he claimed, was addressed to the Moroccan c alim-s or to 
Mawlay Sulayman (87).
(84) A. Bannani, al-Fuyudat, p. 176.
(85) Ibid. Bannani wrote in particular:
( S ( j >^.1 zJ £4 < j 1 Lf-* I I b*^  o 1 ^   ^i
J   ^^  1^ Lc aJU I li ju 1 LlLsj LJ 5^ • u** 1
j J  J & \ 0 \ ^ jL>,MlrUVl bVj* ju* U
^  I V I  ^dug J LM *3 dJJ 1 < U^1 >U ^  b*b» b >L<» I 
* - *>-! -*» d bsljl jiecJ I ( O Cm b *bJ ^  dJJ I dyai J»t»
• d l ie   ^<uU I dJc } 4 «\«"pl j b^l I
(86) Al-Tayyib b. Kiran, Radd Cala madhhab al-wahHabiya, Ms. K 1325, 
BGR, p. 21.
J-fC om o ■«***« ( • ♦ • ) fbVI *** ^  ^  ^ 0+{f) 3
• • • d ■' t*vl  ^dL.x"?i 1 ■' j ■ i
(87) Ibid.
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The ideological content of the two documents seemed 
so important that Mawlay Sulayman deemed it necessary to 
submit the issue to the calim-s for examination. Ibn 
Kiran,being the shaykh al-jamaca, was more qualified 
than any other to draft an answer. The need for the 
formulation of a reply was dictated essentially by the 
necessity of ideological clarification.
In his response, which extended to about fifty pages
(88), al-Tayyib b. Kiran took it upon himself to refute 
the main theological arguments of the Wahhabi doctrine.
He relied on both logic and the sayings of famous theo­
logians to define the nature of belief and heresy and to 
clarify the attitude of Islam towards the veneration of 
saints and recourse to their power of intercession. The 
veneration due to the Prophet and the awliya* argued Ibn 
Kiran, is conformable with the precepts of religion and 
should in no way be considered as idolatrous worship .
Ibn Kfran recognized, however, that some people among 
the camma did in fact exaggerate their reverence towards 
the awliya* but in such cases, he maintained, we should be 
very cautious in deciding whether this veneration had 
reached the point of becoming a heresy or not. The 
punishment of heretical practices, underlined Ibn Kfran, 
must remain limited to their specific authors and should 
in no way be generalized to a whole community (89).
On the Makhzen's side, there was no reaction until 
1811. Between 18 03 and 1811 Mawlay Sulayman refrained 
from either condemning the Wahhabi doctrine or expressing 
openly his sympathy with its principles. Was it the 
hostility of the calim-s to this doctrine which prevented
(88) Ibid. Ibn Kfran' s personal attitude towards the Wahhabi doctrine 
is reflected in his essay (Ms. K. 1325, BGR) . It should not be 
confused with the letter that he wrote to Sacud b.cAbd al-Azfz
on behalf of Mawlay Sulayman (Ms.4624, R.L.) and which reflects 
the Sultan's views. Cf. appendix 55.
(89) Ibid., p.75.
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him from manifesting his favourable disposition ? Some 
indications allow us to conclude that Mawlay Sulayman's 
hostility to innovations and heterodox practices was 
enhanced during this period. In 1804, al-Ducayf reported 
that the Sultan's governor, Muhammad b.cAbd al-Salam al- 
Salawi, prevented the cArab al-Widyan tribes from 
celebrating the mawsim of Sidi Yahya b. Mansur (90). The 
next year Mawlay Sulayman removed the dome off his father's 
shrine in Rabat (91). In 1806, the Sultan wrote an 
important essay in which he attacked Sufi heterodox 
practices (92). Three years later, in 1809, he ordered 
the removal of the tombstone placed on his father's tomb 
claiming that "it was against the Sunna" (93).
Meanwhile, the regular movement of Moroccan pilgrims 
to the Hijaz was hindered . by the alleged insecurity of 
the holy places (94) . The arrival in Fes of a third 
Wahhabi document in 1811 raised the problem again and 
made an official reply inevitable. The new document 
consisted in a letter addressed by Sacud b. cAbd al-AzIz 
to the calim-s of Tunis. A copy of this letter had then 
been dispatched to Fes (95). Mawlay Sulayman thought that 
the time had come for the resumption of the pilgrimage to 
Mecca and the despatch of an official delegation which 
would both transmit the Moroccan position vis-S-vis the 
Wahhabi doctrine and also sound out the real intentions 
and motives of the Wahhabi leaders.
(90) Al-pucayf, p. 411. For al-Du^ayf the event seemed so irrportant that 
he wrote: "From the day of Mawlay Sulayman's proclamation to the 
day in which he removed the tcrrbstone there had elapsed 17 years 
and 11 months less than 7 days".
(91) Ibid., p.442.
(92) Mawlay Sulayman, al-Samac, Ms. 652, Sblhi library, pp. 1-59.
(93) Al-Ducayf, p.454.
(94) Propaganda by conservative forces played an important role in 
diverting devout believers from fulfilling their religious duties.
Cf.the case of an Idrisid sharif, al-FadH al-cAmranr, who dissuaded 
many Moroccan pilgrims frcm proceeding to the Hijaz on the pretence 
that Wahhabi-s had forbidden the visitation of the Holy Places. Cf. 
al-Zayani, Tuhfat al-nubaha3,p.20. Later on, this ascetic sharif 
played an active role in the Fes rebellion against Mawlay Sulaym§n.
(95) Cf. copy of the letter in al-Zayani, al-Turjumana al-kubra, pp.394- 
396. r
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Mawlay Sulayman found no difficulty in convincing the 
Calim-s that it was necessary to issue a fatwa authorizing 
the resumption of pilgrimage. The question addressed to 
the calim-s was formulated in such a way that they were 
left with little freedom of manoeuvre. "Our Lord", wrote 
the calim-s, "has already answered the query and left 
little room for contestation". Relying on the information 
communicated to them in two royal letters about the securi­
ty of the Holy Places, the calim-s wrote that "the people 
of the Maghrib were subject, in the same way as other 
Muslims, to the obligation of pilgrimage, especially after 
it became clear that they were not exposed during their 
journey to any threat from cAbd al-Wahhab(sic). Nobody who 
travelled through the Wahhabi State of the Hijaz ever 
claimed that he had been invited to adopt Wahhabi views 
or had been endangered in his life or property, or pre­
vented from accomplishing his wishes. On the contrary, 
he (cAbd al-Wahhab) was the agent of security and 
tranquillity in every part of the Hijaz, and might very 
well be a support for this Religion"(96).
Never were the Moroccan c alim-s more unanimous in 
praising the action of the Wahhabi-s. Mawlay Sulayman seemed to 
have achieved a preliminary success in overcoming the 
resistance of the religious scholars. He was so encouraged 
that he decided to send an official reply to Sacud b. cAbd 
al-cAzfz. The task of formulating such a reply was en­
trusted to three ^alim-s; al-Tayyib b. Kfran (d.1812), 
author of the essay referenced above, Sulayman al-Hawwat 
(d.1816), the naqib (dean) of the sharff-s, and Hamdun b. 
al-Haj, the uncontested poet of the Sulaymani Court (97).
(96) Cf. fatwa by the calim-s authorizing Mawlay Sulayiran to dispatch 
the pilgrimage caravan in 1811 after he had received favourable 
reports on the security of the Hijaz, in Ms.D.2753, BGR,pp.95-98. 
The signatories of the fatwa were: A^ imad b. Suda, Muhammad b. 
Ibrahim al-Dukkall, Mujianmad al-Zarwalf, Idris al- cIraqf,
Muhammad b. Man§ur, ^amdun b. al-Haj, al-Tayyib b. Kfran andcAbd 
al-Salam al-Azami. Cf. appendix 53.
(97) Cf. Ibn Kiranjs letter to Sa^ud b.cAbd al-^Aziz in the name of 
Mawlay Sulayman in Ms.4624, R.L.; al-Hawwat's letter in Ms.2710, 
R.L., fol.82-86; Hamdun's versified reply in his Dfvan,Ms‘.K.963, 
pp.202-215.
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Ibn Kiran had already made clear his rejection of the 
Wahhabi doctrine. Like Mawlay Sulayman, he remained 
profoundly attached to Maliki-Ashcari theological thought.
He was highly respectful of the sharif-s to whom he 
devoted two of his major works (98) and was by no means 
hostile to the zawiya-s. Among his works there figure, 
in particular, a commentary on the maxims of IbncAta*Allah 
(99) and another on the Mashrshi prayer (al-?alat al- 
mashishiya by the Sufi Pole Mawlay^Abd al-Salam b. MashTsh). 
He was not,therefore, disposed to offer a welcome to 
Wahhabi ideas.
Nor was Sulayman al-Hawwat— whose consultation by the 
Sultan on this issue seemed rather to be a measure of 
courtesy towards the spokesman of the sharlf-s— any more 
receptive to Wahhabi views. Although well grounded in 
the religious sciences, al-Hawwat did not count among the 
senior c alim-s whose opinion was sought on important 
doctrinal issues (100). He distinguished himself not so 
much by his religious scholarship as by his talents as 
the genealogist of the sharifian families of Morocco(101).
He was also profoundly imbued with Sufi ideas. His 
sympathy with the sufi brotherhoods manifested itself 
especially in his condemnation of the persecution to 
which the Darqawi-s were exposed in the years 1794-1795 
(102). Towards Wahhabism al-Hawwat adopted an openly 
hostile attitude (103). In spite of this, he maintained 
good relations with the Sultan to whom he devoted many of 
his eulogistic poems (104).
(98) They consisted in two poems devoted to the exhaltation of the 
Qadiri and Wazzani sharif-s. Cf .Hashiyat Muhammad b. Qasim al- 
Qadiri on Ibn Kiran's cormsntary pn Ibn c£shir's tawfrld, lith.
Fds, no date, vol. I, part I, pp. 4-5.
(99) Cf. footnote 45 above.
(100)His name does not figure, for instance, among the calim-s who were 
consulted in 1811 on the resuption of pilgrimage to the Holy Places. 
Cf. footnote 96 above.
(101)Cf. al-Arbl al-Mashrafi, Nuzhat al-abgar, p. 451.
(102) Ibid.
(103)Al-Hawwat, Dlwan, Ms.2941, R.L., p.57.
(104)Cf.his DiwSr in the eulogy of Mawlay Sulayman, Ms.D.753, BGR;cf. 
also collection of his poems in Ms.Z.3091, R.L.
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The third calim, Hamdun b. al-Haj, was both a 
religious scholar and an unrivalled poet. The excellent 
relations he maintained with the court made of him a 
typical "palace calim". During Mawlay Sulayman's reign 
Hamdun b. al-Haj was often called upon to fill govern­
mental posts. He served in particular as Mufrtasib of Fes 
and governor of the Gharb province. His strict adherence 
to the sharlca made him, sometimes, very unpopular , 
especially with the Wazzaniya religious order whose 
influence extended to the Gharb (105). His dispute with 
Sfdf CA1I b. Ahmad in 1804 (106) was most probably the 
reason why he abandoned the Wazzani bariqa (107) . Al^mad 
al-Tijani attempted later on to attract him to his tariqa 
but without success (108) . Undoubtedly, ^amdun b. al-Haj 
was the most enthusiastic calim for the Wahhabi reformist 
ideas. Al-Zayani went so far as to claim that Hamdun 
confessed his Wahhabism to his son before he died (109).
Among the three answers drafted at Mawlay Sulayman's 
demand, only Hamdun's qaglda is mentioned by Moroccan 
historiographers. There is no trace in the works of al- 
Zayanf or Akansus of Ibn Kfran's reply which constituted, 
nevertheless, the basic document carried by the official 
delegation to the Wahhabi leaders. Both al-Zayani and 
Akansus mentioned Hamdun b. al-Haj as the only calim en­
trusted with the drafting of the Moroccan reply(110). 
Hamdun's qa?ida certainly reflected Mawlay Sulayman's 
attitude, but was rather intended as an eulogistic 
supplement to Ibn Kfran's solidly argued letter. The 
fact that not only Ibn Kfran's letter and Hamdun's qagfda
(105) Al-Ducayf, p.436; al-Kattanf, Salwat, III, pp.4-5; al-Mashraff, 
Nuzhat al-abgar, pp.431-433.
(106) Al-Ducayf, p.436.
(107) Skiredj, Rafc al-hijab, II, p.143.
(108) Cf. Tijani Letters, Ms.K.644, BGR, letter fran Ahmad al-TijanT 
to Hamdun b. al-IJaj, pp. 158-159.
(109) Al-Zayani, Tufrfat al-nubahaf, p.271.
(110) Al-Zayani, al-Turjum5na, p.396; al-RawcJa, fol.185; Akansus,pp. 
298-299.
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but also a third document by Sulayman al-Hawwat (111) 
are now available enables us to have a clearer idea 
about the whole issue.
The examination of the three documents shows, indeed, 
that they all express the same convictions and rely on 
same arguments. The instructions of Mawlay Sulayman to the 
the three calim-s were faithfully respected. Contrary to 
what is claimed by al-Zayani, therefore, Hamdun1s qasida 
did not reflect the convictions of its author alone (112). 
Hamdun b.al-Haj had done no more than to render in verse 
the ideas developed in prose by Ibn Kfran and Sulayman al- 
Hawwat .
Both Ibn Kfran and al-Hawwat had the opportunity to 
express their personal opinion about the Wahhabi doctrine
(113). They both were unequivocally hostile to the said 
doctrine. In his essay on the refutation of the Wahhabi 
ideas, Ibn Kfran attacked "the Wahhabi" as a "blameworthy 
innovator" who "perturbed the belief of the common Muslims"
(114) . Al-Hawwat, on the other hand, qualified the 
Wahhabi-s as "rebels" who threatened with the sword all 
those who did not adopt their views (115). An examination 
of Mawlay Sulayman's message to Sacud b.cAbd al-cAzfz 
makes the great difference between these calim-s personal
(111) Al-Hawwat drafted a letter to Ibn Sa^ud on behalf of Mawlay 
Sulayman but this latter preferred Ibn Kfran's project which was 
more solidly argued. Cf.al-^awwat's letter in Ms.Z.2710, R.L., 
fol.82-86 (appendix 56). Cf. Ibn Kfran's draft in Ms.4624,R.L. 
(appendix 55).
(112) Al-Zayani, al-Rawqla, fol. 185.
(113) Cf. Ms.K. 1325, BGR, for Ibn Kfran's personal opinion and Ms.2941, 
R.L. for al-Hawwat's personal views.
(114) Ibn Kfran, Radd ^ala madhhab al-wahhabiya, pp. 21, 46.
(115) Al-Hawwat, Dfwan, pp.32,57.
On the return of Mawlay Ibrahim from the Hijaz in 1812 al-Hawwat 
wrote : < V &  \S L* *— ^ £— U* j V j
*■1.1 I 1 y  L J  I  ^J UoJ I V 1 yjb }
This accusation is carpletely contradictory to the eulogistic-, 
statements made in the letter he was asked to draft to Sacud b. 
*Abd al- *Aziz and in which he praised in particular the pacifica­
tion of the Hijaz by the Wahhabi-s ; cf. Ms.Z.2710, R.L., fol.85.
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views and the position of the Sultan quite evident (116).
(3) Mawlay_Sulayman_and_the_WahhabiJ3octrine
The fact that Mawlay Sulayman decided to send an official 
delegation in 1811 to deliver his reply to the Wahhabi 
leaders shows the importance he attached to the issue.
This delegation was headed by his elder son and heir 
presumptive, Mawlay Ibrahim,as well as the qadi of 
Marrakech, Muhammad al-Zaddaghl, and a distinguished calim 
from Fes, al-cAbbas b. Kfran (117).
Mawlay Sulayman took the initiative of sending an 
official reply in order to express his good disposition 
towards the Wahhabi ideas. "The aim of this letter", he 
wrote to Sa^ud b.cAbd al-cAziz, "is to dissipate any 
possible suspicion on your part according to which we 
would be opposed to your ideas "(118). In spite of some 
criticism, Mawlay Sulayman remained , on the whole, favour­
able to the reformist spirit of the Wahhabi doctrine. He 
exalted the asceticism of the Wahhabi-s, their hostility to 
all forms of luxury and their endeavours to purify the 
religion form all sorts of detestable innovations. "We 
were pleased ", Mawlay Sulayman wrote, "to hear about your 
conduct, your qualities, your ascetism, your revivification 
of the tenets of religion according to the path traced by 
the pious ancestors (al-salaf al-salifr), your care about 
a sincere Unitarian worship of God and your eradication 
of innovations and deviations which are usually at the 
origin of doctrinal errors and heresies. What we learned 
about you is in perfect harmony with the books of the
(116) Since al-Hawwat's letter was never sent to Sacud, it will be, 
therefore, disregarded in our analysis of Mawlay Sulayman's 
attitude vis-a-vis the Wahhabi doctrine.
(117) Akansus, p.299.
(118) Cf. letter drafted by Ibn Kiran, Ms.4624, R.L., fol.5.
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c alim-s and the doctrines instituted by the salaf and the 
Prophet's companions" (119). Mawlay Sulayman also 
praised the action of the Wahhabi-s in pacifying the 
Hijaz and ensuring the protection of pilgrims (120).
He had, nevertheless, some reservations about the 
Wahhabi doctrine regarding, in particular, the doctrinal 
problem of al-takfIr (excommunication) and the recourse 
to the intercession of prophets and saints.
The major issue of theological disagreement between 
the Wahhabi-s and their opponents was, undoubtedly, the 
question of excommunication. The doctrine of Wahhabism 
was initially founded on the basis of a strict adherence 
to the unicity of God. The followers of Muhammad b.cAbd 
al-Wajihab were, indeed, so attached to the principle of 
God's unicity that they preferred to call themselves al- 
muwahhidun, or Unitarians (121). Their zeal about this 
principle made them very prone to consider the popular 
veneration given to the Prophet and the awliya3as a form 
of idolatrous worship which contradicted the basis founda­
tion of faith. Ideological intolerance, which usually 
characterizes every new movement, led them to abuse of the 
use of excommunication against their opponents. These 
were thus declared to be mushrikun (pi. of mushrik) or 
heretics and whose blood may be let under the terms of the 
sharica.
(119) Letter to Sacud, Ibid., fol.l (personal translation). The letter 
read: jil; # ^  ^  ja  I liij* JUo j
L
J  - -  - j  J ^  ^  J l"   ^ ^ 1 *  j  L ftl I i L J  I 1 ^
« c V l ^ . x l14y S  j asUuJI ^iJloV^LaJI j ^ j J I
t «A I Jum« y * l»Lo) I j  I 4u3 ^«r»1 Jl9 L  <»' }
0 0 0  t >nftJ I y ^  llol I
(120) Ibid., fol.5.
(121) The appelation of "Wahhabis-s" was applied to them by their 
enemies.
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Given his strong attachment to the Maliki-Ashcari 
school (122), Mawlay Sulayman rejected the Wahhabi view 
on this particular issue. He maintained that the 
ex<*3gerated veneration of saints and their entreatment are 
to be considered at most as bidca or as a serious sin 
(kabira) which should in no way result in excluding from 
the Muslim community persons who still believed in God 
and his Prophet (123) . We have already referred to 
Mawlay Sulayman's doctrinal position on the takfIr issue. 
"Excommunication", he wrote in his essay on al-kasb, "is 
a most alarming issue, since it implies the condemnation 
of a person to perpetual hell when the day of the Last 
Judgement comes. The takfir can only be pronounced 
against an infidel about whom there can be no ambiguity"
(124). According to Mawlay Sulayman, the dividing line 
between a believer and an infidel is the profession of 
faith, or the shahada, which is enough in itself to ensure 
the individual against perpetual hell. "It is far safer 
to spare the lives of a thousand infidels", Mawlay 
Sulayman wrote to Sacud b.cAbd al-cAzfz, "than to shed 
unjustly the blood of a single believer" (125).
The second objection made by Mawlay Sulayman to the 
Wahhabi doctrine related to the place occupied by saints 
in Islam. The Wahhabi-s did not deny sainthood or the 
saints' miracles (karamat). They maintained, never­
theless, that only God was worthy of worship and rejected
(122) His Ashcari convictions are clearly expressed in an essay on al- 
kasb written initially by Mawlay Sulayman but completed by Ibn 
Kfran. Cf. Ms.D.1838, BGR, pp.253-270.
(123) Mawlay Sulayman and Ibn Kfran, Jawab ff rasDalat al-kasb, Ms.D. 
1838, BGR, p.269.
(124) Ibid.
(125) Mawlay Sulayman, letter to Saci3d, fol.2.
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therefore all forms of saint cult. They particularly dis­
approved the visitation of the saints1 tombs by the common 
people. The supplication of saints, whether dead or alive, 
was considered as a form of heresy (shirk) since only God 
can fulfill man's wishes (126).
For Mawlay Sulayman, a distinction had to be made 
between a person who resorted to the intercession of 
saints being aware that only God could fulfill his demand 
and a person who addressed himself to a saint believing 
that the saint alone could ensure him good or evil. In 
other words, all depended on the real intention of the 
individual, something which only God knows.
Mawlay Sulayman's letter quoted numerous hadlth-s 
and verses of the Quran which supported the ability of 
prophets and saints to act as intermediaries between man 
his Creator. The recourse to the intercession of saints^ 
argued Mawlay Sulayman, could not be therefore considered 
as a form of heresy. The visitation of the Prophet's 
tomb and the request of his shafaca (intercession) was 
even recommended by the sharrca and remained perfectly 
advisable as long as the prescribed rules of visitation 
were respected (127).
Mawlay Sulayman recognized, however, that these rules 
were usually unknown to the camma who resorted to numerous
(126) On this particular issue the Wahhabi-s are most ambiguous. The 
supplication of saints and the recourse to their power of inter­
cession is considered indiscriminately both as Shirk and as 
bid*a. Cf. letter of Sacud to the calim-s of Tunis in al- 
Zayani's Turjumgna al-kiibra, pp. 394-395 and IbncAbd al-Wahhab,
An Account, fol. 4.
(127) Mawlay Sulayman to Sacud, fol.4.
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detestable innovations, such as the embracing of the 
saints' tombs and the circumambulation of their shrines. 
He agreed, therefore, with the attitude adopted by the 
Wahhabi-s of preventing the common people from visiting 
the tombs of saints. "The visitation by the common 
people of the tombs of saints is usually the occasion 
for unsuitable sayings and heresies", he wrote. "It is 
perfectly legitimate to prevent them from such visita­
tions until they are fully aware of what they say"(128). 
This position is in harmony with Mawlay Sulayman's 
ideas on the visitation of saints (129) and the 
celebration of the mawsim-s which he prohibited for his 
people on more than one occasion, as we have seen earlier.
Between Mawlay Sulayman and the Wahhabi-s there was 
another point of accord: it concerned the ornamentation
of tombs and the erection around them of sumptuous 
buildings. Mawlay Sulayman always abhorred extravagant 
practices which run contrary to the Sunna. The building 
usually raised over a tomb, argued Mawlay Sulayman in his 
letter to Sa^ud, should be kept to a minimum "whether the 
dead is a proprietor, a calim, a sharlf or a sultan"(130). 
Slight constructions could be tolerated for the purpose 
of distinction and preservation but should exclude any 
engravings or excessive ornamentation. He also condemned 
other similar heterodox practices such as the burning of 
candles or the sacrifice of animals on the saints' tombs 
(131).
Mawlay Sulayman's adherence to the Ashcari theory of 
al-kasb was certainly a major obstacle which prevented
(128) Mawlay Sulayman believed that the visitation of saints should be 
allowed only to those who are acquainted with the rules pre­
scribed by the sharica in this respect. Cf. Ibn Murlda, al- 
kawakib al-sayyara fi al-bahth wa al bath cala al-ziyara, Ms.
K 479, BGR, p.113.
(129) Mawlay Sulayman to Sacud, Ms 4624, RL, fol. 4.
(130) Ibid.
(131) Ibid.
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him from adopting the Wahhabi doctrine. However, the 
disagreement on the issue of excommunication was only 
partial since, in principle at least, the Wahhabi-s 
did not consider the author of a grave sin (kabira)to 
be an infidel (kafir) but merely a sinner (132). The 
discord point between Mawlay Sulayman and the Wahhabi-s 
was not constituted by the latter1s doctrinal tenets but 
by their proneness to excommunicate without allowing for 
enough prudence to discern the real kafir from the false 
one. Mawlay Sulayman's criticism of the Wahhabi-s was 
rather directed against their practical abuses. In his 
message to Sacud he called on the Wahhabi-s to adopt a 
more lenient attitude in dealing with theological 
differences. He recalled the rules of debate as formula­
ted by al-Ghazzali and practiced by Ahmad b. Hanbal, 
warning against the dangers of ideological obstinacy and 
intolerance (133). Indeed, the confrontation of ideas 
between the calim-s members of the Moroccan delegation to 
the Hijaz and Sacud b.^Abd al-^Aziz showed an identity of 
views on major theological issues (134).
Mawlay Ibrahim and the members of the delegation were 
given a warm welcome by Sac ud b.cAbd al-cAziz and were 
allowed to visit all Holy Places, including the Prophet's 
tomb (135). According to Akansus, the Moroccans were 
impressed by the ascetism of the Wahhabi prince whose 
"state did not differ from that of any of his subjects" 
(136). Contrary to what they expected, they observed no-
(132) cAbd Allah b. Mnhammd b. cAbd al-Wahhab, An Account, p. 16.
(133) Mawlay Sulayman to Sacud, fol.3.
(134) Akansus, pp.299-300. During the audience accorded to Mawlay 
Ibrahim by Saf ud, it was made clear to the Moroccan delegation 
that the Wahhabi-s upheld the Maliki interpretation of God's 
metaphorical "sitting on the throne" (al-istiwa3). SeF- ud explained 
that the visitation of the Prophet's tcmb was only prohibited 
for ordinary people who were unacquainted with the prescribed 
rules of visitation.
(135) Al-JabartI reported that the Moroccan pilgrimage caravan was 
given an unusual welcome and allowed to travel freely in the 
Hijaz. Cf. al-Jabarti, c Aja3ib al athar, IV, p. 143.
(136) Akansus, p.299.
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thing from him or from his followers which contradicted 
the sharica. During the audience accorded to the 
Moroccan delegation, the opportunity was given to the 
gadi of Marrakech, Muhammad al-Zaddaghi, and to al- 
cAbbas b. Kiran to seek more clarification of the 
Wahhabi doctrine, particularly on the question of inter­
cession of the Prophet and the awllya* and the visitation 
of tombs and shrines(137). Sacud b.cAbd al-cAzfz explained 
to the Moroccan callm-s that the Wahhabi-s were not 
opposed by principle to the visitation of the Prophet's 
tomb, nor did they deny the sainthood of the awliya3.
This visitation, however, had to be performed according 
to certain rules, well established by the sharica, and 
which were usually ignored by the common people. It was 
in order to prevent the visitation of venerated persons 
from becoming a cult in itself, he explained, that the 
Wahhabi-s prohibited ordinary people from entering the 
Prophet's sanctuary (138).
Upon their return in September 1812 the members of 
the delegation reported their impressions and expounded 
the doctrine of Wahhabism. Akansus, who conferred with 
many of them, affirmed that none had seen or heard from 
the Wahhabi-s anything contrary to the shari<a (139) .The 
return of the delegation gave birth, nevertheless, to an 
acute controversy about Wahhabism. The opponents of the 
doctrine, such as al-Zayani and Sulayman al-Hawwat, 
claimed that the Holy Places in the Hijaz were as insecure 
as ever and, were it not for the presence of Mawlay 
Ibrahim among the Moroccan delegation, pilgrims would 
have never been allowed to perform their religious duties 
(140).
(137) Ibid., pp.299-300.
(138) Ibid.
(139) Ibid., p.300.
(140) Following the return of Mawlay Ibrahim frcnt the Hijaz, al-Hawwat
wrote:-
\y y ) I y V y * kS 11 ck-* f-f-J 4 y
J - —>osT I y y y x f I—-S* 1^—!>• £J y
Cf. his Diwan, Ms.2941, R.L., P.57.
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Another point of discord concerned the eulogistic 
ga?ida of Hamdun b. al-Haj. Al-Zayani claimed that it 
reflected in no way the ideas of Mawlay Sulayman and that 
it was composed on the private initiative of Hamdun (141) . 
"How is it possible", al-Zayanf wrote, "to praise this 
erring innovator who should be, in fact, repudiated 
especially after he had spread insecurity in the Holy 
Places, prohibited the visitation and the intercession of 
prophets and saints, and banned the reading of Dala3il al- 
khayrat and the invocation of saints?" (142) .
On the other hand, Akansus who counted among the 
Tijani adepts, affirmed that Hamdun composed his poem "by 
order of the Sultan and in his name" (143) to be delivered 
officially by his son to the head of the Wahhabi State.
Hamdun's qagfda was generally attacked by Mawlay 
Sulayman's contemporaries who, instead of attacking openly 
the Sultan's sympathy with Wahhabism, blamed its author as 
the sole person responsible (144). In this respect, Ahmad 
b.cAbd al-Salam BannanT was more outspoken in his 
criticism of Hamdun b. al-Haj and, indirectly, of Mawlay
(141) Al-Zayani was strongly opposed to the Wahhabi movement. This 
hostility is to be explained, in part at least, by his sympathy 
with the Ottomans. Like al-Hawwat, he maintained that without 
the presence of Mawlay Ibrahim the Moroccan pilgrims would have 
been unable to fulfill their religious duties. Cf.al-Rawfla, 
fol.187.
(142) Al-Zayani, al-Turjuman al-mucrib, p.389 (personal translation). 
jJjfc 1 *■ ^  V  I 0 *%» 3 d  ^   ^ I <•
* 9 1 j— * 0 s" 'j I j j
• ?  o U / l l  J j >1 • L J ^ I o L U m. J l  J iV  J
(143) Akansus, p.299.
(144) This is the case of an anonymous essay refuting the Wahhabi 
doctrine, entitled: Risala fi al-radd cala mubtadicat ahl al- 
badr wa riafoiyat al-mashriq, Ms.D.2594, BGR, pp.251-264. The 
author of this essay attacked those who praise the Wahhabi-s
. in the follcwinq terms:. » . .
JU £  • j*  ^ i jp  03^ t! ^  I Ju * I I (J-fc • £  * J U  )
V ( ♦ ♦ * ) aU L I jJji* j  • JLlC ^aJ y yfj  ^  ^
mtj aD I L V^J a aU i V y *a a  ^>  j  L*
• • • j«>l (^ 44 I
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Sulayman . Bannani argued that Hamdun's eulogy was worthy 
only of legally proclaimed princes, which was not the case 
with the Wahhabi leader (145). Instead of praising Sacud, 
Hamdun "should have appealed to Moroccans, and particular­
ly to the amir al-muminTn may God glorify him in order 
to organize the jihad against this usurpator and in order 
to free the Holy Places from his grasp and assist the 
mujahidin by supplying them with military equipment such 
as gunpowder, guns, artillery and other material. As to 
this kind of speech, it will only encourage him in his 
tyranny" (146) .
Contrary to what Mawlay Sulayman had hoped, the send­
ing of the official reply to the Wahhabi leaders, instead 
of easing the internal resistance of religious forces in 
Morocco, had only exacerbated their hostility. Mawlay 
Sulayman's initiative succeeded neither in convincing the 
calim-s of the religious soundness of the Wahhabi doctrine 
nor in dissipating the malevolent propaganda of conserva­
tive groups about the alleged insecurity of the Holy 
Places. This initiative had, in reality, only served to 
unchain their hostility.
(145) Bannani, al-Fuyujat, pp.124-125.
(146) Ibid., p.151.
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CHAPTER VI
THE ASCENDANCE OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS: 
THE RELIGIOUS POLICY OF MAWLAY SULAYMAN
During the reign of Mawlay Sulayman religious groups 
acquired an unprecedented importance in the political 
affairs of the country. This was due, no doubt, to the 
weakness of the Makhzen, but also to the growing pres­
tige of these groups, especially the sharTf-s. Indeed,
c —among the three religious groups, the alim-s , the 
zawiya-s and the sharif-s, these last were, by virtue 
of their asabiyya, the most active social element which 
succeeded in extending its hegemony over all others.
I - The cAlim-s
A- Role and Function in Society
In an Islamic society, religious nobility could be at­
tained either through sharifian descent or through the 
acquisition of the "holy knowledge" (al- ilm al-sharif) 
For those who lacked a sharifian lineage (sharaf al- 
nasab) religious scholarship offered the alternative for 
a privileged position in society.
The importance of the alim-s, or religious scholars, 
in an Islamic society needs hardly to be underlined. They 
did not only constitute the guardians of the religious
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sciences, but also represented the only body which could inter-
cpret religious law (al-shari a) and therefore, the only
force which could act as a check on the sultan's powers, 
c —After all, the alim-s are the successors of the
Q
Prophet, the guardians of the shari a and consequently 
the source of all religious and political legitimacy.
This importance was underlined every time the Muslim 
community was confronted with an important decision, and 
especially when it was faced with the choice of a new
sultan. Among all the components of the ahl al-hall wa
c c —al- aqd, the alim-s represented the crucial element m
any bay a procedure. Once "elected", the sultan was
not responsible to the calim-s, but often felt obliged
to consult them and justify his decisions to them. Some- 
ctimes, the alim-s took the initiative of issuing a judi­
cial opinion without a request from the sultan and ex­
pected its implementation by the Makhzen (1).
Behind this important role was the relative independ-
ence enjoyed by the alim-s vis-a-vis the Makhzen on which
they depended neither organizationally nor financially.
c —On the organizational level, the alim-s never had a 
clear code to define obligations and internal rules of 
mobility. This ambiguity worked against any attempt by 
the Makhzen to domesticate them. The sultan could ap- 
point alim-s to judicial posts, but was unable to control
(J
control the internal mobility of alim-s from one grade
c —to another. Only the alim-s themselves had the overr 
riding say in the distribution of religious scholars
(1) In 1799, for instance, following the French invasion Of Egypt and 
the unusual movement of European fleets near the Moroccan coast, 
the alim-s of Tetouan wrote to the alim-s of Fes in order to 
obtain a fatwa which would allow the inhabitants of the thughur 
(ports) to buy and carry arms. The desired fatwa was issued and 
Mawlay Sulayman had no alternative but to lift the ban of the 
private use of arms, despite the gravity of such a decision. Cf. 
al-Du ayf, pp.398-400.
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among the various categories of learning (tabaqat,pl.of
c _
tabaga)(2). The appointment of the chief alim (shaykh 
al-jama a) also remained beyond the sultan's control.
C  —This was usually decided by the corps of alim-s accord­
ing to a well established tradition which took into 
consideration the ca1im's canpetence , age and experience.
The alim-s had also a relative financial autonomy. 
Whether he was to fill a judicial or an educational post 
the calim would not be dependent on the Makhzen for his 
emoluments, for these he received from the ahbas. Even 
the gafli, who was appointed by royal decree, was not 
considered a Makhzen official. The distinction between
a Makhzenian post (mangib makhzani) and a legal post
c c •»(mangib shar l) left no room for confusion. The alim-s
did receive occasional presents from the sultan but this
manifestation of sultanian generosity had no significant
c c —effect on the alim1s freedom of thought. A alim could
be even more independent and feared by the Makhzen if
he refused the sultan's favours and declined public
responsibilities. Nothing irritated Sldi Muhammad b.
c — cAbd Allah more than the refusal of a alim, such as
Ahmad al-WarzizT, to accept his donation (3). Such a
C  —negative attitude on the alim's part was also a cause
c —for respect by his fellow alim-s. The greatest eulogy
c —that could be reserved for a alim was to mention that 
he never stained his honour with the acceptance of a 
Makhzenian post (4).
The calim-s filled a number of important functions in 
society, in a least three fields: religious observance, 
teaching and judicature. The first evident function of 
religious scholars was to provide places of worship—  
mosques, sanctuaries and zawiya-s—  with imam-s and 
kha^Ib-s (preachers) to lead the five daily prayers as
—  C  —(2) Under Mawlay Sulayman the alim-s were classified into three cate­
gories. Cf.Ibn Zaydan, al-cIzz wa al-gawla, pp.167-175.
(3) Al-I^ ucayf, p.170. Cf. also Ibid., pp.194 and 198.
(4) Cf. introduction to al-Hawwat's al-Sirr al-dfiahir, lith., Fes, 1932, 
pp.3-4; cf. also Muhammad b. Jacfar al-KattanT, Salwat,III, p. 118.
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well as the Friday prayer. Jointly with his duties as 
prayer leader, the imam assumed a teaching task. It 
was at the mosque, in fact, that the learning process 
began, first by the memorization of the Quran, then by 
the acquisition of the basic disciplines.
Higher education could be acquired in the countryside 
especially in rural areas with an old sedentary tradi­
tion, such as the Jbala and the Sous; but it was mainly
in the ha<iariya towns that the student had the opportu-
c —nity to meet the most eminent alim-s of the country.
After the acquisition of the preliminary education, the
talib, or student, moved to the town where he could
deepen his knowledge and learn new disciplines. Fes was
the uncontested centre of higher education , not only
c —because of the number of outstanding alim-s it embraced 
within its walls, but also by the numerous schools 
(madrasa-s) in the city. Students repaired to Fes from 
all over the country, including from other Iiadariya towns, 
to perfect their learning.
Curriculum and teaching methods underwent little or
no change through centuries. Figh (jurisprudence)
was at the basis of all learning and continued to be
considered as "the king of sciences". Other disciplines
included the exegesis of the Quran (al-tafsir), the
hadith, or the Prophet's traditions, the u?ul, or sources
c —of jurisprudence, theological dogma ( ilm al-kalam) , 
logic (al-man-fciq), mysticism (al-ta?awwuf) in addition 
to grammar, Arabic linguistics and some scientific sub­
jects such as arithmetic, algebra, and astronomy(5). The 
emphasis on the study of certain disciplines could vary 
with time. Thus, the study of Khalil's Mukhtasar was 
almost abandoned under the reign of Sidi Muhammad because 
of this latter's hostility to abridged works as a method
(5) Cf. al-Hawwat, al-Rawja al-mag$uda, pp. 34-57 for a complete list 
of disciplines taught at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
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of teaching. Sidl Muhammad also reproved the study of 
theological dogma (6). Mawlay Sulayman, on the contrary, 
allocated special prizes for those who memorized Khalil's 
Mukhtagar and did notrefrain from venturing into dogmatic 
discussions himself.
Education was mainly based on learning by rote and the 
use of archaic manuals. Many of these were rendered in 
verse in order to facilitate their acquisition. The most 
common teaching method consisted in reading and explain­
ing the text to the students. In practice, the teacher 
never limited himself to the text. He attempted most of 
the time to expound on the subject by referring to the 
opinions of the famous theologians. The study of a single 
manual, such as the Mukhtagar for example, could last as
0
much as ten years and even longer (7). For the alim,
the length of his course was a sign of his scholarly
competence. Attempts by Sfdi Muhammad to introduce some
reforms to the educational system, namely by repressing
the use of secondary manuals, ended in failure. Moroccan 
c —alim-s were not disposed to relinquish their centuries- 
old teaching traditions. Different educational methods 
witnessed by Moroccan alim-s in the Arab East, such as 
Egypt, where the acquisition of the Mukhtagar took no 
more than two years and where "the student became capable 
of teaching in three years"(8) seem to have had no effect 
on teaching methods at the Qarawiyyln (9).
The other function of the alim-s was judicial. From
c — —among the alim-s were recruited the mufti, the qafli and
the udul, or notaries. At the top of the judicial system
there was the sultan himself who appointed the qaji-s and
acted as the highest court of appeal. He appointed the
(6) Cf. chapter V above, pp. 247-248.
(7) A.al-TazI, Jami al-Qarawiyyln, Beirut, 1972, vol. II, p. 727.
(8) Al-Ibtisam, pp.58-59.
(9) It was only in 1845 that Mawlay cAbd al-Rafciman attempted to in­
troduce sane reforms to the educational system of the Qarawiyyln; 
cf. al-TazI, Jami al-Qarawiyyln, III, pp.727-728.
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chief judge (qadl al-qudat) and the judges of the dif­
ferent towns and tribes. In theory, the chief judge, 
who acted at the same time as the gagll of Fes, was en­
titled to appoint and supervise all other judges of the 
country (10) . In practice, however, his prerogatives 
were much more limited, since the judges were appointed 
by royal decree and grievances against them were general­
ly addressed directly to the sultan. Moreover, there 
were a number of regional chief judges at the major towns 
such as Tetouan, Marrakech and Taroudant, who used to 
supervise the gadi-s of their immediate regions. Thus, 
the gagl! of Ouezzane was usually entrusted with the 
supervision of the rural qaqli-s of the Jbala (11) .
The main duty of a qafll was to render justice accord- 
ing to the shari a. His prerogatives also extended to 
many judicial, religious and educational fields. Thus, 
he appointed or dismissed the udul and supervised the 
functions of the na^hir, the muhtasib, as well as those 
of the mosque imam-s and the teachers at the various 
mosques and madrasa-s(12) . Owing to these prerogatives, the 
qadl held a privileged position not only within the body 
of learned men, but in society as a whole. His effective 
power depended, nevertheless, on both the official back­
ing of the sultan and the respect he enjoyed from his
C  —fellow alim-s. This respect was generally based on both 
the qadi1s scholarship and his age.
Beside the qadi, there was the mufti who acted as a 
court of appeal. The mufti (the person who issues a fatwa) 
was a regular function of every alim whose scholarly 
competence was widely recognized. This function enabled 
the citizen to by-pass the qadl, if necessary, when a
(10) Al-Zayani, Takmll gudat Fas cala ma fl Jadhwat al-igtfbas, Ms. 
4792, RL, p. 2.__________
(11) Letter frcm Sid! Muhammad b.cAbd Allah to Sidi fAli b. Aljmad, 
Muharram,1200/Nov.-Dec., 1785, in al-Ducayf, pp.198-199.
(12) Al-Zayani,Takmll gudat Fas, p.2.
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fatwa was requested independently of a prior consultation 
of the latter (13). The muftr acted more often as a court 
of appeal when a contender, being dissatisfied with the 
gac^i's judgement, brought his case before him. Unlike the 
qadl, however, the mufti lacked the necessary authority 
to enforce his sentence and, in case of irreconciliable 
contradiction between the qafli1s judgement and the mufti's 
opinion, the contending parties were left with the only 
ultimate alternative of appealing to the sultan.
As an institutionalized function, it was not establi­
shed in Morocco before the sixteenth century. While the 
same institution was in force in the Eastern Maghrib 
ever since the fourteenth century, in Morocco it was ap­
parently introduced for the first time by the Sa<adian 
Muhammad al-Shaykh(d.1557) in imitation of the Ottoman 
Turks (14). Nevertheless, the post of mufti in Morocco 
was never as important as it was in the Ottoman Empire. 
This institution was in fact so fragile that it simply 
vanished when the qafli al-qudat enjoyed enough moral 
authority and respectability to impose himself as the un­
contested judicial reference. This was the case of al- 
TawdT b. Suda under Sidi Muhammad b.cAbd Allah. Other 
sultans, such as Mawlay Sulayman and his successor Mawlay 
cAbd al-Ra^iman, were even convinced that the existence of 
gaqli and mufti side by side created more problems than 
it solved (15). Among these problems was the tradition­
al professional rivalry which opposed gacji and mufti and 
which led during the last years of Mawlay Sulayman's 
rule to the most distressing consequences.
(13) According to al-Zayani, the post of mufti canes third in the 
administrative hierarchy of the Islamic State after the sultan 
and the wazlr-s (ministers). Cf. Takmil gudat Fas, p.l.
(14) A. Benabdallah, al-Qa^a^ al-maghribi, paper presented to the 
Fes Seminar on Malik b. Anas (1980), p. 6. On the origin of the 
institution in the Eastern Maghrib, cf. R.Rrunschvig, La Berbe- 
rie orientale sous les Hafsides des origines a la fin du We siecle, 
Paris, 1940, vol. II, p. 139.
(15) In 1820 following the different between the qa<ji and the mufti 
of Fes, Mawlay Sulayman abolished the institution of mufti* 
(al-Zayani, Takmil qujat Fas, p. 12)
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C  —B- The Corps of alim-s Under Mawlay Sulayman. 
c —The alim-s did not constitute an effective group with a 
clear structure and recognized rules of accession. All 
those who established themselves in the religious scien­
ces and gained the reputation of belonging to the learned 
elite of the country were alim-s. It was only on the 
occasion of important events, such as the proclamation of 
a sultan, the holding of a consultation on an important 
political or religious issue, or the distribution of a
C  —Makhzen donation, that the question of "who is alim?" 
imposed itself.
_  — C  -
Under Mawlay Sulayman, the alim-s were classified 
into three categories (tabaqat) according to their compe­
tence and scholarly reputation (16) . The first and
c —second tabaqa-s included senior alim-s whose "learning 
piety and insight" enabled them to act as "the people of 
tying and untying" as far as important matters of religion 
were concerned. The third category, on the other hand, 
was made up of talib-s , or students who, after having 
acquired the basic religious science, 'took Up G 
number of low clerical offices : imam-s, khatib^e,teach­
ers at the Quranic schools, notaries, etc.
At the top of the learned pyramid there was the
Q
shaykh at-jama a who, by virtue of his scholarship, piety
0
and age, acted as the spokesman for his fellow alim-s.
He was consulted by the sultan on important matters and
served as an intermediary between him and the rest of
c — — cthe alim-s. Shaykh al-jama a acted sometimes as the
spokesman for the whole Fasi society as was the case
in 1792 when al-Tawdl b. Suda was delegated to act on
* C -(16) Cf. Mawlay Sulayman's dhahir giving the list of alim-s in Fes 
according to their category, issued around 1233/1817-1818, in 
Ibn Zaydan, al- Izz wa al-?awla, II, pp.167-175. The number of 
alim-s under Mawlay Sulayman was 428 (in 1818) carpared to 266 
in 1906. Ccmpare dhahir of Mawlay Sulayman referenced above to 
the dhahir of Mawlay ^ Abd al-CAziz (1894-1908) in Ibn Zaydan,
al- Izz wa al-?awla, II, pp.167-188.
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behalf of the population of Fes in the choice of a new
sultan (17). The moral authority enjoyed by the shaykh 
— cal-jama a enabled him to play a role of arbiter and give 
c —the corps of alim-s a certain appearance of unity and 
homogeneity by keeping in the shade internal cleavages.
Mawlay Sulayman's relations with the calim-s can be
divided into two periods. During the first two decades
of his reign Mawlay Sulayman maintained privilged rela-
c —tions with the alim-s. This was partly due to the 
presence of scholars with whom he had built up close 
ties of cooperation. It is also to be explained by the 
existence until 1812 of a shaykh al-jamaca in the person 
of al-Tayyib b. Kfran whose moral authority among the 
religious scholars served as a safeguard against possible
C —.
inter- alim-s dissensions. The uncontested judicial
authority of Ahmad b. Suda and the abolition of the
institution of muftf during his term also helped to avoid
the traditional qacjl-muftf opposition (18). However,
c —the passing away of many alim-s of the old generation
opened the way after 1812 for the emergence of a new
generation of scholars with whom Mawlay Sulayman had
little contact. Moreover, the re-establishment of the
post of muftf after 1816, together with the appointment
of a young qadl from the Ibn Suda family, contributed
c —to the deterioration of Makhzen- alim-s relations.
  c ~
The fact that Mawlay Sulayman was himself a alim
taking an active part in the religious and cultural life
greatly improved his image among the scholarly elite of
the country. His doctrinal views also contributed to ease
his relations with this religious group. His attachment 
— cto the Maliki-Ash ari tradition as manifested in the re-
(17) Cf. notarial act established on 10 Rajab, 1206/ 4 March, 1792, 
Mic. 2/70, HPMD, Fes, 1978.
(18) These dissensions were best illustrated by the animosity which
opposed al-cAbbas b. Suda and Muhairmad b. Ibrahim al-DukkalX 
after 1816. Cf. below.
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establishment of the teaching of Khalil’s Mukhtagar 
and al-Ghazzali1s IfryaP , was well received by Moroccan 
C alim-s.
Mawlay Sulayman had for teachers the most outstanding 
calim-s of the late eighteenth century. Some of these, 
such as al-Tawdf b. Suda, Ahmad b. Suda, Muhammad al- 
HawwarT andcAbd al-Qadir b. Shaqrun, had been called, by 
Sfdf Muhammad b.cAbd Allah to assume judicial responsi­
bilities and look after the education of his sons. For 
these calim-s,who dominated the scholarly elite at the 
death of Sfdf Muhammad, Mawlay Sulayman' had a great 
respect. He regularly consulted them on important 
religious and political issues and continued to attend 
their lectures even after he assumed power. A close 
contact with Mawlay Sulayman's shaykh-s was maintained 
through the Sultan's learned council which served as a 
seminar for the debate of religious questions.
Some of MawlSy Sulayman's most respected teachers 
were of Bildi origin. Moroccan historiographers did not 
fail to point out that in 1804, Mawlay Sulayman attended 
Ibn Shaqrun's funeral in person to mark his great 
affection for his shaykh (19 ) . He then ordered the burial 
of Ibn Shaqrun within the walls of the holy shrine of 
Mawlay Idris, despite the opposition of the sharif-s (20). 
Al-Tayyib b. Kfran, another Bildi calim, and shaykh al- 
jamaca after al-Tawdi b. Suda,also enjoyed Mawlay 
Sulayman's admiration. Even while sultan, Mawlay Sulayman 
continued to attend Ibn Kfran's lectures at the Qarawiyyln 
preferring to sit among the students as a sign of respect 
for his teacher (21). He also constantly referred to him
(19) Jacfar b. Idris al-Kattanf, al-Shurb, part I, p.7; Muharrmad b. 
Jacfar al-Kattanf, Salwat, I, pp. 95-96. "The Sultan attended his 
funeral and mourned him", noted al-Ijucayf, p. 441.
(20) A. Ibn al-Muwwaz, al-Maqala al murdiya ff al-dawla al-cAlawiya, 
Ms. 493, KL, p. 21; M. Balmlnu, Taqyfd ff bacd asrar al-farlga 
al-tijaniya, Ms. K 461, BGR, pp. 144-145.
(21) Al-Ducayf, p. 364.
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in the clarification of religious and doctrinal issues. 
This sympathy for Bildi calim-s was often interpreted by 
cotemporaries as a sign of Mawlay Sulayman's preference 
of the Bildiyin to other social groups and was parti­
cularly resented by sharif-s (22).
Mawlay Sulayman had also a great esteem for the 
Ibn Suda family which produced many outstanding <alim-s. 
Al-Tawdf b. Suda served as his teacher as well as his 
shaykh from whom he received the Nasiri wird. His advice 
on important issues was regularly solicited by Mawlay 
Sulayman. Ahmad b. Suda and his son al-cAbbas were en­
trusted with the qadirate of Fes during most of his 
reign (23).
However, the,good understanding which existed between
Mawlay Sulayman and the c alim-s was seriously compromised
during the latter part of his reign. This was essentially
due to the internal changes undergone by the  ^alim-s •
between 1792 and 1822. During this period most *alim-s
who served as Mawlay Sulayman's teachers and closest
advisors progressively passed away to be replaced by a
younger generation of <alim-s. The most important loss
for Mawlay Sulayman consisted in the death of al-Tayyib
b. Kfran in 1812 and the disability of Ahmad b. Suda in
1816. The result was the absence among the alim-s of
a moral authority able to fill the vacant post of shaykh 
— cal-jama a or to exercise effectively the duties of chief
c —judge. Under such conditions latent inter- alim-s rival­
ries were bound to emerge to the surface.
c — —The list of alim-s established by Mawlay Sulayman
around 1817 shows a complete renewal of the scholarly
elite (24) . The examination of the fatwa-s and the
c —bay a which brought Mawlay Ibrahim b. al-YazTd to power
in 1820 also confirmed this change. By comparing the
(22) al-pucayf, p.364.
(23) On Mawlay Sulayman's relations with the Ibn Suda family, cf. 
chapter VII below.
(24) Cf. (jhahir referenced in not 16 above.
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c —list of alim-s who proclaimed Mawlay Sulayman in 1792
c -to that of alim-s who dethroned him in 1820 (251 we
notice that among the fifteen scholars who signed the 
c
1792 bay a only one was still alive twenty nine years
later —  Muhammad b. Ibrahim al-Dukkali. Consequently, 
c -most of the alim-s who took part in the Fes rebellion 
belonged to the younger generation of scholars, or 
"ahdath al-CulamaJ|t, as referred to by al-Zayani (26) .
A further observation should be made here. At a 
time when the sharif-s enhanced their presence among 
the scholarly elite, the Bildiyyin who traditionally 
provided "a disproportionate number of scholars" (27)
seem to have lost their privileged position. No Bildi
c —name figured in fact in the bay a proclaiming Mawlay
Ibrahim (28).
c —List "A" - The alim-s who proclaimed Mawlay 
Sulayman in 1792
Muhammad al-Tawdf b. Suda (d.1795)
Ahmad b. al-Tawdi b. Suda (d.18 20)
Muhammad b. CAbd al-Salam al-Fasi (d.1799) 
cAbd al-Qadir b. Shaqrun (d.1804)
Muhammad Bannis (d.1799)
Muhammad b.CAbd al-Majfd al-Fasf (d.1799) 
Yahya b. al-Mahdf al-ShafashawnT (cd. 1813) 
CAli b. Awis (d.1799)
Muhammad b. Ibrahfm al-Dukkali (d.1826)
(25) Canpare lists "A" and "B" below.
(26) al-Zayaril, Tuhfat al-nubaha-*, Ms.6180, R.L., p. 12.
(27) N. Cigar, "Conflict and Cannunity in an Urban Milieu Under the 
cAlawi-s (1660-1830)", The Maghreb Review, Nov.-Dec.,1978, p.9.
(28) Cf. text of the bayCa in DSwQd, III, pp.250-257.
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Muhanmad b. MasCud al-Trunbati (d.1799)
% • •
— — c —Muhammad al-Hadi b. Ziyyan al- Iraqi (d.1799)
Sulayman al-Fishtali (d.1794)
Muhanmad al-Tuhamf Tahar ^
CAbd al-Malik b. al-Hasan al-Fadlir
Idris b. Hashim al-Jutf
C  —List "B" - The alim-s who supported the dethronement 
of Mawlay Sulayman in 1821
Muhammad b. Ibrahim al-Dukkali 
CAbd al-Salam al-Azamr (d.1826)
Abu Bakr al-Manjra (d.1824-1825)
Muhanmad b. AbT Bakr al-Yazghi (d. 1823-1824)
CAbd al-Malik al-MurrT 
Abu Bakr al-IdrisT
Badr al-Din al-Hammumi (d. 1849-1850)
C  —Al- Arbi al-Zarhuni 
Al-Majdhub al-FasT
Muhammad b. Sulayman
c — —Abd al-Salam al-Masnawi
Muhammad b.CAbd al-Rahman al-Dila5!"
During the second decade of the nineteenth century
_   c —relations between Mawlay Sulayman and the alim-s
became increasingly tense, essentially because of the
Sultan's intransigence and refusal to recognize the
changes that had occurred within the learned elite of
the country. His decision in 1816 to appoint a new
qadr from the Ibn Suda family was bound to create
friction between the newly named official and Muhammad
b. Ibrahim al-Dukkali, the muftf, not only because this
latter belonged to a prestigious family which produced
C  —many alim-s in the past, but also because he consi­
dered himself , by virtue of his scholarhip and his
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age, as the most qualified person for the office of
chief judge (29). The young age of the new qadl, al- 
c — —Abbas b. Suda, his inexperience and his inability to 
impose himself to his fellow scholars further aggra-
c _
vated inter- alim rivalries.
II - The Sharif-s
The sharif-s constituted a kind of "blood nobility"
within the Moroccan society. To be a sharif one had to
be able to trace one's descent back to the Prophet
through his daughter Fatima. The Idrisids, whose ances- 
c —tor Idris b. Abd Allah founded in Morocco the first 
Islamic dynasty (788-1016 AD), are the most venerated 
and the most widespread. Between the fourteenth and 
the fifteenth centuries, other sharifian families 
arrived in Morocco. Among these were the Alawids, the 
Qadiri-s, the Siqilli-s, the CIraqi-s and the ManjriyyTn. 
Many of these families resided at Fes, the cradle of 
the Idrisid dynasty, but the Idrisid sharif-s were to 
be found everywhere, particularly in the northern part 
of the country. The Alawids who belong to a different 
branch of sharif-s remained in the Tafilelt until the 
middle of the seventeenth century when they founded 
their own dynasty.
(29) al-Zayani, Takmil gudat Fas, p. 12
* S
LojJ I ^  ^ I I . —  .1* ^ 4  ^  ^  0 ““** j
The fact that the mufti , Muljanmad b. Ibrahim al-Dukkali, had 
ambitions for the post of gafli shews that al-Zayani's classifi­
cation placing the office of mufti above that of chief judge 
(cf.note 13 above) did not always reflect the reality, especial­
ly under Mawlay Sulayman who insisted on curtailing the powers 
of the mufti.
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Sharifdom is based on the possession of the baraka, 
a kind of "beneficient effluvium" or supernatural power 
inherited from the Prophet. Not all sharifian groups 
possessed the same amount of this baraka. The Idrisids 
were considered to be the most prestigious by far, and 
among the Idrisids themselves, some families claimed pre­
eminence over others. Thus, the Kattaniyyin considered 
themselves to be the purest and the most authentic of all 
(30) .
The Idrisid sharif-s lived in concealment for many 
centuries after the fall of their dynasty (10th century 
AD) in order to avoid persecution. With the encouragement 
of the Merinid dynasty (1258-1465), however, they began 
to emerge to the surface. The Merinids hoped to exploit 
the religious prestige of the sharlf-s to their advantage 
to counter the influence of the zawiya-s. This hope was 
enhanced by the concentration of the sharif-s at Fes, 
which seemed to offer greater possibilities for Makhzen 
control. The benevolent Merinid policy towards the 
sharif-s encouraged many sharifian families to return to 
Fes (31)- It was during the Merinid period that, by a 
mysterious coincidence, the relics of Mawlay IdrTs II were 
discovered in Fes (32).
The spread of Sufism was another factor which favoured 
the resurgence of sharifism. The emphasis placed by the 
Shadhili school on the veneration of the Prophet and his 
descendents contributed to the consolidation of sharifism 
as a fundamental principle of both religious and political 
legitimacy. The prestige of the sharif-s further in­
creased after the fifteenth century because of their 
active role in the military resistance to Spanish and
(30) cAbd al-Hayy al-Kattani, Kitab fi al-caDila al-Kattaniya ,Ms.K.
3249, BGR, p.120.
(31) Al-Nasirf, VII, p.6; Ibn Zaydan, al- Izz wa la-$awla, II,pp.85,108
Ibn ai-Haj, al-Durr al-muntakhab, IX, pp. 292-293;cAbd al-Salam b.
al-fayyib al-Qadirf, al-Durr al-saniy, lith., Fes, 1891, pp.17,38.
(32) G. Drague, Esquisse, p.47.
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Portuguese attacks on Morocco (33).
Being a sharif in the Moroccan society entitled one 
not only to the respect and veneration due to the descent 
of the Prophet but also to a number of material privi­
leges. A sharif was, first of all, exempt from military 
service, from non-religious taxes and from all arbitrary 
Makhzen impositions (al-wacj&a^if pi. of wadhif) . Thus, 
the sharTf-s were freed from participating in the presents 
offered to the sultan on the occasion of religious cele­
brations (hadiyya), as well as from the contributions 
paid to Makhzen officials on various occasions (34). They 
were also guaranteed justice by their peers and placed 
under the authority of a sharif shaykh to whom they de­
livered their taxes (35).
In many ways, the sharif-s constituted a State within 
the State. They were immune from a number of contribu­
tions, enjoyed a private jurisdiction and were not subject 
to any lay authority. Between them and the sultan, the 
naqib of the sharif-s (the dean) acted as an intermediary. 
The naqib was appointed by the sultan to look after the 
moral interests of the sharif-s. His main duty resided 
in ascertaining sharifian genealogies and preventing false 
pretenders from staining the Prophet's posterity. He kept an 
inventory of all births and deaths among the sharTf-s and 
saw to it that no misalliances took place between sharif-s 
and non-sharIf-s. The naqib also attempted to divert the 
sharif-s from the exercise of degrading professions which 
were incompatible with the dignity of the holy lineage 
(36). The donations they received from the sultan were
(33) In 1578 the Idrisid sharif-s of northern Morocco participated 
actively in the battle of Wad al-Makhazin. To reward them, A£imad 
al-Man?ur declared inviolable the shrine of Mawlay cAbd al-Salam 
b.Mashish and allowed them a share in the income of the sanctu­
ary of Mawlay Idris.
(34) Al-Zayani, Tuhfat al-hadi, p. 12.
(35) Ibid. __
(36) Ibn Zaydan, al- Izz wa al-sawla, II, pp.74, 79.
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intended essentially to guarantee a decent livelihood to 
the sharif-s without which they would necessarily resort 
to such professions. The naqib acted, finally, as an 
arbitrator in intra-sharifian conflicts so as to avoid 
any outside interference from laymen.
The privileges enjoyed by sharif-s naturally en­
couraged many people to falsify their genealogies and 
claim descent from the Prophet. Such forgeries could 
very well pass unnoticed, particularly during long inter­
vals of civil strife, such as the chaotic period which 
followed the death of Mawlay Isma ll. Sultans attempted 
therefore at different times to ascertain sharifian genea­
logies and establish inventories of authentic sharif-s.
The first attempt in this respect was made by the
C  —Sa adian Ahmad al-Man$ur (d.1603). His inventory (dlwan
— — — cal-ashraf) served later on as a basis for Mawlay Isma ll
to produce his own register (kunnash al-ashraf) (37) . When
Sfdi Muhammad b.CAbd Allah acceded to the Moroccan throne
in 1757, the number of false sharif-s (al-mutasharrifun,
pi. of mutasharrif) had considerably increased. To quell
the clamours of the powerful sharifian families (ahl al-
agabiyya), Sidf Muhammad decided to limit sharifdom to
twelve distinguished branches, or sixteen families (38).
As a measure of solicitude towards the sharif-s he granted
these branches the privilege of dividing among themselves
the inheritance fund of Fes (39). This measure created a
great deal of discontent among the rest of the sharif-s,
c — —or the "common sharTf-s" ( ammat al-ashraf), who did not
belong to the twelve influential branches but still re­
mained fully convinced of their sharifdom. Their in- 
sistant complaints persuaded Sidf Muhammad to abrogate 
in 1201 A H (1786-1787) the concessions he had made to the
(37) Ibid., p. 108.
(38) Cf. list of the twelve branches in Tagyld al-ashraf, Z.3122, R.L.
(39) The inheritance fund of Fes (mal irathat Fas) included all proper­
ties left by heir less persons who died in the city.
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twelve branches and declare that the inheritance fund 
of Fes should be equally divided among all sharifian 
families with the exception of the Idrisids who 
monopolized the revenue of the sanctuary of Mawlay 
Idris instead (40).
The short and unstable reign of Mawlay al-YazTd was 
another occasion for false sharif-s to forge genealogies. 
Mawlay al-Yazid, we are told by al-Zayanl, granted 
dhahlr-s of sharifdom to all pretenders without the 
least check on the authenticiy of their claims (41). 
Nevertheless, he followed a pro-sharifian policy motiva­
ted to a large extent by the support he received from 
the sharif-s of northern Morocco before and after his 
proclamation. This policy was largely responsible for 
the growing interference by the sharif-s and the 
zawiya-s in the political life of the country, especial­
ly during the dynastic crisis which followed his death 
in 1792.
Mawlay Sulayman's relations with the sharif-s were 
governed by two considerations: first, there was his 
centralizing temperament which made him hostile to 
all forms of particularism; secondly , there were his 
personal religious convictions which placed the shari a 
above particular interests. These considerations led 
Mawlay Sulayman to progressively curtail the privileges 
enjoyed by the sharif-s and embittered relations 
between the two sides.
The sharif-s' material privileges were particularly 
. affected. Mawlay Sulayman, like his father, failed to 
solve the traditional dilemma of "who was sharif?"
(40) Al-ZaySnT, Tuhfat al-hadf, p. 13; Ibn ZaydSn, al-CIzz wa al- 
gawla, II,p.86.
(41) Al-ZayanI, Tufofat al-h5di, p.13; CAbd al-Salam al-Qadiri, 
Taqyid ff al-dawla al-calawiya, Ms.248, R.L., p.20.
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During the early disturbed years of Mawlay Sulayman's 
reign, the Makhzen was too busy pacifying the country 
to devote any attention to this thorny problem. When 
it finally did, it found that the number of false pre­
tenders to sharifian status reached such proportions 
that it was impossible to discern an authentic from 
a false sharif. Mawlay Sulayman decided, therefore, 
to place sharif-s and non-sharlf-s on the same foot­
ing to cut short all polemic on the issue. He wrote
to his governors ordering them to collect taxes (zakat)
c —and ushur) from all his subjects, without distinction
(42). By this measure, he undermined the administra­
tive autonomy of the sharif-s.
Sharifian families upon whom Sfdi Muhammad had 
conferred the right to divide among themselves the in­
heritance fund of Fes (43) were deprived from this 
privilege by Mawlay Sulayman (44). To compensate them 
he decided to grant them a regular allowance (sila) 
taken from bayt al-mal. In order to satisfy other 
categories of sharlf-s who felt especially injured, 
Mawlay Sulayman decided in 1795 to extend this allow­
ance to forty-four new families who, though not 
belonging to ahl al- agabiyya (prestigious sharifian 
families), possessed nevertheless sufficient written 
evidence of the authenticity of their lineages. In
addition to these two categories of sharIf-s— ahl al- 
c
agabiyya and those who had written evidence— Mawlay 
Sulayman identified a third category which included 
thirty families whose sharifdom was disputed by 
prestigious sharff-s, but against whom there was no 
decisive evidence. To these thirty families, Mawlay
(42) Al-Zayanl, Tuhfat al-hadi, p. 13 : "He wrote to the governors 
ordering than not to consider any of his dhahir-s and to collect 
their zakat and Qoshur without distinction between sharif and 
mutasharrif".
(43) Ibn Zaydan, al-cIzz wa al-gawla, II, p.86. The list of the six­
teen families (or twelve branches— a branch, shuCba, being more 
general than "a family", caDila) is given in Ms.Z.3122, R.L.
(44) Al-Zayahf, Tuhfat al-hadi, p.13.
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Sulayman decided to grant one fifth of the allowance
given to the two categories above (4 5) until such time as
they produced substantial proof of their sharifdom. By
1801, only three out of these thirty contested fami-
— clies were unable to produce Isma lli dhahir-s 
authenticating their sharifian lineages. To the great
Q
grief of ahl a1- a?abiyya, the corps of sharif-s was 
expanded once more to include twenty seven additional 
families (46).
These measures which were intended to quell the 
clamours of dissatisfied sharif-s only discontented all 
categories. They failed to satisfy the prestigious 
families who did not want to be placed on the same foot­
ing with those whom they considered doubtful sharif-s. 
Ahl al- agabiyya were also affected in their material 
interests because the number of benificiaries from the 
royal concessions had increased considerably. Instead 
of the sixteen families chosen by Sfdi Muhammad b. Abd
Allah there were now eighty-seven to compete for the
c —inheritance fund of Fes. The "common sharif-s" ( ammat 
al-ashraf) were not satisfied either. Mawlay Sulayman's 
measures did not succeed in completely abolishing the 
discrimination they were subjected to by powerful 
sharif-s. On the occasion of the distribution of a 
sultanian ?ila, reported al-Zayani, it used to be said 
"this is for the sharif-s and this is for the muta- 
sharrifun" (47).
Mawlay Sulayman devised another measure intended to 
compensate sharlf-s for the Makhzen's take over of the 
inheritance fund of Fes. It consisted of granting the 
sharif-s the zakat levied on overland trade (48)— 2.5%
(45) Dhahir of Mawlay Sulayman to the sharif-s, dated 7 Rablc 1,1210/ 
21 Sept.,1795 in Ibn Zaydan, al-cIzz wa al-gawla, II,pp.111-113.
(46) Cf.Sulaymani dhahir dated Jumada II, 1216/Oct.-Nov. ,1801,D.A.R.
(47) al-Zayanl, Tufofat al-frgdi, p. 14.
(48) Letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to the shar If-s of Fes, no date, in 
al-Zayani, Tufcfat al-nubaha3,pp. 181-185 (appendix 88).
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tax on capital, paid by merchants returning from the 
Arab East or from Timbuctoo. This decision, however, 
disadvantaged the sharif-s of northern Morocco since a 
large part of the zakat exacted on the caravan trade 
would go to the^Alawid sharif-s of Tafilelt. The 
northern sharif-s were left with the zakat of the 
eastern pilgrimage caravan only. The frequent inter­
ruption of this caravan during the reign of Mawlay 
Sulayman must have certainly affected the interests of 
the sharif-s of Fes and the northern part of the 
country.
The sharif-s were not only affected materially. Their
social and moral status was at stake as well. On the
— cjudicial level, Mawlay Sulayman decreed that the shari a
should stand supreme. A sharif was no longer to be
immune from punishment by Makhzen officials, although
traditionally the naqib or the shaykh of the sharif-s
looked into offences commited by the descendants of the
Prophet, and a layman could never punish a shhrTf . All
he could do was to persuade him in the same way "a slave
would persuade his master's son" (49) because his sins
were the concern of "a prior Divine Providence"(50).
Mawlay Sulayman's most daring action against the 
sharif-s was his abolition of the immunity traditional­
ly enjoyed by the venerated descendants of the Prophet and 
the murabitun (zawiya members). To give his action a
C  —solid legal foundation, Mawlay Sulayman asked the alim-s 
to issue a fatwa concerning the immunity of zawiya-s in 
which some governors had deposited illegally acquired 
funds. In their reply to the Sultan's query, the QSTlim-s
(49) Al-TijanX, Nugrat al-shurafa fX al radd cala ahl al-jafa, Ms 
K 1574, BGR, pp. 551-552.
(50) Ibid., p. 552.
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were unanimous in authorizing the Makhzen to invest such
zawiya-s and recover funds which legally belonged to
bayt al-mal (51). In other words, the zawiya-s and
other venerated places could not serve as a refuge from
cthe judgement of the sharia.
Mawlay Sulayman pursued convicted sharif-s even in­
side such traditionally inviolable places as the shrine
of Mawlay Idris in Fes. For the Sultan, there could be
c cno sahctity above that of the shar I a. Al-Du ayf report­
ed an incident according to which an Idrisid sharif was 
taken out of the shrine of "his ancestor" on the Sultan's 
order and administered five hundred strokes (52). Makhzen 
qa3id-s did not hesitate either to invest holy shrines 
to expel offenders even if these happened to be sharif-s.
In 1796, the gaJid of the Gharb, Ibn al-Jilani, ordered 
his men to invade the shrine of Mawlay Bushta al-Khammar 
in order to arrest a sharif who was then taken to Mawlay 
Sulayman and maimed in application of the precepts of 
the shar! a (53) . The sheltering of offenders and poli­
tical dissidents was clearly the major issue between 
Mawlay Sulayman and the Wazzani and Sharqawi zawiya-s.
In Fes, some of Mawlay Sulayman's governors, such as 
Muhammad Waczlz (1807-1810) and Ahmad al-Qustalf (1817— 
1818), were most unpopular among the sharif-s (54). This
(51) Cf. text of the fatwa by Ibn Kir ah, al-Dukkalf, Muhammad al- 
Zarwal! and Al^ mad b. SuSa in al-Mahdf al-WazzanF, al-Nawazil 
al-kubra, lith., Fes, 1901, vol.Ill, pp.80-81. The same fatwa 
can be consulted in Ms.K. 1072, BGR, pp. 100-115.
(52) Al-Ducayf, p.319, "On Tuesday, 15 Rajab, 1210 (25 Jan.,1796) 
the Sultan arrested the sharif Mawlay al-Ijlusayn b. Muhammad b. 
al-Faqlll al-ldrisl after he was taken out of the shrine of his 
ancestor .When he reached the Sultan he was undressed and 
administered about five hundred strokes ... He was liberated 
afterwards on the intervention of al-faqih al-Haj Muhammad Bannls 
and given a compensation of one hundred mithqal-s, but the 
sharif refused to take it". The fact that a sharif was libera­
ted on the intervention of a Bildi is significant enough. Cf. 
another case of punishment inflicted on a sharif, p.333.
(53) Ibid., p.329.
(54) Al-Zayanl, Alfiyat al-suluk, pp. 213-214; and idem, Jamharat man 
hakama bi Fas, p. 7.
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latter, in particular, came to be known as nuPaddib al- 
ashraf (the person who punishes the sharif-s) (55) .
In his attitude towards the sharif-s Mawlay Sulayman 
was certainly motivated by a deep sense of justice 
refusing to allow people of his own blood to transgress 
the shan a merely because they were the Prophet's 
descendants. It is reported that he once beat his son 
to death for having unjustly killed a slave (56) . This 
does not, however, completely explain his policy towards 
the sharif-s. What he sought in the first place was a 
curb on the power of a social group upon which tradition 
and society had conferred too much consideration. In 
this respect, his confrontation with the sharTf-s cannot 
be detached from his struggle against the growing power 
of religious groups in general. Mawlay Sulayman at­
tempted by various means to diminish the influence of
_ _  Q _
the sharif-s. His privileged relations with the alim-s 
which contrasted with his avoidance of the shariTf-s, 
were intended, according to Sulayman al-Hawwat, as a 
check on the arrogance of the latter (57). Even a 
foreign traveller, such as John Buffa, who was on a short 
visit to the country, observed that "the princes of blood 
and Xeriff-s were not allowed to interfere in any poli­
tical or public business, and were never consulted in 
State affairs"(58).
The conflict with the sharif-s had also an ideologi­
cal dimension. The sharTf-s, whose interests were intima­
tely linked with those of the zawiya-s, could not but be
(55) Ibid.
(56) Al-I^ ajwi, Ikhtigar al-Ibtisam, p. 359. The British consul also 
reported in 1802 that Mawlay Sulayman beat to death a prince of 
the ruling family for having arbitrarily killed a Berber notable; 
cf.F.0.52/12, 12 Aug., 1802.
(57) Sulayman al-^awwat wrote: "After Mawlay al-Yazfd, Mawlay Sulayman 
followed a wise policy which favoured the people of learning and 
religiousness and discarded the rest, elevating seme and dis­
crediting others with the hope of checking their abuses and 
reducing their power"; quoted in Ibn Zaydan, al-cIzz, II,pp.86-87.
(58) John Buffa, Travels, p. 184.
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concerned over Mawlay Sulayman1s reformist ideas. His 
sympathy with the Wahhabi doctrine and his public and 
repeated attacks on popular religious practices 
irritated the sharif~s and the zawiya-s. Mawlay 
Sulayman1s prohibition of the mawsim-s held annually 
by the zawiya-s and the sharif-s constituted not only 
an injury for the material interests of these groups, 
but also an unpardonable outrage against their religious 
traditions. The sharif-s were to play an important role 
in the Fds rebellion during which they openly accused 
Mawlay Sulayman of Wahhabism.
Ill - Religious Orders
The proliferation of religious brotherhoods has certain­
ly been the salient feature of Moroccan history during 
the last four centuries. Sufi ideas, which were in­
troduced into the Maghrib in the eleventh century 
received vigorous encouragement by the doctrines of Abu 
al-Hasan al-ShadhilT (1175-1258 AD) and Muhammad b.cAbd 
al-Rahman al-Jazuli (d.1465). These two mystics did 
not found any particular order or zawiya of their own, 
but served nevertheless as the spiritual reference for 
most tarTqa-s Qf the Maghrib.
The Shadhili-Jazuli school was based on an intensive 
veneration of the Prophet which was quickly extended to 
the latter's descendants. Thus, Moroccan Sufism pro­
gressively fell under the influence of the sharif-s. Al- 
Jazull from whom most tarlga-s claim spiritual descent, 
was a sharif himself and manifested a great pride in 
declaring that he had the privilege of possessing, at 
the same time, the nobility of belief and that of blood 
(al-sharaf al-dlnl wa al-sharaf al-tini)(59). "Man's 
power", he wrote, "springs not from the esteem he enjoys 
or the tribe to which he belongs, but from the nobility
(59) Muhammad al-Mahdl a 1-Fasi", Mumtic al-asmac fi dhikr al-Jazuli 
wa al-Tabbac wa ma lahumA min al-asb5b, lith., Fes,1895/p.3.
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of his origin. I am a sharif, my origin is noble, my
ancestor is the Prophet of God (may peace be upon him)
to whom I am closer than any other creature"(60). In
fact, al-Jazuli did nothing more than underline the
sharifian orientation of Moroccan Sufism whose Poles
(61) , Abu al-Hasan al-Shadhiir and his shaykh Mawlay 
c —Abd al-Salam b. Mashish, were themselves descendants 
of the Prophet (62).
After al-Jazuir, most t;arlqa-s in Morocco came 
under the control of sharifian lineages. With the 
exception of the Qadiriya and the Tijaniya, all claim 
spiritual attachment to the Shadhili-Jazuli tradition.
By the early nineteenth century, the most influential 
zawiya-s (Wazzaniya,and Darqawiya) were led by sharTf-s. 
Indeed, sharifian opposition to Mawlay Sulayman was 
usually associated to that of the zawiya-s. The 
distinction made here between zawiya-s and sharTf-s is 
purely dictated by methodological considerations. In 
practice, these two groups often represented the same 
reality.
Before reviewing the main tarlga-s which dominated 
the religious life at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, the difference between j^arfga, ta3ifa and 
zawiya must be clarified. A tarlqa is a religious path 
which is supposed to lead the murid (aspirant) towards 
a more intimate knowledge of God.and, through an intensi­
ve religious life, put him closer to the Divine presence.
(60) Ibid., p.5.
(61) A Pole (qufcb) means in Sufi terminology the highest spiritual 
authority among the saints during a given period of time. 
Al^ mad al-Tijani, the founder of the Tijani tariqa, claimed 
that he was the Pole of his time.
(62) Muhammad al-Mahdf al-FasT, Murntic al-asmac, p.8.
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Each tarfga is distinguished by its particular wird 
(initiation prayer) and dhikr (litany) which is recited 
either individually or preferably in collective dhikr 
sessions. The adepts of a tariqa form a religious order 
(taDifa) which is headed by a shaykh. Within this reli­
gious association, the murTd is directed towards salva­
tion by following the tarTqa prescriptions. The zawiya 
finally, is a kind of a convent or meeting house where 
the adepts of a particular religious order assemble to 
lead an intensive religious life. Zawiya-s, therefore, 
belong most of the time to a large religious order.
A local zawiya, however, could very well develop its 
own tariqa and evolve into a wider religious order extend­
ing over vast regions and sometimes over many countries. 
The great religious orders of Morocco, the Na^iriya, the 
Sharqawiya. and the Wazzaniya, all started as local zawiya-s . 
Indeed, in the Moroccan context, this evolution was rather 
the rule. With time, the term "zawiya" imposed itself as 
a substitute for "religious order".
A - The Nasiriya
The zawiya of Tamegrout was founded in 783 AH (1575-1576)
c —by Umar b. Ahmad al-Ansari (d.1602). It was only after
his death that the zawiya, under the leadership of
Muhammad b. Na§ir, began to evolve as a brotherhood with
its own Sufi path (63). Muhammad b. Na?ir, who assumed
the responsibility of the zawiya in 1630, was in fact the
spiritual founder of the Na?iriya religious order. His
scrupulous observance of Islamic orthodoxy profoundly
marked the evolution of the zawiya.
The Na?iri tariqa had no distinctive doctrine. "The 
path of the Nasiriya", wrote Afymad b. Khalid al-Na?irf,
"is actually nothing but the path of the Prophet of God
(63) M. Iiajjf, al-Haraka al-fikriya bi al-Maghrib ff cahd al- 
sacdiyin, Rabat, 1976, vol. II, p. 551.
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and his Sunna ... The shaykh Muhammad b. Nasir simply
gave it a new life and served as the agent who strived
for its triumph"(64). Muhammad b. Nasir who was an out- 
c -standing alim and Sufi at the same time, reduced the 
litanies (wird-s) of the Shadhiliya to a single litany 
leaving more room for the recitation of the Quran (65). 
Heterodox Sufi practices, such as the use of musical 
instruments or the recourse to liturgic dances, were 
severely condemned and discarded as detestable innova­
tions (66). The Na§iri-s also considered as innovations 
the immolation of animals on the shrine of saints, the 
use of tobacco and, indeed, all practices which find no
justification in the Quran or in the Prophet's traditions.
c —This orthodox orientation attracted many alim-s to the 
order. Al-TawdiT b. Suda (d.1795) adhered to the Nasiri 
tariga and his son Ahmad (d.1820) was entrusted with the 
leadership of the Fasi branch of the zawiya (67). Mawlay 
Sulayman, following his father's example, also adhered 
to the Nasiri tarTqa whose rigorous orthodoxy was closest 
to his reformist ideals.
Owing to its geographical location, the Nasiri zawiya 
played an important role in the cultural and social life 
of the Dra valley. Tamegrout constituted, indeed, an 
active centre for the propagation of the Arabo-Islamic 
culture on the fringes of the Sahara. Nothing illustrates 
this fact better than the famous library of the zawiya 
which still contains many thousands of manuscripts. The 
weakness of central authority in such a distant region 
furthermore impelled the zawiya to serve as mediator in 
tribal conflicts and extend its beneficent protection to 
local economic activity. This social role made Tamegrout 
into an important staging point for the caravan trade and 
allowed the zawiya to acquire considerable wealth.
(64) G. Drague, Esquisse, p. 203.
(65) al-Ruhuni, cUmdat al-rawlh, VII, pp.603-604.
(66) Muhanmad b.cAbd al-Salam b. Nai?ir, al-Mazayafi ma hadatha min 
al-bidac bi urtmi al-zawaya, Ms Z 3099, PL, pp. 47-49.
(67) Al-yawwat, al-Rawda al-maqsuda, p. 322.
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The distant location of the zawiya on the outskirts 
of the Sahara was never an incentive for the Nasiri 
shaykh-s to develop political ambitions. These always 
manifested great self-restraint in this respect, even 
refusing to take part in the jihad efforts in order to 
avoid being suspected of political designs (68). As a 
result, their relations with the Makhzen were generally 
peaceful and cordial. The refusal of the Na§iri-s to 
mention the sultan's name in the Friday prayer created 
a certain tension between the zawiya and Mawlay Rashid, 
but thecAlawid sultans were soon convinced that this 
omission was not a sign of hostility to the ruling 
dynasty. According to the argument put forward by the 
Nasiri shaykh-s, it was a measure dictated by a strict
observance of the Sunna (69). To show his good will
_ c —
towards the zawiya, Mawlay Isma II allowed Ahmad b.Nasir
to extend his influence to the northern provinces of the
country, apparently with the aim of exercising a closer
control over the activities of the zawiya.
During the first half of the eighteenth century, the 
zawiya succeeded in gaining numerous adepts all over the 
country. Its implantation was particularly important 
amongst Atlas Berbers. The adoption of the Nasiri tariga 
by the Amhawish and Ahansal families was at the basis of 
their politico-religious leadership in the Atlas during 
most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
This northward expansion imposed on the zawiya the 
adoption of a policy of cooperation with the Makhzen. The
  Q   _
fifth shaykh of the zawiya, Ja far b. Musa, entertained 
cordial relations with Sid! Muhammad b. Abd Allah (70).
(68) G. Drague, Esquisse, p.208, note 28.
(69) Ibid. ,p. 189. Mufrairmad b.cAbd al-Salam b.Na^ir gave a different 
interpretation to this practice of the early Na§iri-s. Sfdf 
Muhanmad b. Na?ir, argued the author of al-Mazaya, lived at a 
time when the dynastic struggle between the cAlawids and the 
DilaDi-s was not yet settled. To avoid any ccmplications, he 
chose therefore not to mention any name in the Friday khufba; 
cf., al-Mazaya, p.69.
(70) G. Drague, Esquisse, p.191.
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As a result, the Nasiri-s implanted branches of their
zawiya everywhere and succeeded in becoming one of the
most influential religious orders in the country. How-
c —ever, under the sixth shaykh, Air b. Yusuf (term from 
1783 to 1818-1819), relations deteriorated and Sfdf 
Muhammad b.cAbd Allah not only destroyed a branch of 
the zawiya in the Rif (71) but threatened to invest 
Tamegrout itself (72).
During the reign of Mawlay Sulayman, the Nasiri-s 
entertained excellent relations with the Makhzen. In­
deed, Mawlay Sulayman succeeded in dissipating the 
tension which had reigned on the eve of SidT Muhammad's 
death replacing it by cooperation and good understanding.
Many factors contributed towards this improvement. During
c — —*the term of Air b. Yusuf the zawiya progressively lost
its influence among the Fazaz Berbers whose sympathies 
went instead to the new Darqawi religious order. This 
development reduced the chances of confrontation between 
the Makhzen and the Nasiri zawiya whose Amhawish and 
Ahansal adepts had been at the origin of numerous con­
flicts with thecAlawid dynasty (73). At the beginning 
of the nineteenth century Abu Bakr Amhawish maintained 
very distant relations with his Nasiri shaykh-s. He 
seemed to have more admiration for the shaykh of the 
Darqawi tariqa whose ascetic character and sharifian 
origin were particularly appealing to his austere nature 
and sharifian pretentions (74). The Na?iri-s, on the 
other hand, were not very enthusiastic about the belli­
cose attitude of the Ait Oumalou towards their neigh­
bours (75) .
(71) Al-I?ucayf, p. 203.
(72) Ibid., pp. 210-211.
(73) The Hansali zawiya followed the Nasiri doctrine and intervened 
actively in the troubles which followed the death of Mawlay 
Ismacri in 1727. Cf. Magali Morsy, Les Ahansala, Paris-The Hague, 
1972. Under the reign of Sidr Muhammd the AmhSwish maraboutic 
family gave refuge to Mawlay al-Yazid in 1770, after this one 
rebelled against his father. Cf. al-ZayanT, al-Rawja, fol. 163-164.
(74) G. Drague, pp. 141-143.
(75) Ibn Na^ ir, al-Rifola al-?ughra, p. 215.
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Another factor which contributed to the rapprochement 
between the Nasiriya and the Makhzen during the period 
under study was the need for the zSwiya of Tamegrout to 
resist the expansionism of the Ait Atta Berbers. The south­
ward expansionist drive of the Alt Atta constituted a 
serious threat for the Arab tribes of the Dra valley. By 
the end of the eighteenth century, according to Muhammad b. 
cAbd al-Salam b. Nasir (76), the Ait Atta had occupied 
most of the country stretching between the Tafilelt and 
the Dra river. This expansion compelled the Na§iri-s to 
seek the support of the Makhzen (77).
The orthodoxy of the Nasiri tariga an(j its well- 
known disapproval of blamable innovations must certainly 
have favoured a better understanding between the two sides. 
The doctrine of the Na§iriya, which is "actually nothing 
but the path of God's Prophet" (78), matched perfectly 
Mawlay Sulayman's hostility to heterodox practices. Mawlay 
Sulayman was himself an adept of the Nasiri tarXqa, the 
wird of which he received from his father, as well as from 
the shaykh-s of the zawiya (79). This adherence to the 
Nasiri tariga he also shared with his respected teachers, 
al-Tawdi b. Suda and Ahmad b. Suda (80).
The Nasiri shaykh-s themselves had great esteem for 
Mawlay Sulayman's orthodoxy and religiousness. Muhammad 
b. cAbd al-Salam b. Nasir who met Mawlay Sulayman in 1796
(76) Ibn NSsir, al-Rihla al-Kubra, p. 23.
(77) G. Drague, p. 213.
(78) Ahmad b. Khalid al-Nasiri, Talcat al-mushtari, quoted by G. Drague, 
p. 203.
(79) Ibn Rahmun, al-Durr wa al-ciqyan, D 724, p. 45; A. al-Kattani, 
Fihris al-faharis, II, p. 329.; al-pucayf, p. 394.
(80) S. al-Hawwat, al-Rawda, pp. 316, 322. Ahmad b. Suda received the 
Nasiri wird frcm his father and from cAir b. Yusuf who entrusted 
him with the leadership of the Fasi branch of the zawiya.
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was impressed with the latter1s scholarship and respect 
for the calim-s (81). Moreover, he maintained excellent 
relations with Mawlay Sulayman1s court and called upon 
the shaykh of the zawiya, ^Ali b. Yusuf, to mention the 
Sultan's name in the Friday khu^ba, thus advocating the 
break with an old tradition whereby the Na^iri-s 
omitted the prince's name in their Friday prayers (82).
^All b. Yusuf himself paid frequent visits to the royal 
court and enjoyed Mawlay Sulayman's respect (83). Indeed, 
never before had relations between the Nasiri shaykh-s 
and the cAlawid sultans been so intimate.
B - The Sharqawiya
The Sharqawi zawiya is an offshoot of the Nasiri tarTga.
Its founder, Muhammad al-Sharqi (d. 1601) claimed descent 
from the Prophet's companion cUmar b. al-Khattab (84). 
Muhammad al-Sharqi was a disciple of al-Jazuli through his 
pupil^Abd al- ^ Aziz al-Tabbac. Around 1660, the grandson of 
the founder, Muhammad al-MactjT joined the Nasiri tarXqa. 
However, the shaykh-s of the Sharqawiya religious order 
did not always manifest the same degree of orthodoxy as the 
Nasiri-s. Liturgic dances, for instance, were perfectly 
acceptable to Mawlay Sulayman's contemporary ,al- ‘•ArbT b . 
al-MactI (85) .
The Sharqawiya never succeeded in extending its 
influence to distant regions as did the Nasiriya or the 
Wazzaniya. The Sharqawi-s had neither the missionary drive 
of the Nasiri-s nor the advantage of sharifdom enjoyed by 
the Wazzani-s. The influence of the zawiya remained there­
fore limited to the Tadla and the central plains of Morocco.
(81) Ibn Na?ir, al-Rihla al-sughra, p. 29.
(82) Ibn Nasir, al-Maz5ya, p. 69.
(83) Al-Ducayf, pp. 381, 394. The respect Mawlay Sulayman had for the 
Nasiri-s did not prevent him from launching a punitive attack on 
the zawiya's branch of Beni Touzine (Rif) in 1808. Cf. al-Ducayf, 
p. 450.
(84) cAbd al-Salam al-Qadiri refuted this claim. Cf. his al-Tuhfa al-
qadiriya, II, p. 8.
(85) al-Ducayf, p. 387.
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The geographical location of the zawiya at Boujad, at 
the foot of the Atlas mountains, determined to a large extent, 
the nature of its relations with the Makhzen. By virtue 
of its position , it served as a buffer zone between the 
dissident Berber tribes and the lowland Makhzen country.
The cAlawid sultans had, therefore, a particular interest 
in strengthening the zawiya. The Sharqawi-s were granted 
large concessions over the Tadla and neighbouring tribes 
in the form of azib-s (86). The farming of agricultural 
taxes in these territories, together with the regular 
ziyara-s (offerings) by the faithful (’87) , ensured a 
considerable revenue for the zawiya.
The destruction of the zawiya of Dila3 by Mawlay 
Rashid in 1668 certainly contributed to the emergence of 
the Sharqawiya order as the uncontested religious power 
of central Morocco (88) . The long period of political 
instability witnessed between 1727 and 1757 served also 
to consolidate the prestige of the zawiya, by virtue of 
its role as mediator in local conflicts. During the 
second half of the eighteenth century, the politico- 
religious influence of the zawiya reached such proportion 
that Sidi Muhammad b. CAbd Allah found it necessary to 
direct a military attack against Boujad and evacuate its 
inhabitants (88).
Apparently, Sidi Muhammad's repressive action against 
the zawiya of Boujad caused little harm to the prestige and 
influence of the Sharqawi-s. The political instability
(86) A cazib is a territory the inhabitants of which pay their legal 
taxes to a zawiya by virtue of a concession fran the Makhzen. 
Wazzani sharif-s were granted control not only over taxation 
but over land and its occupants as well.
(87) The Sharqawi zawiya received two annual ziyara-s, one during 
the spring and the other after the end of harvests. They con­
sisted o f both money and agricultural produce (Information 
ccnrnunicated to the author of this thesis by Muhammad al- 
Sharqawi) .
(88) al-Na§iri, VII, p. 53.
(89) Al-Ducayf, p. 197. Al-ZayanT dated this campaign in 1119AH/1784- 
1785 (al-Rav^a, fol.144). The date given by al-Ducayf, being more 
precise (Feb., 1786), seems more probable.
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after his death allowed the zawiya to regain its strength 
and enhance its autonomy by assuming a more pronounced 
role in the 1790's dynastic crisis.
The attitude of the Sharqawi zawiya in the political
contest between Mawlay Sulayman to his brothers from 179 2
c — c —to 1797 was by no means neutral. Al- Arbi b. al-Ma ti 
lent his support to Mawlay Hisham with whom he had a deep 
and intimate friendship (90). Until 1794 the name of 
Mawlay Hisham was still mentioned in the mosques of Boujad 
during Friday prayers (91). Despite al- Arbi's loyalty
to Mawlay Hisham, some influential members of the Sharqawi
— c cfamily, such as Qaddur b. All b. al-Ma tT, had close
relations with Mawlay Sulayman and were in favour of his
cbeing proclaimed. Towards the end of 17 94, al- Arbi b. 
al-Ma ti had become so embarassed by the growing sympathy 
of his own family for Mawlay Sulayman that he sought refuge 
in the mountains (92). Soon afterwards, however, the head 
of the Sharqawiya realized that the moment of truth had 
come and that he could no longer ignore the consensus 
which was building up around Mawlay Sulayman. He was even 
willing to offer his good offices in 1796 to bring about 
the submission of the rebellious Chaouia (93).
A fortuitous incident in 17 96 compromised this new
and fragile reconciliation. Abu Azza al-QustalT, qa3id
0 0 
of the Beni Hsen and affine of al- Arbi b. al-Ma ti, was
assassinated in obscure circumstances, most probably at
Mawlay Sulayman's instigation (94). This incident "deeply
afflicted" al-CArbT b.al-MaCtf (95) and reduced his
enthusiasm for Mawlay Sulayman's cause at a time when the
southern provinces were still in rebellion. Once again,
(90) Al-cArbi Bendawud, al-Fatfr al-wahbi fl manaqib al-shaykh abi 
al-mawahib mawlana al-cArbI, Ms K 2312, BGR, p. 529.
(91) Al-Ducayf, p.300.
(92) Ibid.
(93) Ibid., p.317.
(94) Ibid., pp.327-328.
(95) Ibid., p.328.
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C  C  —al- Arbi b. al-Ma ti turned to Mawlay Hisham (96). It
— C  —was only after the mediation of Fasi alim-s that the 
shaykh of the Sharqawi zawiya agreed to meet Mawlay 
Sulayman in 1797 (97). The rupture between the two sides 
had lasted for about a year.
With the submission of the last strongholds of rebel­
lion in 1798 Mawlay Sulayman directed his attention to 
the consolidation of his rule in the Tadla where Makhzen 
authority had been almost inexistent since the death of 
Sidi Muhammad b. cAbd Allah. Attempts by Mawlay Sulayman 
to impose qa^id-s over the Tadla were constantly thwarted 
by al-CArbi b. al-MaCti. Despite a certain Makhzen tradi­
tion there, Mawlay Sulayman appointed neither a local man 
as qa^id nor did he take the opinion of the zawiya over 
this appointment into consideration. None of the numerous 
qaDid-s appointed after 1798 met with the approval of the 
Tadla tribes. At the end of 1799 these rose in rebellion 
against al-GhazT b. al-Madani, qlPid of the Chaouia and 
whose prerogatives were extended to include the Tadla as 
well (98). In 1801, al-Zayani, who was appointed governor 
of this province, met the same fate (99).
c cTo gain over al- Arbi b. al-Ma ti and neutralize the
opposition of the Tadla tribes, Mawlay Sulayman nominated
nembers of his own family as governors for this province:
his brothers Mawlay al-Tayyib and Mawlay Musa, his son
Muhammad and his son-in-law al-Hablb al-Balghrtf (100).
(96) According to al-Ducayf, the Friday prayer at Boujad was still said 
in the name of Mawlay Hisham at the end of 1796, cf.p.341.
(97) The delegation sent by Mawlay Sulayman to al-CArbi b. al-Mac i^ in 
1797 included al-Tayyib b. Kir an, <Abd al-Qadir b. Shaqrun, Muhammad 
Bannis, in addition to Mawlay Ibrahim, the Sultan's son who was 
ordered to stay at Boujad in order to acquire the religious 
sciences there; cf. al-Ducayf, pp.356-358, 363.
(98) Ibid., p.405. Fran February 1799 to November 1799, the governor­
ship of the Tadla had been assumed by Mawlay al-Tayyib (d.Nov. 1799) .
(99) Ibid., p.413.
(100) Ibid., pp.399, 404, 405, 429, 434, 435; see also letter of rebuke 
fran Mawl5y Sulayman to al-cArbi b. al-MactT, no date, in Ms.K. 1264, 
BGR, pp.361-365 (appendix 54).
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This did not prevent the Beni Mousa and Ourdigha tribes 
from attacking and plundering Makhzen troops at Boujad in 
1801 (101). In 1804 the governorship of the Tadla was en­
trusted to Sulayman LudiyyT (of the Oudaya) and in 1805 
to Muhammad al-Jilali al-Sarghfnr, both strangers to the 
area and devoted servants of the Makhzen (102). Both of 
these qa3id-s were particularly unpopular in the Tadla 
and, according to the literature of the zawiya (103) , 
were at the origin of all the misunderstanding and the 
tension that existed between Mawlay Sulayman and the 
Sharqawi zawiya.
In 1808 the tribes of the Tadla, namely Ouardigha and 
Smala , rose again in rebellion against al-GhazT b. al-
Madanl. This latter succeeded apparently in convincing
c cMawlay Sulayman of the fact that al- Arbi b. al-Ma ti was
the instigator of this rebellion (104) . The Sultan decided
thereafter to put an end, once and for all, to the
arrogance of the Sharqawi zawiya which he considered as
responsible for the persistent agitation among the Tadla
tribes (105). On 26 November 1808, a summons by the Sultan
was read at the great mosque of Boujad : anybody who
remained at Boujad after a lapse of fifteen days would face
c ccapital punishment (106). Al- Arbi b. al-Ma ti was placed
under surveillance at Fes (107) and the zawiya threatened
with punishment similar to the one suffered by the DilaDi-s
in 1668 (108). At the same time the Sultan organized a
punitive expedition against the Tadla tribes and against
the mountain Berbers of Ait Seri (109).
(101) Ibid., pp.417-418.
(102) A. Bendawud, al-Fath al-jwahbr, .530; al-£ucayf, pp.435, 440.
(103) A. Bendawud, al-Fatfr al-wahbf, pp.528-530.
(104) Al-Ducayf, pp.451-452.
(105) Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to al-cArbr b. al-Macti, referenced in 
note 100 above.
(106) Al-Ducayf, p.451.
(107) Al-CArbl b. al-Macti remained in exile fran December 1808 to Aug. 
1809; cf.al-Ducayf, pp.452-453.
(108) Cf. letter mentioned in notes 100 and 105 above.
(109) Al-Ducayf, pp.452-453.
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The Berber policy of Mawlay Sulayman was, in fact, an 
important area of disagreement with the Sharqawi zawiya. 
Traditionally, the zawiya extended its spiritual influence 
over the mountain Berbers, thus drawing into its orbit 
refractory tribes which the military power of the Makhzen 
was incapable of subduing (110) . The shaykh-s of the 
zawiya preferred to see these tribes remain outside Makhzen 
authority. The extension of Makhzen rule to mountainous 
areas would not only compromise the position of the zawiya 
as a useful buffer between Makhzen regions and areas of 
dissidence, but would also deprive the Sharqawi-s of a 
possible refuge in case of conflict with the Makhzen(111). 
It was to conserve this rearguard that the Sharqawi-s used
to discourage the Makhzen from taking any action against
c cthe Atlas Berbers. Al- Arbi b. al-Ma ti often dissuaded
Mawlay Sulayman from risking a perilous military confronta­
tion with "these monkeys" as long as they remained en-: 
trenched in their mountains and were not endangering his 
communication routes through the coastal plains (112). 
Mawlay Sulayman's qa^id-s in the Tadla saw the advice as 
nothing more than a cover for the Sharqawi-s to maintain 
their influence in the Atlas which they intended to use as 
a refuge for offenders from the Tadla (113).
Following Mawlay Sulayman's action against the zawiya
c
in 1808-1808 and the eight months exile of al- Arbi b. al-
C —Ma tT (114), the Sharqawi-s began to avoid involvement in
(110) The Sharqawi-s had, for instance, khadim-s (servants) in the Alt 
Attab tribe; cf.Bendawud, al-Fath al-jwahbi, p.570.
(111) In 1794, for instance, al-cArbf b.al-Mac^i took refuge in the mount­
ains after he refused to proclaim Mawlay Sulayman; cf. al-Ducayf,
p. 300.
(112) A. Bendawud, al-Fatfr al-wahbi, p.530.
(113) Ibid.
(114) Al-CArbI b.al-MaC^f was allowed by Mawlay Sulayman bo return to 
Boujad in Aug. 1809; cf.al-puCayf, p.453. On 22 Jumada II, 1224/
4 Aug., 1809, according to al-Ducayf, al-cArbf b. al-MaC-^i left Fes 
where he was kept "like a prisoner" and was given 81 mules’ by the 
Sultan to carry the numerous presents he received.
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Makhzen affairs. The head of the zawiya disassociated 
himself from the insubordination of the Tadla tribes and 
spent the last years of his life exhorting his followers 
to respect Makhzen authority (115). The punitive military 
campaign had certainly neutralized the power of the Sharqawi 
zawiya, but the weakening of its position as a buffer 
between the Makhzen and the dissident Berber tribes exposed- 
the former to even greater dangers. The "final pacifica­
tion" of the Tadla in 1808-1809 opened the way for a direct 
confrontation with the mountain Berbers. It was only after
a humiliating defeat in 1819 that Mawlay Sulayman realized
c chow sound al- ArbT b.al-Ma t f s  advice had been.
%
C - The Wazzaniya
Between the Sharqawi and Wazzani zawiya-s there were two 
important similarities. First, both zawiya-s occupied 
the foothills of a mountainous area which was often in 
dissidence. This fact bestowed on these zawiya-s an 
important strategic value which the Makhzen attempted to 
use in order to further its poltical interests in the in­
accessible Atlas and Jbala mountains. Secondly, over 
time, the two zawiya-s acquired, with Makhzen encourage­
ment, considerable landed property around the seat of 
the mother zawiya. This led to a high degree of centra­
lization which gave them the appearance of landed theo­
cracies (116).
The Wazzani zawiya was founded by an Idrisid sharif,
c —________ _ ^
Mawlay Abd Allah b. Ibrahim (d.1678) who was an adept of
the Shadhili-Jazuli school. On the doctrinal level, there
is hardly any difference between the Wazzani-s and the
— — cother Shadhili tariqa-s. "Our tarfqa", wrote Mawlay Abd
(115) A. Bendawud, al-Fath al-Jwahbf, p.576.
(116) Ali Bey reported in 1803 that the saints of Boujad and Ouezzane had 
extensive domains the inhabitants of which paid no taxes to the 
Makhzen. According to the same author, these lands were ruled by 
the saints without the interference of the sultan. Cf.his Travels, 
I, p.151.
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Allah, "is based on three principles: the respect of
God's ordinances, the avoidance of evil-doers, and the 
devotion to our Lord the Prophet"(117).
— c —If Mawlay Abd Allah consecrated his life to worship 
and contemplation, his successors and heirs of his baraka 
directed their efforts to the consolidation of the in­
fluence of the zawiya , both inside and outside national 
boundaries. Towards the middle of the eighteenth century, 
Mawlay al-Tayyib, the fourth shaykh of the zawiya, had al­
ready adepts and estates in every part of the country(118). 
At the same time, the zawiya extended its spiritual in­
fluence to the Touat and western Algeria (119) . When Sidi
c —*All b. Ahmad took over the affairs of the zawiya in 1782
the order was about to enter what Abdallah . Laroui calls
"the third stage" of the zawiya's life during which
economic and political preoccupations overshadow all
others (120) .
Sidi All b. Ahmad devoted most of his energies to 
the consolidation of the worldly interests of the zawiya.
He invited the Jews to settle in Ouezzane with the inten­
tion of activating trade and crafts. On the other hand, he 
directed his efforts to provide the zawiya with a military 
force. He persuaded his followers to acquire armaments 
and learn the necessary military skills (121). According
to the author of al-Rawd al-munlf, Sidi All b. Ahmad    *    9 •
developed a personal interest in the acquisition of milita­
ry equipment "until he accumulated more armament than 
is usually found in the arsenals of kings"(122).
(117) Hamduh al-Tahiri, Tuhfat, p. 272; A. al-RuhunT, ctlndat al-rawln, 
VII, pp.714-715.
(118) Muhammad b. al-Tayyib al-Qadiri, Nashr al-Mathanl li ahl al- 
qam al-hadi cashar wa al-thanl, Ms K 2253, BGR, vol. II,p.132.
(119) G. Drague, Esquisse, p. 231.
(120) A. Laroui, Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationa­
lisms marocain I830-I9I2, Paris, 1977, pp. 137-138.
(121) cAbd Allah b.al-Tayyib al-Wazzanl, al-Rawd al-munif, II, fol.78.
(122) Ibid.; al-Miknasf, al-Kawkab al-ascad, lith., Fes, 1906 p.122.
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The economic potential of the zawiya of Ouezzane was 
considerable. In addition to the large estates it owned 
in the Gharb and elsewhere, the shaykh-s received each 
year a considerable amount of offerings from their adepts. 
Ouezzane used to be a destination for pilgrims from all
Q
over the country. Sidi All b. Ahmad spent most of his
time, apparently, receiving ziyara-s from his visitors
(123). The income drawn from these offerings "surpassed
— cthat of any king of Morocco"(124). Mawlay al- Arbi (d.
Q
1850) who succeeded Sidi All b. Ahmad, multiplied the 
landed interests of the zawiya (125) and lived in a 
splendour unknown to the founders of the zawiya (126) .
Q
Before the death of Sfdf Muhammad b. Abd Allah in 
1790 the shaykh-s of the zawiya maintained good relations 
with thecAlawid sultans. In general, they abstained from 
any action which would irritate the Makhzen and expose 
their easily accessible domains to its vengeance. On the 
other hand, the^Alawid sultans saw in the zawiya an import­
ant tool in the control, or at least the containment, of 
the turbulent Jbala tribes. Moreover, the spread of the 
Wazzani tariqa to distant places, such as the Touat and 
western Algeria, gave it additional importance. To reward 
the traditional loyalty of the zawiya, Sidi Muhammad 
decided in 1786 to grant the sharif-s of Ouezzane large 
administrative concessions (127) at a time when he seemed 
determined to curb the growing power of the Sharqawi and 
Nasiri zawiya-s (128) . Following the death of Sidi
(123) A. al-Wazzani, al-Rawd al-munlf, fol.77.
(124) Ibid.
(125) Ibn Has sun, Fahrasa, Mic. 829, BGR.
(126) Michaux-Bellaire,"La maison d'Ouezzane'in Revue du Monde Musulman, 
vol.V, 1908, p.45; Villes et Tribus du Maroc, IV, pp.246-247.
(127) These concessions consisted in the right of the Wazzani shaykh-s 
to (1) administer the sharif-s without interference from the 
Makhzen (2) appoint the qaxjiT for Ouezzane to whcxn the qaqli-s of the 
Jbala would be responsible (3) exercise a control over Makhzen 
qa°id-s at Ouezzane and the Gharb (4) administer local ahbas. Cf. 
al-DuCayf, pp.198-199.
(128) Cf.al-Ducayf, pp. 197 and 210 about the action of Sidi Muhammad 
against the Sharqawi and Nasiri zawiya-s.
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Muhammad, however, the shaykh-s of the Wazzani zawiya 
departed from their traditional neutrality in political 
affairs and played an active role in the dynastic crisis 
which destabilized the country during the early years of 
Mawlay Sulayman's reign. This interference, together 
with Mawlay Sulayman's repudiation of his father's con­
cessions to the zawiya-s, led to the deterioration of 
relations between the two sides.
— C —Sidi All b. Ahmad was the first Wazzani shaykh to
involve himself openly in the country's political affairs
by actively taking part in the 1790 dynastic crisis (129).
After the collapse of Mawlay Maslama's rule in Ouezzane
in April 1792, the head of the zawiya attempted by all
available means to improve his relations with Mawlay
Sulayman, particularly by offering his mediation efforts
in bringing about the submission of the rebellious coastal
provinces. Mawlay Sulayman was, however, determined not to
allow any concessions over Makhzen sovereignty. He first
of all wanted to curtail the administrative autonomy of
the zawiya by appointing his own officials at Ouezzane .
This constituted a clear violation of the understanding
reached in 178 6 between Sfdi Muhammad and the shaykh of
the zawiya (130). In 1795 Mawlay Sulayman nominated an
c — _ —eminent alim from Fes— Muhammad al-Zarwali—  to be gadi
for Ouezzane. A few days later, this nomination was revoked
— c —and al-Zarwali was replaced by Ahmad al-Dar awl al-Wazzani/
— cmost probably on Sidi All's intervention (131). The 
following year, the Sultan extended the authority of his 
qa3id in the Gharb, al-Jilanl b. al-Mufaddal, to include 
Ouezzane and the tribe of Masmouda, as well as other 
neighbouring territories considered by the sharff-s of 
Ouezzane as falling within their sphere of influence (132).
(129) Cf. chapter IV above, pp. I76-I8I.
(130) Cf. note 66 above.
(131) Al-DuPayf, p. 301.
(132) Ibid., p.325.
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For Ouezzane, al-Jilani delegated a Makhzen official to 
reside in the town itself.
c —Sidf All b. Ahmad was deeply irritated by Mawlay
Sulayman's attempts to abolish the administrative privi­
leges of the zawiya. He energetically resisted these 
attempts and sought every means of preventing Makhzen 
qa-^id-s from exercising their duties. On this issue 
Mawlay Sulayman was not ready to compromise. "Ouezzane 
being part of the Moroccan territory", he wrote to SidT 
AIT b. Ahmad, "any official who is appointed there should 
feel at home ... The person appointed by our uncle must 
govern in conformity with the shari a and will therefore
remain as long as he respects it and observes our direct­
ives" (133). Mawlay Sulayman succeeded, no doubt, in in­
stalling his ga3id-s but relations between the Makhzen and 
the sharlf-s of Ouezzane were often disturbed by similar 
incidents over the appointment and the administrative pre­
rogatives of Makhzen qa3id-s (134) .
The other issue on which Mawlay Sulayman refused to
compromise related to the function of the zawiya as a
refuge for dissidents and common law offenders. "A zawiya,
0
he wrote to Sidi All b. Ahmad, "is supposed to be a shel­
ter for the oppressed and not for the oppressor"(135). The 
zawiya, he argued, can in no way enjoy more respectability 
than Mecca and Medina because, even these holiest of places 
are not empowered by the sharl a to shelter offenders (136)* 
In other words, Mawlay Sulayman affirmed his determination
(133) Al-Jilani was referred to as "our uncle" by Mawlay Sulayman 
because he belonged to the MaCqil Arabs frcm which had ccme the 
Sultan's mother. Cf letter fran Mawlay Sulayman to SidX cAlf b. 
Ahmad in al-DuCayf, p. 326 (appendix 12) .
(134) Another example of this tension between the Wazzani zawiya and the 
Makhzen is the case of the governorship of Hamduh b. al-Haj over 
the Gharb province. After repeated complaints by the sharif-s of 
Ouezzane, Hamduh was finally revoked. Cf.al-DuCayf, p.436; Hamduh's 
Dlwan, pp.178-179.
(135) Letter referenced in note 133 above.
(136) Ibid.
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not to allow the zawiya to become a cover for subversive 
action. Many precedents induced him to adopt such an 
attitude. During 1795 and 1796 alone, the zawiya gave 
refuge to at least three former qa^id-s whose extradition 
was demanded by the Makhzen (137).
Q___________________________ _
Until 1811, when Sidi All b. Ahmad died, Mawlay 
Sulayman followed a policy of cautious cooperation with 
the Wazzani zawiya while using the good offices of the 
sharif-s of Ouezzane to obtain the submission of political 
dissidents (138) . The death of Sidi AIT marked a turning 
point in Mawlay Sulayman's relations with this zawiya. The 
contest over the succession between SfdrcAli's sons offered 
the Makhzen a golden opportunity to reduce the power of a 
religious group whose open interference in the political 
arena twenty years before had threatened the ^ Alawid 
dynasty itself.
0 ^
Sidi All b. Ahmad left two candidates for his
— «•» csuccession, Sidi al-Tuhami (d.1825) and SIdr al- Arbi (d.
1850). During their father's lifetime they assumed dif­
ferent roles within the zawiya. The eldest, Sidi al-
Tuhami, had developed strong ties with the urban notables,
c — cthe alim-s, and the Sultan's entourage. Sidi al- Arbi,
on the other hand, was used by his father to settle dis­
putes among tribes and enjoyed, consequently, the sympathy 
of the rural notables and of the far distant regions on 
Morocco's eastern and south-eastern borders (139). In the 
succession dispute, Mawlay Sulayman openly sided with Sidi 
al-Tuhami. He wrote to the notables of the country urging 
them to recognize Sidi al-Tuhami as the legitimate heir of
(137) Among these were: al-Ghaz! b.Salama who escaped the prison of 
Mehdia , Sulayman b.al-Qurshf, and Ibn Khadda al-SharqT; cf.al- 
pucayf, pp.313,316-317, 340.
(138) In 1797, Sidf caIi b. Aljmad succeeded in a joint mission with some 
calim-s of Fes, in bringing about the submission of cAbd al-Rahmah 
b. Nasir; cf.al-puCayf, pp.367-368.
(139) A.al-Wazzani, al-Rawi al-munlf ,11,p.66; Ibn Hamza al-MiknSsi, al- 
Kawkab al-ascad, pp.185-187.
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his father's baraka (140). Eminent calim-s, such as 
Hamdun b.al-Haj and Sulayman al-Hawwat, also supported 
al-Tuhaml's candidature (141). The sympathy of common 
people, however, as well as that of the adepts of the 
zawiya in general, went primarily to Sfdf al-CArbf (142) .
The history of the Wazzaniya religious order during 
the second decade of the nineteenth century was characteri 
zed by acute rivalry between the two sons of Sfdf All 
over the leadership of the zawiya. On more than one 
occasion Mawlay Sulayman was asked to mediate between Sid!
c
al-Tuhami and S!d! al- Arbi. Replying to a complaint by
the former, Mawlay Sulayman confirmed once more his parti-
c —ality in the conflict. He asserted that Sfd! All b.
Ahmad had chosen S!d! al-Tuhami as his successor and
Q
demanded that S!d! al- Arbi should not interfere anymore
in the affairs of the zawiya (143) . However, Mawlay
— cSulayman saw no way of preventing Sfdf al- Arbi from
— creceiving visitors and ziyara-s. "Had Sfdf AIT left one
thousand sons", wrote Mawlay Sulayman, "all would receive
their share of the ziyara-s without causing any harm to
each other"(144).
(140) A.al-Wazzanf, al-Rawd al-munif, II,p.66; see also letter from 
Mawlay Sulayman to Sfdl al-Tuhami supporting his candidature in 
Ms.K.1264, pp.361-365 (appendix 51).
(141) Al-Miknasf, al-Kawkab al-asCad, pp. 191-218; A.al-Wazzanf, al- 
Ravd al-munif, II,p..48.
(142) A. Barman!, Tafrliyat al- adhan wa al-masamic , Ms K 650, BGR, p.
1-Ar 9 ( 1  - - I
(143) Letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to Sid! al-Tuhami, no date, in al- 
Rawd al-munif, II,p.48, in which Mawlay Sulayman confirmed the 
legitimacy of his succession to the leadership of the zawiya 
(appendix 52) i
(144) Ibid.
131.
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At one time coexistence between the two brothers
cbecame impossible. Sfdf al- Arbi was finally obliged to 
abandon the mother zawiya to his brother and settle at 
Tetouan (145). After the death of Sfdl al-Tuhami in 1825 
the leadership of the zawiya was assumed by his son al- 
Tahar. It was only in 1840, when SfdT al-Tahar died, that 
the zawiya was again united under the leadership of Sidi 
al-CArbi.
Ultimately, Mawlay Sulayman failed to weaken the 
Wazzani zawiya by supporting one brother against the other. 
His policy towards the zawiya during the second decade of 
the nineteenth century served only to antagonize Sidi al- 
Arbi and the rural groups that were supporting him. In
C —fact, Sidi al- Arbi could never forgive Mawlay Sulayman's 
interference in the internal affairs of the zawiya (146).
He was to play a leading role in the Fes rebellion of 1820- 
1822 .
D - The Darqawiya
With the foundation of this new tarXqa during the second 
half of the eighteenth century, Mawlay al-CArbi al-Darqawi 
(1737-1823) intended to breathe a new life into the 
Shadhili doctrine, at a time when existing religious 
orders became almost exclusively preoccupied with worldly
(145) Al-Zayanf, Tufrfat al-nubaha3, p.169.
(146) This interference in the internal affairs of the zawiya extended 
also to marriage alliances. In 1802, Mawlay Sulayman married 
one of his sons to a Wazzani sharlfa in spite of the opposition 
manifested by the sharlf-s of Ouezzane (al-Qucayf, p.422). In 
1815, Mawlay Sulayman also obliged Sidi" al-CArbi to ally with 
the maraboutic family of Awlad al-Majdhub of Masmouda, tradition- 
aly held in contanpt by the sharrf-s of Ouezzane (al-Rawd al- 
munif, II, pp.40-42).
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interests. Favoured by the sharifdom of its founder, the 
Darqawiya succeeded , within a few decades, in becoming 
one of the most important Sufi orders of the Maghrib.
_ c c
In fact, it was the shaykh of Mawlay al- Arbi, Alf
al-Jamal (d.1779), who paved the way for the emergence of
this new tariqa. In his works, we find the basic ideas
c „advocated later on by his disciple. Mawlay al- Arbi's 
contribution resided in the popularization of his master's 
principles (147).
The doctrine of the Darqawi tarlqa is based on the 
curbing of human passions and self humiliation as a means 
of rising above worldly attractions. The murfd should 
detach himself from the material world in order to con­
centrate on the path of Goc}. This detachment (al-tajrid)
(148) which involves both body and mind, should lead man 
to a state of fana°, or complete dissolution in God. In 
order to defeat man's temptations, the tarlqa advocated 
"the breaking of the custom" (kharq al- ada), whereby its
Q
adepts were to wear patched garments (al-muraqqa a), prac­
tice mendicancy and lead an unconventional life (149) .
Q
"The curbing of temptations", wrote Mawlay al- Arbf, "leads 
man to an authentic knowledge of God, dissipates his doubts 
and puts him nearer to the Divine presence"(150).
The Darqawi tarIqa accorded great importance to dhikr
_ c
sessions and the practice of the sama as a means of
C —achieving ecstasy. Orthodox alim-s condemned these prac­
tices and Mawlay Sulayman sought to attack such detestable 
innovations at every opportunity.
(147) Compare al-Yawaqlt al-hisan by CAir al-Jamal (Ms.D.1741,BGR) to 
Mawlay al-cArbr al-Darqawi's RasaPil (lith., Fes, 1901) and his 
al-Mudhakara al-qalbiya (Ms.D. 1736, BGR) .
(148) The tajrld means detachment from both sensual and moral preoccupa­
tions in order to concentrate on God. A complete detachment sup­
poses the abandonment to all means of livelihood and the wearing 
of al-muraqqaCa; cf. al-Tayyib b. Kir an, Sharh al-hikam al-catcPiya
p.6.
(149) Mawlay al-CArbi al-Darqawi, Rasa3il, Ms K 3095, BGR, p.-79.
(150) Ibid., p.68.
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c —The opposition of orthodox alim-s did not, however, 
prevent the Darqawi tariqa from spreading rapidly, parti­
cularly among the rural populations and the lower urban 
classes. The sharifdom of the founder facilitated this 
rapid expansion. During the latter part of the eighteenth 
century and the early nineteenth century, the Darqawi 
tariga rapidly replaced the Nasiriya order among the 
Sanhaja Berbers of the Fazaz. Ibn al-Ghazi, leader of 
the Zemmour confederation, was a devout disciple of the 
Mawlay al- Arbi and his successors adhered to the Darqawi 
order. In Algeria, the zawiya became so powerful at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century that it posed a serious 
political threat to the Turkish rulers there.
— cDespite this success, Mawlay al- Arbi felt uneasy
c —about the resistance of the alim-s and the upper classes 
to his teachings. The unorthodoxy of some practices by 
the Darqawi-s and the advocacy of pauperism discouraged
C —many alim-s and wealthy townsmen from joining the new 
order (151) . When the zawiya was subjected to Makhzen 
repression during the early years of Mawlay Sulayman's 
reign, the alim-s usually sided with the Makhzen (152).
To overcome these difficulties, Mawlay al- Arbi eventually 
deemed it necessary to adopt a different approach towards 
the khassa, particularly by providing more flexible criteria 
for recruitment.
These concessions were best illustrated by the case
_ _  Q
of Muhammad al-Harraq (d.1845), an eminent alim and preach­
er at the great mosque of Tetouan, who was accepted into
Q
the order without being required to wear the muraqqa a or 
practice mendicancy (153).
(151) The author of Tarlkh Titwan affirmed that among the Darqawi 
adepts in Tetouan, there were no scholars "which shows that the 
Calim-s of Tetouan and its faqih-s during that period were not 
in favour of Sufism and ascetic life"; cf. Dawud, al-Nur al-
barraq fi tarjamat alrshaykh Muframnad al-fjarraq, Tdtouan, 1968, p. 31.
(152) Muharrmad al-Makudi, al-Irshad wa al-tibyan, pp. 199-223; Dawud,
III, pp.206-223.
(153) Dawud, al-Nur al-barraq, p.21.
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_ c
For Mawlay al- Arbi, the presence of an eminent 
calim within the order became even more important after 
the death of his two lieutenants, Ahmad b. Ajiba (d.1809)
Q
and Muhammad al-Buzidf (d.1813). An alim such as Muhammad
_ cal-Harraq would, according to Mawlay al- Arbi, defend the
tariga against its ideological detractors and improve its 
image in the eyes of the intellectual circles (154). 
Muhammad al-Harraq seemed to fulfill all the necessary
Q
requirements. He was at the same time alim, sharif, a 
respected townsman, and he maintained good relations with 
Makhzen officials.
Al-Harraq engaged the tariga upon a new direction.
He repudiated the Darqawi principles of humility and 
pauperism and maintained cordial contacts with the Makhzen. 
This new orientation allowed the Darqawi order to con­
solidate its position within the urban upper society and 
helped, at the same time, to put an end to the persecution 
of Darqawi-s by the Makhzen. Experience had convinced 
the founder of the tarTqa that his order could not develop
C —while subjected to attacks from the alim-s and repression 
by the Makhzen.
On the accession of Mawlay Sulayman to the throne in 
1792, the Darqawi zawiya was hardly significant as a 
religious group. Unlike the Wazzani and Sharqawi zawiya-s 
it did not take any part in the dynastic crisis of 1790's. 
Nevertheless, in a relatively short period of time, Mawlay 
al- ArbT al-Darqawf succeeded in spreading the word of his 
tariga even beyond the national borders. This rapid ex­
pansion, particularly in the countryside, is usually as­
cribed to the simplicity of its teachings and its exalta­
tion of poverty, which made its message similar to the way 
of life of the mass of people.
(154) Ibid., p.26.
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It was precisely this popular appeal of the tariga 
which raised the apprehensions of the Makhzen. When 
Darqawi teachings first made their appearance in north­
ern Morocco during the 1790's, Makhzen authorities were 
clearly determined to stamp out this subversive order. 
Mawlay Sulayman's governor at Tetouan, al-SarTdT, 
launched a campaign against adepts of the tariga in 1795
C —and put Ahmad b. Ajlba — an eminent disciple of Mawlay
c — cal- Arbi al-Darqawi—  in prison (155). Ibn Ajlba and
his imprisoned companions were accused by the authori­
ties of heterodox Sufi practices, mingling with women,
unconventional dress and ecstatic dances (156) . Ahmad
c *b. AjTba was ordered by the governor of Tetouan to
0
abandon his muragqa a and return to his normal teaching 
activities, but his Sufi convictions remained unshakable. 
Mawlay Sulayman himself was informed of Ibn CAjTba's case 
His order to the governor was categoric : "if he does 
not return to his former state, put him in chains and send 
him to me"(157).
0
While in prison, Ibn Ajlba was visited by a delega­
tion of Darqawi-s who came from other parts of the country. 
They were also arrested and imprisoned and asked to abandon 
their Sufi practices (158). At the same time, the branch 
of the zawiya at Tetouan was closed. In the face of this
(155) Ahmad b.CAjlba was a calim before he was converted to the Darqawi 
tariga around 1793. After he completed his religious education at 
Fes, he returned to Tetouan in order to devote himself to the 
teaching of religious sciences. He produced numerous works dealing 
mainly with Sufism. His conversion to the Darqawi tariga was a 
great shock to Tetouani society. He liquidated all his property and 
turned into a wandering mystic wearing the muraggaca, walking bare­
footed and sleeping in the street. Cf. his Fahrasa, Ms.D. 1845,BGR; 
M.al-MuCaskarf, Kanz al-asrar, Ms.K.2841,BGR; Dawud, III, pp.206- 
233; J.L.Michon, L'autobiographie (fahrasa) du soufi marocain Ahmad 
IbncAjiba (1747-1809) , Leiden, 1969.
(156) Al-Makudi, pp.206,210, 233-234; Dawud, III, p.219.
(157) J.L.Michon, p.115; Dawud, III, p.210. _
(158) Among the emprisoned visitors figured Muhammad al-Makudi, author of 
al-Irshad wa al-tibyan, which relates the suffering of the Darqawi-s 
at Tetouan.
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fierce repression, Mawlay al-CArbr could do nothing but 
exhort his adepts in Tetouan to remain faithful to their 
principles and wait for the end of the storm (159) .
For the Makhzen the Darqawi-s threatened not only 
public tranquility but also the moral values of the khassa. 
In Tetouan, they met with the opposition of all categories
Q
of the urban elite: notables, alim-s and sharIf-s (160) . 
There is no doubt that the hostility of the upper urban 
society to the ascetic principles of the t;arXga was a 
major obstacle to its success in the urban milieu and 
deprived it, consequently, of any solid support in its 
moment of adversity.
The immediate result of this repressive campaign was
„ c —the adoption of new tactics by Mawlay al- Arbi al-DarqawX.
The new plan consisted in withdrawing his disciples from 
towns where they attracted the attention of Makhzen authori­
ties too easily, to concentrate on the countryside and 
neighbouring Algerian territory. Thus, the head of the 
northern branch of the zawiya, Muhammad al-BuzTdi*, was
ordered to take refuge at Tlemcen where he was joined by a
— c — cal-Hashmi b. Ajlba, brother of Aljmad b. Ajlba. After he
cwas freed in 179 5-1796, Ahmad b. Ajiba refused to resume 
his teaching activities and preferred, instead, to follow 
the advice of his shaykh and settle in his native tribe of 
Anjra (161). This new tactic bore fruits within a short 
period of time. In less than ten years, the Darqawi-s 
became so powerful in western Algeria that they destabilized 
Turkish rule in that area. Realizing his inability to stop 
the spread of the Darqawiya order, Mawlay Sulayman then 
tried not to antagonize it.
(159) Cf. letters fran Mawlay al-CArbl* to his followers in Tetouan in 
Ms.D.1856, BGR, pp.254-270.
(160) Dawud, III, p.213.On the hostility of the Wazzani-s, cf.Ibn CAjXba's 
Fahrasa, p. 38. The Raysuni sharif-s of Tetouan were also hostile 
to the Darqawi-s and approved Makhzen repression. Sulayman al- 
Hawwat was among the few to raise his voice against the persecution 
of the Darqawi-s. Cf.al-Mashraff, al-Husam, p.451.
(161) Dawud, III, p.210.
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The unexpectedly rapid success of the Darqawiya called 
forth a more conciliatory attitude on the Makhzen's part. 
The spread of the tarac?a into some of the most uncontrol­
lable regions (the Jbala and eastern provinces) which were 
also considered as thughur (points of confrontation with
the enemy) induced Mawlay Sulayman to improve his relations 
— cwith Mawlay al- Arbi and seek his cooperation. By 1797,
two years after the repressive campaign of Tetouan, there
were indications that relations between the two sides were
— cbeginning to improve. During that year, Mawlay al- ArbT
was able to intercede before Mawlay Sulayman and obtain the
release of an imprisoned gap id (162). In return, Mawlay
Sulayman requested the good offices of the Darqawi shaykh
— cin his differences with Mawlay Maslama. Mawlay al- Arbi was 
asked in October 1797 to proceed to Algeria and arrange for 
Mawlay Sulayman's brother to return to Morocco (163).
In 1805, the prospects of cooperation between the two
csides appeared so encouraging that Mawlay al- Arbi thought 
of using his spiritual influence in western Algeria to 
bring about the annexation of Tlemcen to Morocco. Follow­
ing the repression of Darqawi adepts by the Bey of Oran, a 
disciple of Mawlay al-cArbi, CAbd al-Qadir b.al-Sharif, 
decided to lead a rebellion against the ruling Turks in the 
summer of 1805. Weakened by a severe famine and an un­
stable internal situation, the Algerian government proved 
to be incapable of putting the rebellion down. Ibn al- 
Sharff succeeded in besieging Oran from all sides, except 
from the sea through which the town received its supplies 
(164). The Algerian Turks were so helpless that the Dey 
decided to call upon Mawlay Sulayman for assistance. Ibn 
al-Sharif's rebellion, the Dey stated in a letter to Mawlay
(162) Al-DuCayf, p.364.
(163) Cf. letter frcm Mawlay cAbd al-Salam, the Sultan's brother, to 
Mawlay al-cArbi al-Darqawi, dated 22 Rabic II, 1212/14 Oct.,1797 
in al-Fasf al-Fihri, Qabllat BanX Zarwal, Rabat, 1962, p. 45.
(164) Cf. story of Ibn al-Sharif's rebellion in al-Zayahf, al-Rawfla,fol. 
181-182; Ibn al-AQraj al-Sulaymani*, Zubdat al-tarrkh, vol.Ill,pp. 
124-127; an anonymous Taqyld on the Darq5wi uprising in Western 
Algeria, Ms. D 1492, BGR.
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Sulayman, was nothing more than the tail of a snake whose
head lay in Morocco. To prove his good disposition, Mawlay
— c _ —Sulayman sent Mawlay al- Arbi al-Darqawi on a mission to
Tlemcen with the aim of re-establishing peace between Ibn 
al-Sharif and the Bey of Oran (165) .
To Mawlay Sulayman's great surprise, the Darqawi 
shaykh returned from Tlemcen with a written bayca from 
Ibn al-Sharif and a delegation of notables to present their 
allegiance to the Sultan of Morocco (166) . Mawlay Sulayman 
was by no means ready to involve himself in an adventure 
the outcome of which was still not clear. vThe people of Tlemcen 
were well received", wrote al-Salawr to the British consul 
who asked for clarification, "but were ordered by His 
Majesty to return to their country and their rulers, 
because he said, it is illegal for us to set one Muslim 
against another"(167). On the other hand, Mawlay Sulayman 
did not want to hurt Mawlay al-cArbi's feelings. He praised 
his salutary efforts and promised him that as soon as the 
winter was over, he would go in person to Tlemcen in order 
to receive the allegiance of Ibn al-SharTf and his follow­
ers (168). At the same time, he sent his brother Mawlay 
Musa with a contingent to Oujda so as to prevent his sub­
jects from getting involved in Algerian affairs (169) and 
dispatched the qa-*id of the Oudaya army to Tlemcen in order
to come between Ibn al-SharTf's followers and the Turks, 
c —Ayyad Ludiyyi was instructed to remain in Algeria until
the Bey had taken firm control of the region (170) . The
— cpromises given by the Sultan to Mawlay al- Arbi were, ap­
parently, nothing more than a manoeuvre intended to put off
(165) Cf. letter fran Mawlay Sulayman to Mawlay al-cArbi dated 16 Jumada 
11,1220 in al-Fasr al-Fihri, Qabilat, pp.44-45. Cf.also F.0.52/13, 
10 March,1805.
(166) This bay°a was met with joy and festivities in Morocco; cf .al- 
DuCayf, p.444; Sulayman al-Hawwat, Diwan, pp.156-157.
(167) F.0.174/284, letter fran al-Salawf to Matra, dated 13 Jumada I, 
1220/9 Aug.,1805.
(168) Cf.two letters fran Mawlay Sulayman to Mawlay al-cArbr al-Darqawi* 
in al-Fasi al-Fihri, Qabilat, pp.44-45.
(169) F.0.174/284, letter mentioned in note 167 above.
(170) Al-Zayahr, al-Raw^a, fol.182.
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the head of the Darqawiya order.
One of the resons behind Mawlay Sulayman's refusal to 
acceed to the wishes of Mawlay al-CArbI was certainly his 
reluctance to bring under his control a turbulent region 
from which subversion could easily spread to other parts 
of his kingdom. Even the existence of an independent 
Darqawi republic on his eastern borders would have consti­
tuted a serious threat to the eastern provinces which had 
only been recovered from the Algerian Turks in 1798 (171) . 
The annexation of Tlemcen, besides the difficulties it would 
have raised with the Dey of Algiers, would certainly have 
placed Mawlay Sulayman in debt to the shaykh of the : 
Darqawiya order and would have increased the power of this 
most uncontrollable religious group. Ot'her Considerations 
^resulting from the European wars, weighed in favour of a 
cautious decision on Mawlay Sulayman's part. Moroccan 
fears of a European invasion increased with the break-down 
of the Peace of Amiens and the resumption of hostilities in 
1804. Any military adventure on the eastern borders would 
have been most undesirable at a time when the Makhzen was 
paying particular attention to the fortification of the 
northern ports and even cherishing the hope of recovering 
the fortress of Ceuta from Spanish control (172).
_ r« q
Mawlay al- Arbi's deception over the bay a of Tlemcen 
was followed by a certain coolness in relations between 
the zawiya and Mawlay Sulayman. This tendency was rein­
forced by Mawlay Sulayman's attacks on heterodox Sufi 
practices and his sympathy with Wahhabi reformist ideas 
(173). Contact between the two sides, however, was not
completely lost. In 1812, Mawlay Sulayman agreed to grant
c — -*•refuge to Abd al-Qadir b. al-Sharif and promised to
receive him as hospitably as he had received al-TijanT in
(171) Al-l?uCayf, p.380.
(172) Cf.M. El Mansour,"Mawlay Sulayman's Endeavours to Recover Ceuta ' 
(in Arabic), Majallat Kulliyat al-Adab, Rabat, V-VI (1979) , pp. 
29-44.
(173) Mawlay Sulayman's essay on the samac was written in 1806,and was 
designed to discredit such practices which concerned the Darqawi-s 
in the first place.
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1799 (174). The following year, the people of Tlemcen
and Oran sent again a delegation to Meknes in order to
c -*renew their bay a to Mawlay Sulayman (17 5) . Despite the
popular enthusiasm for this event (176), Mawlay Sulayman
seemed as determined as ever not to compromise himself in
any such adventure. Was this refusal motivated by similar
considerations to those behind the rejection of the pro-
Q
ferred bay a in 1805, or was it motivated by the increas­
ing difficulties which faced the Makhzen during the last 
decade of Mawlay Sulayman's reign ?
Whatever the answer, relations between Mawlay Sulayman 
and the Darqawi zawiya deteriorated steadily during the 
second decade of the nineteenth century. This deteriora­
tion was intimately linked to the progress of the Darqawiya 
among the Sanhaja Berbers of the Zemmour and the Middle 
Atlas. Ibn al-Ghazi, leader of the Zemmour and a devoted 
adept of the Darqawi tariga,"never acted except on the 
advice of his shaykh”(177). Abu Bakr Amhawish also 
maintained cordial relations with Mawlay al-cArbF and 
sympathized with his teachings. This implantation of the 
Darqawi tariga among the troublesome Berber tribes led to 
greater involvement of Mawlay al-CArbr in the political 
affairs of the country. In 1820, the Darqawi shaykh, for whom 
contempt for temporal power and worldly attractions consti­
tuted a basic principle, figured among the most militant 
elements in the Fes rebellion.
Meanwhile, however, the emergence after 1818 of the 
new tendency within the tarlqa, represented by al-Harraq, 
inaugurated a new era in the relations between the 
Makhzen and the Darqawi zawiya. Owing to his urban origin
(174) Letter fran Mawlay Sulayman to the governor of Fes dated 16 Jumada 
I, 1227/28 May, 1812, in Mic. 12/67, HPMD, Fes, 1978.
(175) CCC, vol. 24, 26 May, 1813; al-puCayf, p.499.
(176) Ibid. Public rejoicing rejoicing was reported at Tangier and Rabat.
(177) Al-Zayani, Tuhfat al-nubaha3, p.195.
330
al-Harraq maintained excellent relations with the Makhzen 
and succeeded in gaining over disciples from among govern­
ment officials such as Mawlay cAbd al-Rahman's minister,
c —Muhammad al- Amrawf, and this latter's katib, the author
of al-Ibtisam (178). This new tendency manifested its
independence during the Fes rebellion when al-Harraq
c - —refused to sign the bay a proclaiming Mawlay Ibrahim
despite the imprisonment of his shaykh by Mawlay Sulayman
during the whole period of the rebellion (179) .
E - The Tijaniya
One of the characteristics of Moroccan Sufism since the 
fifteenth century had been its national orientation under 
the influence of al-JazulT's teachings. Eastern Sufi 
schools, such as the Qadiriya, were progressively replaced 
by Jazuli oriented ^axigs^s. The introduction into Morocco 
of a new tarlqa by Ajimad al-TijanT (d.1815) was bound to 
provoke reactions from the local zawiya-s against this 
intruder who claimed pre-eminence over all other Sufi Poles 
(qutb-s).
Before he founded his ^arTqa at Ain Madi (Algeria) in 
1782, Ahmad al-Tijanl had been a disciple of many tariqa-s 
including the Wazzaniya, the Darqawiya and the Nasiriya. 
None of these tarTqa-s had satisfied his aspirations, how­
ever. "We have had several shaykh-s", he wrote, "but none 
was of any help to us. Our teacher and spiritual reference 
for this tarlqa is our Lord Muhammad himself"(180).
(178) Dawud, al-Nur al-barraq, pp. 66-68; al-Hajwf*, Ikhti?ar al-Ibtisam, 
p.355.
(179) Al-Tuhami al-Wazzani*, al-Zawiya,Tetouan, 1942, pp. 199, 201.
(180) M. b.al-Mushrl, Rawd al-muhibb al-fanl fi ma talaqqayriahu min Abi 
al—cAbbas al-Tijani, Ms D 2028, BGR, p. 236.
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Al-TijanT claimed that it was from the Prophet that 
he received the order to found his own tariga which he 
preferred to call "Muhammadiya". The litanies he pre­
scribed to his adepts were supposed to be dictated by 
the Prophet Muhammad with whom al-TijanT was able to com­
municate while awake (181). Al-Tijani ascribed to his 
order special privileges. Not only he claimed to be the 
"seal of saints" (khatim al-awliya^), but also the "Pole 
of Poles" (qutb al-aqtab), the highest spiritual power of 
his time (182). Moreover, al-Tijani guaranteed to his 
followers a position superior to that of the greatest 
saints and which could normally be attained only by the 
Prophet's companions (183).
The claim that the f-arTqa1 s teachings were received 
directly from the Prophet led al-Tijani to impose special 
restrictions on his adepts. A disciple of al-TijanT could 
not attach himself to a second tariga "because true love 
cannot be divided" (184) , nor could he give up this path 
and turn to an alternative, since this would mean turning 
away from the Messenger of God himself (185). The Tijani-s 
were consequently forbidden to visit other saints, whether 
dead or alive (186).
Unlike the Darqawiya, the Tijani tariga did not ad*r 
vocate privation, pauperism and the curbing of man's 
passions. Ahmad al-Tijani, we are told by his adepts, 
lived in luxury "wearing the best of clothes and riding 
the best of mounts"(187). The Prophet is supposed to have 
ordered al-TijanT to adhere to this tariga "without any 
need for retreat or isolation"(188). Al-Tijani in fact had
(181) Abun Nasr, The Tijaniyya, London, 1965, p. 38.
(182) Mutianmad Ganndn, Raf c al-citab ^ airman tar aka al-ziyara min al-ashab. 
Ms K 2028, BGR, p. 342 ^ Abun Nasr, The Tijaniyya, p. 28.
(183) Tijani Letters, p.169.
(184) Muljanmad Gannuh, Rafc al-citab, p.345.
(185) Ibid., p.338.
(186) Tijani Letters, p.169; cunar al-Fawti, Suyuf al-SaCfd, p.21.
(187) Muljanmad Balminu, Taqyid, p. 117.
(188) cumar al-Fawti", Suyuf al-Sacjd, p.76.
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the reputation of being able to ensure wealth for his 
adepts in this world and salvation in the life to come
(189). This incited many wealthy people to join the tariga 
and thus contributed to the development of the order into 
an aristocratic congregation.
The spread of the Tijani -tarfqa was hindered by a 
number of factors. The non-sharif origin of A£imad al- 
Tijani constituted a handicap in a country where sharifdom 
had become a vital criterion of legitimacy. Ahmad al- 
Tijanf attempted to forge a sharifian lineage for himself 
but without success (190) . The repudiation of the Shadhili 
doctrine was another obstacle which faced the Tijani order 
This latter represented in fact an attack on the very 
principle of popular Moroccan Islam which was based on the 
cult of saints. Finally, the opposition of existing 
zawiya-s must have slowed down the spread of the Tijani 
order. Ahmad al-Tijani's ideas inevitably antagonized these 
zawiya-s when he affirmed that the Tijaniya was derived 
directly from the Prophet and that it was not only superior 
to all f-ariqa-s, but also the seal which abrogated all 
other Sufi paths (191).
The Tijani order recruited its adepts from among the 
non-sharff urban kha?ga: Makhzen officials, merchants and
influential families. "Most of his adepts", wrote al-cArbf 
al-Mashraff, "are merchants and people of wealth" (192) . This 
tariqa counted also many of adepts from among the Bildiyyin 
of Fes who happened to control a sizable share of Fasi 
economic power, particularly in the commercial field. There
(189) Abun Nasr, The Tijaniyya, p.47.
(190) Al-Tijani's alleged sharifdcm is based on a supposed personal con­
firmation by the Prophet but rests on no objective evidence; cf.
Ibn al-Mushrf, Raw^ al-muhibb,p. 313. Al-Tijahf attempted by all 
means to gain over the sharif-s, or at least temporize their hosti­
lity. He even wrote an essay in the defence of the holy lineage 
entitled "Nu§rat al-shurafa f f al-radd cala ahl al-jafa", Ms.K. 
1574, BGR, pp1517-556.
(191) Mu^ airmad Gannuh, al-Durr al-mandhum, Ms D 2135, BGR, p. 276.
(192) Al-cArbi al-Mashraff, Nuzhat al-ab$ar, p.431.
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is no doubt that the benevolent attitude manifested by 
Mawlay Sulayman towards Ahmad al-TijanT encouraged many 
people from Makhzen circles to join this religious order. 
For the Makhzen this brotherhood seemed to offer a valu­
able opportunity to counter-balance the preponderant in­
fluence of popularly based zawiya-s which were far less 
easy to control than a zawiya based among the urban elite.
When Ahmad al-Tijanl* fled the persecution of the 
Algerian Turks in 1798 he chose to reside in Fes where he 
was offered a most hospitable reception by Mawlay Sulayman . 
He was given a magnificent house which cost, according to 
al-ZayanT, 20,000 mithqal-s (193) and a regular allowance 
which largely covered his needs. Later on, he was assisted 
with the building of his zawiya and offered protection 
against the people of Fes who attempted to obstruct 
construction (194).
Mawlay Sulayman seems to have been so impressed with 
the piety of al-Tijani*, his ascetism and his scholarship 
that he invited him to join his learned council which in-
(2
eluded the most eminent alim-s of the country (195) . This 
benevolence does not, however, mean that Mawlay Sulayman 
shared the ideological tenets of the Tijaniya. Refuge and 
hospitality were traditionally granted by Moroccan sultans 
to all those who fled political or religious persecution
(196). The hostility of al-Tijanf to the cult of saints 
and the celebration of mawsim-s (197) was certainly ap­
preciated by Mawlay Sulayman whose opposition to heterodox 
practices has been already underlined. However, contrary 
to claims by Tijani sources, Mawlay Sulayman never considered
(193) Al-Zayahi*, al-Rawla, fol.172.
(194) Abun Nasr, The Tijaniyya, p.20.
(195) Ibid., p.21.
(196) In 1812 Mawlay Sulayman manifested his readiness to receive Ibn al- 
Sharff, the Darqawi leader in Algeria, persecuted by the Turks.
(197) Balmihu, Taqyid, p.147.
343
joining the Tijani tarfqa (198). Ahmad al-Tijanf did, in 
fact, propose to him the Tijani wird, alleging that he had 
received a special message from the Prophet for "his son 
Sulayman" (199). Apparently, Mawlay Sulayman remained in­
sensible to this appeal. His joining of the Tijaniya would 
have been incompatible with his obedience to the Nasiri 
•fcarfqa whose strict observance of the Sunna coincided more 
with his orthodox tendencies. Shortly before his death, 
Mawlay SulaymSn still acknowledged his loyalty to the 
Nasiri tariga (200). Nonetheless, the Sultan must have 
thought about using this new ^ariqa to counteract the power 
of the Shadhili-sharifian zawiya-s.
The Calim-s manifested a different attitude towards 
the founder of the Tijani tariga. Ibn Kfran, the shaykh al- 
jamaca, is reported to have attacked him publicly r in the
meetings of the learned council (201). Another contempo-
c c___________________ ^rary alim, Ahmad b. Abd al-Salam Bannam, considered the
allegation by the Tijani-s according to which the Prophet
attended their dhikr sessions in person as evidence of
"their absurdity, imbecility and ignorance"(202). Hamdun
b. al-Haj, on the contrary, maintained good relations with
Ahmad al-Tijanf (203) . An attempt was made by this latter
to recruit him into his order, but without success (204).
The sharlf-s and the zawiya-s could only adopt a 
hostile attitude, the Tijaniya being a rebellion against 
both sharifian ideology and the Shadhili Sufi school from
(198) Abun Nasr, The Tijaniyya,p.20.
(199) Letter fran Aj^ mad al-Tijanf to Mawlay Sulayman inviting him to 
join his order, no date, in TijSni Letters, pp.159-160.
(200) Cf. Ijaza by Mawlay Sulayman to Ahmad b. al-Nadf, 15 Shawwal, 1236/
16 July, 1821, authorizing him to recite the Nasiri wird, in D.A.R. 
Cf. also A.al-Kattanf, Fihris,II, p.331.
(201) Abun Nasr, The Tijaniyya, p.21.
(202) A. Bannanf, Tafrliyat al-adhan, p. 186.
(203) al-Hafnawf, Tacrif al-khalai bi rijal al-salaf, Algiers, 1906, p. 37.
(204) A letter fran Ahmad al-Tijanf to fjamdun b. al-Ha j, no date, in 
al-Tijanl, Tijani Letters, Ms K 2815, BGR, pp. 158-159.
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which almost all Maghribi ^ariqa-s derived. Indeed, al- 
Tijani* condemned the cult of saints, the visitation of 
their shrines and the celebration of mawsim-s, all funda­
mental traditions of Moroccan Islam. This explains the 
little success encountered by his order in Fes where the 
visitation of the shrine of Mawlay Idris could not be 
dispensed with. So attached were the Fasi-s to this saint 
that al-Tijani was obliged to compromise on this particular 
issue (205) .
Nor did the Shadhili zawiya-s accept the allegation 
by al-Tijani” about the supremacy of his tariga. Al-Tijani* 
claimed, in fact, that his tariqa automatically abrogated 
all previous ones, in the same way Islam superseded all 
previous religions (206). He also affirmed that his adepts 
held before God a position higher than that of the most 
eminent saints (207) . This placed him in direct confronta­
tion with the traditional tariqa-s the wird-s of which he 
had adopted and abandoned.
At one time the Fasi milieu had become so inimical that 
Ahmad al-Tijanl* considered emigrating to the Arab East(208). 
Only the protection of the Makhzen enabled him to overcome 
his difficulties. The friendliness of the Sultan induced, 
no doubt, many members of the Makhzen to join the Tijaniya. 
One of Mawlay Sulayman's sons, Mawlay Abd al-Salam, adopted 
this tariga (209), as well as Akansus who was counted among 
the closest collaborators of Mawlay Sulayman. Numerically, 
however, the Tijaniya was still insignificant when its 
founder died in 1815. Its importance, until then, resided 
more in the ideological challenge it posed for Moroccan 
religious groups than in its intrinsic power.
(205) In order to attract new recruits al-Tijani allowed sometimes his 
followers to visit this shrine; cf .al-Ruhuni, cumdat al-rawin,X, 
pp.147-148.
(206) Muhammad Gannun, al-Durr al-mandbum, p. 276.
(207) Letter fran Ahmad al-Tijanl to ?, in Tijani Letters, p.169.
(208) Abun Nasr, The Tijaniyya, p.21.
(209) Al-Fadiir , al-Durar al-bahiya, lith., Fes, 1895, vol. I, p. 177.
Another son of Mawlay Sulayman, Mawlay CA1I, openly attacked the 
Tijani far Iqa and the allegations made by its founder according to 
which he was the seal of sainthood. Cf. Muhammad b. cAzzuz, Kashf 
al-ran, Ms K 644, BGR, p. 233.
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CHAPTER VII
THE FES REBELLION (1820-1822) : THE TRADITIONALISTS1 REVENGE
The Fes rebellion of 1820-1822 represents the culmination 
of the socio-political crisis — latent for many years 
before - of Mawlay Sulayman's reign. This political up­
rising which led to the proclamation of a rival prince, 
was the outcome of Mawlay Sulayman's growing isolation 
as well as a result of adverse factors over which he had 
no control. By virtue of his tribal and religious poli­
cies, Mawlay Sulayman had deprived himself of reliable 
allies and made too many enemies. The Sultan's lack of a 
flexible and coherent tribal policy deprived him of 
important strategic allies and his religious ideas also 
alienated the religious groups. Lacking enough funds and 
a reliable army, Mawlay Sulayman could not possibly 
withstand the joint effects of desolating natural 
calamities and a humiliating military setback.
I - Gathering Storms
The Battle of Azrou (April 1811) is generally considered 
as a turning point in the reign of Mawlay Sulayman and 
the onset of a steady decline of his authority. However, 
the difficulties encountered by the Makhzen during the 
second decade of the nineteenth century were not solely 
the result of military failures. Experience proved that 
when the Makhzen disposed of enough income, a major 
military setback —  such as the one suffered in 1800—  
could easily be overcome. What made the situation in­
creasingly untenable for Mawlay Sulayman after 1811 were 
the financial difficulties that resulted from the fall
34« '
of maritime trade returns. The end of the Napoleonic wars 
in the Iberian Peninsula resulted in a decline of provision 
exports which, before 1814, went to the British, Spanish 
and Portuguese armies (1). To compensate for the consequent 
fall in Makhzen revenue, Mawlay Sulayman decided in 1815 to 
raise import duties for Moroccan Muslim merchants from 2.5% 
to 10% and, in February 1817, consented to major tariff 
reductions on some basic exports, thus inaugurating a new 
commercial policy. More important, however, were the natural 
calamities (famine of 1817-1818, plague of 1818-1820) which 
greatly affected Makhzen finances. These calamities also 
contributed to the deterioration of relations between the 
Makhzen and the tribes, as the latter were unable to 
honour their tax obligations, thus creating propitious 
conditions for the disruption of internal peace.
A - The Famine of 1817-1818
The crop failure of 1812 marked the end of agricultural
abundance which characterized the middle era of Mawlay 
Sulayman4s reign. Nonetheless, it was followed by three 
years of relatively good harvests which allowed peasants 
to reconstitute their reserves. The country was again
exposed to scarcity in 1816 as a result of a locust in­
vasion (2) .
It was during the early months of 1817 that the 
spectre of famine became certain. "The continuation of 
a desolating drought of which there are few examples in 
this country had thrown into consternation the African 
monarch and all his subjects", wrote de Lesseps in March 
1817 (3). " ... The inhabitants of every sex, age and
religion live in lamentations, fasting and prayers. The 
recent e*|j<irKnC€ of a scarcity which emptied the silos 
adds to their alarm"(4).
(1) Cf. above chapter III, pp. 167-168.
(2) OCC, vol.25, fol.29-33.
(3) OCC, vol.25, 24 March, 1817.
(4) Ibid.
34 7 '
The rise in cereal prices was enhanced during 
the spring of 1817 by Mawlay Sulayman's unfortunate 
decision to allow wheat exports to France. One month 
after the arrival in Rabat of French officials who were 
to supervise these exports, wheat prices rose by at least 
50%, reaching as much as 22 uqiya-s for the mudd, as 
compared With 2-4 uqiya-s in time of abundance (5) .
By September 1817 the mudd of wheat cost about 26 
uqiya-s (6). At that price, few people could afford to 
buy cereals. By the end of the year the Makhzen took the 
initiative, for the first time, of distributing free meals 
made up of herbs, roots and rice to indigent people (7). 
To relieve the sufferings of a starving population, 
European consuls also decided to import maize from 
Gibraltar to assist the needy inhabitants of Tangier(8). 
"Never Morocco offered a more distressing picture", 
wrote Sourdeau (9).
The drought continued in 1818. In February the 
mudd of wheat cost 22 uqiya-s at Rabat (10). "More than 
half the population lived on herbs", wrote Sourdeau, "as 
they could not afford the price of cereals" (11).
For the common people, the rise in cereal prices 
was intimately linked to the export concession made by 
the Sultan to the Christians. Mawlay Sulayman's decision 
was most unpopular among the urban population and in 
the inland provinces. Despite all precautions by the 
Makhzen to give the least publicity to the exportation 
of wheat, the news led to a general rise of prices, 
especially at Fes and Marrakech (12). Even wheat that
(5) Ibid., 12 April, 1817. Cf. chapter Illabove, pp. 99-100.
(6) Ibid., 29 Sept., 1817.
(7) CCC, vol.25, 13 Dec., 1817.
(8) OCC, vol.26, 19 Feb., 1818.
(9) Ibid.
(10) Ibid.
(11) Ibid.
(12) CCC, vol.25, letter from Ahmad b. M'barak to Sourdeau, 9 Qacda, 
1232 / 20 Sept., 1817.
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was loaded from Safi to Tangier for the relief of the 
northern provinces was taken by the common people to be 
part of the deal concluded with France (13). In Rabat 
"a population alarmed about its own existence" attacked 
the boats that came to load wheat (14). In September 
1817, the people of Fes remonstrated against the export 
of cereals and reminded Mawlay Sulayman of the promise 
he made in 1792 not to allow the sale of cereals, oil 
and wool to the Christians (15). The Sultan found him­
self compelled to order an immediate stoppage of exports, 
but could he dispense with his customs revenue at a time 
when the agriculture-based taxation system was in no 
position to provide the necessary funds (16)?
B - The Scourge of God : The Plague Epidemic of 
1818 - 1820.
The two year famine had already paved the way for the subsequent 
epidemic. This time, the plague attacked the country 
through the northern ports after the arrival of a number 
of returning pilgrims in May-June 1818. The outbreak 
of the malady was preceded by the arrival in Tangier 
of a British three masted ship from Alexandria. It was 
among the 4 30 pilgrims she had brought back that the 
first casualties occurred by the middle of June (17) .
This second epidemic was less violent in its nature 
and less devastating than the previous one in 1799-1800, 
although it lasted a little longer. Average daily estimates 
represented between one third and two thirds of those 
recorded in 1799-1800. This was partly due to the fact 
that the population afflicted in 1818 was less numerous.
The previous eighteen years had hardly been sufficient 
for the reconstitution of the population.
(13) Ibid.
(14) C C C , vol.25, 12 April, 1817.
(15) Ibid., 29 Sept., 1817.
(16) On the Sultan‘s caimercial policy after 1817 cf. pp. 169-170 above.
(17) CCC, vol.26, 18 June, 1818.
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During the year 1818 the plague remained confined 
to northern and eastern Morocco. Tangier lost 2,000 
souls during the first six months of the epidemic (18) . 
At Tetouan, death rates in 1818 remained moderate : 10 
to 20 per day as a maximum. It was in the spring of 
1819 that the epidemic reached its apex there, at a time 
when the south still remained free from the malady. In 
March, the number of deaths at Fes reached several 
hundreds per day. The British Health Agent reported 
that in Fes "people are employed from sunrise to sunset 
in burying the dead"(19). In April,their number was 
supposed to have reached 400 per day (20). At Tetouan, 
the number of victims daily fluctuated between 70 and 
100 (21).
The middle of 1819 constituted a turning point for 
the epidemic. In the north, it was everywhere on the 
decline. In some places, such as Tangier, Larache, Fes 
and Meknes, it had ceased entirely by September(22\ At 
this point the plague spread to the Tamesna and the 
southern provinces where it reached its apex in the . 
spring of 1820. In February 1820, there were about 200 
deaths per day at Mariakech. In March, the record figure 
of 900 per day was reached (23). In April, this number 
fell to 600 and continued to decline until the disease 
disappeared almost completely in July (24). With the 
end of the summer, the epidemic seemed to exhaust itself 
everywhere. By October, it still persisted at Agadir 
but that was to be the last sign of it (25) .
(18) CCC, vol.26, 28 Dec., 1818. Moroccan sources mention that Tangier 
lost 1/5 of its population during the whole epidemic (cf.cAbd al- 
Salam b. Suda, Itfraf al-mutali^ , events of the year 1233 AH.
(19) C.0.91/74, 8 April, 1819.
(20) Ibid., 10 May, 1819.
(21) Tetouani contemporary sources quoted by Dawud estimated the losses 
at the apex of the plague at 80 per day; cf. Dawud, III, p.249.
(22) C.0.91/74, 7 Oct., 1819.
(23) C.0.91/76, 24 March, 1820.
(24) Ibid., 28 July, 1820.
(25) Ibid., 6 Oct., 1820.
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The losses during the second plague of 1818-1820 were 
much smaller than those of the Great Plague of 1799- 
1800 as local estimates for the cities of Fes and 
Tetouan during the first and second epidemics 
show. In 1799-1800, the number of casualties at the 
height of the epidemic reached 2,500 per day according 
to the author of al-Ibtisam (26). In 1818-1820, the 
maximum at Fes never exceeded 300 per day according to 
the same source (27). Contemporary Tetouani sources 
affirm that the maximum daily losses in 1818-1820 
represented a little more than half of the 1799-1800 
maximum (80 deaths against 150) (28).
The Makhzen was greatly affected by the plague of 
1818-1820. Propitious conditions for social unrest 
resulting frcm the drought of 1817 were further enhanced. 
Contrary to the situation that prevailed during and after 
the Great Plague of 1799-1800 (firm control of the country 
by Mawlay Sulayman after the pacification was achieved, 
death of major political opponents, agricultural abundance 
after 1800), this second epidemic only aggravated the 
problems facing the Makhzen. The decrease in Makhzen 
revenues as a result of the drought which continued in 
1818 undermined its means of intervention and made it 
very difficult for Mawlay Sulayman to benefit from the 
inheritance of the plague victims as in 1800.
Makhzen income was also reduced by the interruption 
of commercial relations with most European countries. 
Between 1818 and 1821 Great Britain withdrew its consul 
general and suspended almost all contact with Morocco.
Even provisions for Gibraltar ceased to be drawn from 
Morocco (29). Spain also refused to receive in her ports 
ships arriving from Morocco (30). Only France attempted
(26) Al-Ibtisam, p.7.
(27) Ibid.
(28) Dawud, III, pp.234, 249.
(29) F.0.52/24, 23 Feb., 1823.
(30) OCC, vol.26, 2 and 6 October, 1818.
to encourage commercial exchange with Morocco during 
the 1818-1820 epidemic with the aim of restoring French 
presence in Morocco. On the whole, commercial contact 
with Europe was greatly reduced during these three years.
The army suffered equally from the plague. In 1819 
Mawlay Sulayman's military potential, at the time he 
confronted the Alt Oumalou, was greatly weakened by the 
epidemic. The army consisted then of a large number of 
new recruits. The losses from the disease were so signi­
ficant in 1818 that Mawlay Sulayman deemed it necessa­
ry to replace soldiers who perished in the plague by 
their adult sons (31). In 1819, the joint effects of 
the Zai'an defeat and the plague imposed further reorgani­
zation measures. The Oudaya were reinforced in August 
of the same year by the incorporation of two Arab tribes 
from the country adjacent to Fes (32) . At the same time 
MawlSy Sulayman decided to reorganize what remained of 
the army on the basis of an old system adopted by his 
father (33). Owing to the lack of the necessary 
financial means, however, Mawlay Sulayman proved in­
capable of ensuring an adequate reorganization of the 
army.
Plague when it coincides with the breakdown of 
order, as in 1819-1820, creates a certain psychological 
climate in which the image and authority of the ruling 
prince is seriously undermined (34). Epidemics were
(31) D.A.R., letter fran Mawlay Sulayman to the qaJid of the Oudaya 
dated 7 Mu^ iarram, 1234/6 Nov., 1818, concerning the replacement 
the deceased soldiers.
(32) D.A.R., letter from Mawlay Sulayman to the qa^id of the Oudaya 
dated 21 Shawwal, 1234/13 Aug., 1819, concerning the incorporation 
of Himyane and Oulad el-Haj into the Oudaya army.
(33) D.A.R., letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to the qlPid of the Oudaya 
dated 21 Shawwal, 1234/13 Aug., 1819, concerning the reorganization 
of the army after the end of the plague in the northern provinces.
(34) Biraben and Le Goff,”La peste du haut Moyen Age, p. 1498.
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commonly regarded as God's punishment for man's in­
creasing insubordination and an illustration of the 
divine anger (35). For the popular masses, however, 
the scapegoat for their bitterness tended to be the 
temporal power itself. The authorization granted by 
Mawlay Sulayman to France in 1817 to export wheat in 
the midst of a severe drought while "the population 
was alarmed about its own existence"(36), and his determina­
tion to dismantle the Moroccan navy during the same 
year, thus abandoning the jihad, could only be perceived 
as manifestations of a benevolent policy towards the 
enemies of Islam and the cause for God's anger. In 
the summer of 1817 the French consul reported that 
"the saints, or individuals who have a great influence 
on the people of towns and countryside, invoke God in 
their prayers to give them another king"(37). In 1819, 
while the plague was raging, Mawlay Sulayman confirmed, 
once again/ his hostility to the heterodox practices of 
the zawiya-s by prohibiting the celebration of mawsim-s, 
or religious fairs (38) . Conservative religious groups did not 
fail to point out what they considered as religious deviation on 
Mawlay Sulayman's part and accused him of Wahhabism in 1820 (39).
The conjunction of natural calamities and the imam's 
failure in his duties served to enhance the all-pervading 
pessimism and led people to draw a parallel between 
these calamities and the shortcomings of the temporal 
power (40). The general feeling of despair and helpless-
(35) Ibid.
(36) COC, vol.25, 12 April, 1817.
(37) Ibid., 20 Aug., 1817.
(38) Cf. extracts fron Mawlay Sulayman's khutba (1819) in al-cArbl al- 
Mashrafi, Sharh al-shamaqmaqiyya, unumbered pages.
(39) Muharrmd b. Idris al- cAmr5wr, Nafhat al-araj, Ms.Z.3866, R.L., 
p. 50.
(40) On such a parallel cf. reflections by Muframnad b. Hamza al-Miknasi 
quoted in cAbd Allah b. al-Tayyib al-Wazzani, al-Raw^ al-munlf , 
Ms.K.2304, BGR, II, fol.157-158:
i ^  I 0 JLJI j
, JkU J ,  i u  Lm J I • J L-JU I U J ,  UiJaJ I «
- * . .  . Y U  j l , C jX J I  J i l  L - U i  J - i
( written in 1821-1822 ).
«^aJ 1 LwLj L< j 
JkJI Jjkl jL . c L^I
4 j f - "  ^ )
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ness facilitated the emergence of mahdi-s (pretenders) 
in whom the common people hoped to find an alternative 
for a temporal power condemned by the divine providence. 
It was for the triumph of Islam that a charismatic 
figure such as Abu Bakr Amhawish led his men against the 
troops of the Makhzen in the midst of the 1818-1820 
plague (41).
Natural calamities tend also to favour popular 
religion and enhance the prestige of religious groups 
such as the sharTf-s and the zawiya-s. The fact that 
opposition to Mawlay Sulayman acquired a more accentu­
ated religious character after 1818 was not merely a 
fortuitous coincidence.
C- The Za’ian Defeat (May, 1819)
The undecisive character of the Battle of Azrou had left 
the mountain Berbers of the Middle Atlas virtually out­
side Makhzen rule. Being unable to submit them militari­
ly, Mawlay Sulayman spared no effort since 1811 to 
tighten the economic blockade against the Ait Oumalou.
He believed that the denial of lowlands cereals to the 
dissidents would easily bring down Abu Bakr Amhawish and 
the Ait Oumalou leaders. In 1813 the Zaer, the Zemmour 
and the Ourdigha tribes were forced to pay heavy fines 
for selling cereals to mountain Berbers (42). At the end 
of 1818, in the midst of a devastating famine, Mawlay 
Sulayman renewed his determination to stifle the Ait 
Oumalou. He ordered the lowland qa3id-s to prevent wheat 
sales to the Ait Oumalou and declared that every tribe 
which did not respect his orders could be plundered by 
its neighbours (43).
(41) Jeannine Drouin, Un cycle oral hagiographique dans le Moyen Atlas 
marocain, Paris, 1975, p. III.
(42) Al-Ducayf, p.498.
(43) Letters from Mawlay Sulayman to the qa^id of Agourai (near Meknes) 
dated 3 Hijja, 1233/4 Oct.,1818 and 11 Hijja, 1233/12 Oct.,1818, 
in D.A.R.
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In the spring of 1819 Mawlay Sulayman decided to 
lead a major expedition against the mountain Berbers.
The decision was apparently taken upon the advice of 
Muhammad b. al-GhazT, leader of the Zemmour and Mawlay 
Sulayman's newly appointed qa3id for the Berber regions
(44). Ibn al-Ghazi's plan, according to al-ZayanT, 
provided for a major offensive which would assail the 
Ait Oumalou from the south. The Haouz tribes, under 
the leadership of Mawlay Sulayman, and the northern 
army commanded by Mawlay Ibrahim and including the 
Zemmour, the Arab tribes of the Azghar, the Oudaya and the 
cAbid were to meet at the Tadla and from there would 
invest the Adekhsan (upper Oum er-Rbia valley), 
considered to be the breadbasket of the Ait Oumalou.
The military expedition coincided with the 
height of the plague epidemic in the northern provinces
(45). "People were in great distress", wrote al-ZayanT, 
"and were in no state to take part in this military 
campaign"(46). Mawlay Sulayman, who was then at 
Marrakech, seems to have been unaware of the devasta­
ting effects of the plague epidemic in the northern 
provinces. Indeed, al-ZayanT blames Mawlay Ibrahim, son 
and vice-regent of Mawlay Sulayman at Fes, for not 
having informed his father of the real extent of the 
epidemic and the great suffering it had caused to the 
population (47).
The number of Makhzen troops assembled in the Tadla 
amounted to about 60,000 men (48). In May 1819 Mawlay 
Sulayman headed to the Adekhsan where he ordered the 
destruction of cereal plantations belonging to the Alt
(44) Al-ZayanT, TarTkh al-wilaya, p. 3.
(45) Cf. evolution of the second plague epidemic above.
(46) Al-ZayanT, al-Raw^ a, fol.191.
(47) Ibid., fol.23.
(48) Al-Na^irf, VIII, p.134.
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Oumalou. Military confrontation between the Makhzen and 
Abu Bakr Amhawish could have been avoided when the Ait 
Oumalou came to the Sultan's son, Mawlay Ibrahim, asking 
for forgiveness and manifesting at the same time their 
readiness to pay the indemnity demanded and provide the 
necessary hostages as a guarantee for their good behaviour 
(49). However, Mawlay Ibrahim , "an extremely hot-headed 
prince" not only persuaded his father to reject this offer but 
massacred a number of wcmen and children among the peace dele­
gation which came to him (50) . According to al-Zayani, the 
Sultan refused the peace offer on the advice of Ibn al- 
Ghazf who was at the origin of the whole plan of the 
battle (51) .
During the first day of the battle, casualties were 
mainly limited to Makhzen contingents from the Arab 
tribes. According to a "trustworthy" witness of the 
battle quoted by al-Na$irf, Ibn al-Ghazi, commander of 
the lowland Berbers, had previously agreed with the Alt 
Oumalou to spare each other by using only gunpowder in 
the firing (52). Having suspected the malevolence of 
Ibn al-Ghazi, Mawlay Sulayman ordered on the second day 
of the battle the withdrawal of Berber contingents from 
the fighting to test, he argued, the military competence 
of his Arab troops. As soon as the fighting resumed, Ibn 
al-Ghazi decided to abandon the Sultan and join the Ait 
Oumalou. Caught between mountain and lowland Berbers, 
Makhzen troops were completely overwhelmed and demoralized. 
As a result, all tribal contingents deserted Mawlay 
Sulayman who was left with thecAbid and the Oudaya (53).
(49) Al-Zayani, Tarlkh al-wilaya, p. 4.
(50) E. Mercier, Histoire de l'Afrique septentrionale (Berberie) 
depuis les temps les plus recules jusgu'a la conquete fran- 
qaise (1830) , Paris, 1888, vol. Ill, p. 513.
(51) Al-Zayani, Tarlkh al-wilaya, p. 4.
(52) Akansus and al-Nasiri ascribe the defeat of Makhzen troops to the 
betrayal of Ibn al-Ghazi who decided to join the Ait Oumalou at the 
last minute (al-Jaysh, p.315; al-Na^ irf, VIII, pp.134-135). Al- 
Zayani' s version is that Ibn al-Ghazi's tribesmen and other low­
land Berbers just deserted in front of the heavy fire of the Ait 
Oumalou(al-Rawja, fol.191 and Tarlkh, p.4). Akansus's allegation 
reflects most probably the official justification of the defeat.
(53) Al-Na§irF, VIII, p. 135.
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By the end of the second day, the Makhzen armies 
were completely routed. Mawlay Ibrahim was mortally 
wounded and Mawlay Sulayman himself made prisoner. At 
no time, however, was he ill-treated by his enemies. On 
the contrary, once identified he was shown every respect as 
a sharif. His tent was torn into pieces and distribu­
ted among the Ait Oumalou Berbers as an invocation of 
his baraka (54). After three days of captivity he was 
accompanied to the outskirts of his capital, Meknes, 
and set free.
After the battle, rumours about the defeat of Mawlay 
Sulayman circulated for many days (55). The tidings of 
this defeat quickly spread to the whole country, genera­
ting confusion and restlessness both among the army and 
the tribes. Communications between Fes, Meknes and their 
surroundings became unsafe after the Berber rebels . 
spread into the surrounding plains. The populations of 
the Azghar, already suffering from the plague, had to 
bear the consequences.
Mawlay Sulayman took the shock of his captivity and the 
death of his elder son and heir presumptive badly. For 
months he remained secluded in his Meknes palace. His 
ability to act was also greatly reduced after many 
officials and army qa3id-s had died in the battle (56) . 
Ahmad b. M'barak, who had replaced Muhammad al-SalawT 
as chief minister, was the only official of importance 
who remained and through whom Mawlay Sulayman transmitted
his orders (57). "His Majesty", wrote the French consul,
"is in an awkward position vis-a-vis his own people who, 
after making him prisoner, escorted him to his palace. His 
only safeguard", added Sourdeau, "resides in the veneration 
due to him as a sharif"(58).
(54) CCC, Vol.26, 10 June, 1819.
(55) Ibid.
(56) Abd al-Kabir b. al-Majdhub al-Fasi, Tadhkirat, p.347.
(57) CCC, vol.26, 18 July, 1819.
(58) Ibid., 30 June, 1819.
The disintegration of the army under the joint 
effects of the plague and the Zai'an defeat prevented 
Mawlay Sulayman from taking any concrete action to 
restore the Makhzen's credibility among his subjects.
The army needed reorganization, as well as clothing and 
equipment. The incapacity of the army was such that it 
even proved unable to convey military equipment safely 
from the ports to the besieged capital (59).
Mawlay Sulayman's handling of the after-effects of 
the defeat only helped to perpetuate the political crisis. 
In the summer of 1819 he imprisoned a delegation of six 
hundred Berber notables from the Alt Idrassen who came 
to Meknes asking for his forgiveness. After they were 
hospitably received, the palace gates were secured and 
the notables put into irons. Mawlay Sulayman apparently 
intended to keep them as hostages for future good 
behaviour. However, his actions only added fuel to the 
flames of Berber dissidence. Infuriated by what they 
regarded as a betrayal on the Sultan's part, the Berber 
tribes united under the leadership of Abu Bakr Amhawish 
and laid siege to Meknes. "This (action) led to the 
deterioration of the situation and set fire to all parts 
of the Maghrib", wrote Akansus . "The Berbers united in 
a common front and .solicited the coming of the imposter"
(60). For a time, the traditional antagonism between 
lowland and mountain Berbers was set aside and the 
Makhzen was no longer able to play on it to contain the 
dissidence of the Ait Oumalou. In September, 1819 the 
Siege around Meknes was tightened after Amhawish himself 
took command of the Berber contingents. All
attempts by Mawlay Sulayman to bring some Berber tribes 
over to his side failed "after concord was realised among 
them and differences forgotten" (61).
(59) Ibid., 30 Sept., 1819.
(60) Akansus, p. 318.
(61) Ibid.
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Mawlay Sulayman was more•isolated than ever. Not 
one provincial qlPid was able to raise an army and come 
to his assistance at Meknes. Left without pay, some 
contingents of the army refused to carry out their 
duties (62). In the capital itself, insubordination 
spread to the cAbid . who, in November, 1819, massacred 
Ahmad b. M'barak, their commander and the Sultan's chief 
minister (63) .
The liberation of the Berber hostages at the begin- 
ing of 18 20 after the marabout^Abd Allah b. Hamza al- 
cAyyashf interceded on their hehalf, failed to end the 
siege of Meknes (64).Mawlay Sulayman had not been ahle 
to leave his capital since his liberation by the Ait 
Oumalou in May 1819. On the verge of despair, he declared 
that he placed his confidence in God alone who makes and 
unmakes kings (65).
II - Prelude to an Urban Rebellion
Fes, with its industry and commerce, was deeply affected 
by the famine of 1817-1818 and its consequences. Its 
people were particularly upset by Mawlay Sulayman's 
decision to allow wheat exports to France in 1817. The 
French official who was supervising the export of wheat 
at Rabat wrote in September 1817 that Fes was "most 
discontented because every outlet of its commerce and 
industry was closed" (66). The news of the Zaian defeat 
and the ensuing increase of banditry in the Sals plain 
rendered all commercial relations with the outside world 
very risky. The repercussions from the economic
(62) CCC, vol. 26, 30 June, 1819.
(63) Ibid., 3 Dec., 1819.
(64) Akansus, p.319. Many of these hostages (100 according to the 
French consul) had died in prison because of the insalubrious 
conditions there. Cf. CCC, vol. 26, 20 Sept., 1819.
(65) CCC, vol. 27, 22 Jan., 1820.
(66) CCC, vol. 25, 29 Sept., 1819.
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difficulties and the political uncertainty which had 
prevailed since May 1819 soon found their way to Fasi 
politics.
The persistence of tribal agitation in the Sais 
plain and the absence of effective Makhzen authority 
within Fes itself were bound to disturb the precarious 
coexistence between the various components of Fasi 
society. Fes had always had three ga3 id-s, one for each 
of the three sections of the city (^Adwa, Andalus and 
LamtiyTh) and Sfdf Muhammad b. <Abd Allah respected this 
tradition (67) . Mawlay Sulayman, however, succeeded in 
imposing a single qa3id, an arrangement which was accepted 
by the Fasi-s only so long as the Makhzen proved powerful 
enough to ensure peace and tranquility in their city. This, 
however, was no longer possible after the Zaian setback.
Mawlay Sulayman had spent more than eight months 
confined in his capital when, in February 1820, he 
received the first alarming news from Fes. At the beginn­
ing of 1820 the ^Adwa section of Fes objected to the 
governorship of Muljammad al-Saffar, who was Andalusian, 
and sought to have him recalled (68). Group loyalties 
welled up to the surface and inevitably led to violence. 
Mawlay Sulayman, who was beseiged in Meknes, wrote a 
letter to the people of Fes in which he satisfied neither 
his governor nor those who objected to him (69). He 
particularly blamed the notables, who, he claimed, instead 
of assisting the Sultan in suppressing disobedience, 
preferred to spend their time in their villas and gardens.
(67) Al-Du^ayf, p. 167.
(68) Sources at our disposal make no reference to the nature of 
grievances: the people of Fes, and the ^Adwa in particular, had 
against al-Saffar. However, Mawlay Sulayman in his letter to the 
people of Fes (al-NasirF, VIII, pp. 139-141) accused the governor 
of Fes of avarice and compared him to a dog who was attacked by 
other dogs for having refused to share his food with them.
(69) Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to the people of Fes in Akansus, pp. 
320-322 and al-Na$irf, VIII, pp.139-141.
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In the same letter he expounded on the principles that 
governed his policy towards the city of Fes. " I en­
trust your government to outsiders (barrani-s) because 
they are less likely to arouse your jealousy ... and 
to merchants because they do not covet others' wealth 
and content themselves w7ith their prestigious position 
on order to fructify their capital" (70).
The letter produced no effect on the Fasi-s, for 
the gravity of the situation required action rather than 
words. Mawlay Sulayman was not totally unaware of this, 
yet he hoped he would be able to appease tensions in Fes 
while he was besieged by Berber tribes in Meknes. The 
release of the Berber hostages had no discernible effect 
on the tribal agitation around the capital, so Mawlay 
Sulayman finally resolved to leave Meknes and head for 
Fes despite the grave risks involved. During its night­
time journey to Fes, the Sultan's convoy was assailed by 
Berber insurgents from all sides and the protection of 
the marabout Muhammad b. Hamza al-^Ayyashi, who accom­
panied Mawlay Sulayman, proved to be of no avail (71).
Immediately after his arrival on Fes, Mawlay 
Sulayman ordered that all Berbers .in the city should 
be destituted. Great excesses were committed and the 
generalised conflict between Mawlay Sulayman and the 
Berbers acquired a tinge of racial antagonism between 
Arabs and Berbers (72). Nevertheless, Mawlay Sulayman 
did succeed in restoring tranquillity within the city 
itself. Muframmad al-Saffar was recalled and replaced by 
a was! fr 2a sim b. Sakin, who was an officer of the
(70) Ibid.
(71) Akansus, p. 319.
(72) Ibid., cf. also al-Majdhub al-Fasi, Tadhkirat, p. 348.
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cAbfd army (73). This measure temporarily quelled the 
unrest within the city and allowed Mawlay Sulayman to 
direct his attention to the pacification of the coastal 
regions of the Gharb where the authority of the qa3id-s 
had been greatly weakened after the Zaian defeat (74).
In his journey through the Gharb the Sultan was 
accompanied by the ^Abfd and Oudaya armies who agreed to 
leave their families in Fes and Meknes only after 
having been premised that they would not have to go beyond 
Rabat. He also had contingents from the Haouz tribes who 
were among the few remaining supporters of the Makhzen. 
Once in Rabat, Ibn al-JilalT, qaDid of the Rehamna and 
companion of Mawlay Sulayman in his captivity amongst 
the Zaian, proposed that the Sultan change his residence 
temporarily to Marrakech where he was more likely to 
enjoy the support of the neighbouring tribes (75). The 
Oudaya and the ^AbTd, however, were quite unwilling to 
abandon their families to the insecurity which reigned 
around Fes and Meknes and,therefore, refused to proceed 
to Marrakech as requested by the Sultan. The notables of 
the Haouz, on the other hand, warned Mawlay Sulayman that 
if he returned to Meknes he might lose the chance of 
reaching their country for ever (76). Mawlay Sulayman 
was thus presented with an embarassing choice: if he 
satisfied the Haouz notables he risked alienating his 
army, but if he chose to return to Meknes he risked 
his throne. Finally, he resolved to head southward even 
if his army refused to follow.
When he left Rabat in June 1820, Mawlay Sulayman ■ 
was not even sure he would reach Marrakech safely 
because of the insecurity of roads. He decided, therefore,
(73) Al-Zayanf, Jamharat man hakama bi Fas, p.9; Akansus, p.319.
(74) Akansus, p.323.
(75) Ibid.; al-Majdhiub al-Fasi, Tadhkirat, p.348.
(76) Al-Majdhub al-Fasf, Tadhkirat, p.348.
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to travel in disguise among the Seraghna, who on their 
way to Marrakech, spread rumours that the Sultan was 
still at Rabat. For several days, people in the northern 
part of the country were unable to ascertain where the 
Sultan was in fact. The Oudaya and the ^Abid who 
returned to Fes and Meknes created the greatest confu­
sion. The Sultan, they reported, had abandoned the 
Azghar and fled to the south (77). In addition to 
spreading injurious rumours, .the ^Abfd and the Oudaya 
began to plunder Jewish quarters in both Fes and Meknes 
(7 8) thus inaugurating a cycle of violence which was 
impossible to control.
Ill - The Power Vacuum and the Fasi Response
The hasty and ill-timed departure of Mawlay Sulayman to 
Marrakech had a disastrous effect oh the course of events 
in the north. The Sultan had delegated authority to his 
two sons, Mawlay al-Husayn in Meknes and Mawlay ^AlT in 
Fes. The two princes, however, were effectively incapable 
of making their voice heard, even among the army. 
Immediately after the departure of Mawlay Sulayman 
towards the middle of June 1820, the Oudaya plundered 
the Jewish quarter of Fes for three days. This attack 
on the millafr affected the interests of the Muslim 
population as well since many Fasi merchants used to 
entrust their merchandise and financial capital to 
Jewish associates. "This incited the people of Fes to 
rebellion", wrote al-Zayani, "because they lost consi­
derable sums of money" (79). What alarmed the people of 
Fes was the declared intention of the Oudaya to extend 
their plundering to Old Fes itself. "After the small
(77) Ibid.
(78) Ibid.
(79) Al-Zayani, Tuhfat al-nubaha?, K 241, p. 226.
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millah", said the Oudaya, "we will plunder the big 
one" (80). The people of Fes were exposed to external 
violence for the first time since the unstable reign 
of Mawlay cAbd Allah (1729-1757).
The Sultan's prolonged residence at Marrakech during 
the summer of 1820 made the Makhzen's administrative 
presence in the north less and less perceptible. The 
appeal addressed by Mawlay Sulayman to the Oudaya to 
return what they had plundered in the millclfr to its 
legitimate owners remained a dead letter (81). The Oudaya 
even escalated their aggression by blockading Old Fes.
They looted every caravan that entered or left the city 
and plundered livestock belonging to Fasi-s. Inside Old 
Fes itself, crafts and trade were paralyzed as a result 
of the blockade. In order to deal with the growing inse­
curity which they faced, the Fasi-s decided to fill the 
power vacuum by appointing their own qa^id-s. Each of 
the three sections of the city appointed its own ga3id, 
thus resuming a tradition which had disappeared with 
Mawlay Sulayman. The qa^id-s who had to ensure security 
within their sections and organize resistance to the 
Oudaya were cAbd al-Rahman b. Faris, Qaddur al-Mqarff 
and Ahmad al-Harthi.
Another conflict emerged along with the power vacuum: 
the contest between the mufti and the get (jr. The rivalry 
between the mufti, Muhammad b. Ibrahim al-Dukkali and the 
gacjf, al-cAbbas b. Suda cannot be fully appraised unless 
seen in the light of the privileged relations that existed 
between Mawlay Sulayman and the Ibn Suda family. Since 
the second half of the eighteenth century, this, family 
had enjoyed the favours of the cAlawid sultans more than
(80) Ibid.
(81) Cf. Mawlay Sulayman's letter to the people of Fes exhorting them 
to return Jewish property, dated 2 Shawwal, 1235/13 July, 1820, 
in CCC, vol.27, fol.68-69.
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any other learned family of the country. This was largely 
due to the reputation gained by al-Tawdl b. Suda as the 
uncontested authority during the second half of the eighteenth 
century. According to Muhammad al-Ruhuni, al-Tawdf had 
served as teacher of all talim-s of his time, excepting one 
only— Muhammad b. al-Qasim al-SijilmassI (82). Al-Tawdi was 
not only respected by sultans and his fellow calim-s, but 
also by sharlf-s. Nothing illustrates better this esteem 
than the unanimous decision taken in 1792 by the calim-s, 
sharif-s and notables of Fes to give him a free hand in the 
choice of a new sultan for the country (83).
His son Ahmad was appointed gadf of Fes by Sidi 
Muhammad b . cAbd Allah and, after having been discarded 
by Mawlay al-Yazfd, was re-established in his office 
in 1792 by Mawlay Sulayman (84) . In addition to the 
exercise of justice in the city of Fes he was invested 
by Mawlay Sulayman with the power to supervise all 
judges of Morocco (gaqir al-qucjat) (85) . Ahmad b. Suda 
held this post for the period extending from 1792 to 1816 
with a short interruption in 1801 (86). The competence 
of Ahmad b. Suda was such that Mawlay Sulayman decided 
to dispense with the post of mufti (87).
For Mawlay Sulayman the Ibn Suda-s were not only 
teachers, but spiritual guides as well. Indeed, it was 
through al-Tawdi b. Suda that he received the Nasiri wird 
(88) . This explains the great esteem in which he held his 
shaykh-s. During the early years of his reign, Mawlay
(82) Muhammad al-Ruhuni, Awdab al-masalik wa ashal al-maraql ila 
sabki ibrlz al-shaykh ^Abd al-Baqi, Cairo, 1888-1889, vol.I,p.13.
(83) Cf. chapter IV above, pp. 178-179.
(84) Cf. Sulayman's gjhahir appointing Ahmad b. Suda as qacjli of Fes in 
al-Hawwat, al-Rawja al-maqsuda, p.320 (appendix 3 ). Cf. also al- 
Ducayf, p.414.
(85) Al-Hawwat, al-Rawda al-maq?uda, pp.320-321; al-Zayani", Takmll,p.9.
(86) Al-Ducayf, p.414.
(87) Al-Hawwat, al-Rawja al-maqsuda , p. 323.
(88)^ Abd al-Hayy al-Kattani, Fihris, II, p.329; al-Hawwat, al-Rawfla, 
p.322; Mu^ iammad b. Ja^ar al-Kattanr, Salwat, I, p. 116.
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Sulayman kept al-Tawdl b. Suda informed of the political 
developments in the country and sought his advice on the 
important issues of his time (89) . The Sultan continued 
to observe the same attitude towards Ahmad b. al-Tawdl b. 
Suda. Even when he was on bad terms with the people of 
Fes, he continued to write to the qadi acquainting him 
with major political events (90). This attitude towards 
the Ibn Suda-s who monopolized the royal privileges for 
several decades, caused a great embitterment on the part 
of other learned families of Fes as well as the sharif-s
(91) .
When Ahmad b. Suda lost his sight in 1816, the post of 
gad! was conferred upon his youngest son, al-cAbbas who was 
by that time twenty-nine years old. On the other hand,
Ibn Ibrahim al-Dukkall,a senior and aged calim, was 
nominated mufti. Al-Dukkall was disappointed with Mawlay
_ C  —________________________________Sulayman's choice for a young alim from the Ibn Suda 
family to serve as qadi of F&s, considering himself as 
better qualified for this most prestigious judicial post 
in the kingdom (9 2). In addition, al-cAbbas proved to 
be uncooperative and manifested a firm determination 
to render justice without the services of a mufti (93).
In the conflict which opposed the two judicial authorities 
at F£s, Mawlay Sulayman sided with the qafli every time he 
was asked to intervene. In 1817, he restricted the judicial 
prerogatives of the mufti and, at the beginning of 1820, 
abolished the post of mufti altogether after an argument
(89) Cf. for instance letter of Mawlay Sulayman to al-Tawdl b. Suda, no 
date^  Mic. 3,HFMD, Fes, 1978, in which the Sultan informs him 
about the submission of the Chaouia and asks for his legal opinion 
concerning the export of wheat to the Christian nations.
(90) Al-Ducayf mentions that in 1797 Mawlay Sulayman wrote a letter to 
Ahmad b. Suda informing him of the political situation in the 
Chaouia. JThe letter was read publically to the people of Fes (p. 361) .
(91) Ibn Zaydan, al- cIzz wa al-sawla, II, p. 90.
(92) Al-Zayani, Takmll qu^St* Fas, p. 12.
(93) Ibid.
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between the two judicial authorities over a case 
involving two sharif-s of Fes (94) .
The qacji-mufti antagonism acquired a new dimension 
when on June 11, 1820, al-Dukkall and another senior 
Calira, ^Abd al-Salam al-AzamT (the only two remaining 
^alim-s who had signed Mawlay Sulayman's bayca) wrote 
a letter to the Sultan asking for the recall of al-^Abbas 
b. Suda. The two signatories denounced Ibn Suda's incapa­
city and injustice and pointed to his youth, his inex­
perience and his contempt for the mufti's opinion (95). 
Mawlay Sulayman received the letter at Rabat while 
considering whether to proceed to Marrakech or return to 
his capital. Apparently, he underestimated the gravity 
of the case over which the mufti and the qacji were 
quarreling, assuming that the conflict was nothing more 
than normal professional rivalry (96). He did not deem 
it necessary to send a reply.
After the plunder of the millafr by the Oudaya at the 
end of June and the consequent appointment of sectional 
qa^id-s by the Fasi-s, al-^Abbas found himself in an 
increasingly untenable situation as he lacked the 
necessary means to enforce his sentences. During the 
summer of 18 20, he was attacked by a sharif, Sid. I” al- 
Tahar al-Kattani, who fired at him while he was holding 
a public audience (97). The consequent arrest of al- 
Kattanl by Makhzen officials, already overshadowed by 
the locally appointed qa?id-s, provoked a general reaction
(94) Letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to Muhammad b. Ibrahim al-DukkSIT 
restricting his judicial prerogatives, dated 5 Ramad3n, 1232/19 
July, 1817, in DAR, (appendix 74). The circumstances of his dis­
missal are not clear. Akansus mentioned that the mufti was re­
voked following a confrontation between Ibn Suda and al-Dukkali 
over a case involving two sharif-s fran Fes, but gave no details 
about it. Al-Na?iri who relied on Akansus reproduced the same 
story, adding that the case was "well known" (al-Nasiri, VIII, 
p. 146) . In the material we have consulted we have found no trace 
of this case.
(95) Letter fran al-Dukkall and al-Azami to Mawlay Sulayman, dated 29 
Shacban, 1235/11 June, 1820 in al-Mashrafl, al-Husam, pp.328-329; 
cf. also al-Nasiri, VIII, pp. 146-147.
(96) Akansus, p.326.
(97) Ibid.
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of solidarity with the KattSni sharif. Ultimately, the 
Andalusian notable, Ibn al-Raziq, intervened and forced 
his liberation (98). Terrorized by the attempt made on 
his life, Ibn Suda could no longer leave his home. The 
KattanT case proved, furthermore, that it was no longer 
possible for the qadi to adequately fulfil his 
judicial functions. The rebels simply dismissed him and 
appointed a new qadi, Muhammad b. cAbd al-Ra^iman al- 
Dila^T. This dealt the final blow to what remained of 
Makhzen authority in Fes.
Nonetheless, the people of Fes in no way disputed 
Mawlay Sulayman's legitimacy. By appointing their own 
qa^id-s and nominating a new judge they did not intend 
to overthrow the local representatives of the Makhzen; 
they simply made up for a deficient administration which 
proved to be powerless in the face of the events that 
were taking place. The people of Fes still looked forward 
to the return of Mawlay Sulayman to his seat of government 
and for the normalization of the country's political 
situation.In the summer of 1820, al-Dukkali wrote to 
Mawlay Sulayman, on behalf of the Fasi-s, asking for his 
prompt return to the Azghar (99). The Sultan, however, 
did not respond to this request. On 22 August, he 
answered the people of Fes with a most ambiguous and 
enigmatic letter which only served to inflame the 
situation (100). In it, Mawlay Sulayman ascribed the 
political crisis to the weakness of the army and its
(98) Cf. letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to the people of Fes, no date, in 
al-ZayanT, Tufcfat al-nubahaP, pp. 181-185 (appendix 89).
(99) Al-Majdhub al-FasT, Tadhkirat, p. 349.
(100)Cf.letter in Ms.D.2795, BGR, p.393. The letter dated 13 Qacda,1235/ 
22 Aug., 1820, must have arrived in FSs much later than the date 
given by Akansus (Shawwal 1235/July-Aug., 1820) ; cf. Akansus,p. 326. 
According to the author of Tadhkirat, p. 349, Mawlay Sulayman's 
reply was written on the back of the letter sent to him by Ibn 
Ihrahim and al-Azaml. This letter is reproduced in appendix 82).
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inability to ensure the collection of taxes. He, 
implicitly, admitted his impotence and advised the Fasi-s 
to take the responsibility for their own security upon 
themselves by seeking the alliance of Berber tribes, as
used to be the case during the chaotic reign of his
grandfather, Mawlay cAbd Allah. This alliance, he said, 
would allow them to thwart the Oudaya attacks while he 
was away. The most confusing statement in the letter was 
the allusion he made to abdication when he wrote: "May 
God reserve a happy ending to what remains (of my life) 
and ensure my replacement among the Muslims ... I am 
not the first to abandon this matter; those who are more 
virtuous than myself, such as al-Husayn, the noblest 
among the sons of Fatima al-Zahra^ already did" (101).
The Sultan's enigmatic letter reached Fes during the 
second week of September 1820. It was addressed to 
Muhammad b. Ibrahim al-Dukkall, Sid I" Muhammad b.al-Tahar 
al-cAlawI and al-Talib b. Jallun. Ibn Ibrahim al-Dukkali 
who was the first to read the letter, made a copy 
of it before he handed over the original to Mawlay ^All, 
the Sultan's son and vice-regent in the city (102). Some 
Calim-s also had an opportunity to see the original. Upon 
the reception of the royal message, Mawlay ^Ali convened 
the notables in a mosque adjacent to his residence and read 
it to them in the presence of a large crowd (103). A great
turmoil resulted among the audience, but the prince, who
did not appreciate his father's attitude, refused to 
hand it over and, after shutting himself up in his house, 
burnt it. As a result, suspicion about the Sultan's real 
intentions increased.
(101) Letter fran Mawlay Sulayman to the people of Fes in Ms.D.2795,BGR, 
p.393.
(102) Al-Majdhub al-FSsi, Tadhkirat, p.349.
(103) Akansus,p.326.
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What was the real intention of Mawlay Sulayman in 
addressing the people of Fes in such vague terms as those 
used in his letter? Apologists for the ^Alawid dynasty, 
such as al-Zayani and Akansus, refuse to see any explicit 
mention of abdication on the Sultan's part in the letter. 
Al-Zayani refuses categorically any idea of abdication, 
even accusing al-Dukkall of having falsified the letter 
(104). Akansus, on the other hand, rejects the accusation 
by al-Zayani against al-Dukkall and recognizes the 
equivocal character of the letter (105). Nevertheless, as 
usual, Akansus finds an excuse for Mawlay Sulayman. His 
intention was not to abdicate, argues the author of al- 
Jaysh, but to arouse the people of Fes and incite them 
to manifest a greater attachment to his person (106). 
cAbd al-Kablr b. al-Majdhub al-Fasl, whose father was 
involved in the rebellion, offers a different inter­
pretation. According to the author of Tadhkirat al- 
Muhsinln, Mawlay Sulayman was genuine in his proposal of 
abdication (107). Even an objective chronicler such as 
the anonymous author of al-Ibtisam tends to support the 
latter explanation^ claiming that Mawlay Sulayman chose 
to abdicate in order to avoid further bloodshed and 
social disorder (108).
Indeed, a careful examination of Mawlay Sulayman1s 
letter leaves no doubt about his intention to abandon his 
responsibilities as head of the Muslim community. His 
reference to the case of al-Husayn, son of CA11 b. Abl 
Talib, could only be interpreted as a determination to 
abdicate. Moreover, it was not the first time that 
Mawlay Sulayman had expressed his will to relinquish 
power. Since the Zaian military setback he had become 
increasingly pessimistic about the future of his reign, 
particularly after the death of his elder son Mawlay
(104) Al-Zayani, Tuhfat al-nubaha-3, pp. 178-179. Al-Zayani produced a 
slightly different version of the letter which, he claimed, was 
al-Dukkali's copy freed from all additions and alterations.
(105) Akansus, p.327.
(106) Ibid.
(107) Al-Majdhub al-Fasl, Tadhkirat, p. 349.
(108) Al-Ibtisam, p.65.
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Ibrahim, the assassination of his only minister, Afymad 
b. M'barak, and the collapse of his army. During the 
summer of 1820, while at Marrakech, he told Rehamna 
notables that he had been tempted more than once by the 
idea of abandoning the political scene to dedicate the 
rest of his life to the worship of God (109) . Whatever 
his real intention, his letter offered the Fasi-s an 
unexpected occasion to rid themselves of a sultan who 
had effectively ceased to rule since May, 1819.
IV - The Proclamation of a New Sultan
Thoughts of dethroning Mawlay Sulayman went back at least 
to the summer of 1817 when,in the midst of a catastrophic 
famine he allowed wheat to be exported to Christians and 
also decided to end the j ihad at sea by disarming the 
Moroccan navy. The French consul general noted then that 
"the saints, or individuals who have a great influence 
over towns and countryside, implore God in their prayers 
to give them another king" (110). By then the name of 
Mawlay Ibrahim, son of the late Mawlay al-Yazid, was 
mentioned as a possible candidate (111).
The deposition of a sultan, however, is not made 
easy by the sharlca . The imam cannot be deposed unless 
officially declared incapable of meeting the ultimate 
goals prescribed for the imamate, namely the guarantee 
of public tranquility which is an essential condition for 
the exercise of religious and wordly duties. He can also 
be replaced by another imam if he admits his incapacity 
to govern (112). The most perplexing issue which faced 
the leaders of the rebellion since the arrival of Mawlay
(109) Akansus, p.327.
(110) OCC, vol.25, 20 July, 1817.
(111) Ibid., 29 Sept., 1817.
(112) On the imamate in Islam cf.rAbd al-Qadir al-Fasl, Risala fiT al- 
imama al-Cudhma wa shuruf man yataqalladuha, Ms D 1861, BGR, pp. 
368-388; Ahmad al-Ruhuni, Nush amir al-muminln, Ms D 2160, BGR.
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Sulayman1s letter of abdication was the question of 
how to find a legal justification for the deposition of 
the Sultan.
At the request of the rebellion leaders, who over­
whelmingly belonged to the Andalusian notability (113), 
al-Dukkali and other ^alim-s spent more than two months 
trying to build up a legal basis for the destitution of 
Mawlay Sulayman. The most important document on which 
they could rely was obviously what they considered to be 
the abdication letter, but the original copy had been 
lost and the people of Fes were only left with an 
unauthenticated copy. To authenticate this duplicate, the 
calim-s and talib-s who had the chance of reading the 
original copy, were convened and asked to testify that 
the copy made by Ibn Ibrahim al-Dukkall conformed to 
the original. Three scholars only were able to provide 
such a testimony (114).
Now that that the authenticity of the letter in 
question was legally established, the c alim-s could issue 
a fatwa authorizing the deposition cf Mawlay Sulayman. In 
fact, two fatwa-s were issued on the basis of the Sultan's 
letter. They were signed respectively be Muhammad b. 
Ibrahim al-Dukkali and Muhammad al-Yazghi. These fatwa-s 
were supported by a number of falim-s who agreed that the 
letter was a clear abdication on Mawlay Sulayman's part 
and an explicit recognition of political impotence. "The 
Muslims are called to appoint an imam", wrote Ibn Ibrahim, 
"otherwise, two parties would have sinned: the people of 
tying and untying (ahl al-foall wa al-Caqd)and the candi­
date who fulfills the conditions of the imamate"(115).
(113) Al-Zayanf, Tuhfat,pp. 155-156. The main Andalusian leaders of the 
rebellion were: Muhamrad b. ^ Abd al-Raziq, Mu^ ianrnad b. Sulayman, 
Qaddur cAmir andcAllal al-cAfiya. Cf. also Akansus, p.328.
(114) Cf. certified copy of Mawlay Sulayman's letter in Ms.D.2795, BGR, 
p. 393, appendix 82.
(115) Cf. fatwa by al-Dukkall in Ms. D 2795, p.393 (appendix 83).
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In principle, this well-grounded fatwa could have 
in itself offered sufficient justification for the 
dethronement of Mawlay Sulayman. However, many calim-s 
were reluctant to support the fatwa. The authenticity of 
the letter, which had served as the basis of the fatwa, 
was still contested by a number of influential persons 
who refused to join al-Dukkali and his party. Furthermore, 
the letter appeared to be vague and enigmatic. Nowhere 
was there a clear statement of abdication. For many 
calim-s the dethronement of the imam was too important 
a question to be grounded on such a meagre evidence. 
Accordingly, the fatwa issued by al-Dukkali and his party 
failed to rally enough support for the rebels. The 
Oudaya and the cAbfd, in particular, refused to join the 
movement.
To overcome the hesitations of many reluctant calim-s 
the leaders of the rebellion resorted to a second device. 
Apart from the question of voluntary abdication of the 
imam, the Muslim community is empowered by the shar1ca 
to depose him if his incapacity to govern and ensure 
internal peace is proved. The leaders of the rebellion, 
therefore, established a notarial act to prove that since 
the unfortunate Zaian battle, the country had been 
virtually without government (116). This notarial act was 
produced at the beginning of November, 1820, less than 
two weeks before the proclamation of the new prince. On 
the basis of this notarial act the calim-s were asked 
to issue a second fatwa authorizing the Muslim community 
to appoint another ruler.
The second fatwa (#) relied on the following arguments:
1. the manifest disintegration of the Sultan's authority,
2. his inability to ensure the respect for law and order,
3. the break up of unanimity around him, and
4. the rejection of his authority by the army and by 
the centre of legitimacy, i.e. Fes.
(116) Cf. notarial act dated beginning Safar, 1236/ Nov., 1820 
in Ms D 2795, pp. 397-398 (appendix 84).
( * ) Cf. appendix 85.
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"This act", wrote cAbd al-Salam al-AzamI,"is sufficient 
in itself for the proclamation of a new imam, even if the 
first one maintains himself" (117). The proclamation of a 
new prince became, according to Muhammad b. Ibrahim al- 
DukkalT, not only desirable, but a most urgent obligation 
of the Muslim community (118). Mawlay Sulayman was, 
therefore, to be deposed on the basis of two fatwa-s, 
relying on both his letter and the notarial act establi­
shing his powerlessness. The number of calim-s who lent 
their support to the second fatwa had considerably in­
creased since the promulgation of the first fatwa, six 
weeks before (119).
The legal ground having been cleared, the people of 
Fes proceeded on 16 November, 1820 to the election of Mawlay 
Ibrahim b. al-YazId as the new sultan. The proclamation 
ceremony was attended by Sldi al-cArbl al-Wazzani, Mawlay 
al-cArbI al-DarqawI, Abu Bakr Amhawish, Muhammad b. al- 
GhazI and Muhammad b. Hammu WaczTz. The Fasi rebellion 
ceased, therefore, to be a purely urban uprising and streched 
beyond the walls of Fes to acquire the dimension of a 
dynastic crisis. The rebels failed, however, to gain 
either the Oudaya or thecAbfd armies. Most Arab tribes 
of the Azghar also refused to back the rebels' cause.
The Idrisid sharif-s and the adepts of the two shari- 
fian zawiya-s seemed at first in favour of a complete 
dynastic change. Ibn al-Ghazi, head of the Zemmour and 
devout disciple of Mawlay al-cArbT al-DarqawT, proposed 
the proclamation of an Idrisid candidate (120). The 
Andalusian notables, on the contrary, fearing a drastic 
swing in favour of the sharif-s, expressed their opposi­
tion to this idea and called for the proclamation of 
Mawlay Ibrahim who, they argued, was more likely to rally 
the sympathy of the army (121).
(117) Fatwa by al-Azaml in Ms.D.2795, p.399 / appendix 85.
(118) FatwS by al-Dukkali in Ms.D.2795, p.398.
(119) 19 calim-s signed the second document, while the first fatwa was
approved by 9 Calim-s only.
(120) Al-Zayani, Tuhfat al-nubaha^ , p.194.
(121) Ibid.,pp.194-195.
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Mawlay Ibrahim did not have any political ambitions.
He even refused the sultanate at the beginning and 
accepted only reluctantly under the threat of an Idrisid 
prince being chosen. For the popular masses, however, he 
symbolized the myth of his father, the hero of the jihad , 
and was capable therefore of rallying the sympathy of 
the northern provinces which, thirty years before, were 
the first to proclaim Mawlay al-YazId.
V - The Word Spreads
The creation of a political alliance between the people 
of Fes and the Berber tribes of the Fazaz determined the 
army and most of the Arab tribes to stand aloof from the 
movement. The Berber contingents, therefore, remained the 
main military force upon which the new regime depended to 
enforce its authority beyond the walls of Fes.
After drafting the bayca, the rebels started a 
campaign to secure its acceptance by the northern pro­
vinces. These not only constituted the stronghold of the 
Idrisid sharif-s, but offered material and political 
advantages for the regime as well. Through the northern 
ports, they could both control maritime trade and develop 
contacts with the representatives of the European countries 
from which they could obtain political recognition and 
military equipment.
Mawlay Ibrahim left Fes for the north at the end of i ... 
January 1821 (122). He was accompanied by his chief
advisor, Sidi al-cArbI al-Wazzani. The Wazzani sharif 
appealed to his followers everywhere to recognize the 
newly proclaimed sultan (123). As he approached each 
village or town he proclaimed that "Mawlay Sulayman's star
(122) F.O. 174/26, 19 Feb., 1821.
(123) Al-Zayani, Tuhfat al-nubaha-*,Ms K 241, p. 171.
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is set and Mawlay Ibrahim is the Sultan to be obeyed"
(124). The religious prestige of both the Wazzani and 
the Raysuni sharlf-s was used to gain support for the new 
sultan, particularly in the countryside (125). In the 
Gharb, the Sefiane under the leadership of Muhammad al-
Lushi, provided reliable support (126). In the Jbala^the
religious influence of the sharif-s of Ouezzane was of 
great help to the rebels. However, the coastal towns of 
Tangier and Larache refused to join the new regime because 
of the important cAbfd garrisons stationed in them. Of all
the northern towns, only Tetouan agreed to open its doors
to Mawlay Ibrahfm.
Indeed, Tetouan1s situation was in many respects 
similar to that of Fes. As an industrial and commercial 
centre, Tetouan had been exposed ever since the summer of 
1819 to continuous siege by the neighbouring tribes. In 
July 1820, following the plunder of the Jewish quarter 
of Fes by the Oudaya, the Jbala tribes attempted the same 
against the millah of Tetouan (127). The blockade enforced 
around the town affected not only the commercial interests 
of the Tetouani artisans and traders, but even prevented 
a normal food supply. In the summer of 1820, the inhabit­
ants found themselves obliged to import wheat from 
Gibraltar (128). For the people of Tetouan, therefore, as 
for the people of Fes, the rebellion promised an end to a 
distressing situation.
It was only after the insurgents left Fes that Mawlay 
Sulayman decided to act. The news of their heading to the 
northern ports made him very uneasy about the future. The 
control of the ports would offer his enemies the necessary
(124) C.0.91/79, Robert Sillery's Report.
(125) Muhammad b. Idris al-cAmrawi, Nafl^ at al-araj, Ms Z 3866, RL, p. 68.
(126) CCC, vol.27, 1 March, 1821.
(127) CCC, vol.27, fol.57-58. The attack was put off by the qa/id of
Tetouan, cAbd al-Rahman ^Ashcash, with the assistance of the popu­
lation who— it was remarked on this occasion— "volunteered to 
act in defence of the Jews and evinced an extraordinary determi­
nation to protect them"(C.0.91/76, 15 June, 1820).
(128) CCC, vol.27, 24 July, 1820.
37(3
funds to consolidate their rule and allow them to acquire 
arms from Europe, thus making their defeat extremely 
difficult. The ^Abid and the Oudaya were also pressing 
for the return of Mawlay Sulayman to the Azghar.
In fact, Mawlay Sulayman's situation had signifi-: 
cantly improved since the proclamation of Mawlay Ibrahim 
in November, 1820. The major development was the refusal 
of the Oudaya and the ^AbTd to join the rebels. Several 
tribes also refused to proclaim the new sultan more from 
hostility to the Fasi-Berber alliance than from fidelity 
to Mawlay Sulayman. These groups which were indifferent or 
hostile to the rebels soon felt the need for an alter­
native and turned back, therefore, to Mawlay Sulayman. 
Tribes which before the proclamation of Mawlay Ibrahim 
had refused to take sides, were placed in an embarassing 
situation after the rebellion. Ultimately, it became 
impossible for them to stand idly by. Tribal antagonisms 
played an important role in polarizing support around one 
prince or another (129). The ^Abid and the Oudaya, who 
a few months before had abandoned Mawlay Sulayman, not 
only refused to join the rebels, but went to Marrakech to 
ask for his forgiveness and request his return to his 
capital (130). In a sense, the proclamation of Mawlay 
Ibrahim offered Mawlay Sulayman a real chance to re­
establish his authority over the country.
When Mawlay Sulayman returned to the Azghar in March 
18 21, accompanied by contingents from the army and the 
Haouz tribes, he had for the first time since 1819 a 
military force with which to assert his authority.
The pacification of the northern tribes did not pose
any major difficulty. The situation, however, was differ-
(129) Thus, the Beni Hsen, traditionally opposed to the Sefiane and the
Zarmour, refused to join the rebels because of the outstanding
role played by the leaders these two confederations in the rebel­
lion.
(130) Al-MajdHub al-FasT, Tadhkirat, p.352.
ent in the case of F£s and Tetouan, which the rebels had 
already entered, and where they entrenched themselves. The 
reduction of these two cities necessitated a long siege.
VI - The Collapse of the Rebellion
The unexpected death of Mawlay Ibrahim on 15 March, 1821 
seemed to offer a solution to the dynastic crisis which 
had resulted from the Fes rebellion. The news of his death 
was received with a great joy by Mawlay Sulayman who was 
preparing the siege of Tetouan. The insurgents, however, 
manifested a firm resolution to persist in their rebellion, 
for immediately after the death of Mawlay Ibrahim they 
proclaimed his brother, Mawlay SacId under the same 
conditions originally proposed in the bayca of 16 November, 
1820 (131). The bay^a of Tetouan, drawn up by cAbd al- 
M51ik al-Murri, a Fasi sharif who played a significant 
role in the rebellion, reiterated these conditions 
according to which the sharlf-s and all those who enjoyed 
"a noble genealogy" were to assume a prominent role in the 
public affairs of the country (132). The bayca of Mawlay 
Sa^ -Td also reflected a certain ascendance of the Wazzani 
sharif-s who were the most militant agitators in a region 
considered to be the stronghold of the Idrisid sharif-s 
outside Fes.
From March 1821 to April 1822 Mawlay Sulayman's 
attention was mainly taken up with with the siege of Fes 
and Tetouan. Mawlay CA1T, the Sultan's son, was entrusted 
with the military operations in the north, while Mawlay 
Sulayman took residence in New Fes to direct in person 
the siege of the neighbouring town. Mawlay cAlf succeeded 
in subduing the northern tribes, but the Tetouani-s 
offered a fierce resistance to the 15,000 strong army sent 
by the Makhzen. Tetouan was in a better position to resist 
Mawlay Sulayman for two main reasons. First, the city
(131) Cf. bayca of Mawlay Sacid in Dawud, III, pp. 259-264.
(132) Ibid.
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had a larger rumat (urban militia) force than Fes. In 1795 
Tetouan was still able to mobilize 2, 000 militia men (133) . 
It had also many competent artillerymen (tubjiya) some of 
whom had been sent to assist the people of Fes (134) . 
Secondly, Tetouan,being a maritime town, had larger stores 
of military equipment. Moreover, the people of Tetouan 
managed to control the port of Martil until January 1822. 
Martil served not only as a maritime outlet, but also as 
an important depot of military equipment (135).
The siege of Fes and Tetouan lasted for about a year. 
During this period events began progressively to favour 
Mawlay Sulayman. In the spring of 1821, the rebels suffered 
a major defeat at the hands of the Oudaya when Mawlay 
Sacfd attempted to enter Fes after having been proclaimed 
at Tetouan. In June, 1821 the Beni Mguild submitted to 
Mawlay Sulayman (136) and in July, Sulaymani troops 
inflicted heavy losses on the Ait Oumalou after Abu Bakr 
Amhawish attempted to relieve Fes (137) . This military 
success was mainly due to the artillery received by the 
Makhzen from Tangier (138). It encouraged other tribes 
to submit to Mawlay Sulayman, particularly the Guerouane 
and Oulad al-Haj (139).
Following these military successes, Mawlay Sulayman 
headed north at the end of October, 1821 to inspect the 
forces besieging Tetouan. He spent most of the winter at 
Tangier from which he directed military operations.
(133) Al-Ducayf, p.315.
(134) Akansus, p.336.
(135) C.0.91/79, Robert Sillery's Report.
(136) Letter frcmcAbd al-Qaiir al-Turkf, chief bombardier of Mawlay 
Sulayman, to Khalid al-cUmarI, gad I of Tangier, dated 17 Ramadan, 
1236/18 June, 1821 in CCC, vol.27.
(137) Letter from Fes dated 6 Qacda, 1236/6 Aug., 1821, in CCC,vol.27.
(138) Ibid.
(139) Ibid.
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Despite a reinforcement of 3,000 men who were mobilized 
by his nephew, Mawlay cAbd al-Rahman from the Doukkala, 
Abda and Chiadma, Mawlay Sulayman failed to break 
the Tetouani resistance. In January 1822, Makhzen troops 
gained control of the Martil fortress, but were unable 
to subdue Tetouan itself. In February 1822, after the 
besiegers suffered heavy losses, Mawlay Suayman decided 
to abandon the siege and return to Fes (140).
In February-March 1822, Mawlay Sulayman led a pacifi­
cation tour through the country north and east of Fes.
By subduing the Ghiatta, and particularly the Hayaina, 
he succeeded in depriving the Fasi-s of their most 
important source of cereals. Henceforth, Fes was unable 
to maintain effective contact with Tetouan or with the 
surrounding tribes. Tired with the long siege, the people 
of Fes opened the gates to Mawlay Sulayman who entered 
the city on 20 April, 1822. The submission of Tetouan 
automatically followed on 3 May, 1822 (141).
Strangely enough, it was the rebellion of Fes which 
saved the country from the political impasse it had 
reached after the Zalan defeat. It was only after the 
proclamation of Mawlay Ibrahim in November, 1820 that a 
certain consensus began to take shape around Mawlay 
Sulayman. Instead of overthrowing Mawlay Sulayman, the 
Fes rebellion did in fact contribute to the restoration 
of his authority.
The major factor which contributed to improve Mawlay 
Sulayman's situation was the refusal of the army to 
rally the rebels' cause. The war which broke out in 
October, 1820 between the Oudaya and the Fasi-s (142) was 
decisive in this respect. The Fasi-s who had forgotten all 
about warfare "because of the long period of peace", were
(140) C.0.91/79, Robert Sillery's Report.
(141) Ibid.
(142) Al-Majdhub al-Fasf, Tadhkirat, p. 351.
380
completely overpowered by the Oudaya cavalry (143). The 
people of Fes had no other alternative but to appeal to 
the Berber tribes for assistance. Ultimately, this Berber 
intervention on behalf of the Fasi-s made any recon­
ciliation between these and the Oudaya impossible and 
persuaded the latter to treat the rebellious regime with 
hostility.
The nature of the coalition behind Mawlay Ibrahim 
(sharif-s, Fasi-s and Berbers) persuaded most of the Arab 
tribes of the Azghar to rally to Mawlay Sulayman's cause. 
Tribal antagonisms to a large extent determined the out­
come of the rebellion. Thus, the Beni Hsen declared their 
allegiance to Mawlay Sulayman immediately after their 
traditional opponents, the Zemmour and the Sefiane, 
rallied to the party of Mawlay Ibrahim (144). Traditional 
tribal animosities were also responsible for the disinteg­
ration of the united Berber front. The first major 
defection occurred within the Ait Oumalou themselves. In 
June 1821, the submission of the Beni Mguild (145) was 
followed by that of other Berber tribes such as the Ait 
Morghad and the Ait Izdeg who, together with the Beni 
Mguild, were able to provide Mawlay Sulayman with one 
thousand cavalrymen (146). With the assistance of these 
tribes, Mawlay Sulayman won a major victory over Abu Bakr 
Amhawish on 29 July, 1821 (147). This military success
led to the defection of the Guerouane, thus undermining 
the fragile Berber coaliton led by Amhawish (148). 
Thereafter, the Berber alliance ceased to be of any use to 
the people of Fes.
(143) Ibid.
(144) CCC, vol.27, bulletin covering the period frcm 4 to 19 March, 1821.
(145) Cf. letter mentioned in note 136 above.
(146) Cf. note 137 above.
(147) Ibid.
(148) Ibid.
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The rebels were also weakened by the fortuitous 
arrest of the head of the Darqawiya religious order.
Mawlay al-^Arbl al-DarqawT was taken into custody by the 
Oudaya after he failed to persuade them to join Mawlay 
Ibrahim's party. Ibn al-Ghazl was greatly concerned about 
the future of his shaykh and manifested, therefore, great 
moderation while the latter remained in Mawlay Sulayman's 
hands.
The role of the Darqawi-s in the rebellion was also 
tempered by the political ascendance of the Wazzaniya 
religious order, particularly after the movement extended 
to the northern provinces. Contrary to Darqawi hopes, the 
new sultan did not confer any leading role in his govern­
ment upon Ibn al-Ghazi (149). The real leadership of the 
whole movement was taken instead by the Wazzani sharif-s. 
The political dominance of the Wazzani-s necessarily 
moderated Darqawi enthusiasm for the cause of Mawlay 
Ibrahim and his brother, Mawlay Sacid.
Mawlay Sulayman's success was also made possible by 
the financial difficulties of the rebels. When they had 
proclaimed the new sultan, the rebellion leaders had anti­
cipated that they would gain a rapid control of the 
northern ports from which they could establish commercial 
contact with the outside world. Their failure to subdue 
these places considerably diminished their chances of 
success. Nor were Fes and Tetouan able to establish any 
durable contacts with their hinterland. The financial 
resources of the rebels ran out very quickly. Makhzen 
funds left by Mawlay Sulayman in the treasuries of Fes and 
Tetouan were soon consumed. Other public funds such as 
the ahbas and the inheritance of the munqa^icun were also 
used up (150). Fasi and Tetouani merchants who had staked 
their support on a lightning victory were the next victims 
of the financial difficulties that faced the rebels. After 
the exhaustion of public funds, the rebels turned to them
(149) Al-Zayani, Tuhfat al-nubaha3, K 241, p. 196.
(150) Al-Ibtisam, p. 67; al-Majdhub al-Fasi, Tadhkirat, p. 353.
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so that their resources were also consumed by the expenses 
of the war.
Moreover, lamentable living conditions within the 
besieged cities of Fes and Tetouan greatly undermined 
the population's morale. "During these days", wrote the 
author of al-Ibtisam, "the people of Fes were in a great 
distress because of the rise in food prices and the inter­
ruption of communications" (151). The shelling of 
residential quarters by Makhzen artillery made even worse 
the living conditions of the Fasi-s and the Tetouani-s.
Food stores inside Fes were hit and eye witnesses reported 
scenes of streets running with oil, honey and butter (152). 
The economic blockade of Fes became unbearable after 
Mawlay Sulayman1s military successes over the Berber 
coalition under Abu Bakr Amhawish in the summer of 1821 
and the submission of the neighbouring Hayaina in February 
1822 .
Mawlay Sulayman's victory was also made easier by his 
military superiority. The failure of the rebels to control 
the ports deprived them not only of an important source 
of revenue, but also prevented them from receiving 
sophisticated military equipment from abroad. Mawlay 
Sulayman, on the contrary, benifited from the regular 
flow of heavy arms which he received from Europe. In 1820, 
he received fifty canons from France, Great Britain and 
Sweden (153). The following year, he was supplied with 
twenty mountain guns from Gibraltar (154). The use of 
artillery proved to be decisive in the defeat of Abu Bakr 
Amhawish in July 1821 as well as in the siege of both Fes 
and Tetouan.
(151) Al-Ibtisam, p.67. Cf. similar observations by al-Majdhub al- 
Fasi, Tadhkirat, pp.353-354.
(152) A letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman's chief bombardier at Fes to the 
gadI of Tangier dated 17 Ramadan, 1236/18 June, 1821 reported 
that shelling continued even during the holy month of Ramadan. 
Cf. COC, vol.27, fol.218.
(153) CCC, vol.27, 25 May, 1820.
(154) F.0.52/22, 17 March, 1821.
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Finally, Mawlay Sulayman's success was partly due to the 
benevolent attitude of the European countries. During 
this political crisis, European nations were unanimous in 
their support of him. The conservative nature of the rebel 
regime and the religious groups that were behind it had 
raised the apprehensions of the European consuls. "The 
European powers", wrote Sourdeau, the French consul, in 
1820, "are determined to use every possible means in order 
to keep the present Emperor, with his peaceful policy, on 
the throne" (155). The fact that the new regime was easily 
identified with the short-lived reign of Mawlay al-YazXd 
and that he depended on the same intransigent groups 
excited the fears of European nations. "Soon we will see 
the Moroccan navy, at present annihilated, privateering in 
the Straits and disturbing trade in every possible way" 
wrote Sourdeau in 1820 (156). The European consuls refused 
to recognize or assist the rebels and provided Mawlay 
Sulayman with every possible assistance. Not only did they 
comply with his appeal to boycott the port of Martil, the 
only window the rebels had on the outside world, but also 
provided him with the necessary artillery to ensure a 
military superiority over his opponents. Not less 
important was the military assistance received from Spain 
through the fortress of Ceuta and which was used in the 
siege of Tetouan (157). Great Britain assisted him 
financially, facilitated the transfer- of Muhammad Bejja's- 
inheritance (158), and granted him a loan of 50,000 Spanish 
dollars in 18 21 (159). During the same year, Denmark
(155) COC, vol.27, 20 May, 1820.
(156) Ibid.
(157) COC,’vol. 29, 4 Jan., 1822.
(158) C.O. 91/79,- Order by the Governor of Gibraltar concerning Bejja's 
property, dated, 11 Aug., 1821. Cf. note 82 in chapter IV above.
(159) F.0.52/22, 16 April, 1821.
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agreed to pay its arrears of trihute amounting to 100,000 
Spanish dollars (160) without making any juridical protest 
over the existence of two rival princes (161) . This 
financial assistance proved to be highly valuable at a 
time when Mawlay Sulayman's income was greatly reduced by 
the political and economic situation.
VII - The Nature of the Rebellion
Some European authors have seen the Fes rebellion as the 
creation of trading interests and a reaction by the 
merchant class against the restrictive commercial policy of 
Mawlay Sulayman (162). A more careful examination of facts 
leaves no doubt, however, about the conservative character 
of the movement. While the rebellion did allow the merchant 
class to play a more active role in the country's political 
affairs after 1822, it was by no means carried out by 
merchants.
Indeed, a glance at the bayca issued by the rebels to 
Mawlay Ibrahim on 16 November, 1820 tends to invalidate 
Lazarev's claim that the Fasi upheaval against Mawlay 
Sulayman constituted a "bourgeois revolution" (163). The 
authors of the bayca called upon the new sultan to remove 
merchants from government and to rely instead on the 
sharif-s and the traditional notability. "The interests of 
the Muslim community should not be placed in the hands of 
merchants and wealthy people", underlined the text of the 
bayca, "but in the hands of individuals whose noble
(160) F.0.52/22, 17 March, 1821.
(161) In 1794 Denmark had refused to pay its tribute on the pretext that
Mawlay Sulayman was not in complete control of the country; cf .F.O.
52/10, 21 Sept., 1794.
(162) Cf. in particular Thanassy, Des relations politigues et caimerciales 
de la France avec le Maroc, 1842, et G.Lazarev, "Aspects du capita- 
lisme agraire au Maroc avant le Protec torat', in Annua ire de l'Afrique 
du nord, CNRS, 1975, pp.57-90.
(163) Lazarev wrote about the rebellion: "II soiible qu'elle ait ete plus
qu'une revolte, mais une revolution qui porta la bourgeoisie canmer-
gante^  au pouvoir dans la cite de Fes"; cf.his1'Aspects du capita- 
lisme,’ p. 59.
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ancestry stands out as the surest guarantee against 
deviation and treachery" (164). The conditional bayca 
also called upon Mawlay Ibrahim to respect and honour 
those of noble ancestry, "without overlooking the 
distinction that exists between sharTf-s and non-sharlf-s 
(165). Makhzen responsibilities, demanded the bayca, 
should be entrusted to families whose loyalty to the 
cAlawid dynasty had been proved during the reign of 
Mawlay Ismacfl—  in other words, to the prestigious 
traditional families (166). The composition of Mawlay 
Ibrahim's government brings a further proof of the 
conservative nature of the rebellion. Muhammad b. Sulayman, 
an Andalusian, was appointed chief minister, while Sidi 
al-cArbT, head of the Wazzaniya religious order, assumed 
the role of advisor to the new sultan (167) .
The examination of the Fasi signatories of the bayca 
also makes the predominance of the Andalusian and sharifian 
elements clear. The Calim-s and merchants, on the other 
hand, seem to have played a secondary role in the 
rebellion. While the traditional Fasi notables and the 
Idrisid sharif-s remained convinced enemies of Mawlay 
Sulayman throughout the rebellion, the support of the 
calim-s and the merchants slackened very quickly.
A - Rumat and Notables
Since the break-down of Makhzen authority after the 
Zalan defeat, the Andalusian notables, particularly 
those belonging to families traditionally known to have 
provided the politico-military leadership in Fes,
(164) Cf. text of the bayca in Dawud, III, p.256 (extracts in appendix 
86).
(165) Ibid.
(166) This is a clear reference to Mawlay Ismail's reliance on 
Andalusian notables in the government of Fes. Andalusian families 
such as al-Rusi and al-Ghamati provided governors and army 
officers during his reign. The Bildiyyih, on the contrary, seem to 
to have been held in disgrace by Mawlay IsmacIl. Cf .N. Cigar,"Une 
lettre inedite de Muly Ismacil aux gens de Fes',' in Hesperis-Tamuda 
vol.,XV, 1974, pp.105-118.
(167) CCC, vol.27, 1 March, 1821.
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reacquired an importance they had lost under Mawlay 
Sulayman. In view of the growing insecurity caused by 
Oudaya attacks, the people of Fes were forced to turn to 
these notables to whom they entrusted the defence of their 
lives and property. However, the importance of the rumat 
leadership tended to decline as the rebellion broadened to 
become more than a purely Fasi movement.
The rumat (pi. of rami) formed the urban militia of 
some hadariya towns, such as Fes, Tetouan and Sale. They 
were initially armed with crossbows, but adopted firearms 
later on (168). It is not possible to ascertain when and 
how the institution originated, but the rumat were, 
apparently, first used by the Makhzen during the reign of 
the Sa^adian sultan Ahmad al-Mansur (1578-1603) (169).
They were financed on a local basis and their main duty 
was the defence of the town against tribal attacks and the 
guarantee of tranquillity within the town itself in times 
of political instability.
Under the cAlawid dynasty, the city of Fes was usually 
requested to contribute to the Makhzen's military needs by 
sending a contingent of rumat to fight alongside the army. 
The size of this contingent varied greatly from one reign 
to another. Under Mawlay IsmacIl, Fes used to support a 
military force of 3,000 men (170). Following his death, 
the military contribution of Fes was reduced to only 500 
men. This did not prevent the rumat leaders from playing 
a significant role in Fasi politics during the chaotic 
reign of Mawlay cAbd Allah. The Andalusian family of al- 
LirXni, for instance, provided both rumat commanders and
(168) Ibn cAlf al-Dukkali, Ithaf, 13,009, R.L., p. 16.
CJ ^ ; J J l  r .U ,liuLj_ iJ  t w o 1* !
4---- LS (J* O'— ** (J—^ 4 L^uJ I 3 Uj 4 JLV; . . .
(169) Al-Nasirf, V, p. 163.
(170) Al-Zayani, Tuhfat al-nubaha*, K241, p. 192.
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Makhzen governors during this period (171). The military 
contribution of Fes was subject to a further reduction 
with the accession of Sidi Muhammad b. cAbd Allah to 
power in 1757. During his reign the people of Fes supported 
a modest force of only 50 men (172). His successor, Mawlay 
al-Yazid, brought back the Fes quota of rumat to 500 men
(173) . After .1792 , Mawlay Sulayman reduced the military 
contribution of Fes to a symbolic figure of eighteen men, 
one for each quarter. In his military campaigns he was 
often satisfied with ten men only (174). Despite their 
modest size, the rumat of Fes took part in the pacification 
of the Chaouia in 1797 (175) and in 1800 in the Makhzen 
expedition against the Alt Oumalou (176).
It is clear that the importance of the rumat as a 
military force was considerably reduced during the reign 
of Mawlay Sulayman. The reduction of their number by the 
Makhzen, in addition to the long period of peace enjoyed 
by Fes during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, were the main factors behind this decline.
When hostilities erupted between the Oudaya and the Fasi-s 
in October 1820, the latter realised that they had 
completely forgotten military practice. As a result, they 
were helpless before the Oudaya "because they had no 
longer any experience in fighting", wrote the author of 
Tadhkirat al-Muhsinln, "after the long period of peace 
(...). It was the first fighting witnessed by the people 
(of Fes)" (177)
Akansus, who witnessed the early phases of the 
rebellion, affirmed that the most active group was not
(171) Al-Ducayf, p. 148; Atmad Ibn al-Haj, al-Durr al-muntakhab, 
Ms. Z 1875, R.L., p.289; al-Nasiri, VII, p.35.
(172) Al-Zayani, Tuhfat al-nubaha3, p.193.
(173) Al-Ducayf, p.242; al-Zayani, Tuhfat al-nubaha , p.193.
(174) Al-Zayani, Tutjfat al-nubaha3, p.193.
(175) Al-Ducayf, pp.344-345.
(176) Ibid., p.410.
(177) Al-Majdhub al-Fasf, Tadhkirat; p. 351.
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made up of merchants and wealthy people—  as Mawlay 
Sulayman had assumed while he was still at Marrakech—  
but of "individuals who make their appearance in time of 
trouble only, called al-rumat" (178). The mere fact that 
Akansus had to explain what was meant by the term rumat 
already shows how unacquainted his contemporaries were 
with this institution. The rumat who led the Fes rebellion 
were certainly not from the lower ranks of the urban 
militia since the institution had almost ceased to exist 
as a military force by 1820. Moreover, the lower ranks 
of the rumat were usually temporary recruits, drawn 
essentially from the"rabble" and, therefore, unable to 
perpetuate rumat traditions during a long and peaceful 
reign such as that of Mawlay Sulayman. Only the prestigious 
families which had traditionally monopolized the military 
and administrative leadership on the city were capable of 
of playing such a significant role in the rebellion.
Al-ZayanT, who also was a witness of the rebellion, 
made no reference at all to the rumat. Instead, the leading 
role he attributed to the Andalusian notables. Mawlay 
Sulayman himself, in a letter to the people of Fes during 
the rebellion (179), vehemently attacked the Andalusians 
accusing them of being "at the root of the evil". The cAdwa 
and the Lamtiyin, on the other hand, maintained Mawlay 
Sulayman, were only misled by the Andalusians. In fact, the 
rumat referred to by Akansus and the Andalusians mentioned 
both by al-Zayani and Mawlay Sulayman were one and the 
same. We find the same names of families who traditionally 
supplied the leadership of the rumat (180). They also 
provided local governors during the reigns of Mawlay 
Ismacn  and Mawlay cAbd Allah.
(178) Akansus, p.328.
(179) Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to the people of Fes (1821), in al- 
Zayanl, Tuhfat al-nubaha3, pp.185-188 , appendix 89.
(180) Among these names we find: al-Lirrnl, al-Ghamati, al-Jazulf, 
al-Kha1;Ib, ^ Adll and others. Cf. list of Fasi notables Who deposed 
Mawlay Sulayman and proclaimed his nephew in the text of the bayca 
of Mawlay Ibrahim, Dawud, III, p.254.
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The primordial role attributed by Akansus to the 
rumat leaders, who were predominantly Andalusians, appears 
to be contradicted by the insignificant size of the rumat 
force by 18 20. Their importance, however, resided not in 
their number, but in their ability to officer the rabble 
and organize the defence of the city. Moreover, their 
weight within Fasi society was not merely due to their 
sense of military organization and mobilization. It was 
also due to their political leadership for, under the 
cAlawid dynasty, they provided not only rumat commanders 
but also Makhzen qa3id-s. Sometimes, the same individu­
als happened to be rumat commanders and local qa3id-s 
at the same time (181). Owing to their importance within 
Fasi society, the rumat leaders were counted among the 
acyan, or notables, and were, therefore, consulted on 
important matters, particularly when it came to the 
designation of a new sultan.
As a socio-military force, the rumat became particu­
larly powerful in times of political uncertainly when 
their military experience was sought by the other social 
groups. They even acquired the upper hand during periods of 
weak central authority. "Once they make their appearance", 
wrote Akansus, "wealthy people fall under their might and 
mercy"(182). The fact that their military importance had 
declined during the reign of Mawlay Sulayman did not mean 
that they had ceased to exist in 1820. Even if the lower 
ranks could easily disband and disappear over time, the 
traditional leadership was more likely to survive as it 
was closely associated with the Fasi notability.
Mawlay Sulayman was aware of their existence within 
the Fasi social structure, but he never gave them any
(181) N. Cigar , An Edition and Translation of the Chronicles from 
Mufoanmad al-Qadiri's Nashr al-Mathahl, Ph.D. Thesis. 1976. 
Oxford University, p. 14.
(182) Akansus, p.333.
tfi | |*i • r r  3L y  o>7-J. u  n r  • mT’* •/, i?
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importance. His centralizing administrative policy led
him to erode the power of this private military force by 
reducing its numbers and removing its leaders from local 
Makhzen responsibilities. "Between Mawlay Sulayman and 
these rumat leaders", noted Akansus, "there was a deeply 
rooted hatred"(183). He never Solicited their aid or 
advice because he preferred " people of decency and religious­
ness" to them (184). Apparently, Mawlay Sulayman had 
little desire to depend on individuals who derived their 
influence from "street power". Moreover, their strong 
sense of g asabiyya (esprit de corps) made them uncontrol­
lable and unreliable for Makhzen purposes. In running 
the affairs of Fes, Mawlay Sulayman preferred people who 
had no particular attachments to this traditional politico 
military elite. The government of the city was always 
entrusted to outsiders (barrani-s), palace slaves (wasif-s 
or to merchants "who were solely interested in the fructi­
fication of their capital" and whose loyalty to the . 
Makhzen was, therefore, more likely to be assured.
Governors of Fes, 1792-1822
1792-1802 Ahmad al-Yammurl
1802
1802-1803
1803-1807 
1807-1810
al-Habib b. Abd al-Hadf 
Muhammad b. i fAbd al-Sadaq 
A^imad al-Yammur i" 
Muhammad al-Salawi 
AbacqTl al-Susf 
Muhammad Wacziz
1810-1811 cUmar Abu Sitta
Muhammad b. Sirat al- 
Sharguf
Makhzen qa-^ id from 
the Ait Immour
Sultan’s affine
wasif
wagif
Makhzen qa3id
leader and qa^id of 
the Ait Idrassen
Makhzen qaJid 
Makhzen qa3id
(183) Akansus, p.328.
(184) Ibid. Akansus wrote about Mawlay Sulayman's relation with the 
rumat leaders:
, ; * ^ I  V v  n  y ^ u  r J b  ^  J jV  j l ;  v
“.ciiJJtf
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1811-1812 cAbd al-Qadir Sffra 
cAbd al-Rahman Sffra 
1813-1815 Muhammad al-Salawf
merchant
merchant
Muhammad al-SarTdi 
Muhammad Mezwar
wasif
-—  *
merchant
Makhzen qa3 id from 
the Ait Immour
cAli Majjut
1815-1817 Muhammad b.cAbd al-Sadaq
1817-1818 Ahmad al-Qusi;air katib
1818-1820 Muhammad al-Saffar merchant
wa?If1820 Qasim b. Sakin
(*Abd al-Rahman b. Far is 
(
Fasi notables 
chosen during the 
rebellion
1820-1822 (Qaddur al-Mqarff
(
(Ahmad al-Harthi
1822
(April-Nov) Mawlay cAbd al-Rahman 
b. Hisham
Sources: Al-ZayanT, Takmil gudat Fas; Idem, Jamharat man 
hakama bi Fas; Al-Ducayf; Akansus, al-Jaysh.
Mawlay Sulayman1s administrative policy and his dis­
like for the rumat leaders greatly disturbed the 
traditional Fasi notability. The break down of Mawlay 
Sulayman's authority after 1819 offered them a chance to 
openly express their hostility and make common cause with 
the sharif-s, in so far as the traditional privileges of 
both groups were threatened. An examination of the condi­
tions imposed on Mawlay Ibrahim in the bayca of 1820 makes 
the identity of interest of the traditional notables and 
the sharlf-s clear. However, the extension of the rebel­
lion beyond the walls of Fes greatly reduced the im­
portance of the rumat leaders in the movement and opened 
the way for the sharlf-s to dominate it.
B - The Sharlf-s
The use of military power by the rumat leaders in 1820 un­
doubtedly brought them to the front of the political scene 
but it did not confer the leadership of the rebellion upon
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them. In fact, the political leadership of the movement 
remained the prerogative of the sharif-s whose influence 
was further increased with the involvement of the 
sharifian zawiya-s and the extension of the rebellion into 
the countryside.
The sharTf-s never forgave Mawlay Sulayman for having 
attempted to erode their privileges by every means availa­
ble (185). The sharlf-s of Fes viewed Mawlay Sulayman's 
policy of favouring people of scholarship and wealth at 
the expense of those who belonged to the Prophet's holy 
lineage with indignation. His learned council mainly 
involved c alim-s belonging to the Bildiyyln or the camma, 
to whom he referred for advice on important matters. No­
thing could be more shocking to the sharif-s of Fes than 
the decision taken by Mawlay Sulayman in 1804 to bury his 
Bildi shaykh, cAbd al-Qadir b. Shaqrun, within the walls 
of the holy shrine of Mawlay Idris (186).
Of all the Fasi social groups the sharif-s were the 
most resentful of Mawlay Sulayman's sympathy with the 
Bildiyyln. The long period of peace that the city had 
enjoyed primarily favoured a group such as the Bildiyyln 
whose main strength was based on wealth and learning (187) . 
The outstanding achievements of the Bildiyyln in the 
fields of scholarship and trade during this period tended 
to exacerbate friction with groups whose privileges were 
inherited (sharif-s and traditional notables) and, on the 
other hand, groups whose achievements in the fields of 
learning and trade represented the only means of improving
(185) Cf. chapter VI. above, pp. 303-309.
(186) Ibn al-Muwwaz, al-Maqala al-murdiyya, Ms.493, R.L., p.21. The 
only other Bildi ^ alim to have been buried in the shrine of 
Mawlay Idris iscAbd al-Salam Gassus (d.1709) . By ordering his 
burial within the walls of the holy shrine, Mawlay IsmacXl 
apparently sought to expiate his killing of the famous Calim of 
Fes. Cf . al-Nasirl, VII, pp.94-95.
(187) N. Cigar,”Conflict and Cannunity in an Urban Milieu under 
the^Alawi-s” The Maghreb Review, Nov.-Dec., 1978, p.5.
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their social status (c amma and Bildiyyln) . Mawlay Sulayman 's 
neglect of the sharIf-s can only be explained by his eager­
ness to avoid being tied to a group whose c agabiyya and 
particularist tendencies were likely to compromise his 
efforts at centralization. His reliance on people of wealth 
and learning did not involve such a risk. Mawlay Sulayman 
was openly criticized by his contemporaries for his partia­
lity towards the Bildiyyin."The Sultan", wrote al-Ducayf, 
"respected their views and had a great affection for them.
He preferred them to the rest of the people of Fes and en­
trusted them with his money and trade from which they 
gained considerable fortunes"(188).
During most of the rebellion, the Idrisid sharlf-s, 
in particular, proved to be the most ardent enemies of 
Mawlay Sulayman's regime. The attempt made by al-Kattanl 
in the summer of 1820 on the life of the qaqll, al-cAbbas 
b. Suda, presaged the downfall of Mawlay Sulayman's 
authority in the city. When Makhzen officials arrested 
him, sharifian ca^abiyya began to work and al-Kattani was 
immediately freed by his fellow sharlf-s (189). Another 
sharif, al-Fadll al-clmranl, who already distinguished
(188) A contonporary of Mawlay Sulayman expressed his criticism of the 
Sultan's sympathy with the Bildiyyln in the following verses:
L. J  I * - - I .  • ' £ L> J ^ 4 V I J 1^ 4 1^1 ** U5 d m  m j
I3 rt4^ I ^   ■■' " f ^ } 1 ^
The old controversial issue of the alleged preference of the 
Israelite race by the Quran was raised again during the early 
years of the nineteenth century (al-Zayani, al-Turjumana al-kubra, 
p. 357). The issue used to be raised everytime the friction between 
the Bildiyyln and the other Fasi groups reached an explosive stage. 
Ahmad b. cAbd al-Salam Bannani (d.1818) devoted a long work to the 
issue (Tahliyat al-athan wa al-masamic, Ms.K.650, BGR) . Mawlay 
Sulayman , we are told by BannanI, did not approve of the campaign 
that was launched against the Bildi (-alim-s. Cf. Bannani,
Tahliyat, p.16.
(189) Letter frcrn Mawlay Sulayman to the people of Fes (1821)' in al- 
Zayanl, Tuhfat al-nubaha^, pp.181-185.
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himself by his militancy against the Wahhabi reformist 
movement, took an active part in the rebellion by incit­
ing the Fasi-s to violence (190). cAlim-s of sharif origin 
played a critical role in clearing the legal ground for 
the dethronement of Mawlay Sulayman. Sharifian <- alim-s 
were heavily represented among the signatories of the 
fatwa-s which authorized the deposition of Mawlay 
.Sulayman (19.1) . This also applied to the bay^a which 
brought Mawlay Ibrahim to the throne in November 18 20
(192).
The sharif leadership of the rebellion was, above 
all, determined by the involvement of two important 
sharifian zawiya-s, the Wazzaniya and the Darqawiya. Sldl 
al-^Arbl al-Wazzan1 found in the rebellion a means to 
avenge himself on a sultan who, since the death of Sidl 
cAli b. Ahmad in 1811, had constantly sided against him in 
the succession contest in the zawiya (193). Owing to the 
wide influence he had amongst the tribes, his role became 
decisive once the newly proclaimed sultan needed to ex­
tend his rule to the northern provinces. Indeed, with­
out the crucial support of the Wazzani sharff-s, the 
extension of the rebellion to the countryside would not 
have been possible. When the movement reached the north­
ern provinces, a Wazzani sharif of Tetouan, Sfdf cAbd al- 
Karlm b.cAbd Allah, became the main agent of rebel
(190) Ibid.,p.174.
(191) Cf. fatwa-s in Ms.D.2795, BGR, pp.393-404.
(192) Cf. signatories of the bayca in Dawud, III, pp. 253-254. The shar If-s 
represented 1/3 of the signatories and there was not a single Bildi 
calim among the proclaimers of the new sultan.
(193) Cf. chapter VI. In a long poem (urjuza) al-Zayani pointed out the 
leading role of the sharlf-s in the Fes rebellion:
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propaganda in the northern Jbala (194). His devotion 
to the new regime and his religious influence led him 
to be appointed vice-regent for Te'touan and its sur­
roundings. His zeal for the rebellion was such that, 
even after the surrender of Fes and Tetouan in the 
spring of 1822, he still refused to abandon the struggle 
(195) .
The Darqawiya religious order whose founder was an 
Idrisid sharif himself, also took an active part in the 
rebellion,particularly during its early stages. Mawlay 
al-cArbI al-DarqawI attended the proclamation of Mawlay 
Ibrahim and used his religious influence in an attempt 
to gain over the Oudaya to the cause of the rebels. His 
disciple, Muhammad b. al-GhazI, leader of the Zemmour 
confederation, took a prominent part in mobilizing Berber 
support for the new regime. According to al-Zayani, he 
was in favour of a complete dynastic change, as he 
proposed the designation of an Idrisid prince (19 6). The 
importance of the Darqawiya religious order tended, how­
ever, to diminish after the arrest of the Darqawi shaykh 
by the Oudaya and the emergence of the Wazzani sharff-s 
as the uncontested leaders of the rebellion.
C - The cAlim-s
It is not easy to evaluate the nature of the calim-s1 
involvement in the rebellion as they did not represent a 
distinct social group or a particular set of group 
interests. Their loyalty was often a function of the 
social connection they had with existing groups (sharlf-s, 
Bildiyyln, camma) or their membership of a particular 
religious order.
(194) Al-Wazzani, al-Zawiya, p.200; Dawud, III, pp.260-261.
(195) Al-Wazzani, al-Zawiya, p.200; al-Ruhunl, cUmdat al-rawln, II,
p.192.
(196) Al-Zayani, Tuhfat al-nubaha3, p.169.
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There is no doubt that the changes which occurted 
within the corps of *alim-s during the second decade of 
the nineteenth century (197) had a significant impact 
upon the political loyalties of the scholarly elite 
during the rebellion. During this decade worsening 
internal difficulties tended to monopolize Mawlay 
Sulayman's attention and, consequently, made his rela­
tions with the Calim-s very distant. The meetings of 
his learned council became very rare. The institution 
itself tended to disintegrate after the death of its 
most prominent members : al-Tayyib b. Kiran (d.1812), 
Yahya al-Shafashawni (d.1813), Hamdun b.al-Haj (1817) 
and Ahmad b. Suda (d.1820). The corps of calim-s fell 
progressively under the influence of the sharif-s. In­
deed, the Calim-s of sharifian origin such ascAbd al- 
Salam al-Azaml, cAbd al-Malik al-MurrT and Abu Bakr al- 
Manjra, played a leading role in the legitimization of 
the rebellion.
Despite this, the proportion of Calim-s who lent 
their support to the rebellion remained insignificant
(198). It should also be borne in mind that many Calim-s 
whose names appeared at the bottom of the f atwa drafted 
in November 18 20 were, a few days before the proclamation 
of Mawlay Ibrahim, subject to pressure and threat (199) . 
Thus, we find among the signatories of this fatwa the 
deposed gadi, al-cAbbas b. Suda and other members of his 
family who were exposed to great sufferings during the 
rebellion (200).
(197) Cf. chapter VI.
(198) 12 cglim-s signed the bayCa on 16 November, 1820 out of a total 
of 90 Calim-s belonging to the first and second categories —  
those who were liable to appear at the formal act of proclama­
tion. Cf. bayCa of Mawlay Ibrahim in Dawud III, pp.253-254; list 
of c alim-s established by Mawlay Sulayman around 1818 in Ibn 
Zaydan, al-cIzz wa al-sawla, II, pp.168-169.
(199) Al-Zayani, Tuhfat al-nubahaJ, p. 158.
(200) Cf. fatwa issued at the beginning of Safar, 1236/early Nov. ,1820 
in Ms.D.2795, pp.398-404; cf. also Gharrlt, Fawasil al-juman,
p. 92 on the persecution of the Ibn Suda family during the rebel­
lion.
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The sympathy of the Calim-s for the rebellion 
slackened very quickly after the new regime failed to 
gain enough support in the country at large. Some falim-s 
such as Muhammad al-Yazghl, the author of Mawlay Ibrahim's 
bayca and one of the most fervent militants of the early 
phase of the rebellion, rallied to Mawlay Sulayman's 
party later on and, consequently, suffered imprisonment 
and torture by the rebels (201) . When Mawlay Ibrahim 
died four months after his proclamation, very few ^ alim-s 
were ready to approve the bayCa of his brother, Mawlay 
Sa^id (202).
D - Merchants
In his study on precolonial social structures in Morocco 
(203), G. Lazarev blames the Fds rebellion on a commercial 
bourgeoisie in search for a greater share in public 
affairs. A similar interpretation was formulated by R. 
Thomassy when he claimed that Mawlay Sulayman's commercial 
policy was the main reason behind the political agitation 
experienced during the latter part of his reign (204).
The examination of Moroccan sources, however, allows us 
to draw a different conclusion .
During Mawlay Sulayman's reign, Fes, as an industrial 
and a commercial city, enjoyed not only a long period of 
peace, but also a period of prosperity to which a number 
of fiscal privilges contributed. Mawlay Sulayman, who 
believed at the beginning of the rebellion that merchants 
and people of wealth were the ring-leaders of the move­
ment, could not understand why the Fasi-s should be so un­
grateful to him after all the privileges he had granted 
them (205). In a letter to them following the proclama-
(201) Al-^AmrawI, Nafhat al-araj, p.45.
(202) 10 Calim-s only from Fes and Tetouan approved the bay^a of Mawlay
Sa^ Td, proclaimed on 17 March, 1821. Cf. text of the bay^a in
Dawud, III, pp. 259-264; n
(203) G. Lazarev,vXAspects du capitalisme agraire, pp. 58-60.
(204) R. Thariassy, Des relations, p. 316.
(205) Letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to the people of Fes, in al-Zayani,
Tuhfat al-nubaha3, pp.181-185 (appendix 88),
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tion of Mawlay Ibrahim, he reminded the merchants of his 
past endeavours to promote their interests (206) . He mentioned 
in particular the abolition of the maks, the reduction of 
port duties for Moroccan Muslim merchants from 10 to 2.5% 
and the alleviation of the city's military burden. Indeed 
by reducing the rumat contingent from 500 men to a symbolic 
force of only 18 men, he considerably alleviated the 
financial burden on the Fasi merchants since they used 
to make the largest contribution to the equipping and 
maintenance of this urban militia. People of wealth could 
not hope for more favourable conditions : a peaceful reign, 
light taxation and an insignificant contribution to the 
military effort. "Fcfsi merchants . . . were firmly 
attached to Abi al-Rabic (Mawlay Sulayman) because it was 
during his times that they attained prosperity", wrote the 
author of al-Ibtisam, "but they were overpowered" (207).
The fiscal privileges enjoyed by Moroccan merchants 
remained unimpaired until 1815 when Mawlay Sulayman's 
financial difficulties induced him to operate some changes 
in his commercial policy. However, neither the increase 
of import duties for Muslim merchants (1815) nor the limit­
ation on the travel abroad of Moroccan nationals (1816) 
seem to have seriously affected the interests of Fasi and 
Tetouani merchants. Despite these measures, the big 
merchants of these two towns continued to have commercial 
relations with Europe and the Arab East (208). The libera­
lization of the export trade after 1817 (209) was not 
either disadvantageous to the Moroccan merchants. These 
complained above all about the decline of contact with
(206) Ibid.
(207) Al-Ibtisam, p.67. Cn merchants under Mawlay Sulayman cf. chapter
III above, pp. I08-II7.
(208) Cf. private correspondence of Muharrmad Bejja in D.A.R., years 
1232-1234 A.H. Among these merchants we find Ibn al-Talib, 
Muharrmad Mezwar, al-cAbbas Buhlal, Muhammad al-Sarrukh, al-Tahar 
Baddu and Muhamnad al-Brubl.
(209) Cf. chapter III above, pp. 169-170.
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the outside world and the harmful effects of the drought
(210) .
The involvement of Fasi merchants in the rebellion 
was thus essentially motivated by circumstantial considera­
tions. The breakdown of Makhzen authority after 1819 led 
to the spread of insecurity in the northern provinces/ and 
consequently threatened the commercial interests of Fes. 
Moreover, natural calamities disturbed the country's 
economy and worked against the immediate interests of the 
merchant class. The prospect of a political change was, 
therefore, tempting for merchants who were seeking a more 
stable and a more efficient regime. Their hopes were 
soon frustrated, especially when they realized they had 
to pay the bill for the rebellion (211).
The text of the bay^a which brought this latter to 
the throne dispels any illusion about the bourgeois 
character of the rebellion. The bayca called upon the 
new sultan to rely on the sharlf-s and the traditional 
notables and "to avoid placing the affairs of Muslims in 
the hands of merchants and the wealthy because it is the 
cause of ruin"(212). The fact that merchants tended to 
play a more prominent role in Makhzen affairs after 1822 
should not mislead us in assessing the significance of 
their participation in the rebellion. The ascendance of 
the merchant class after 1822 was largely due to the en­
couragement of the Makhzen for whom this class represented 
the only counterweight capable of upsetting the influence 
of conservative groups.
(210) Letter fran Muhammad al-Brubi to Bejja, Jumaia II, 1234/March- 
April, 1819.
(211) Al-Ibtisam, p.67; al-Majdhub al-FasT, Tadhkirat, p.353.
(212) Cf. bay*a of Mawlay Ibrahjm in Dawud, III, p.256.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
C O N C L U S I O N
Although Mawlay Sulayman did eventually succeed in 
crushing the rebellion led by traditionalist groups, his 
prestige had been damaged beyond measure. Other misfortunes 
were to confront him during the last months of his reign, 
particularly the humiliating military defeat in July 1822 
at the hands of the Charradi zawiya near Marrakech (1).
After having completed the pacification of northern 
Morocco, Mawl5y Sulayman proceeded to the south, where 
tribal antagonism between the Cherarda and the Rehamna 
tribes threatened to develop into a violent confrontation. 
The confrontation between these two tribal groups had 
originated from rivalry over land in the Nfis valley (2). 
However, the leadership of al-Mahdl al-CharradT among his 
tribesmen and the intervention of MawlSy Sulayman on the 
side of the Rehamna led to a direct confrontation between 
the Charradi zawiya and the Makhzen. In July 1822, the 
Makhzen troops were defeated and Mawl5y Sulayman was
himself held prisoner for several days (3).
In the autumn of the same year the Sultan suffered
a final blow from the Cherarda tribes. Together with some
of the Chiadma, the Cherarda attacked a Makhzen convoy 
which was carrying taxes collected from the Essaouira
(1) Cf. Drague, Esquisse, pp.91-92.
(2) P. Pascon, Le Haouz de Marrakech, Rabat, 1917* I, p.197.
(3) Akansus, pp. 344-345. Mawl3ycAbd al-Rahman avenged this 
humiliation when in 1828 he razed, the z5wiva to the ground 
and transferred the Cherarda to the Gharb. Cf. al-Nasirl,
IX, pp.17-20.
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trade and they plundered it (4). Considerable amounts 
of money and goods were lost at a time when the Makhzen 
was still trying to enforce its authority over the 
country. Mawlay Sulayman was deeply affected by the 
incident which caused his health to deteriorate until 
he died on 28 November 1822.
The encounter with the Charradi zawiya was, in one 
way, a further attempt against Mawlay Sulayman by 
traditionalist groups. However, neither the Fes 
rebellion nor the Charradi encounter succeeded, and 
they only served to confirm the Makhzen in its new post- 
1817 policies. In fact, by then Mawlay Sulayman had 
realised that commercial contact with Europe was the 
only way he could reduce his financial dependence on 
the uncertain countryside and, at the same time, effectively 
resist traditionalist groups. The commercial opening to 
Europe which began in early 1817 with the granting of 
important reductions in tariffs was continued during 
the following years, particularly during the period of 
the Fes rebellion. Indeed, without export income, which 
was mainly used to pay for military equipment, the defeat 
of the rebellion would have been impossible.
Thus, to overcome opposition, Mawlay Sulayman had 
to return to the liberal commercial policy he had adopted 
during the 17 90s. However, this time he was apparently 
determined not to abandon trade with Europe as an important 
potential source of revenue for the Makhzen. In fact,
Mawlay Sulayman was confronted with a much more fundamental 
choice. Instead of the unsatisfactory system of taxing
(4) AkansUs, p.346.
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the tribes and relieving the fiscal burden of urban-based 
economic activity, the Makhzen was obliged to rely on 
trade and merchants as part of a permanent strategy.
Unlike the commercial policy adopted by Mawlay Sulayman 
after 179 8 when he had pacified the country, the end of 
the Fes rebellion was not accompanied by any restrictive 
measures on exports to Europe. Indeed, several decisions 
seemed to confirm that he had broken with his past 
experience once and for all. By agreeing to establish 
diplomatic relations with Sardinia in September 1822 (5) 
and by deciding to reopen the port of El-Jadida to 
European trade one month before he died (6), Mawlay 
Sulayman showed that the time had come to end Morocco1s 
isolationist tendencies.
His choice of his nephew, MawlaycAbd al-Rahman, as 
his successor was partly dictated by his concern to 
ensure continuity for the policies of his later years. 
Indeed, as governor of Essaouira from 1821 to 1822,
Mawlay cAbd al-Rahm5n not only proved himself to be a 
competent administrator, but he had also turned out to 
be an enthusiastic encourager of trade as well. During 
his residence there he had developed personal ties with 
Jewish and European merchants (7). In a way, his career 
resembled that of Sidi Muhammad b. cAbd Allah who, prior 
to his assumption of power in 1757, had also been governor
(5) F.O. 52/13, letter fran Mawlay Sulayman to the King of Sardinia, 
29 Sept., 1822.
(6) F.O. 174/28, 2 Nov., 1822. Cf. also F.O. 52/23, 23 Nov. 1822 
and a letter frran Mawlay Sulayman to Beloniel (Jewish merchant) 
requesting his assistance in the reopening of the port of
El" Jadida in D.A.R. (year 1238 AH) .
(7) F.O. 174/155, 24 Jan., 1823 and 31 Dec., 1823.
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at Essaouira. As soon as he acceded: to the throne,
MawlaycAbd al- Rahman called upon the wealthy Fasi merchant 
al-Talib b. Jallun to serve as his chief minister (8) and 
immediately thereafter granted Meir Macnin large monopolies 
over the export trade.
Merchants, of all social categories/ seemed to be the 
only group whose alliance was of strategic value to the 
Makhzen. There is no doubt that the merchant class, 
particularly in Fes and T^touan, was greatly weakened 
after 1817 as a result of natural calamities and the 
political instability which followed the Sultan's defeat 
at the hands of the Zaian. It was weakened even more by 
the Fes rebellion during which Mawlay Ibrahim and his 
brother Mawlay SacId extorted large sums of money from 
both Fasi and Tetouani merchants. Nevertheless, weakened 
as it was in 1822, the urban mercantile bourgeoisie 
emerged from the rebellion as the only victorious group 
on which the Makhzen could rely to keep the traditionalist 
groups in check.
As a practical statesman, however, Mawlay ^ Abd al-Rahman 
was anxious not to antagonize these groups, particularly at 
a time when the embryonic merchant class was not yet power­
ful enough to provide solid support to the Makhzen. As a 
result, to temper any potential opposition they might have 
demonstrated, he granted them a number of concessions. He 
had inaugurated his reign by a gesture of goodwill towards 
the Idrisid sharlf-s when he ordered the enlargement of 
the shrine of Mawlay Idris (9). The Wazzani sharlf-s were
(8) F.O. 52/24, 11 Feb. 1823.
(9) Al-Nasirl, IX, p.8.
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allowed to take control of the inheritances of people 
who died without heirs in the Touat. Traditional notables 
of both urban and rural origins were also given a share 
in the government of the country. Al-Tayyib al-Biyyaz, 
one of the leaders of the Fes rebellion, was entrusted 
with control of the customs of Tangier and, later on, 
appointed qa^ id of Fes itself (10) . Muhammad U-MimQn, 
leader of the Guerouane, was appointed qaDid of Tangier 
and Muhammad b. al-Ghazf, of the Zemmour, became one of 
the closest advisors to Mawlay Sulayman's successor for 
a time. This policy of rapprochement with the tradition­
alist elements within Moroccan society was, in fact, 
nothing more than a tactical policy designed to neutralize 
their hostility. After 1822 these groups progressively 
lost ground to the mercantile bourgeoisie which took an 
increasingly active role in running the Makhzen bureaucracy. 
Indeed, the history of Morocco during the rest of the 
nineteenth century was dominated by the ascendance of 
this merchant class whose development went hand in hand 
with the country's commercial opening to Europe.
(10) ibid.
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G L O S S A R Y
Adi
Ahbas
Ahl al- 
dhimina
Ahl al-hall 
wa al- caqd
c-n .Alim
Amin
CAmma
CAsabiyya
^shura^
ACyan
CAzib
Baraka
„ CBay a
Bayt al-mal
BidCa
Dhikr
Dfwan
Fanega
Faqih
Fatwa
(pi. udul), notary.
Pious endowments.
The protected people, particularly Jews 
living under the protection of the Muslim 
community.
People responsible for tying and untying
matters of religion. They include the 
c —alim-s, sharif-s, notables and army chiefs. 
A religious scholar.
Tax collector; superintendant; head of a 
professional corporation.
Common people.
Group cohesion, "esprit de corps”.
Tenth day of Muharram, first month of the 
Hijra year.
Notables, people of distinction.
Territory the inhabitants of which pay their 
taxes to a zawiya instead of the Makhzen. 
Supernatural power owned by saints and 
sharif-s.
Vow of allegiance.
State treasury.
A blameworthy innovation.
Incessant repetition of certain words or 
phrases in praise and remembrance of God.
A collection of poems; register.
Spanish measure equivalent to 1.58 bushels 
(or 4 Moroccan mudd-s).
Jurisconsult, learned man.
Formal judicial opinion issued by the mufti 
(or by a prominent alim).
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Hadariya (towns)
Hadith
Hadiyya
Hanta
Hartani
cIlm
Q
Ilm al-kalam 
Imam
I jaza
Jaysh
Kabira
Karama
Kasb
Katib
Khadim
Khassa
Khutba
Madrasa
Madhhab
Makhzen
Maks
Manaqib
Mawlay
Mawsim
Seats of urban civilization (Fes, 
Tetouan, Rabat and Sale).
Tradition going back to the Prophet. 
Present, gift.
Professional association of artisans or 
traders.
(pi. harratin), descendant of a black 
slave.
Knowledge, science of divine things. 
Dogmatic theology.
"Leader" in public worship, the 
spiritual and temporal leader of the 
Muslim community.
Recognition of authority in a field (or 
fields) of learning.
Army,' tribe providing troops in return 
for exemption from taxes.
Major sin.
Saint's mira.cle, sign of God's favour. 
Acquisition, personal initiative. 
Secretary.
Servant, adept of a particular zawiya 
or religious order.
Elite, people of distinction 
A homily delivered at the Friday prayer. 
A higher religious school.
Juridical school, rite.
Storehouse or treasury. By extention, 
used in Morocco to mean the State. 
Artibrary (non-religious) taxes. They 
include gate taxes, market dues and the 
State monopolies.
Virtues of saints, works of merit.
My Lord, title of distinction given to 
sharTf-s (used interchangeably with SidI) 
Religious fair.
427
Mehalla
Millah
Mudd
Muhtasib
Mujahid 
MunqatiC
Murabit
MuraqqaCa
Mur id
Mushrik
Mutasharrif
Nadhir
Qa^id
Qasfda
Qintar
Ratib
Rihla
Rumat
al-Salaf al-Salih 
SamaC
Sanad 
Shafaca
Army detachment on expedition.
Jewish quarter.
Measure for cereals and other agri­
cultural produce. At the beginning of 
the XlXth century, it equaled 12.5 kilo­
grams for wheat and 10 kilograms for 
barley. The Rabat mudd was three times 
the standard (Fasi) mudd.
Market provost and supervisor of public 
morality.
(pi. mujahidun),fighter in a holy war. 
c —(pi. munqati un), a person who dies with­
out leaving heirs.
A man who devotes his life to worship in 
a retreat, a popularly acclaimed saint. 
Patched garment worn by the adepts of 
some religious orders, particularly by 
the Darqawi-s.
Aspirant, disciple.
Heretic,polytheist 
False sharif.
Administrator of pious endowments.
Chief,* governor.
Poem.
Moroccan quintal, equivalent to 118 
English pounds. As a monetary measure 
it equaled 1,000 mithqal-s.
Salary.
Travel, travel account.
Urban militia of some major towns, such 
as Fes and Tetouan.
Pious ancestors.
Use of musical instruments for cult 
purposes.
Chain of transmission of knowledge. 
Intercession of a saint or a prophet 
between the believer and God.
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Shahada
Sharlca
Sharif
Shaykh
Shirk
Sila
Silsila
Sunna
Tabaca
Tabaqa
Takfir
Talib
Tarfqa
Tubj iya 
(Turkish)
Urjuza 
Uqiya
Ushur
Wali
WasTf
Wazlr
Wird
Zakat
Ziyara
Zawiya
Profession of faith.
Islamic law.
A descendant of the Prophet Muhammad.
Spiritual leader; teacher; head of a religious 
order.
Polytheism.
A voluntary allowance; a regular gift from 
the sultan.
The line of succession in a religious order
traced to some religious authority.
Prophet’s traditions.
Sultan's personal guard, 
c —Category (of alim-s or saints). 
Excommunication from the Muslim community. 
Student; learned man; secretary.
Sufi path.
Artillerymen.
A poem according to a particular metre called 
rajaz.
The basic monetary unit in pre-colonial 
Morocco, based on bronze. In 1818 it cost 
3 shillings and 6 pence or 40 French centimes.
Quranic tax of one tenth on agricultural 
produce.
(pi. awliya>) , God's friend, saint.
Sultan's slave.
Minister.
Litany; initiation formula communicated by a 
shaykh to a murId.
Tax of 2.5% paid on precious metals, merchandise and 
livestock after one year's uninterrupted possession 
of a certain minimum (nisab) .
Offering made to a saint or a sharlf.
A convent or a retreat. In North Africa also 
used to designate a religious order.
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3Almost all the documents contained therein are being 
published for the first time here. By reproducing these 
documents we aim at:-
1. Providing those who seek a deeper knowledge of 
the period with first hand information for a more intimate 
acquaintance with the issues discussed in the thesis.
2. Assembling as much documents as possible about 
a reign which is not only under-studied but which is also 
strikingly poor in documents.
Thus, we would have contributed to clear a major 
obstacle which has prevented until now the study of the 
period.
The documents are organized chronologically. Docu­
ments which bear no date and which we were unable to 
situate in time will come last.
4Appendix 1 : Letter of rebuke from Mawlay Sulayman to 
Sidl CA1I b. Aljmad concerning the latter's support for 
Mawlay Maslama.
Date : not mentioned (1792)
Source: Ms.K.1264, BGR, p.365.
* J——*>.1 Ox 0>^— *"•—*j ****0x
jl> y L# I J  jlxJ t  ^ —>*«.l1 >^11 Lj>.L
IJ—a ^  bujj jU ^JI y ijlkiJL  uLLUjy I—mJ ^  dJJ  ^ :£
4 ^Lrl VJ dJ <»■.—,>»'V 0 1,4 Jsu,4j dol <-,LjUI
» cijl <d* LiJ I bl# 4 d  if. jl« ji dJy ^
4 d - I,..i j  aJjl<o aJUI dJLli^J 4 jJILJ!  ^ ^JLall v_0c^
J — ^o x  J fj*  > U L  ^ IJ I  Jl^.1 J*l-d;V 4 dJ a*U, dLU J *
■»*rf j® ^4 1*5 4 JJp LJ L aJ Aj* (j*^ J ^  (_/• Ul J
• J g Uy VI aJLII j i -  aJJ ju»J^ dJ ^ J / U U I
I <1 M>,il I 4j\mf,hy jj I g|> AlilJIj J^ ill d  Ju {j+
L *^1 *d > *4 J^bli • p<oJ L I L y^4 I
« m
4 J j !■<>dll I dA A*t J> d j A*A^f  do* ys> 0i.Oi
W l
^ juJ  I aa» ^  Ll? jj IaJ d*j di d  V.t.ll d  —c* c  CMgjt L**j
dJ I V^w Ii »»J ll L. lift O* df J  1^ # J LnmidJ L I ^
J j m ■■■.%{ ^  l—fti I jj# ^  >>* 4b V^wl d  l> VJ y 4 aJ <—w J V
*r
• A— ■ .‘jij aU I
Appendix 2 : Letter from Mawlay Hisham to the king 
of Spain asking for money and military equipment. 
Date : 29 Jumada II, 1206 / 23 Feb., 1792.
Source : A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4328.
j— ..yi oUJ-J' JJ
d « J  C m  ji JJ li J-Arf 1*1 | J  Jtfj I I J *  ^ I
 ^  ^'■ —— )^  y Otfi** b j A* — On cJ 111 I ^  JI* >■ ^ 4  Jtx j Ou«
b  j J |j 4 V—»^  >|J b  L  Alt ^  I^ J I J I O l  if j
0  V I* • *11L <J LJI b z j . A > 3  4---------y  j ^ j Z  ^  JJ I J  U1
3 -kdd <o* *—> j  v>—5l5L*J 1^ J^bCJI^ a^UI^ ^
1 . JI ox I uJUJI Lual>- y^lt
,  *^U J J I y Lkyjl ^ 4  S^5l b  I(i.X* y 4 i^ ~ y 41 ^  44
. *>1 J l ,  JJI * U 0 J J ^ J I  IJl» J*y  . Jj\
M
.  1206 fL J b^ Ij b! I i »tj
6Appendix 3 : Dliahlr by Mawlay Sulayman appointing 
Ahmad b. Suda gafll of Fes.
Date : 21 Rajab, 1206 / 15 March, 1792.
Source: Sulayman al-Hawwat, al-Rawfla al mag?uda,
Ms. K.2351, pp.320-321.
A* >■«<» y iJ  iU**»« L* U  4 g *i ^ 1  S aU  I y 4 J - » >  y aU  >V« %11
43 Jum > 1a« A *  J  Ij i  C >  J  J  ^  .* tJ  I I «*» LfJ I I I
** WA *
J —« * C aU I ^JJ 4—Zy3y aJJ I JUuJ I jL}
J L c  j  c d jL :  aD  lj  a;15j 1 jla  ^ At I a^ojl jla* I a >
*s« U U  >lj ** bj ^  1 b *^y*y b a* V b*»j
 >Nl j j U I
aJU I JLt I >U *>»4 ^  Lij I » Aj JUC
(  £  L— J  -  Vj* )  aJ aJUI J  I— S
IJLa A !««■«) I A  jtCkiy ^ , i » )  I ^ llJ  JLgg\*J L  aU  I 4 JU^
A ^ l Ju^U I^U I J*<*l aJ aJI ^ L J I ^ N l
4 J 1 f  L  ^  I ^ w J  I u * > 1  «L «J I j *  L . J  I JUVw^if I C >  jJ I
4U» * I >1* >«J? aJ rt* ^ImAi aU  I ^ y u l 4 ^  b l  1 Ju *S4 ^  Aj ** I ^  * *
»
4 m ihhmIvw A L^lj LlJ^  A j*y A <»> J4Lt^ 4^ y9y aL) I AJ>> y A*^ /1 A JLA
La NSj aJJ I l t w L0  A j J ^ | I (j*  l l  4jtA^- * ‘S ir  I J
a Lm^J a bf^b^ ul^4«J I u 11 I pL |J a b^oJ  ^  a ^ * 1 * I La La^ ,, ^  b
i 1 ■ ■■■" hi A> aJJ I * L i )^J O 4  |> i»w V  V ^ « L « J  I Jy A * i t  ^4 l*J
■«*»! (J^lJ I * (Ja ) I b^li ^  A Ainf Vj
^  ^  a 111 Lf ulILw^ Ij 4  ^J L a lg aJU I L ju^
7jjj* s L a TjJI J U J L  jJ-jJI ^y— l.*s<^  * tfLoiJI (-tJli <lU  1 *L^ ,jJ
' !»>♦  ^ | lk| l I JlJ I I 4 yLf Jj ^ AJ I ^  ^  U^yul I kaU iJ li »1*> MW
' * * i iM»l^  j l  *jo w )^.«J ^  I A^ J J j   ^ <aJ l>* A^ Vi 19 aJ  I Jtf *^*-» *«1
a) l>. ^  0*3  ^ O ^  ^  A L; I*> J  UJ  ^ iljN aJ*2 j4  y  (ji Jlx> A*aj ArfA
L ^  J  I f  lilt (J y  j l  4 J l,f. A ll  \aM A 4 4  A llf^ j >5jJ I ^  JlA
AwmU I j  L * J  tiU  J ^ 4  * !^J ^  i^ w j  4 Ag If A^  kV f ' C j  A*«Aj ^J-kt tiU *3 ^A
I— — .lull.. * j  L «JL« ««> L«£ AU ^  ^*»^J I AU I JL*fc ^ylj^ Lfc* j  ti)J L ,
j J  io • ^ ^LmJ Ij I j  jj) I u » >  Lo >U *>>< L* j
• <—iJ^ j^jjS Lj Ai*» ^ If Jji) I j ^>4 ^
8Appendix 4 : Letter from Mawlay Maslama to the
European consuls at Tangier concerning his different 
with Mawlay Sulayman.
Date : 21 Shacban, 1206 / 14 April, 1792.
Source: A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4328.
0 I^l L VJ i y  Vj Jy> 0 1,11 *^*4
SjKiU jJLIL o  I 2il— S 2 L^a^ J
* j jj ^ ^  j y t  j  > U  N  I L ■ i « j  1 i n  ( J  V ^ «
1^«4 lul 1^* pf-**
 ^o u  ^ #1>j jl»*> >l c^ Lwli^ li>j « 1^
• l j ' m ■' ■— "■ • 0J4 I. -fciSii LjJc JjjJ ^  jj I I I | .-
♦ 1206 ^i s & 2 1  ij— 9)
9Appendix 5 : Letter from Juan Manuel Salmon, Spanish
consul general to Mawlay Sulayman concerning the offici­
al Spanish attitude towards the dynastic crisis in 
Morocco.
Date : End of Shawwal, 1206 / June , 1792.
Source : A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4327.
(j Vy* ij jumt ^>aJ I  ^UJI j J^suaJ 1 I
4%.
f*/" jL»«tI ^ l».t jw
j l f  j  Ik L , dJ*JI j  V^* ^JJ y
JS 4j
u  i I  i | j  J  £ •  * J  l * * J  ^  ^ L a J  I  ^  ^  j  f ^ l * *
| .i^ Lm ^ j|  ^ <«» a r |j 1 I 1. ■• Jul* lii>
V _ J  J ^ U I  j 3 \ j *  J U L l  J J
f  ^  U a J -w  ^ j J  l j  < ^ « J  1 < L >
i i l  ! j  j l j ^ j l ^  c ^ a J I  o l ^ L J  ^  * J  ^ . . i V j l I  L — « t  <J  u U ^ ,  U 5  J ; t r n
£ l j j l  v j^ ll #j£*;V « jl dJLJI ^ V j*  J ^ iJL  &5V j * i* U !
< i i i  ***^   ^ J UaJ J CL*I^Li^I 4 JlA if
) "*j j J* d « | ^ jJU <*U J ^ )|j j fS+ JLXL
• 1 " tJ J J j  I J L  «iAv j  JJ L ^ is  J jJb J  f 4 jj* u JJ^  ^  j j  I ^5j>-1
^ 1 J ® j  J > l  JU Vi I j l j  I I JLA 4 JLi£ T j j
O ^ t  O ^ V «  V j  r a L  V j
■ 4 2 J L -J I Jai> * ,-  el j i  dJ J j  * , j  ILJLmJ I y>
10
111 I J I jlIcVI J  Uw £» • LL^iJ I
5* A
—^'j *■' j *---w jj! >w ^  4^ J j | * 11 J-lAj CL* Lw ^J'4 4jLI I * Lw ^  J
d  LM (jV^4 J  * .JLrL ~ VI iJjaJI *— i;lLJL»
|»~-idl>^ C*^ei> <««<«b^ l 1^ c a JI
d  '"«' I* j  ^  y  lj> jSj j Lfc<» *■*■*>-* L j • I ^ l — *"
Jl) I 4 JLA 0*£» I **4! I 1>A> 1 JAt l-Jjl ^  jJ 4  jS jl |^J I - -r I
1^ ■ n>j>l j 4 JL «JL£ (Jyyiw ^lj»> 1^^  J <JJ I (J^4 V—JJsl j A C 4L J I jLu* j 
♦ 1206 4i«» (JIj^i ^ >1^ < j—  .U x
O ------ .Ul ^ U .  J J  ^ I J I
* a  m
o*~----J- jjij— $  o ^5-^ 05J
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Appendix . 6 : Letter from al-Ghaz! b. Salama (Mawlay
Sulayman's qa* id) to the Spanish consul general, J.M. 
Salmon, concerning the concession of Dar al-Bayda to 
the Spanish.
Date : 2 Shawwal, 1207 /I3 May, 1793.
Source : A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4330 (2).
o' «-ui r
—  ■ —  ■■ 1 j j J j .  J J L  jjlUI rUJ!
L  0 ' ^  J - f J t  o *  o j J - 4*
Q  ■ ^  4JJ (JyS? j libL j |*j
*■  !■■ 1H 4j*% 1 ■* bV^«4i j u aJI <I*JI bV^l 4« >l> bV^4
j-mi ■ I y O^ *  ^  ^ 4^ b»c j I j*oil I
^ - k a j *  4J 0 * . * L  I  a f t  J - « i -  o - 1 J   ^ ^  V ^ t
^ — ■■ ■■ ■« liL’lj * z p j  L ;  **yyy J * *  I oft J l *  ^ * _ ; S /
> * j I *  (j « v y  < j I a 2 l ! 1  j b »  1 i m p ^ > > 3  ^ j L > j  J j  ^ b U a J L n
l * b  J c  J j Sj  4JJ  I  4j  «<L* ^  m  L m»1 t b V j 4  4j.<A>S *U  4 1.. ■ ( J
|} " v/< o^i <u» I^ 1 ^  *U I 4 xl <ilj j
* ^ ... ^ J* <iL4j»yJ! L^ J £  LoyJ I oij
lj — I . *15 b^Lufl/ | ^ J  ^ ^  ^ JUJjj d J ! 4U > j  yuOl b V j 4 j  b j L w
 ^ ■ b  C jl5  * 1 /u J  I j \  jJ  i I J  U»1 L' JUw JL^jc
b —  ^ *1^  ^  ^ <4 ^  ^ 4 11 jj 4 .L11 i^yu ill 4 a J  lj b >Vi..* 4 |^.> ^
f — " " ^  y ^5o i t  ^^sJI u J I
 ^■■ 1^.? J  Jb ^ jJI y^y 4j*Jp jJil! J9 ^ jl)1 (j4ma3
« A  ^
1 L > J  ^  ^ j l  j  j j >  j  L ^ J  I j  I j J  I ^ j «  ( j ' L i  ^  I ^ L mJ I b  V j *  1^ tfJJ
12
<i! I |*U «1  V i
4lj - JJI tjJ 0 lk L J I L 'V j L CL* J^ L J ji#  I
I j sulmxIi* * jLit Jf ~ S J t  ^  *aH ^  bl» I? J* L
4~%J| c>.a]u ^  iiU j  ^4 mJ it# *—L**#  ^ L»Lm L Owts ^4 dJ
t* l... ,.1 j  V *111 **! j l  £  UaJLJ I bVj«J l>. ^  aJLaJ U  til) j  J -i?  V |i*V  
<-■ljg t jjI  ^4  ^15 U^ b*l^> - \^u jy^ i i<^ J> *L v V j
b  > L  o> L .J ^  • iU  i S  t ^  t 4 |  ^ w l  I L  > K « ' o ^ «
^  JJ! a i
^ -■■# ^4  <J jc» I4J ^L^[t bV^J til"« JL>j tdJl> b#.^ JL*j
c£ J '" nil *^ bb^  0^ 3 iJ jrft ^  < JLlc djlj J^m m a) ^AtbaJI
f l ^ l  b V j. U l5 U - J l^ t  J l o ^ j i J I  V,1 J  c u l^
* I < iU  ^ -L ^ w  - b  t ^ l  L  jJ 1 ^ j iTji «Ai* l ^ l l  I A iyJj  J i l t  b ^ N t M
.  1 2 0 7  f U  J l j - £  2  £ — ~ l v >  ^
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Appendix 7 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to Antonio
Gonzales Salmon, Spanish vice-consul, apologizing for 
the attack made by Jbala tribesmen on Spanish vessels 
and seamen at Martil and showing readiness to receive 
Spanish friars in Morocco.
Date : 3 Shacban, 1208 / 6 March, 1794.
Source : A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4331 (1).
V J  V j  (J j ^ - V j  4  JL > •  j  < D  j u a J l
( t A » )
4 1 ■ 1 1 111 J  VI 111, «1>
JLU j.iy U I I  ^V wtl I **
La* **"’*• I ^■L > 1  o  «ia ^ Lj •—J i i.c
1 ■ U  l»l;J» j^JLjl U U j  dULotiULj; <uic ^
5u^>J1 4L, L »  till** <111 4 U . L & U  JL*. 4
^  1 V  I Jl»< til) J lj 1 J ly t^ jl
i*l—.. .ft Jl! 0 L2 2— :9j)* &  W** ^
^  1 i. n.f^  L j . ( 1 « j >  * 1. ijjjj VJ (1 L I a « V ^  t, 1. it, b«
Jm m 5 liU I J I ^ J I  ^ ^  < *-<
^ V <jJ* till J ilUJLJl ^  y ^ t .  ^  ^ J^ U**^ "
^  ^ .LaJI tibV^L L  <UI #Li ^ J  i >  ^  ^5-U j ^ 4
<1)1^  U^»iv >^1 ^IJ L  ^ lJI idJl
*
1 i *>lf X \^*‘^  ^ wU ^ j„!c c > ^ » « jyJ *m 1*.«<>» y y» Jl> til) IJ t Jx
^a  tile V, Li) * > l >  V# j  L<
I J—->-1 1^ /Sj V  L^g , J  *U I Ia a^C J L^n I I Igg \yt 1 ll* 1 tl> n )
l ^ y X t  J j  4  * J u  V j  1 J > -  J L  V j  ^ A
14
 ^ ^ J I4   ^ ^ ■A .«» » ^  ^J4 I 4 & ^  p 'l i^.li J jJ  I j j  ^
^ %l^ l^  L4  ^ y l^  L  J O-iv L4 4  i  ^ r^- ^ *J L*< ^
j l i i  ifcj . J  V l ^  4 l x >  *J l*) I < u l c  \y* L  ^  J  J L a  ^ A ^ g  L^. I9 ^ y l f  L*5 ^
# 12OB r l— t. j L —t ‘^ Jli ^ L , ) ‘oy-^x
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Appendix 8 : Letter from Mawlay Maslama to the
Governor of Ceuta asking for amunitions while he was 
entrenched in the shrine of MawlaycAbd al-Salam b. 
Mashtsh (1795).
Date : 8 §afar, 1210 / 24 August, 1795.
Source : D.A.R.
a J  I * j  L '  J  4J J I   ^ 4 JL>> y 4X )  JU *>J 1
(  t  j l k J I  )
>1——■■ 1 1*1 • (J I  ^4 , 7 » ^ l >  ^]J
\C JU( 1 J !!%<♦ j ^  \jmmloJij L J  |^ J» ^ ^ < b f
f S  ^ L J I  y  i — w (Sif*: y
j  L .  8  .  b / j  u  U  ^ 1 ,  j u V ,  JL. V ,  O - J L . 1 .  . 1 ) 1  * U  0 J
. 1210 f l .
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Appendix 9 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to Sidl CA1I b. Ahmad
following the normalization of relations with the Wazzani zawiya. 
Date : 1795.
Source; al-Ducayf, p.308.
a U  I I . j  ! ^ | 1  I  O  ^  * »  <  t l i . f r  ^ — 4
* * 1 1 1 A — « * > j  ^  * > < > 1  ^ I f r  *—$jA I C _ C ^ w J  I I
■^■1; ( ^ 1) V  ^JJ I tl^tfr j£\ i.l ^  Ull tLm< y
4 jU j f*& jU ^ t k  L^5 fLJI VI pJLu
J * * ^  jl# j j ffcii Ijly (^  1^ ) L ^ I ^ vLjJ dLj tU (^1)
< mJ juLlaJ j—>.1 r L^-5' iiLjU. ^  V j IjJtf l >  eLf *111
*■111 L*iV^1 ^jJ I I Jlt k }  • £a*J I j i*l—JcLw VI  ^^  jJ I ,^1
-— .*UI L V ^ U lLU U *U I* J U ;
jmm* *U I JttC jj. ptl <t.*i.l I  ^ ^9^ 1 I  ^ || Lll I 1 n Ll If' <yt>j
b^L) ■% .* Lwl j*S>A4 li ■ rtf y l.BitiIf 4j J »♦ Ln*.
(— 5>l J U I ^ U - V ^ ^ I ^ I ^ I ^ L c /  Uljfr1 LJ  
* ^  «!*■*! I I^ j  I* ju.wI I ^  *1) I a^ O !j ^ *11 y
»*^ { tJ 4 |l "■‘Sg J j^ mSj tU * L«|mJ I |^| jl J ^
» f L^.,J  I y  * 1—fr jj I 1^ L ~ 0  jA -^J  ^„f j <111
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Appendix 1 0 ; Letter from Mawlay Hisham to Carlos IV, 
king of Spain, introducing his ambassador.
Date : 1 Shacban, 1210 / 10 Feb., 1796.
Source: A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4331.
*«JL1L VI V  ^ 4 y *1) j>... — . — .-JI
1 '» ^   ^ li*' ^ L>0
 4  iiyh) 4 Jj£,j* ^ o J U  U y  4  4.1., ,3 y  b j * 1  <11 I j  1
4 # Jj m i U a U  I „ V l  dL/ L^wwW L/ ^ 4 wl^ h4 ^ ^   ^^ j ^ J
■■ ^ ^ J^.W  j L ,44j^ ^ 4 IP I I^J I L ^ a J  LaJLa ^  ^ ^  ^  4 J «^*V L«44^
4 < i b  j J l j  < H 41 jl J L  4 j  L s *  *  I j  6 j  * ! lJ  L»Jj
m
h > )  i - * s j l  L l W  l i l H j L ^ ^  J J )  d J I J L .  L V x ^ L J U  y - J j-  ) )  *111
m
4 ^ j—  «4j b  ^0*1 1 4>ll I* lil*lf jj5 4 <JL>- jM *U L
m m m
4 ^ - I h J  Ij o  1- J 1^ 4 i) 1^ 1 ^j4 c  L lIc  ^  L*m *JL) 1 1*1
*11  L  f . y > - j j  1 b  J l j  l y - ^ b  O  ^ 1 ! 1 3 j  J  l ^ J  l j  ^ . U J  1 JL  J - > c l j
1 "  * ^ j*. 1^  *aJ 1  ^ l j  1 -*J  1 1. 1  ^ j j  1 V J  J  L # j  *J J  I *  U  J L i*
^ L W  e U  b s ^ y  J L c  * 1 ) 1  * U  0 J 0 r - l ^ l ] l  
u  1] J Ib 'S t  — > J  1 ^ J ,  * 1 )1  J L £  t ^ V j *  <-*— .^ . i t j  1 y t i J I  L l^ v Ih o
f 9 •
*  ^i im 11 i !■■ **w^ ^ J  JL*£ j  ^Jl; L/^  JLi? ^ 4  ^ *- ■ '^.^4 !1\U ^
• l-»^ *j-Js 7j^ v t'l^bjl vjli
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Appendix 11 : Letter from^Abd al-Rahman b. Nasir to the 
Spanish consul general J.G. Salmon cencerning an embassy 
sent by Mawlay Hisham to the Spanish Court.
Date : 1 Shacban, 1210/ 10 Feb., 1796.
Source: A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4331.
. & «  V J  A-J ----- --  y  A-------------- L I JL— ^ * » J !
—»**' O *  ^ \ JJ
m
A s  c »  ! j j i  a U  j l f  j l > o  L ^ l  ^
"-j 4? ^  J L a ^  t l J  L  I V ^ 4  O  ^  ( 3  ^  I w-lJ I v )  I
/ A  ^ m
- b *   ^k . L »  y  l l w  * iU  j  *  L L u w  t^ J  I V i J l  5 y  4 ^ ^  ^  ^
*  l ^ » > u  a J J  I 4jmsu ^ L t 1^  L ‘ iJU -w  i i a L J '  O
t i L - j U x L J  ' - A L j - d  I A - b ^  l >  y  t d J U  J *  a U  b ^ < x i t  f a —  ^  ^  aJJ I a j L »
>
j f o J   ^ Aj> l l ^  j y ^ ' ! > '  I J L >  J l  *-4 I j j  ^ - . ^ i i ;  A >  J U  ^ J *
j V j f — l l »  J ;1 j > j  - r J  l * J  I J J  J  kJ  ^ P  ^  f $ \ y  i JU  I J  l l »  jJ -^ O  l * £
I i >ii ^  ^  4* ^ a J  J ^  ^  ■ l * c  j >  ^  a J J  I 4* > j  I L *  L  j u m  
 > w V  J U l  c / * ^ ^  I / ^ 5 s j  j  ^ j U I  J t  c i l j U J  W * .?
/ -T' j
A - i  i wi **v* I4  I J L A  y  I ^ A t *  a U !  4 j * & Z  b V j ^ j  U  J L .u i a L )  I * L w
f — k l k L ,  J J  J - - a j  # j L  d J U j  j  a ^  ' i b s  g j j  V  J  ^ > l j J  l j  l i L > j  d j V
I  . U  <« aJL) I J L f  U U ^ A I  I C k l i j  I ^ 4  ^lJ wLw J j  I j J  I I «JL®> 14 C > b5"
< J ^ J  I A> U x l i J  *— ! I j i l ^  ^ v J  I *•—«5j ^  A ^ 4 ^  aJD i A j ^ l  ^  l . ' t 4  L  V j< * j
j  ^ 4  b  U a U  ^ - l i I  >  < j  '- J U j A J  I A< l.» iQ  ^  1K  b  ^ y ) J  ^ J C  I  ^ 0 4  j
m  I j j l l  V - 1 t o  A U  L  ^ 4  V  A J j w  J  A  11. ««> A A J j * ^
^ l    V i  J — J L i J I  ^  a I— J j  L  0 U  a J . a *  ^  a U I  A j l j  1 J J  V J  a j J L J  J
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aJ I j  ^ JsJUj * J l  I 4j -aJ 4-m "-IH J J5" <■ ^1) I JL
— ^ * -  4 jut ^aJJ 1, ^ :M o-Jb j ^ ly.Vl
•  * - a ) ^  l * J  4 j Sit 4«l-w ^4 t '-J j L*#J I ^  L . * w  ^4 j  -. ^
,-JUl ^ J U I  fUJ! ^
aU I aI«1 ^ Jo >-<J I ^ b>-^  I JUt
M
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Appendix 12 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to Sldi ‘All 
b. Ahmad concerning the appointment of Makhzenian 
ga* id-s in Ouezzane and the neighbouring region.
Date : Hijja, 1210 / June-July, 1796.
Source : al-Ducayf, p.326.
A Ii-n mMm*  ^ V  ^4 A U  ^  <f  ^aJU JLj % l  I
» ■ > (jf A j « > I L a )  J ^  I > U  L 1 «o 4^
* * ■■ -+ ^  o  Ijy S j  ^  O  O ' *  ^  J  ^ y *  ^ U4->^
J  ~  ■ ■ ■ J L  I  »t ! 1 4^ I I (5 ^  L1a*J 1 ^  ^  i l  I
j J  J J ^  J j  a a i • • • a L ^ w  ^  15 ^ ^ *— -j »■>! L
•  ^  l t. x l <44 J u l  (j4 1^0- |> j ^ L »^ w  y <Sys*  ^ * L J  I J
A ■ . I < U  I < L »  1 J sZjy&J *  *jJ  ^  T  i l l  in ic ^  . )  i
•A .
1 *4*0- j • j^4.l J.'Stl I |> ^ O 1 J.Ao ^  L* I^ n) ^  ^ .^A»*^ ' y* LJ
d J J ,  *  o ^ J u L u  o L r t - . c - J , f J U i t > - i U I  J J  v ^ o .  U ^ l
l ,0y L J — i i J I  i t r f J I  U U J ^ c f i J I  J ^ l
L — % im>4 ^  ^ q\)  ^ k_^ 1,1 hi* c x u l  ^ j»*f I jA L^4 ^ tO
• 1210 i _ > o J  I tj j  J I — £  V I  < J L j  <4 u . «  * < L ) I 4^ V y
21
Appendix 13 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman's minister
Muhammad Ibn cUthman to the Spanish Prime Minister Godoy 
concerning the rebellion of the southern coastal provin­
ces .
Date : 16 Muharram, 1211 / 22 July, 1796.
Source : A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4345.
 ^ I ^ I aU I ^
jj I j i j y < Jl^s< L *» ^  jl) I jl—11 I
•Jjfy  ^ JUy 0   ^ I 1 1 4 I <u)y>  ^w> VI
 ^■■ 1 J ^  !<^«l I U %\|« «J <—»ll5 JLIt ^4 LJ.c
J "ii i ^  y J ^  * I ^  i>t J Lrf Im9 I *^"U  ^ j j  JL
I .1 J '■■J-lxi L .%LJ I J^Jj ^ 4 l !.C  ^JJ ^J4 ^ JJ ^JU»1
J* ■ I ' >4^ j  Jj4 JL>^ Jf4rf V c'1 ^  JJ I d .lj  I ^4 j  tltf 1+* l> i> 4  
I -J .l  J  1^1 JL »— £  jy yo>J L VJ tflll jua« ij * l— cn— *<>J ^
^  i ■ / .i***/ *iU j  j l»4 4 jl« ) q .**♦'  ^ p jb  ^ 4  1 7 9 2  dJJ I
y  ^ <u^L») I # jlA L * .l*» J I in ^ L(  ^  jjlL) ^ l> j
j—U j  o-» Uiwjb ,>* 1 2 0 9  ^ J  till J ,JL
V^4 *^1 Jj  j4
^>i I  bwj  ^ l-*4 •ill* wviL **■ ^  I l^yiJ I jl«
■^■■*«**» I ^4^ L* JLm u y • L>I^J J  ^ll>^ l I U*«w
J —.4 «f * I c ib  J J  Jjwl 4L>- ^  V ijl*  J .  I  J fc lj 4 jJLj J  I oV^^dlM
^  V, , v j I ^  1^7 <ul* IJLa jj^  ^JJ JLjL—I dJL* d J  j  * >
i. 11» 0 ^ 5  4 ^ > - L J  I d J b  ^ U % *  1 ^ y > » «  l ’L  1 < ^ - 0 ^
 ^wii ^ b  d.L 11 O’*  ^ J.lo j  4«^% 4 4J 1^* Mil  ^ 4 Ja^by
% A
I  * j l - J  * d J J  I d J  j j j  *  d J L f t  ^ U i U
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d  I j  0 1 fcU  * 1 I  ^»AA< 4 »|5I^ 4 4^ U  I
*^»  ^;^1*1 ^ I JLA <* Law eilj ^ ^5 wX*l J J^j^.14 £ 4 4wf //** ^
s— ^  o l »_r>^ J  L Vgi< ?V L I V.J aw ‘•“'Vtl.cll • I b aJL» J  <^KI I
• f^— <---w li*  ^  ^  l|«(W^ .<j I
<—jJ  L i ^  alD J^> ii rf»VI - 1 1 1  4 j^ l L ju -  *U jjL rl 1 * 1  V^I J jjl*
>^—4 I tdJ j  ^yU ^  15 jJj o ^ULaJ  I yLw^ 5jL>jJI L IcjJ ( d  I £ —^ V
<—a*1* j j  15 L ZlaiUsJI o le  J*U JU  dJb j  i ^ U I  - Jla ^JJ j j j d l
< wi * J>Aw 4.A^ I ti# J>  L <J ljJ j  ^ . * 4  -JJ I 44 %j til \ |  U ilj<w 4 jJ Ij
• (7 *>>l}Ji I J^aJ oUI^4 cuts' IS  J l> J I j^ a i)
^ — 4  ^ ^ 1 2 0 9  d J J ^ i^ L J I d liJ  jjv I 4jv ^  V U b  ^L*l 
lj—J IjY j til) jS  iu L -J  cdJL till J ^L  1*5 JLfiLU Yj Li>- fjj& u  Lp, 
^ U l - V l  W 1 d U  ^  ^ J J I  ds Y,1* * 0 *Y1 J J  U U I  -J la  J *
- ^ - ^ * 1  *i*c 1 > ( j V^ « I  ^| > 4  ^ I ^  j^ >  I pA o  j j
 ^J j I^ L® j-Atl I JLA J ^ 4  (j®jf * l«3A J IJ  JL— Aw^j5 wL l^ j  ^4j^  Y,
^y*«»y«4  ^ 1 ^ ) 4  1 ^  4wlf  |^ A til I a) Loll I J ly*
 ^ lot i 11*  ^Y5 I j  |.t jua 4  jlc   ^<115 %) * > 4  ^
j  I—I. i.oit l I o y **"t o>t* -^ -U JL) I d5 Y,1 L-jJ J  ^ *1 J ^ j L-*-l I J  -J
^■■^J !>■ j  1^ 4**»^  dJ JU I^L^ J pA JL*t J^s lj I ^bJ..Ai c i t  4Jb^jl ^  JL^ o  ^
4 , , . t j i •  *K 4 o L ^ i  t  I4 1^ J A r f  |J ^  J ^ I  *4 ^ ) 4  l^w l x  t *^ » >  |M 4  j J  I
^ ' ■ 1  —— 0*1 L  >L> OW L i  L 5  JJ^51L 1 I l j  A i ‘ l )  I J  4 J J 9  L  - 1 5  I JLA j * £  ^ ^4^ll I
*,—^ >  4 * I Ja 4w>U I d id  >^5*51^4  ^  LrJ I
j *
A I4  |i | .Li  ^ > u j  I Li Li if —J_a1 «3 loull I 1 ^ 4  4jV C3
4^1 *3 toll I ^ 4  L3^ #^ J I Aia» <)ll I 1^^  J ^  ^aimiI I ^A^ j j  | A<
0 — • J jd  - J L>J I ^  J J« |wfj J^«4w ^4 ^  I dw ^ t;
1^ -^  jlJ I J  Jj • JuJ L -44 O’* f l^l-AifcW 4 Jjj^«j> J j—it Uj 4-J Jj*4ASw
I J lA  4 *  Law 4.J L - ,  I t* l b  ^ ^  <ul^ow L  < l) I iJ ^  Jl) I ^ « l i  Lw j j l t l  I C  L 5  J u l  I
4 1—  1 ■ «.» ^ y k j  I ^ -A  I « L | J  A I L* J j 4 » l  l J U  I j ^ i l )  I
^ — .A 1-kJ I t» ■>*».%» dJLJ I / if  4 / i^ ^   ^ J  tiL u
t^*1 .51 ^4 4^  yj <uL d  *iljbl> • ^40 I4 y^lt /*^ l luxxi 4J ^ ltV
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IjJL y)) p A jU i J *  jL iJ I J-a1 *lL j J  1 jj* iLp-UI dbJ jU d l
f  LL >  ^  4 £  Lb J 1 C « • lj —«ir j  Y U >4 ^ jt
4m~*S\j* #Lw Jj ^  L* jlo» c ld  ^  I J  * dJU I *"■„<
 ^ *•
/ ,  ■ x (^ 4 J^ 4 dJ aj J3 ^ 4   ^ .5 t^ rjjJ ««^«» d " l I  |t tXA*
1 j * L» jt f  !^L5p l *wSf I I dJ j  ^4 j  b} a l*>  1^ dJ «l^  lJ.L>
L « » a a  JLrfa ^ J b  A4I I 4^15 Ll b t  y  L iftoC  L I lij l»
^ ■ M  4  J L t  ^  —J 15 aJ 1 L . « t  1 4„i.«taJ ^ 1 » J  —JJ ail# * l !  4 f ^ t  *S# I jfS *1
i,t 1 1 N*i pJ5 *\j>*d\ J J  L^a« i^^Ijij ^ 4  y  ^4y  y ^ J I  JjL5
p —  -5 .-J  li a dJ »v5t c j  Ya b  4 Ijj^  L  ^yl J ^  1.1 ^4   ^ b  >\j 4> -^ tlL
J —-*a>wm I** ppJ b.1 J *  L.d I j  d j Y^ 1 I jit L Y j 5^^ 11
jrmm^ m^4^  ^ p i Lww J  bd I ^|A itb pA Jiit - j  t>^ <) I j^jk ^  j  jJ  I O’* ^  JL^t
ijjjvU  I d id  4^1>JI v j g  +*■ y  tj1 dJJI tUiiu YJ J 1^ iJ->J I ^  U5
> ,
^ — 4 4>jl>JI 4. J^ wiJ I d b  LJLaJ YJ 4^ 4 I. # ^sJLaaJI j^p^J ^Y^ 4^ 4
• 4 /LxJl
" ^ 1) * J)JT^ ^ O'* A*b L jit y^S I^ai jA44p)l b*L« J L>i 1*1^
J  ' ■■■ " •* ' U * jL »  ^  A 4*LaA L t j5  ^5) ^ j< a X * y  <J^ yl»4»YI yaai> ^ « a )
• I— U L  p0 ^ t l j J I  pL>«. -u 5  a 2j m +, 1 2 1 1  r U ja ^ s J I^
4 4 -  4J U I u i k j  J  b i t  J  4  % 4 J T - J I  o ~ * ,
0 \ L U I  UVj. .^1.
pii 5 ^L «V 4 ^I.ILjld  L rr
♦ .^If .L- —»,f Y i£ j~J I J j>J L»
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Appendix . 14 : Letter from the Ottoman Sultan, Selfm III,
to Mawlay Sulayman requesting his help to defeat French 
designs in Egypt.
Date : 3 RablcI, 1213 / 15 August, 1798.
Source : F.O. 174/124.
The French nation having risen into rebellion and renoun­
ced all belief in the One and Omniscient God, as well as 
in the Apostles and Prophets, and being intent on subvert­
ing all religious institutions, have destroyed churches 
(sic) and banished every worship. They deny Universal 
Resurrection and Judgement and having devoted themselves 
to tenets contradictory of immortal life are become follow­
ers of the odious doctrine of metempsychosis.
They having thus united in an attack against all Christian 
nations in order to bring them over to the vile principles 
and new invented laws which they have introduced into their 
own country, have at last by dint of war and pillage forced 
the greatest part of the French to embrace their stupid 
system. In a word their national character being construct­
ed on principles of rebellion, treachery and tyranny, they 
are become a vile race, seeking only to spread anarchy on 
all sides. Thus, owing to a spirit of deceit and arrogance, 
and without advice being given to the Sublime Porte by their 
republic relative to a rupture or having made any declara­
tion of war, as practiced by all regular governments, a 
wretch named Bonaparte lately came at the head of a great 
number of troops to a province— which is under Ottoman 
jurisdiction— there threw off the mask by the attack of 
Alexandria and Rosetta...
25
Their visible end in thus breaking treaties, violating 
the peace and in perpetrating the above stated aggres­
sion is to extend their attacks against all in the faith 
of Islam. For as it has been ascertainted from sundry 
intercepted dispatches, their plan is to assail the 
three holy cities of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, it 
becomes a religious duty incumbent upon all true 
believers whether in the East or West, in Persia or in 
Arabia, to develop all their power and force at the cost 
of their lives and properties to repell and defeat that 
nation unto total extirpation.
When all this, therefore, be known to the Sultan of 
Morocco, it is the hope and desire of the Sublime Porte 
that— the favour of God being first implored and the 
fullest confidence put in his help— the most sollicitous 
measures be adopted for the purpose of intercepting the 
ships which may be sent to the succour of the French in- 
vadors of Egypt, and thus cutting off their communica­
tions as a means of adding to the Mooselmen strength 
while theirs be curtailed: In a word that nothing be 
left undone to stop their ships carrying dispatches and 
to intercept and weaken the above nation, by falling upon 
them from all sides to the honor and defense of Islam.
3 Rabeah Ewell, 1213 
(15 August, 1798 ) 
Certified (signed) Spencer Smith, 
H.B.M. Minister Plenipotentiary 
at the Ottoman Porte.
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Appendix 15 : Letter fron Mawlay Sulayiran to the French
Directoire concerning the seizure by French cruizers of 
property belonging to Moroccan merchants.
Date: 22 Rabifl, 1213/ 3 Sept., 1798.
Source: A.F. Ill, 74#| Archives Nationales (Paris) .
^ 1  JLJIJJL VI
i - J - t  <>•
• aJ I <i i* , ^  li J * ^ylJ' * j  J ,
( ^ • g u i ^ i u i )
p jl------ ill p « Ijl ,_y j  J^sd ^Jl
0 LaJyii I aJ L
I pZij  J  1 . *11 — c l c  \S Im 4   ^ i t  I J  l >  jtS- 4 «* 1> A
^ J J I^ I  L J , C w rM o * J-J-JI o ^ ' j W  u -* ;1
J  , - J t  ^  L d J ^ c l L - .  l £ L _  U J I ^ I J L c
9
 ^ ■ * * bL I* Jjs« 5^1^  Ity J^ >^ b I ^  I} r*^ ^
«  ,.„, - . j l c  b  j  u l L J  1 4   *J\ - k »  1 > J  | J  f— / •  O  I
j. - ■ ^  11^—«1 ^  JLiA* j 1 I— ■*/Aif u*b»J I
b ^  .^ -*> I* J bi» a -.t  ^ .« V  ^ j^«t ^
1 gpv^fll j^-5j *L^jku l_J JUc  ^aJI 
^  ■ ■ If- Jj* I* iH*?b j Jl—•'jI J  l..^l I u» UmoL J  Us I—J  ^
l^ t l ^  I v ^ 1 L -i-* ^  I^ J y^*
o  bfl I I jifc jJ I o  L%<o1 y 6  ^|w>lt p^ xL«
^  1 jlc 4 j J ^  (mw b j P j  I jlc ^ U J  t ,v»—11 <uwJ I t
o * J— u-» *-V ; J jy-^J Ck
f^ti^ yAt y^  ^ •y>^« y  Lftjjl, a^ >>l*J I ^J l«
♦
_r_'3l ^ L k t l
^  ■  ,* X *  y 4 <1 I  I»*il“  1 j  ^ * j f  J L m J L I * *  ^ j l l  1 ■■ ^  , n J  I
• I ^  >1 |«t ^Jflx
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Appendix 16 z Letter from Abd Allah b. Abd el Malik, 
governor of Tangier, to the British consul general J.M 
Matra, asking for the purchase of two war vessels in 
England.
Date : 6 Shawwal, 1214 / 3 March, 1800.
Source: F.O. 174/284.
f & f  jrU- 
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Appendix; 17 : Letter from al-SalawI to J.M. Matra 
expressing .Moroccan satisfaction at the expulsion 
of the French from Egypt and inquiring about the 
situation in the Mediterranean.
Date : 8 Shacban, 1216/14 December,1801.
Source: F.O. 174/ 286.
*— — ^d-£. U5"
Crpiyjs
& X-r 7 j y ^ I
V ^ / * ^ ^  J 1  <£ J *— /
)  'L A* ^ ^  ^  I ^7* ^ ^
f %j-&  W  ^  JU T/.) ^ A  I
E ! t / r  yf
-»^ Z1 L i A . k i ( ^ j L s k) ]c j
{^ A ' ^ A  f a / ) ^ 1 7 0
u ^ l ^  ^ j L f ^ & s  , < @ $ :i i ,
. L, J ^ d i S i U  wu_Sii><-i\ro)fiy> <££. ' ^ v r ^ '
• J ^*? ^ A ^ j A * l. ! ^ . ^  *>^  '^ Sr^  /£>^. ^ 8" ^ i y ^ '
r H  i^<.-Lw. . - » i ->-.z-' . . . . t-.. ,. .* ' jl ts «, -
, ^ L  A  ^A
5 -
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Appendix . 18 : Letter from al-SalawI to J.M.Matra 
dealing with various issues among which the Moroccan 
promise to allow a British establishment at Ksar el 
Seghir or Beliounech.
Date : 27 Rabic 11,1217/27 August, 1802.
Source: F.O. 174/284.
/V v£f f t - i J
^ J-® L / ) < G * k k - £ J s ^ s
■;/ 2 - 7* r
i t b r ^ b z P  ^ — ^ W ^ ; ,
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Appendix 19 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to J.M.Matra 
concerning the redemption of ten Muslim captives held 
at Malta.
Date : 23 Shacban, 1218/8 December,1803.
Source: F.O. 174/284.
< ~ J L ) L  V J  ^y  ^  ^
( f-lkll )
f 1** L JJtf tlA. 1*1 1^ 1* I* J^* y-m~A*yll) I ^J j
 ^ i ^*l JJj 4yilSj ^4  U  Krf J^y 1 L J jll d~iaj
\ \ ( j a l x j  * 4 ^ J  1^*1 Jy® >{
,  ^nt u it f . ^  >J I  ^ L jj)  LaJ I Lu Ia*J .  ^  yii) t*U J *.*^ 1.^ .4^ ^
<■■>< I  ^J i 1 Ij LoJU Uyls l>  J  Lw ^ b j^ f 4 1* 4**11 4 J Lft
. 1218  f U * d ,L J I  0 U ^  23 ^
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Appendix 20 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to J.M.Matra 
concerning preventive measures against epidemics.
Date : 11 Rajab, 1219 / 22 May, 1804.
Source: F.O. 174/284.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ U l  ,  V I V ,  V ,   .
(^•1— ^Ulf.lkJI)
* L^ J I J I 4.— mg? 1 I.ll J ^  .m* III JlA< U I • I 1^ 9 U 1
o  — '* O )  J   ^ j l  o l j 5 ^ L » J  I y  J j — ■ .*■*: * »  1 J — L  ^  y iJjU*  J — (3*^*
# ^ } J1 J - * ^  <-* --»?  <jy— 9j~*~ o j ^ = »  J — O
I I * > w"  i I J — $  < -U  ,Jy]aK>£2 y  J f- ^ J  I  ^  ^  ,..fc I  j j j  I L o J  y  f  ^  y
C*X— — i. —I J  y 4 —*4 X *  J  ■■ %  J J  ' *>»Sg V  j  < iU  j  V  £ y  J  i > » l I j
^--»•«— *jk, JJI j u—
• 1 2 1 9  r L v ^ " M
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Appendix 21 : Letter from al-Salawi to J.M. Matra 
giving clarifications about the Darqawi rebellion in 
Western Algeria.
Date : 13 Jumada I, 1220/9 August, 1805.
Source: F.O. 174/284.
J J j j i l L  Jj  l-» \ J
p i i y  J L T J
*— XfJjCX^Ls*aLc-/*A \S&<J> 
i w l y j j  o / r J  J? J U u h ^ J L J k ^ J j r J U J ^  *>J
ise^tr-
l lr— fy k -J  tJLitJkj
< J o ) f r f u J ± l J t t 4 J i / i.jljJ ±  ^  > j U z / ^ ^ A l d >  A-.
li-— &  / 1  / _#1  j jjj  x V ^ / / £ ^ ? ^ g / . / c * ,
j ^ A v /
“*— ■ ^ ' j j (- r A ^ } < j ~ ? . <--. f y L ’J  L t ^ i  /  £ / ) - ? .  I b t J  l y a ^  /jxfiJ J  j- >)
Jj Jz j JiJ ^ I o - ^  \ U i  > y r £ j \ r r i U ! * J f r i
}2z ojUjijuJ, ^ if .j  f sJ * 5 jsv ls- $*liZ'c / c > * /
- A M . f  f
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Appendix, 22 : Letter from al-SalawI to the British
consul general J. Green,asking for a British naval 
pass to convey a quantity of wheat to the Regency of 
Tunis.
Date : 18 Jumada I, 1221/3 August, 1806.
Source: F.O. 174/284.
p  t  ojfj j*, i 3  ( j Vy, pj>s>x u  I 1
g r i - j  L(^ r c^ C  - A *  j J
y ( J ^ J J J % J  Icr-^yylJ ^ JLjIjoy A i rv p U  t^ J
&  O J J J-* J P . y - ^  J
{)Am )l { & £  t X L *  P o  J J/zj 5»J I u ) f ^  ^J
d r — S v ^  I  f e - A -  A /
J 2 - 2 J i P j Jj  ]/fj ) 1 / { # /^^ 0 ^
/ v j  I/°J
I
/JJ;
Appendix . 23 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to J. Green 
asking redress in favour of Moroccan jew merchants 
whose property, loaded on three vessels, was seized by 
British cruizers.
Date : 20 Jumada II, 1221/ 4 September, 1806.
Source: F.0.174/284.
Xs-?  - r ^ lr
6-*/ t o
. \ J P P l zL.O)(j;+-U*Cr+
3(i
Appendix 24 : Letter from al-Salawi to J. Green 
regarding the liberation of Muslim captives held at 
Lisbon and the evacuation of the gewish community in 
Larache.
Date : 4 Rajab, 1221 / 17 Sept., 1806.
Source: F.O. 174/284.
J J )  i  w i j i
] ^ L  O f f i J f L l , i  j j
S l 2 J i X c  4
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Appendix 25 : Letter from al-SalawI to J. Green
concerning the redemption of Muslim captives held at 
Leghorn.
Date : 14 Shawwal, 1221 / 25 Dec., 1806.
Source: F.O. 174/284.
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Appendix 26 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to J. Green 
declining a British demand for the permission to export 
provisions from Essaouira.
Date : 2 Rabl^ If 1222 / 10 May, 1807.
Source; F.O. 174/285.
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Appendix 27 : Letter from al-Salawi to J. Green re­
questing a pass for a Moroccan vessel carrying a 
present to Napoleon.
Date : 2 Rabic I, 1222 / 10 May, 1807.
Source: F.O. 174/285.
t6 1 l»iX I
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Appendix 28 : Letter from al-Salawi to J. Green giving 
the reasons behind the limitation of exports.
Date : 6 Rabic II, 1222/ 13 June, 18 07.
Source: F.O. 174/285.
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^  J^ 4s ^ y j <J^ y-f* (•— ^ <^ r,e*Ai O*
• i * " — jJ y ^  iJ 1 J 4 >jf^ ] I ^ylt y ^5il lift J  |< Mtlt < II m>y b L j ?  ^ 4  1^1 JL>1
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Appendix 29 : Letter from al-Salawi to J. Green 
inquiring about the rupture between Great Britain and 
the Sublime Porte and requesting a pass for a Tripoli­
tan vessel to proceed from Larache to Tripoli.
Date : 11 Rabic 11,1222 / 18 June, 1807.
Source: F.O. 174/285.
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Appendix 30 : Letter from al-Salawi to J. Green advising 
him on how to approach Mawlay Sulayman to get more sup­
plies for British naval forces.
Date : 10 Jumada I, 1222 / 16 July , 1807.
Source: E.O. 174/285.
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Appendix 31 : Letter from al-Salawi to J. Green
concerning the handling of exports by Jewish merchants. 
Date : 20 Jumada I, 1222 / 26 July, 1807.
Source: F.O. 174/285.
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Appendix 32 : Letter from al-Salawf to J. Green
regarding the redemption of Muslim captives in Sardinia. 
Date : 23 Ramadan, 12 22 / 24 Nov., 18 07.
Source: F.O. 174/285.
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Appendix 3 3 : Pledge by Muhammad b.cAbd al-Salam al- 
SalawT to the British government regarding the fortress 
of Ceuta.
Date : 10 Shawwal, 1222 / 11 Dec., 1807.
Source; F.O. 52/13.
Blessed be the only God and faith in him, witnesses that 
I, Sidi Mohamed ben Abdeslam Slawi, servant of the Al­
mighty God and subject of His Imperial Majesty Mulay 
Sliman, whom God preserve, minister of marine and 
foreign affairs, being vested with due authority by 
His Imperial Majesty, to bind myself to the English 
nation, thus, if the English nation will take possession 
of Ceuta from the enemies now residing there and restore 
it to the Moors, a free exportation of oxen, sheep, 
fowels, eggs, and vegetables shall be allowed paying for 
the same as in the time of my master Sidi Mohamed ben 
Abdallah, whom God rest his soul; and I further pledge 
myself to allow the exportation of gums, wax, hides,and 
other articles of trade paying the same duty as in the 
time of the aforementioned Sidi Mohamed ben Abdallah, 
but these privileges shall only be granted to English 
Christian merchants.
To the above conditions His Imperial Majesty and myself 
severally bind ourselves, according to His Imperial 
Majesty's authority vested in me, as witnesses my hand 
and seal at Tetouan, this tenth day of Shawwal, 1222.
Appendix 34 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to Muhammad
b.cAbd al-Sadaq concerning the purchase of a war vessel 
in England by Meir Macnin.
Date : 28 Hijja,l222 / 26 Feb., 1808. •
Source; F.O. 52/14.
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Appendix 35 : Letter from al-SalawT to J. Green on
Anglo-Moroccan preparations for the siege of Ceuta. 
Date : 11 Safar, 1223 / 8 April, 1808.
Source: F.O. 174/17.
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Appendix 3 6 : Letter from J. Green to Mawlay Sulayman
giving assurances about the British landing on the
Moroccan islet of Tawra .
Date : 16 Safar, 1223 / 13 April, 1808.
Source: F.O. 174/17.
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Appendix, 37 : Letter from al-Salawi to J. Green
concerning the British landing on the Islet of Tawra.! 
Date : 18 Safar 1223 / 15 April, 1808.
Source; F.O. 174/2.
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Appendix, 38 : Letter from al-Salawi to J. Green on
the Ceuta question and the British landing on the islet 
of Tawra.
Date : 27 Safar, 1223 / 24 April, 1808.
Source: F.O. 174/17.
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Appendix 39 : Letter from al-Salawi to James Green
concerning a joint British-Moroccan blockade of Ceuta. 
Date : 28 Safar 1223 / 25 April, 1808.
Source: F.O. 174/17.
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Appendix 40 : Letter from al-Salawl to J. Green on
the Ceuta question.
Date : 1 Rabi^ I, 1223 / 27 April, 1808.
Source: F.O. 174/17.
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Appendix 41 : Letter from the governor of E'ssaouira
to the British Chancellor of the Exchequer concerning 
the purchase of a war vessel in England.
Date : 16 RabTc I, 1223-/ 12 May', 1808.
Source: F.O. 52/14. #
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Appendix 42: Letter from al-Salawi to Admiral Collingwood 
proposing the supply of Spain with horses in return for 
the fortress of Ceuta.
Date: 20 Jumada, 1223/ 14 July, 1808.
Source:British Museum, Add. Ms. 40,098.
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Appendix 4 3 : An example of a Sulaymani passport.
Date : middle of Jumada II, 1223 / August, 1808.
Source: F.O. 174/17.
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Appendix 44 : Letter from al-Salawi to J. Green
asking for a maritime pass to secure the return to 
France of Captain Burel.
Date : 24 Rabic I, 1224 / 9 May, 1809.
Source: F.O. 174/17.
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Appendix . 45 : Letter of rebuke from Mawlay Sulayman
to al-<Arbi b al-Mac .^I, head of the Sharqawi zawiya 
Date : not mentioned in the text, but letter written
during al-cArbl b. al-MactI's exile in Fds (Dec., 1808- 
Aug., 1809).
Source: Ms. K.1264, BGR, pp.361-365.
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J^wwmmam9 l^ jl I* ^ J f  ^  Ji j j *  c j  -A >  l« l 4 JAW V J J  J  * J >  J - if
•  L  m, mi L ' c b y c *  O ’*  A la A ^  l*« V j L ^ J j **.LwC ^ ^.m J l>1 V j 4 ( i!
L ,  -* j  ^ jJ i l l  J=u-w  V  ^ j b  tj J J I r  o ^ 3^  ^  •* *y A  L*~S A d J l v - j l y  j j l
j j  > ^ j  f L J !  ,J L c  V 4 j^ L w J I d J J  JL^>.j VJ d  j l T
A ■ -  >111 ^  ^ > > jlj 4 Jl>  I* >Ut  1—AjAjJ I ^ ^»i o >  4 J  L J  l j  uJ ^ ix )  I
J —^ iwlj4viLL* ^ j L j I v  f UJI or-*~ ) 4 -^LJJ j*S/l jLa> L ii 4 r tJU dJ JL
J I —  i  -xT. .. I tlL I j  ^  1^ 4 111) L  j l  ^ 4* J i jT  «w L J  I o h  e j  j  4 d j  U J  J  } (>
4 a—  »L1 I ju* fj* ju>* ^^ 1*^ *3! 4 a lU L  'wJLUI jJIjJI L *V j* a&L*
Am 4 ‘V jj I ^  4.  l*J L iU  4 j *  U  I ^ L v l j j  Lm5^  4 A lj^  A « . *fcjJ L  aJJ I ■»
J  I^JI^ Jtidi *i\ v  4 j y i  A iU i . U - i  d u 1 4^ T j i 5
v> — ^  ’ “j  ^ i "i* >I >  O  j l >1 I*  ^ j f  j  r t j  ^JLaa jy w  ^d 4 Jb^ Lm*l I
^ "■ »L  L# j 5 Ll*J I I*  A jA jJ  I j  ^L <* l>  4j 3aJ I j i l f  J j t >  y >  4 j
—  I ." j l j  4 A l^4w J A j a w  ^J L J  I 4 A V 4^ I | .I*  j t. *■" A W  y d  I Aw  yJ j  ^4
d j j i .  y  J jk l  y L >  4  a lo lU j aJ5 d J  j  fJ
je—mmS J. <w l  4 1 I » m >» aJU I lU t W > X  I* J ^wb2LmJuV« J it  *^~» • J 4 AmwJ L >  J
^ - ,  j j u J  T (> ^ J j y  1^ ^  L  j J I j J I  L *V j4 JJJ j y l  aJJI ^ j j o I  ^  aJU I 
(J»| "I -*■! I O * b{ 1^ I j  4 fyU  I ^^ 4 Ijjix J S  4 r j i l  L  A.JL
aJU I y w j J  I ^  L j  1*> JL a J  I I JJ4 AlL>w ^jJ J j* V  I y t f l  l*J^ * I
J •
0 ■ ■ "• 1^11 ^Jf L ^ *lf yvv ^ 4 O 1^ Jy~*lI Jm*>
1 9 a 9 « #r
1 a- w  a L a  « <-»j  * j  ^ I £  ly L  j —w  j  4 * t w ) %* ^ ju b  J a  4 ^5j<
4 ^ ■■! 1 iL j 4 j 1 ^  J a ,  J  l>  y 4 4 | X j  A J  L J  ^ 4 ^I mC l  AU ^ ■■* J j  »f  L f
4 I L .^ ! I A j> y  l« 4 A.|A<I I A lx #  I j j  J  >w ^J j 4 A t «■ ?1 I l j jL w  ^ j j
 1_______ J l>  4 ^ J ^ I ^ I j u J I Oh  4j**1 J "iwg £Jj L * ji^ l A J - ^JijJ
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4  ^ i i  L».^ * 4 i I m *^ J I 4 ^C Lv All j I iiUiA 4J L |»L«
a*jj——— J l J  oh bftj*-*- V y d  I 4 lu L J I J jlj— 1 0-4  o — L**
tlL J Ail J L pO 11 «* I j  4 4^» ll A..., JL# t J J L  X r^jxJ I ^   ^ *4 LJ I
O* ~ J f -"-»->■j  t  L*J I o>4 vj J-d iJ  I oh*  f—*j J  !■■—** * ^  LJ I oh* ^
^ ,
X... ■ 11 It.J O Ia Jl) I *^-IL Z^jSy 4 4^  LU I alL*-411 y  jtfjjJ lj  ^L J  x! I <L.> < ll«
f ■"'■ ■ :^ ^  c5^ * 4 (*^  O*  ^ oJ J—*S)* (*—^-x>j
;  *j  f ~ t - *  di * Oh y  f-fJ  * o jJ -* - ' Oh
^ •*■*■! ) 4  f l j  y  oy-^jP o>^  (*-^^ 4 j l ^
•I ^ O H  ^  -J o h j4 ^ ^ I j  f U ^ l ’ L ^ o l ^ l ,  o ^ V 1
4 o a » .. i — — J L w I LJ o  I ■ J  ^  4 ^ <iM a>  jj^ w  ( j j  Oh  ^ 0  L I
4A »«w flf  ^ »^»>* jJJmf w ll OH ^  4 i^ J ^ lfj-w  A^ Ay I™ &y i# 14 1 if lj
O L——™ejJ I y   ^ 4 A .. ■ Of Up  ^—L lf  *•"•«■;>» )  OH f ^  O ^ L^J I
4dJ L J I db dJL oh- ^  b1 L j dJ J 05 dL*o oJ 4 *~b* J-^kJ I
4 A —t> I j j  I J Lj VI J>  JC j  4 axJ L J  I Oh O^i O ^  b (j) J f s +  }
J ----------% %  y i v-h U j- * -  o  ^
4 ^  ■ L  Oh I a ■ if ^  Oj nQJ 5^.»drf L  ^J^l* LJ  ^ 4 o I J y  1^
I 0 1• J  ■ »;^ |l Jy  i* J i- -* *» L I jIL a  I* ^ J  ■ ■ ■■!*" * t y J.»-» 1a J y  •
y —wA L l y^d 4 AL* ^ L  IaA   ^JlaJ I X  Lx  Vj 4 AL— I a V  AlU I If
4 f y .. .  . JV A JLtf y  iffy aJJ I 0) ^  I^Jf J  4 Ty.. |  .A j L J Oh OH I
^ y lyT ,.  .. j rIV j4Jk>-«r yS. Oh u^yL _/>L  ^-pliiJ J  l^ k jl*
^ IJ J I y J I  j J  x ’VI oh jL » 4  ^ L J I  oh. j L “] ^  ^ J  ^4)^
4 (j jl->  yti I yobl I oh d *  y* o IkLJ I jl^x ^1 j  \j*%) I jllly  L^-I* l*^ «*
4 I y l V-J A O^  J-*-j4 0/* Oh^ J Oh *** v-«Jad I J  U  l^kJj
V*
^jf-JJ ^j&^y 4 jL5j y -  <*y lj Oh 0-k-m IjJ 1 A^*y>1 FS-“^  d) •& y
%A -  M  V
*•*■> i. .-* A oJ—* 4 oh ^ O h *  J 4 ^  <xjl& y —Jl
J  -»** L J —s j ly   ^| jh. j *  *•**«»■*>- *y*»J dJ o  b l
J—w—^  AU ^.u.*) OH (Jy c J j O/J^ 4 Q)-. m<il lx# A ll ml I  ^L j'^ lJ 4 O J^—X I#
f\j — i l l  <Lb>*JI J J  ‘d-Jt; 4jl*4 *H ^  jo i: o;1 J*^*^ d;1 * I^ J I  
O LJ y <J jli-J I J J I Jlf j  *  ^l/SU * I jCJA VI y  f>>^ J ^  Oh ^
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^  i f j  ^  L - m J  I ^  4 L #  J  < »  I I m a M L I  ^  ■■■ ^   ^J 4 U  I  '  ■ 11^
t ^ L J I  « J * U  i ^ a j l Oh 4>^>1 o>^  * X —i^ J I 4 il «»^  <u I—*-«
0 /-— * I  '‘O’ I u j u*J ^  l*J L il I 1 j. -** * d .-J  I Oh dJ j  I J
4 J j  jmjt iw l x J I  0 1 ^^ 3x4 jla  L J  lj L J  I y  Ia * j j  *— *^1 y d  I * j l—L J  I
^  ^Jj J J 1^# 4 JjX- b y  fct ^■ ■ X i  ^|».— *X^lj J^  j
J —-ftL>»iJI L ,^j1 4 £^7$ £ *-d  auLc alU I v_?L o V L i*l
4 0^ 1  S ^ U l  o J  i o l ^  o b ^ j>  <: J ^ l  o l  j U I  *v  J> oh
J  uMi j  L — I j-all I j i.J  I U Vj# alLc I O'"*** J I «J I Oh ~^-w  ^ Oh  ^ lJ"!
 ^i ■! J 4 ^ * L w l  j*  —>  A ^ w —J  ^ aJ I ^  JLX—| 0 1 Ayl^ 4 j j* ll  4, tj JL*  ^J J 
1 m>*1 l j  * I iPJlI L iA^ J I 4 .■■.»* > ,w X ) L  4 j  j L  l« j I JL-—ff VI Oh 4.* a-
4 L J f  J b  al« |i»tJ 4 )b *>  4 j  )L  Oh 4 x  l^> j Oh * J Axt o> L l j  * j  «idJ 
jN . , . . ., y  y j l  aJ o ^ -^ j I ...— ^ .. V 4 ^ U  j  J « -d  lj ^J-JI Oh I
0; I ? I J j • j\ jC il auL J I o h  «J-x d  ^  I*- 4 j\ JlUcVI aJ ^  oj— b V
4 .i— | ■> d J  L  U  4 c ilxJ I jLj>- oh ,/b l y l5 l  oh y d L J  I onjd  ^y   ^d *
4 .■■ Ij d  I VJ v3^i fdx 4 o  ^  jJ-A J  X j*I>w  V I o  I—mJ V^ I
J  — ■■-* *v dJ I j l»>7j 4 o>t *J lj J-i-*J I J***** d  ,m+r, oh J ^  4 On-d  I y
4^ L . i^L> J V j i AlU d J I j L J  y -m J I < ^ «1 LXrf L u x l«  4 D b jb f d *A X  
IJ .I. -I I k * 0>J'.-L  0 1 J-; 4^  ■ I A A JL v>_jLt dJ I {J J- .  *>w *lg/S ^
4 J«m -J  b J  A i 11* J — L  V j 4 T ^ -J j li. —> ^i.» A —11l.*v AlU I A ■*
4 tJl . u If a jl<jJ  I o> 1 ' b  * dJ L^J I a—»C ^ iL  Oh* *<$j*. b'^
■ -  jlj J 5  y  fz -r y4 ^ - m * A  y jZ d — £ y J  4 d J J  a— 15 ^ o J  I ?— *>»* j
^  X -L I ( jhj.  ly  )L  y L >  I jw *-L j I yw. pfcj J * M . ■* x oh/- * ^ ^  I
u f t  . ^ rr
* L— jl) I a L —w^J I m^^jty lj^ J  j  b d  j  lj >ln < I Oh *d I j ^y 4 O^ ya
L-*5 oh>*J I **>  V y >  b«j4 oh>J I o i^ d j V j 4 ax a u ) I o>£ * d  I o
('f ”Ji * j^ OH? bftArf A o x» Ji *t» jo y ^ J  I 0> L J  b  OH>dJ OH^d IJ • A.>»c l 1< -X
A in- J  \  I <i <t x* V O J  I X L f  ^ i J J J 4 A JLw JL> I J t 1a.—» ^Jb A L ^
l y V j 4 ^  l i  «u» o ^ d  b L^*1 Oi* J  ^  b  LJ • L  j l
4 ^ 1 Mi, ,#> J 1.—  ^ I x * ■- l-> tl 1 JlA . Ij . i. i l* ^  * ^LaI  Jjlx I I ^{1 J  J b |—>*
V*
0> " ** d ^  I o> "“i--: ^  ^ ^  b J  lj A^ j «iJ 1 a ■,.♦_* no Oh L^ jx*^  ^ IJx oh 5
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J l j L j  * J l  ^  l^w u—*'. Cs* 4—
*^ ,l'^ w ^   ^ I *»•*■ L JlMwf  ^ I ^ jl J«*t L 'jl lj
a O
 ^J'" 4’ L%« i^£ ^  ^ J till I *yj ^  ^pj 1 I «■«! I Js I ^«aJ I JaJa ii'j liM l I
J  ^ ■!< l^ i—ll-i a |^ «J^  ‘w I J£  ^ii | ii^  ^ C» 4 --.I.if  ^ii■  ^m i ^1
j  I I J J »fc^  JUU  ^1ji I &   ^.-{ .x l I J*9w* A y I JLwC^)/ I <^ A4<  ^i i^ l | ii* I I
t H 1 ■ I J1 <ij <>al I 4mmmj ^  irtV  j  4 4 ■■■>|><C •—> IJ  Mi^  <l I5  d t 0 ^   ^ j l  JL ^ | 1^
(J j   ^ J Ji*J J 0 “* J I ^Ij i — ^  I ^  J—  * 4 4 i. . W . J.>4 J  m  !**> 1 .J 11
J  *
^  1 * 1 »^»' ii i^ * ^  At I t  ^ l) Jl ^.t a ii ■ 1.11 JL>- p**<l ^jJ p i p M *l**t I
t ^^aJjUj* *.^<1 in (J 1 lj<l !o Jl) I l^.A>a»  ^t At la %l 1^ A« ■) I (Jj It
 ^■'■ 1 *Vn.A*  ^  ^ f' *'j } * O,}*^ »■* ^  p
a
• |iiim i^1 uta 1^  ^ JJ  ^ JLft JU aJL) L
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Appendix 4 6 : Letter from al-Salawi to J. Green
concerning the draining of foreign specie from Morocco 
by Jewish merchants.
Date : 26 Rablc II, 1224 / 10 June, 1809.
Source: F.O. 174/17.
f - b 1*  Wf y  I h i f / C ^ >!-*>/
^ L/i j ^ 61
J b ' < J d J L ,  
f c l l f M / ?/v71 f c l r b f U l j
zyy-'&j^jjjdi/   ^IcJ&fJ f (jXiL Xv/ " !
6j— * J J  o 1*L b l ? ^  b ' l 4 ^  I
yJ ^ j '  <* vif /*<+ 6 j ? b  J  k flj oy\*t>j !cj
 sllji JA*'
* j r . ) ^
1 2  2 4 { l * j t i J l crA-j |^ _  ^ f f ? A  "-r^rv
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Appendix 47 : Fatwa by the calim-s of Fes concerning
the sale of horses to Spain in return for the restitution 
of three presidios on the Mediterranean coast.
Date : 1809-1810.
Source: al-Mahdi al-Wazzani, al~Nawazil al-jadlda al- 
kubra, Lith.^Fes, 1910, vol.Ill, pp.35-36.
 ^■*<^  I ^  jJ I J^*j I ^ I  «-Vj■*» U
!■ ■ i Ait I  J juL 4—5^ JL) I y^L.1 I LJL.
J '■ J  ^  ^ ^  >X I 1 M .J » ^  <Jl) I ^^4 l„J j  I A.1 I X«C JIm)
J-■ J *\j m  O ^  L^jij jlL 1*4 a5^15
^ ^  ^  ^ «L« J  I ^ 4  (J U  I f JJ  L * I ^
Ujjl jJ^4 I *iLL ) <—Ji> ^  Cil J yl.l.A.j 4 ijj LaJ JJ I a
^  a ^  L «i« * * L|JL*5 ^ j . *J I ^«w L  I ) *»^
1 )  _L>Li>.VI aJ I ^   ^o J  * *-*x ' \+ LlI^v^I
* a.— w JjJ 1 I I tlllj 1 V^J j l ^ j l  Jj I
ft 5 , ,
O ■ 1 ■ *• ^ t^s J ) ^  J li » a# I ajxIj^ .JL I . ^ 4   ^|»'m ^
V / - ^ ) ^  a»> C ^ -"  C h V / 9^ ^  ^  ^  ^
I f f  *  __ ^ , (J L* • A V ^ — * )  0 “ O"4
Vj^ — > f t"**4 ^ U J  I L^J * U ^ j t  aJ jLfc Ijjl5 <_*,**>• J  I#
^ ) ~~ "4 I J x * * ' f A I 4J I (jrf I j  Ijj * <J jLfJ I yjt l*l> 4 4J JL^J I
■*■**■{ o*t J  •‘‘J  I ^ U f -*J) i joxi ft*** J-a» j  ai-j *ilJ j ^
J ^ ' • Oi aJ ^ vj-^  ^ j4! \Sj^" a^ J * ft*"*4
J^——J a5^ 4 j^JLJ 1 *L j ^  <i)^i1 jli* 1>^L« ^ 5^hiJJ ^ • j^^ xa.
5 c/4^ o-* f  ^ft^J J-4-^  O"* O-***'^  ^ u ^  * rf~** ^  *■* cS*
)-— yf 4 jLuJ I oy** ^   ^ * li) L ^^sJ sa4*^ I ft****
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J —...  ^a$ UJ o£loJI « J* LfJtfuJjaJI Jy_j 4  £^1
A_«* U  p|J £ L* V 4j1 Vj £*J lj pY-~» # 1  ^j W  ^  v^i V  ^
1^ ^)LJ 1^ ^ J»>J 15" I 4 I ^ if
Vj ^  ^ v^ ** 0 )— Kf*i ^ ^ J/^ S ^  ^ o*i I* I 0-» ft-** t Uj ^
<«A l^ il I J * >  J J  I jj* U  I jflX> i c ^ M iil t—*■ ^  • jj«! Li) I
) "»4 *ij l> j 4 I ^ 4  Ia ^ I ( cI- .. jO I o  ^) L«|.» NJ
• *
m)j a^k« <—9j4x11 m^J 1 ^  yla a LjJj aJ 1
1^ ii# j *J 1 0*^0  ^* *» i aJ a 1 c j 15" I a J  ^ * aw L J 1* aJ^  j^^ A> L*J I
 ^ i > jl  wLxi 1^  1^  ^  IjiJ I  ^f   ^U U 1 f  »4i  ^L. j^l L
^1^—.5 v>» f t ^ y -  <4 £)}& U* j»'>L-'^ l J j*1  ^,1-a A y ^ U J ^  c J J L J l i
. JX • d Ja  0> *l^  ^  f t - ‘J—» V ^  * c /  J y  Ajl L* A/ s—f j
HjLj^ c-jl5 Ajfc I p i  I j^ix c*JU>» £  j—a ^ysll L Sjfc Ip i  L Ay J^ La 
>J 1 £-J1 15" la J j A y  VI j lyjJ I (y * £CZ  a ■ ...^  I JjJ^ U 1^ a_>^ >1^U
<*1. .,..,«:! 1 ,y^y J^ >* j Jj 4 lull*.* ,y U» ^j2 L>
. uLji A JLa iP I  AjJjJI J j-s  AJ>*3\y} !
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Appendix 48 : Letter from al-Salawi to J. Green
about the Ceuta question.
Date : 15 Rabic II, 1225 / 20 May, 1810.
Source: F.O. 174/21.
• s
'; j£.U ^  i, LJl^i/ siilvi*
f S .  J f - d l ^ r J l  i p ~ 
, !;■— «4 rtj-»J r *.j[*  j & i^ j I;u v i
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Appendix 4 9 : Letter from al-Salawi to J. Green about
the seizure by British cruizers of merchandize belonging 
to two Fasi merchants.
Date : 25 Shawwal, 1225 / 23 Nov., 1810.
Source: F.O. 174/21.
| > .J I  J^i\  JJL ly V j , U
oJ*"9 Lj 4 Ij^ yiJI
J *!^J! \S j CUI1 y J U J I  JLJI ^;hJI JU-.II
 __5jt 4,
1 i i# |J L, 1» |. <L>j<ib ^TL I^  ^ o L ji^  I •-*
H>—^  j  * <— Lj' i  ^ <J LJ j  '■ ^ jj* * I S^z jLc ^  L5
^  ilLI J v_Jw C  ^ ^ Ji 1 4/  ^1 ' I «A 1 ^ ^
d,l--------------Jl^ 2 5  (j* *UI ^JLuJI j.iLJI a-* ^  .,*>^
.  1 2 2 5  f l- - - - - - - -1
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Appendix 50 : Letter from al-Salawi to J. Green
asking for the restitution of a vessel belonging to 
cAbd al-Karim b. al-Talib, captured by the British 
navy at Malta.
Date : 14 Rablc I, 1226 / 8 April, 1811.
Source: F.O. 174/21.
* 5 1
^ l y i i  IL  L - J v *  ^ s r / A r
£ } / )  < J L  ^
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Appendix 51 : Letter of congratulation from Mawlay
Sulayman to Sfdl al-TuhSml upon his accession to the 
leadership of the Wazzani zawiya in 1811.
Date : 17 Rablc II, 1226 / 11 May, 1811.
Source: Ms.K. 1264, BGR, pp.361-365.
4 ^  tU U U aU I 4 J >  y aU
I ■  | (J .V 1 1 jy m m m i ^ 4  C* J  JU y ® *^ L  ^ I.i.i ^  jl 4 J L  aJ I ^
1 ■ . . J L  LL>.I^viJ«o jj x L a  I ^  dl gf.-s o  j &  j
L —  i **• L*.^ L^jl> * * hiit ^  L— k  >■ < ■* lj^  ^ ^ 4  jtyy
^ 1  f J L J I j  J & i U I  * 4 . U  aJUI 4j \z >\ ^ J J I  J ^ l
, - ^ J I ,  J *$ J I > D lj * ^yl^sJI j  v 5 l/J ! j y  J iJ I  
^  j ■ >» >iU n  ^  ♦ ^LaII * ^LmJI «■ 11 I ^ L)I
0“™ * “ ^  *^<*J I aII I <..■>>■>■ ^j).x  ^  jl.«m> a JJ I ^
~ - w*
1— iyju o  — mi.H j L : l  J-a-^ j *  c i l L ^  a J a *  jIjjJI dUUJ 1 * t d J L . ^
I .».< L» ^Sz j  L «. Ur r  t r  ^)  * ti]J b  ‘t  I J^AA4 J  »||4 «* 1 I £ 1 I. b il l ! ^ 4 (iLu4M 
4 ^ L^mJ I 4 I u Sj L j I v2i*l>1 L tl^  z  L*4i y
 ^ 1^1 J 6 aJL) I 1 |. m m aJU L  q J  a! I Lw ^A > ^ 4  4 J <!■■«» Lw ^ il y
• • •
4  < * o  L«i4^J I J  L m J s  ^ J  y jl V  ^ 0  ^ 4 «^ *» ^  ■■ hi ..I
j U -  ^ L 1  ^ VJ 4 VJ V  ,jJJ1 aDI p U  ju->1 ^ J — * 4  J'-*-' j 
Sj.. ., .j> L J  I 4 yyJL*J I y l p >  VI 4 j  L J  I L L >  ^  aj1 ^SJJ j 4  4^ !  L^jl
4 ^ 1 iL  ils ^  y ^  L I J I  ^ 4 L5" y 4 4^^J I aJ  >» j l  I ^  iflJ
4 L .im. j 1. .» .*^ 11 * L >  VI • • • • • • « •  ^ 1 ■ 1411^ >J  I L b 5  ^jLt j
■^' ■ —  jJ 1^ o  t>-  ^ • Jt> J I^ J I y j! lyiJ I J >" A JI
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I i ^ } * V 1 U U ; ^ J l /V I I JlA t  ^ U ^ I  ^A d.C» <i j\ , W J
f^  !■ ■■ II .1 I I . X» ^ 4  aJJ I 44 “> ■J  j  Lx 4 ^ ^*9 L  J-A>1 y  ^nA 4  4 4  j ~ m
* **«' mW.4 4 4^  jy jS 4 4.Ji V ^ ib .^V.I I I 4L* 1 4  p b (J 1
4 H yi J aJJI 4— *xJ J  J J  4 LfiLtfl Jill I C— ^JV j 4 l^i J=>1 **yjJ I
4 11 w "* * ( " * '  j  ^1 I JlA J  X > (ja J  y 4 4U «lJ U  4J Ll>
(—!,_... « LJ i2*^>o*l 4 Ajj^>J O tri O ’4 A-L*A — ..i,.".*L* ^
i  I J J  a J L > a J  4 J iV jJ I  aUUJ Ow^pl y 4 0U , U J Is>“
Oj- < - 4JJ I b^9jjj 4 A. Ixw t^ » AJ L jii y 4 4^  L >•  ^. * l>
*  ^to*
•«• ^  *—*vJ J J J j  l?S4 ^  J J 4 4 Jlf 4«1 > I J L ^  4 4 JLA^  (J-^4 4 *..- 1>J I
>“ &4 aJjjI y 4 llu» L* l>  ^ 4lJU I (Ji> 4 Ly b by >wli I j^L j
0""“““"* U^J ^ ‘■4‘ 4 *-L >^4 I jul 4J J bff 44^ .xl I J-A->-  ^ 4 A-L< Aj b C^ J ^ I
* L ^444^ J y aL*!, ^»01 y 4 L  I* 0 \y jJ LJ I !^l> A Ixljv-
4 J  >> ■„. sS \  I yJj£ J J  4JUI JUn>m ‘■~-«-»■> oJ J '^J ^  4
J — A>lyUI ljr^>- ^ >» jl—i2C—V! J^S. J —Sz y 4 J l j^ l  *ZJL L JtLx <~JUJ M*
O —  1. Lf-& *ksj*\ JL*>. 1 Jj : JliJI J y  J J  J^au*^  4 JiLxillj
u— '}> 4 ^  L1 L  1  ^.Tf^ v I J J C< bj^J 1^ A X4J I t J if ^ ij) 4 AL^ o^^  b
• 4.
J - ■ .fa  y l—■ ■■i-.1*-VI (_yii L *  )— t  L<L~->1 0 } )  !■ ' -"I
J o  j l  J - U ;  )  * I--------------- d»l,1 o_-U u  ^
^ v*
U*"^ i ^ 4 4/i^  J * bj fb*J 4 .^j4^  ^ J  cr* ^  O* Ofi
 ^I ii.ii $4 ) I ^ J  1 a L I*  .la? U  ^ O- L  L|«<) I J ^ « a >  { } J ~  U 4   ^ 4  *■—-* l^  J j j  I 0
^  1 ■ 14 * »» b  4J <■" . L».4." L *  4 1 *^1 c J J > w  4 r J U  I j » * l  y 4 . ^ j J  I
4 — 11 bj I 4^jJ i j ^ y *  J 15 j )  y  • & j z  liJ I f 3 ~  J^L aJJ J J ^ t
4 ( j ............ .Mt"i l I aJLaJI^  < j L t  ^  ^  L^JJ  ^4lU /^9yVl \ y j * * > \ y
^  y 4 j e  ^| I JLA lZy 4 4 U ^ J  I 1 t»Jj  4 .J  J  I 4L*J im.4 jju iJ  b^
« «> • •
4 ^  ■; 4jl l^y J  ^ ^ _^th 4 Jt J  4 j d  I mCK VI
4  j j  I uL^>m l^ *L .1  ^  4  4 ^ a la J I J L  ^ L J L ^
0— * j  ** *i-J^
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«> ^ I t Lj O 4^  ^ J I ^ m^mmmmmtmf  ^^ IjJ << I jJ
t*-»p. —«■) 11 L ^  «*l5 !( Li^ini -.1 i^i.*s»1 I ^  ..J 1-> It
I » | f i I ^1x11 ^ 1 x Cm!Lm«^ ^^<4^  L  L  x l  J^L*>
1 — 1 ^ ^  1^ ^ 1^  l 1 *vlI A<C J«rt) I I 1^# *^*< %«>i 4 1 1 I ^ lf>^  ^
m m  « 9
j  j aU^ t lam«1> a  ktu ^Li aJD I Lft jii 4 A t j  Ai | ( j j LJI o**^
• < * j i ■ >f ^
j*mmi.-jv <-.— .<■>: cu;1 ^  *__jl» L» * < j   yL I___ u • Li^ )/I £ > S  {j S
j — +>- J LjJ Cjlj Coiitfl L It Jtf * Ag I JA ^L-J I aJ Jl19 jj y
j X«J I <*i I <a^ li) I JlS  &  4 q«J ^  j  |- - ^ I JJJ 1 C*^ .% y L^>-
^ ■ ’ 3 •U^II dj# dJI^
Wfc
J  1 » nl L  ij A« y A 4JU I 4 JL <1>I^ jl ^j^tll L  <JW «L  JAti
« ■■......   1^  lj  11 | Ay 4y JLC I^ J t A« Lm» ««^»  ^Ann %L<>
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Appendix . 52 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to Sidi al-
Tuhaml supporting him in his conflict with Sidi al-cArbI 
over the leadership of the Wazzani zawiya.
Date : not mentioned. Written following the death of
SidicAli b. Ahmad (April 1811).
Source: al-Rawql al-munif, II, Ms. K.2304 , BGR, fol. 48-49.
J < I a U I c  aJUI c a Lv) >v«*s< ^ in
* ^ — -L r o -. ^5— L- ( "M  ^  ^5— J-aJ I
** *  ^ v>
t *  III :______(__SJtf iUI
 ^ LJ I < ■ i  ^ A >C V ^  <>) L A L.il.i I <1 f * I J I Jl.^ l JUu ^
* *  j 6 v * ( j *  Li) I L  1*1 ^ t * L >  <m*a jl j a a D  I J IaI 1^ 
A I  y J  wiii J.uU A«« j O^jCJ 1 0  • aJL) t A,*x<^af Cl L A «L 
v4 —4 jJ  d lj1  aJLIL jLfJtl J^Lk> y^J 4*y IjJ I ^  y j L J ^ U
^rUI £ y $  0  y* 4 jS\y 4 L>. y  A.J-X L5l>- O jl y AjL»> ^  til)
Lt-I5' u j l  t jit jjM» t i ) ^  c i  It l^i a^L^J L  a ) ft j u
jl—— .ij J5 y  <yy 4 \l*y ® ^  j4 V> at4® ^
j^ jr t  y *  j j t  oJ y 4 j *  fS t^^y **y}j o+
4 * 1 »  U jL o  oJ—» * a j  / * / *  ^  ju L J I  ay<vc
A—^— ■■will ) I  ) t aJL) I AXAC L *3 1 .«5* ^ |J 4^ A> L^a« ^ lit I JLACwI
Lm2« ^*au  aJ VyL (Jf J li...rfJ I Ai *Si (J >L» LmJSaA I y I
jyj-*t 4 ^ 1  o +  y 4 1 o — 4 4 ^
Aim ■ »J Kg J  I jdJ I y  Jl>V V<m.T!L» J y) y -t 4L+9 LJL V j® y^O&J I jL l
i >U *S« I (J JL« A^ll^ ** ^ J ..l A Lijlfc V AgA ^ |Kg
4 V  Q  1 . >.■" f .i) I y (J*, ?1,t ) I A ) a!) I JL*t L ^  Ijj J jl1  I Jtf y
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J U ^  j* J V1 jjfLt Lg I j j—Sz* j o Ijj v>i J— jl
o -k  cf j Ui JI VI ^ 1  oJ > 6 U jj o-i J V^ 1 <^ J—* ^
. f V I I ,  *U I 'L i oJ v ,iJI , >  J^ JLU. -dJli o U ^ J I
Appendix 53 : Fatwa by the calim-s authorizing the
resumption of pilgrimage to the Holy Places in the Hijaz 
after its take over by the Wahhabi-s.
Date : not mentioned (1811)
Source: Ms.D.2753, BGR, pp.95-98.
1 n" y  a J  \ * y  iJU *S« b .Li mt <11 I y  4 JL»> y  aJL) iU *\11
 ^ JLj^  O4  J.*i«>  ^1 A.lf  jjj O’*  ^ 1 L |> ll* ^1 J
1 1 4  ^  ^ L|»IC ^ J s J L  -J  * ^  ^  4 V *  ‘k r  J ^ J 1 y^>l* « x l 1
" »4 ^  1 c l t  4 j >  y  •  ^  j J  1 y  1^ ^  ^  * > L  1 a ^  L > *  y  ^  *<^ > 1 1
J — ^ ^  jlJ a J  1 4^y **ylf J 4 J  1 —1^ 1  1 4 li-t • J  1 ■ ■4^ I L i  1^
^lj"  ■  4 . <■! <y« y * 4jyA%+  j C l )  ly y A * l  1 ^ y L t  y * <yj r t < «  <11 L <4 ^
^ — {1 O  1— # j  V  V > b i l  I t  3— r f  y  ^ y \ )  I < - 5  y  ♦  b j - l
< c l 5 ^ ^  a : L > .yj a D I  b V j *  ^ l i ,  * ^ l » J L .  U V ^ ^ I
■ J <J^ 4 jL j^  V b jy*jyL I I <4 C y> L ty >  ^
4 U*) J 1
I— u ib ly  y * J /^  * *UL jyauJl L*V^,Lb5 Ub1 j&  * juo 0
Qy 1.1—11.-U V, o j ly l l  L ^ j Ia * y * <tyLJI L ^L »« U Lylsty ^  ■ —»*buJ 1 < *ly
. ^  J 11^  4 „ jb  IM *w ly> I^jtr U V^4 >14 ^ 4 b j  I y < ij b j  1 J
j  — 4 jJ fl; L|—It U 'ly -J I yA> * J jl i l^ /l l *
J—■■»,■■♦ J5 £>JI ^ y A y ^  J^I J *  y • J—2 l-J  1
»»f  < | ^ >  ( j 4  *  y  I a  j  j  LJ ^  j y  v 1  y  4  J * J - J  I ^ 4 1  ^ l k * «» I 0 * *
■■ ■ 1 y9 ^jlj < It J #Jy J ^  J U oJ L J mm* O"*4 |J jJ  ^ t-o-Ltt y} I
O’’—  ^ *■* (f ) S i4 y L  ^  • a»U j l  aJ u j l  a—i;  J *  <LUi->Li-^l
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0 “£  ^ ^ 4  »  j I x n I  I ' w  yj % J  i^r* J b *  ^  < »  l y
mmI H^yl 1 Oy> ^  J j 1 — X< J^4 b i t  bjf ^  U ly • ^  tjJ I 1 JlA | ^  w
1 .1 L1 1  ^b«4» jy y*l« aJ 1*5 j t J..i» ««Li4 L »l» 4# y<1 J  t  ..<^1 y n 9y^fm^4
*£^ Jp fl-** ^*“*SJ Y} ft"-*4 £ I £>J I lj—2,^  ^  1 3y \jo\$
.1 JUi J U I j >S aJ Ljn idJ j  J^bliW * t-^ y r j y 4 t**A y  y
^ ■ *4 4 J*- 3 J  ■** b ,Jy ^yj # ^ *lc -b l>1 ji  aIJ t b
<«Jj ^lbu» 1 V>  ^ £*\^bJ! ^b  aDj A ^J^^lyJl Jji^b jU ^ l 0 ^
<-— JOy 4— I ^JJ U^fluU. I ,jb  aJJj J^y J 5 u ^
^  ■■ 1 1 ^ *1  1 ^j* «J I a J  I l i i l  J  y^ fr y  ^ a m v  A>J J ^ 1  L.",m  | ^  C X w i 1
^  ^  <* *>  ( J i )  A^ 3" y 4ybj 4 5 L j  ( j  I— £  ^ i  l A j  i l w
A#b yj4  ^ y^ 4 bj «r 4 p ^ lf j y ^k .i w>»l 1 11*\< 4 y^» u i  j *
^  ■ ' ' m/!** y^tVJ 1 Arf b> 1«—£y« y 4 L-wb>- y \j*j <ll y A*?.— -^ 4 ^ 4  y 4 4 -.4 b <*1^
J-< y 4 C b> jJ 1 I^aXw y}y I J y .^  y* J  J It^ l ly J  J lyjJ 1 J y J  V
^ * — ~<4 1 y < t  ^ y  J y .  ^Jy 4 O  b ^ y J  1 O 1^  ^  b * ^  1 *ilL ^ y  UJ I ^ /4  J  JLjtf I4 l i t
O i aJLJI oJ— > y— ^  * aUI J y  ^ JS y 4 ^LX^I £ 4  4<y ^  Jjy I jfy^l 
• 4 ■■ ly.*y 1 y A b  y l  J y  ^  O y ^  < u l t  ) l>  ^ ^ * b  d J y * j  J y ? y  ^ ^ j a J  I
^1 b .".>o^ 1 * i > ^  ( j t w V  j J  1 A i t *  i j l  ^  4
♦ ^ -- ^  ^y 4y^ y^  o A V tj^ ^
!»■ -  1 "  f - ;  y A y  bVy 4 . ^ L y  ^ 4  i t  jLsl) I  ^ 4  L ' V y 4  < J ]  j Li1 I4
<J— — — — & 4  j*-^ -*4 «-*• J—'1«g t i l l  J ^y aU I tjr*-^ < bjy^ * yA— I l i y j ^
J — 4 ^  (J ^ l.y.l w 1 Atlyrf t ill J ^ y  JM > jV y l A«g> cJjA^ JL5y 4 y ^ J I
J ■.* l?y 4 ^aJLw^J ly y^^ lL^ l) I 3^ L> A Ls* J^ lb*J I tX^ A^ oJ 1 UsJ I b V y  y 1 j JL* 
b — ■■■ 14 4 I 4^J**W  ^^5 y ^ <4^)1 1 ^x^Oi) 1 aJ )bi <fy# ^jlty 4^1 li J 1 y ■!..* 1 1
•  Jk 4. —. ^ y j  1 I — |.i*»IaAJ
■ ■■ ■ [4  y 4 y i  1 1 yV4^ b  ^ < « t y, ^ - w b   ^) b »  4 1 JLft J J lA /  4 4JJ JU  x l  I —
^  J y  1 1 1. 11 I >V« »> a U  I . V- .^ f  ( J y L  4 ) | { 1  y b w  b ^  4 j J  ly 4 ^  < J  I ^ 1.» L  4L*
0  4—J  aJU 1 b —5" 4 J y  1 . .w  ^ y
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« «UI uikl 
**il lyyyi 1 y y*t i^i »X»*S# <11 1 JUt ly» 4 )ltl yy 1\| 1141 1 t  ^ I4 AjJ « V# *0 1 V
4 ^ ___ .7 4-u- J U aIII
4 4 u, aUI 4i'y 0*1^1 o ^j Cm ^ . ; j ’ *-j -
4 aJJ I 4 ■! 1 tty yy A44 CM >U fS» Ay JU<C y —
4 >»J I A* aU 1 UILm, ^LJ I Q y J*>> A*j *Uf j
lw  iL ml I4 axUsJL^ VI 1^ <w.lb_>JI ^y 4 aJJ jw>J I —
O---------b A^ _^-y, A-.y! Ajj—» J^ h ll J U  ,jX vi.^ w 5^ 4 a^ J ^ ,  rUVI
y  ■'»«b j ^  b-^ J ^  U 1 '■j* »LZ|> b ] y 4 A-fc ly^ j y4 L Vy J l> I Ay V 5^ 4 ^yy>ll I 
4 4■■».i m .v  aJJ I® J^cbaMM 1 CM  ^ 4 by^t y JyS y  biJy 4 ^ y ^  «l.w
4 ly^  1 »1 it CM * bJ 1 Arfy «1 it y 4 <>yP yL^ i. I4 y
1 A —
«£ Am J y»i»^ y AUy JLf y 4 )^LmJ ly 4 ^ 1, 4L^ y JU%J 1 4 aJLI JU_>J I —
. c* .c *. jji oty 0 f iui
4 U JUxJ
4 <U a U  I C t JaJ ^  ^  b » l *> ^ 4  
4—  —  r l5y  ^  ^ L c  aJJ 1 *+>-jy ^ b  r M J ^  a U I  4 U :<  jL »
y — Sw ^ 4 4  *iw«Jy 4 . «»if jj I 4 Jl> *L> |^ 5^y 1L0  aJLI I y*-» IIM*I 1 A4 )L»i
* **■ 11 1.1 ^  y Lfc ^ y A w  O  b  jJ I _^ij. — 1 «^ 4.j L b y  4 4 « ^ b  4 J >L CAntfy^  l^y
'^1 • 4,M^ yxl 1 . 1*7 aJL) I ^jb y 4 Hi ^y J  J .Jy j^ b tlJI «A «• ^
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Appendix 54 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to the qa3 id 
of the Oudaya on the eve of the battle of Azrou about 
the tactic to be adopted vis-a-vis the Fazaz Berbers. 
Date : not mentioned (1811)
Source: Mic.1207, BGR, pp.465-467.
* 1^—J y tiLJU aJU I
Jj  1?^  y L j  «i« aJL) I I ; ■> ity* J^ yi JLa< y
j  1 t <JLJ J5c» juuU* ju»JI aJLI *La y jL|—1=»I JjLlU aUI
• I i  jj a  jJ Art* LU til tfU V  y JL>1 i.wi.aliji V  L|JLL 
1*1 y  jLwlJ L j  JLi^ y^ jpy&J I J# U  LJ I J*LJ I a I
y 4 J 1*5" LJ I I Jl aJ ^ll LJ I v<^*s*l I
A 1 i 5 m J  I  4 J L | *  £  LaJ V I  J  ■ ■* aJL y •  V
• U j j l t  A* LaJ I lj^> y O \j I Jui 1 Lf-j aJLI I ^ 4  I 
.Lj - A?1 I ^  Ljj y*4jJ\ y A*LaJ I aL|£ «jLjVI
UfcjJbU*! y j  V JJI « I I | -A* 1 | V L|JU( y
I— jJ (J-* jJ c9i^ a«IaJI aL*L JmaLmI UV^* ^ 1 ,jH * jjk
jlam I - ^ . a I a  al5*« 2 *! L J  I ^Luw'*3l5  ^ 1>^L V  y L»j£
L jj—~ aJj J *  j i  y* ^jLJ I J jil I y ^t-J I } J  LaJ I jy>-
v*»L a# I aJL) I A*** 4^ ^ > U  I pjL ^  L»L) I y
-^jl;1 fimJ f-jJ Lli^cli V^ l—5 ^yj\ J  La^^J a*LJI J  li 1^*4 * aL* 
c ^ J J I ^ l r f l  VI 1*1, d W
L— * j* J  iM ^  < t^ .* J I 1*1 y • ^* J^ a J  I ^ 4  I^ jaI*
a ^4a*L«i> ^  asVa  ^j .J  1^ A** a Altl J*Ia< A;* I a>1 Ll^ 
^ ■ " 5^* a**^*JI V L  L I j4.Jlcy» j4^L*
y 4 J^ j>  %Li.aJ J^  ^tflkl L -^*1 All (Jj J L j4 J*LJ I
^  JJI aJJI y dJs. ^  JJ I j r  rL.y4j&A} \ ^  J  JU
A— ^ U v-. L5J I la^ wJaAl»>U ♦ "LLjLJ j*aZj\9 J i
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U  I (ii JUft 4-JaJ^^t j A 4l< | fc» t*<Lilft j lj*» }  ^ i^*^-
-^1 I ■ 1 f  j *j J \  ij\5 JLtf <J-tb-J J *J I L V j^  *JL*» U . jJJ I ^ -k 1
^ 1  S ^ U p i i l  ^  ^ 3 U  j j t i j t  J j  Li j* jl>I^ J . L ^
^ i i l  L  ^ 4  L * l t  | j k 1 ^ >  ^ j J  I y k  j L * J  I ^ £ )  ^  l > ) ^ * t l  iJii>)> Jill 3 L l >  
* L j &  j l d J  j  j l l i J *  V  j b  JLJ I * L i  ^  I U j j  I j l  « J L a *  **j41 l ^ h i « l  
j L o J I  J a 1 v j 4 J I  j  L fJ - 5 ' jJ L U I  j  C « l *  ^1 ^ l > } j  j u i  * U  I
>!■■— .— • V  L f J £  I {.* l > j  4 * 1  J j ' J l  , J *  O — t* y L - J I  <jrc-*~ J j J  } 
£  L k l  in.1 1 j^o L>. ^1) b l  ^ ■ ‘h !  I, ^ J  ^  ♦  L ^ x ^
A • 1 •
) *  L a  ^  ^ * ^ - 4 r  ^j y '  ^ v-*‘-«-^* L  4 J  U  V I  j
^ ^ 1  j J  L  t j j V  1— ill 1 j i » % i  m U m J  I i i L i ^  ^ i >  ^  <J L % t a U  I * U  ^  f
j l  -i J  I L ^ - J  v  J  ^ ^  J ^ L i i l  d J b  4JLH * L t  o l  c f 4® 5
4 | . > j  V j b t f l l l  * l ~  &  [ j J t ^ b D I  I J L *  j  ♦ ^ J l k J I
4-  — : ,fl f* J I  L U  j  ft L J  I j u ^ i *  1 ^ J L   ^1*  ^  d i J  U s  1^
4 ^ La )  I 4  n t  Ik ) ^  ^  k > V I  ^4 4 «  ^  L r  C j 1  L .  y 
• I- «l»l I j  JmmS—m* ^  A t f c l J f i  ^ 1 5  I j  I U £  O  b ^  V I  ^
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Appendix 55 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to Sac ud b. 
*Abd al-cAz!z expounding the Sultan's position regarding 
the Wahhabi doctrine.
Date : not mentioned (1811).
Source: Ms.4 629, R.L., fol.1-5.
i— tm t ■> Li W ^1 m *^ll 4 Ia J I aU I 4 O’*
^  L— k t l  I ^ 4  4-L L«J I ^  . 4 ^  4 I » *  M I |* V  t a p  ^  . 1 .  C J mm i t  y  ♦  L a  « J  J
* jL L jV l J*J J J  jly)My jL -*J Ij J^^5 J * S
• lj—»> J  —  «w1 ^  4u pJyiM j * L il!  dJ JL jjd
* v l— 1* o  ^
£p?~  ^I j l j  * I £-*>■ (>• dJ I ^5iaX». ^  3li aJL) I ^  L jy> 1
j a  4 i^icpLh5^<  ^ L 4JJI { ^ *  < « i ^  L^«  ^ *Lh*aJ I
iU 4 tai*U y  5—J jlyu O"—*4 y  * 5—^ ^
L^ii* jitlt ^  ja^ a a ^  jl) I aU t is ^  * L»?j ■> jj j  y
0 L-e*>Jj IgJ jJ I gp tlA jj I ^4 ^0 1 ^ /!• 1>« ^  1*aL
(J —«4**) ^4  jl" |^) I {jj**y LJ  I * t l .*J I ^  - w^ )> j^jL* ^  *1) I ^ j
g—. - A iy J  I CP V ^ LoJ I j £ ju) I J^ni y  O t * ^   ^ V£   ^"■* ^  y ^  ^  s j 9  J
^■»*»^  JL9 L 4^ <*>* Lj * CP V l.^ jx) I 4 j ^ S y  J? Lo>J I  ^ 1 mJ 1 Am
I .4  ^ 2L*,LH«aJlj‘ULJI c*atJu  ^ fU^JI<wj5 «J 1^  <lL>^ [I J—5 <J
j — j.wm LL^ I g» Lj * dJL rU"^ l ^jL  ^  CJ-* V
♦ )L «*£*■* A%l I g^  I (tal^ *^  0“| taLA \ j }  I Jl>j VI  ^L )
J  1  LJj ^ 5 I j  jJ I Ju* (J^4 A J A L j^Lf g-taMt AjS) LJ I y*2LA4 L. A j«^
V, UUII > 1  ^4 V-taJ JU T JL>| dJ J 4^ jmmS&Z A CP 1 ■ * J.*S»I \y  ^JL-J I
d ) £  ■ ' «4 L^j  L-t 4 1. mS s - jLi J4 cp I jjIaJ I * I^ aVI JaI
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41—* t») I Ji - ftl  ^LJ 1 JA y 4 CP L Ixi aU I LA 4 jyj*&
^ p -^>1 4 CpL_aJ=JJL *P J  I yP>y A.jcjj'VI Ap?VI^  j m.~ VI I
f--------- L j  P  if  AlU I *Q aJJ I Jy^/m j  I iiji 1 .r J  L  ^  l j * D  I
n
4 J..I ■> O*-***”} (J *x>-J Jx J -*W  eT". 0#;JL*
* ^ ^ 1  jly JI VJiJ)UI JL  LfJtf <5/ Chr-^~J O *21 JL  S.VI
^ -  1 <>• 4 auLc L*1 L  J L *  ^15 o-* J L   ^ ^L xV l j l ^ J )  j *  IjJ L
4 a^mJ (^c Cv jp JL % I J“^ l O’* ^ J  j" ^  |J  ^  ^ a1) I ^  J
U>— J-* J i— aJJI j lx pm o’ tX**** |ta».J
J y  -  i; L5Vj *D I J L-A4 J  U 4 t-jLjp* ^ 11—5yi jl 1ytf <*_, y - j  JJ I ^  L-a
4 ¥ A^  <t«l I ^y Arf y  )L Ci L I jj ll) L 4 j^y —..ii* tap ■■ i
<.* .y  O V L a)  ) c«Lj* a 1 ai A>Atp * t i j  dJ j  j  L j
A— *») I vl^  J l>1 ^y L5 AL*JjJ I aJ^ > *)y A> 1^*A* J 4 JlL^ > pJ
aJJIVJ aJJVJU ^ m *£>** jL —J—* <1^  L*j *
P A
ay*_—  -.5.1I p ^ L J c jL  * apL0I  L  dJ J J j  4 A^A J  ^4
j— 9 1—5 V, I . f-;5jj4 ^1 J  <Jy*-A*U » 3l>- J— ^
cr—»Lj j i S j ^ y  4 yl5 AP*1 £;lyJI JyJ 1* I^—a2lJI ^Lj^J^L* J  talliwi 
/■-•*■)) p>b>taj Jyp <>•** p*L> lj J LaJ I J Lft V J  LaJ aJJ I i_>L>J a— I^ J I 
j-~915V ^  jCLi 0)^1 J L} * t_y .j>i D 1 ^ -f >*. >,1*^ 4 y 15 Apl (JJ?1a
a—.Ll 1 J f  gyJl 0 }J f—^  ^ ol/^cjL cr^LiJI Jy Jjkj
%* M
J_aJ  ^ # d  jp  aJ^l) j y l  I ja o *  f Suft p>y w  ^ * a LaJ I
« >
 ^ ' | ■>« d J «) 1 y  L j  p  ly V  I a Ia >  ^sS z> ^4  Jjl*«»
j y 4 ^  1 g^ «J 1 |5« 1 jJ  4 4jyj& tj>»itaiJI ^4  f"L L  *■ i JLw  L  jL u tL
^■■>1 unit I  ^l y  g> J jjj L  jX J x  )1> v y o laJ I  ^LpJ 1 I lift L».*» V
lj* * * *  1 jl« ^ J  1 ^4L ^  t^aLita4 l*~>^  tap j .a ) I iL—jf^ l I a* tap J A il I
U5 15 Lft tai>^  l^ aj * L taptf 4 y  15 4^s^i J I? 0^ Sj4 ^ 1 ■ ■ »jl 1— t y*j* y  
J —  a 5  J ^ V j  L l 4 - A f t j  p r l ^  P ^   ^J p f j ^  • ^L J^ ^  J L
^  V»
t .  ju r }  y  «_ij p  t  i * ar  isj t ^  i j  v j ^ i_,» i j  ^  ^ j  » 1 j - T
.1 f L ^ J , J , al2c c?^L>dJ^ 4 5^LJ  ^ alLJ I L+*<ap4 ^  L  L aJ
1 ■ .4 ft J L > 1  * L jLftft ji 15 L a ^ V  J J U  I ta) J • a Lta»>j  y  1
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jj I l^ n«^  L  jj) La J yi5^ ) i-tt ^  '-Iv J l > ^  ^
up) o * * ^  ^  * V  o^i ^   ^ J « -“ J  {-*'./*' 1 "*J
^ ^ .y j j s  J J I VJ JJ V J U  L ju o ^ b jl  ’  ; ;___ , l \  J U  0 1
0— l j ^  l^ JU J l  ,Jc»l U , ",l 1 S j^ l (y_ I JJ j j l  VJ JJ %  
4 U 1 aJ,5 ^  1,3 l» • * ? a J J  ci£-i V a  " i J 15 ^  > U  I
1—  a ^ J U  I Jji J J  I VJ aJJ V  ^j>. ^  U I  Jjlsl ^ 1  o^*1 * fL.y <JL&
■< > 5 1* a D  ) VJ p - f J ■' f*!* )^ 4
j' III" «* I ImJ • <U<fl > ) I * Ini CJI <■»>  y * L*^*w 4 J 1 | *w I L  I ^ V  1 4 l>>
^ 1*J 1 jJ L -J I ( j* * )^  Jl>), j*& 4^  j )  JuVl ^Ul iJ (j«ytM «*•
^ uL5j » ^ L -  r J < * « * .  ^ U «— ^ JxLaJ I ^ 4  -^i)1
y j  P*«»U ^  *iJ i Li)J .t^l I (J^ fcl ) jjO 1*4^  (joy." 1^
J^l-^ 4 a) li*4 V (Jrf A <»t 1>J> V A * I ^ 4  J# kLj Lj«L^W
4 J— .*X J  *iJI ) j  O'* (j^ La* J  U — (J j j  jjJJ ^Lkl>>)
<■ i" V J&«,g " * * aJ ^  j l  o*JVJ ***--* J— «tUjJ I j^Lj  V , " * *J jJ _ t VJ 
l i f  I* * ^ 5  aJ ^  o  ^  O* ^J *■"*)■*-•"■))
f  "* fcJ I^ JU J  U • Q)j .- «X*L. ,1 J a  aJJI J ,J/4 »X*-aJ
■»» ijt I L*J I «m  jJ  ^ .m« J  3L0  ^jiJ 15 ^  J aJJ li ^^4»*>i**w I
>1 -O w  ^  j* Ll) I ^tj (J li^  * »rJ lj ^  d  I j < j  L..aJ I j  1jl*\*4i i ^  1^  1
A- —>— (J? • a1) I ^ «.. .5  ^ni . | .? ^ -‘^ « T j I J—ill aU I j^y J ^ 4
4 J '■■■ >L> y iJ  JlJ I <iJ I J j« 4 A M^hO L jU ^M t> J ) JLtS/1
j " 1-  »■■» j —  TiJ 1^4 VJ *ll)) ^ j y S *  V, r L. I 4trt«l I • JA <— l) L>w
£  ; U I  J * J \  y* a U I 0 1  j U t c l  f  ^Jyy]  i w J t i i H k t J  t  ^ J L J  I
aJJ I JLtC aJ ^  j^ l x AjJ J L m C ^  Aj «o^  ^  LJ I jL ,tvl I
T jL jL » j ,1 f —f >* )^ *> *Le3y kysJL»jL) 4_*»lijJI ^  ^LaJ I J  t  1>m6vLwI 
A ■ ■ "f lei • aJJ I 1 ■ I II A ^ l 5  jl flfJ J  ^ 4  aJ w  U
aa,1a4 xa< J o J -*  ^»j« At ^5 LiU j  ^ 4  ^Ltt V , < 1 »v «*> , <t»  L.5ti, 
j j  *lfcuJ 1 ,ls V l At cijis  l^r 15 \ j  U * Lw>^/1 J  aJ U 2$\jj jL ^ ^ / l  
j^u* JL# V _^J51 JJ 1^   ^ c  y j I i i 5 l j  ^ i :  J5  " J  LaJ J  li . ^ -^ .jJJ J jla J  1 
 Jl^ 11 J L J I  • A j y  J J  - ^ V l d ^ L  IJJ ■ J U ,  . J y j j \  jla.
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•MeJ  J, 1-1^ 1 JJI ^  1,1s 0*011 ^ .w :  Vj ' . cl,^ l
J * - — _ I J a I  1 i V 1 ■ y I j lii *-*»w tJ i J j  • 4J ^
j>^}~) o * ^ "  J } j ^^ o^j 1— i J l  J O )  Jjt) r ^ ^
  *W'Sil U  • ^ y -**4 J  La^l Uu-^JKt £ „  J£), y i 5  . Iujv
* * L * j V l  ? L » *  #l 5 j V l  *Lj 1 4L-~ cijtr JaiUJU L  ^yL* iLJL^
diJ U»t V  L  J^j ^ A jyj*& Jj-* dJ I Jj* |JL( Jj * VJ Jy • LJ <L»x ) L, 
* 1 1 Jj Jj u \s  * J l^ 3 >  I ^^J ItJkki ^ ^ ^ 0  V, ltl«>]
, i Aj Jl>iI, do Lit a) I d t  «1«J I ^)lt I ^4 ^ L f ^ - A A* Aot
L^JI At^ < ^ V I  ji AtLxM> ^ , y i  ^xl,JI j I a  ^ 4
0  J  LaJ 4j1, 4 <JLaJ I d. 1 JJ L  4*5 U  ^ L a J I  doU*» ,j1, 4 jL_jJ I J
4*
lJLJLl> I o5> 4*^. til 1 1» li>-V I Ll • ju,* L  V  ,1 juj, V  L  aU *  ^ 1
*x>-l, L^ g> ^ aJ I ,1 ^ tat >> ^ »* >< Ja
Jj— * l^/ll v U ^  k/  L5* •**> 4 J*3^  £•
■■« ^ J LaJ I j L  >J  ♦ ♦ 1.^, | : U  I*, J  j a J  I, a,JL L J  I J?yj-~ I <*-» 1 5
^ I'V 1^  Jl<U ^ w% L1 L5 V  I V I
1 ■ ■ j I JC R<1 I ^  A4^ 4A> 4^ iU I JU>l III VlJ
J,j— ^ o^J a^aUk*, aJjVj^JjsJ! ^ L o J *
V, <**«!« 1. *.».>* M. 4 ■>» *J I J o w  J)> LJ I ^ j  a  ^ L : -*> V  I, ^  L J  VI
1a  <. jiL, a * ^  l 5 t  Aj j  ^ y  a m  LL * l,A^f I, ^ j u ) I c«w  (5*
^ 4 *  ^£)L*^ l x L w  j J ^  ^ V U I  AglJ (j-jt** L* 1 JLa , L^J LL* J,
4  >Lt AgtL ^ 4 jjx L  *|»li^i) I 4a LJ y I (_)gA3w J  J a
* L m J  I 4 L  J L U  J  L  jj> 4 Agt i tli.*si ,1 ^y«4 4^1) U I  ^ L a i
1 - j l k L .  ,1 iLy-A , 1 1 j  L  ,1 I D  L  c ^ J  I 0 I5 ' 1 ^ , 4  , 1 ^ 1  J - *
j' -■ vu^ iiJ 1 * LJ I j U*,  41 4* ij*y. O J j * ^  43 f £
J j"^ ^  I '-'t jLv1 ti) j d * wilti 1 y  ^ U J  I ^ ^ 4  t J —jv, jXit 3 L  A**l> ,1
1— ?yi <^ *JLnJ I 4*51 J j\  -L i* 4*15)1 v i>Z~ 1 ^  jySi I ,jJLt 4*15)1, *L J I
/ -5  jy 4 J ,L* l^*t dt V J I, *-■!» W411 Ja**awj 4 A^j yJ  d  lytj
y ™'  ^J>4 AyL (_/*J 4*iL f j,.“ *i.) I *^9,, )^^ J I jy^J I La*1 L J L L f
J  4 JU ^ 4 ^  ^  ^  V  A«^lg Atg.At 4j  JL* ,1 ill) JJ V  L  j JLt 4,^ t
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m
jJ, * AjJ—t 0,,£J1 d iilj! bjjL aJ-a^ * alJL d~>-, 'ill JJ ,  Ju‘
4—— «■ ■■■I*.** j l  V, au VJ" ^ 4  a,cc, I iLft y   ^Vi) I J j-  juJ I d > l - 0  L .<m»i
c*— u > ^ c A( J  u * y , ^ i,  - l u i ,  ^ u i
^  j  i ■»! 1 Lg LaJ I I IL  iiiJ I  L t ^ , m i I Jl& 15 I  ^ *-) Lia  ax a L
iiUj5,4 JLs*UJ ^yL VJ pi T-iiL. jli ,J, Jy>^ s»>L> au cu-*J 
U>* ^ L f ,,  { »t< , j l i  JA> J* j5  o-4 ^ ~*Ag ^
4' Ajt I 11 »-*»«) I ^ 4^  • AU L  j)*Uilt *,«lJ I Jj Hi J  [ LJ I y  LJ AU, JUAo
*
4 -«g| I A 1 1 J  Lw^J I j  1 4W> I J v x L '  P  j i  ^j-oJ LaJ 1,,-J * j  Lj 
A«— *JJ l*J I * I ^ It (j^  1 I y  J , U I^ a ) I ^  1 4^1 I ( ,  I «<y  ^4 (jo g) ill) J
M - I
t L * J  I i j  I J  I t ,  4 » L » ,  AuJx- AlL) I t y l 4> L j i > »  ^ i  y l £  AU > ■ X t lg l  J^jm ^  A l t l
*
*^— «■ jJ I, jJ I Ji ■>»» 1 J-4^  Jgt 4 A ii «f JL i—a»i>1 L  ^I t*  V 1 Jofti
4 *41 ii mj-aJ I O'4  J  ly J  I 1 |i La % ,  lJl  J J t^ A   tjL  *  11 AU, *U) I f  j J  1 4 *J I * 4
*
Ly-—JL J=0 » , (J, A2*w V ^  JJ I ,aA L>J 1 A-Lfr J*t ,4 J„> Jull d*->L» 4 LUitl, 
J^x) L * 1 *41 w) I La ItL   ^J I  0,, 1 * 4 11 4u JL 4it y  U I ^  A |^j I ^  a) I til) J
: I ,J,1,
• # • ^  1 LaJ I ^ L < ^  ^ j —M0 I o L jl tjLj
: Jl ;C 1 J J
• £
• 11 j^*^J ^ /*J I ,y  ^LaL l^ * 1,-4 , i,  a I, — »L ^yJIt L^* iiLL
* Jl 5
y  j )  ^  j  y  v j *  *  c^ J  1.—.m> jA< L f* li > 1  ^ t j y
* ** —' tg 4u l l 1 j^ J  l y  lj  y »  l J J u a ^  ^  14* l , ,  ^y tiL) L J  It ,
l —  ,.i ^ *1 i nJUJ 10JI— j*j>, * aJLjl) 1 V dL^jj 1 jps 1 Vjcl** * i— * aJJ
. *T
—J J J l I 1 *1 0  L  W„  lll l  L  44, U O  xlj. ^  ,  dt,oAU y  J  lit  ? it* M|g
O — 51 4 \y*t «ju diL  ^ ? J^y?JI ,y ^  I* J U, ♦ * Jjh-, y. 4 J U I
4 01 ■■ 1 ».» y  j l  L y_A* ,, «*iitl I js .
do J^  I * ,—i« »ii*«« Ai J t  + y » ,  4 * 1—ft AlL) I y  |g AU JL J j^ i * Lx jJ  I d* I J I*,
.J J 4* ^ l*tf^J L 4, | '^ l^  VJ ly ^ A * , 1^41 «* 4* LaJ I y t ^  ill) JU 4 I wtlt
L * 4  ^ ^ JtJ I ,  J >  JL?, • r r *  3li  ^1 v  lj ■■ 1 w.L ^  a ^  j l  4 JUI
J — . J U I - l i l j  ,1 * U L  c -J I, d i ^ l  jS }  L d> Iy j  I J j*  <5JLy->J I vjO-A* aJ_AJU
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A M ■ <»l 1 p  1 ^  V I A* LaJ I ^ '•A r j X *  J t j  — A*L. fr do LJ I,
• 1 . —,x. j  dJ L a y  UJ , do Iy j  1 j *  di) j  J5, J* j  LtJ I y  }y^ Ji * liJJ, 
 ^1, ■■ fc<> 1 1 A, Lj j i  Jl 4 LaJ I AyAo J J  L 1*1 ~ L ,  —1 1 1 JLC  ^ J
1  ^i * .^.a ma ♦ do V Ly> jy^c '■*' V L« j^* LJ lc y^ «* V ^gxl I ^ J1 *^xJ
* Ju*V I •« a V. J  I l^yj V " s*T y  L ,y«* I— L? j I a*»^yyL L l^ JL** syi>- 
Jill I di^ aJ I **Uw " auJu* d*—J  yjULw* doJX a* aJ-aIi  dU L du* J->,
J------^L-U* 1 O b iJ I 4^^  4 a* I *s,i *» ^ j LJ 1 d» L.\/ >^JL V L, L
Jjy Ji ■'■ a,  y^^J 1 y ij«to <i* x,,  *m u^ a J J ,y  1 f "f * J - i ,  ^Lm  J5*
a  ^y i i j , y L o j i ^ x  ^y*ig ly l j jus ai, y
I yj I «LiJ LJ 1 * LL*J 1 jy* y 5  d-> Ju, lyU 4  I jp L^ i y^
—> y i ^  <>x dll l  jjy 4  <r>oJ i J*J5 i y  d*j L y
5  a*, a*3 1 ,y ,  * 1 j a  a* V >  1 j  J aJ«*Xo jy l i  ,  4 1 y  x
AX
^  — -■* y> *-*-» >• y  U y » j j i  , > j  ^  i ,1 y ^  j  u  y ,  <yj u  i
dJ ■■ J dij L|*LX yAt ,t l^ «Io,A» Jjjjj I do*l5 aJJ L .^>^>* Vt A Low ,1 1oA<0
i—i .L L|o* j  jirt* Ajttg ,*g Lft^ >fci«lt LftydA* a jJL o 5L J  a* j^J
T»
a u> jj* aJ5 I Jla, J V>J I vj* aL y<x y  J Jj aJ I i3 y * )  * a i x  ^ y  L*
Dy-iJi L^-yj! u j , diyyLx LjlL Lj  1 * -* ^  v •y ,V is j/r c sijjJi
jL — >  ^jJ A j > A *  Jjpt ol L J l^ jj a**JI Jal — » o 1 ,
4 y  ■.'.*« syl^u y ^  4 a*ax, t^,>JI VJ Lj.*g» V 
,L*ai>VI y *  L .lJ I iJL yi a Ja y  di li ,aiJI la>,4 Jj^JJ ajaLo Vi
L J, • ,  1 —i* ^  1, yjlx ^^I^^VI *>>«« jy+* L'l L  yJai 1^ * Li—I.* t a
* •
 ^1 . — 1 ,i iLLiLa-l LJLaJ, ^  J l jj* do J l y  y L y  ya«A? L  J
jy 1 ' w J  vj 1 yL ^  is j^, ,iy i y.*»u, 4 ^^jljl) yj»L>,
.(iudJ JL^ >^AwAwU* U AgwX^ oJ I A * * I p-J I y*x yjai l>* ,
o ■ "■ > (Jts y 4 ^
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4*
A i,In— ft t ^ ■ Looj L L11 , 4 U iioj ), I I jl  ^ ■*i ^ I
*
J j* *  J j p *  JJ ^  4 U=oJ I, y y ^  ^ L  l^ * O y 4 I—iL_f»>l 1 ‘-ill* ^CtuioL A, i —J I
A Ji.^ * d J .w . J j  1 iJ) i i ii lj> 1 llL J  ,  4 J j* , «iX *««»<* I O '* X L 5 ,  A—C LU  I ^jJJ do X
I i .* , 4  it*J I J j*  I ^glif C jp^  0^5 4 ^  I * * ) I J )««*>■**-^
o'
aJJ I ^j L* y  I, JJ oz V, 4 jr+.i*» >*) I v0^ ^  ^ o J 4 tSU  i ^  ^ o—»>^
I III- ■ * » r t r 4  ^ J U  I ,d>- aJLI I, **VJ *^«JI J .. L  J — o-*So V, 4 A £ j l > * , ~ * ,
A ■—i ■■ l^it |*4* L*m* I y j A , k J  |^ 4« L ) j i >  , ^  Ua*oiJ I Jl5 ^ 4  ^ — ^LJ , aJJ I
a  * w >u *S4 L' Vy#, 1* x  1w  aJJ I y ^  o  L*s»J 1 ^ |. >4 d  a  L x- VJ
A L) ju x J I 0 1 b l ^ a  > l 4, , > ^ 1  -u L > J , - J l 4 J s y  4 o-*JVl, oJ^I
• jk  V^ t- J L J I  do,
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Appendix 56 : Draft of a letter from Mawlay Sulaymian
to Sacud b.cAbd al-Aziz on the Wahhabi doctrine written 
by Sulayman al-Hawwat.
Date : not mentioned (1811)
Source: Z.2710, R.L., fol. 82-86.
AlU a ^ J I
I*; J I  j u J  U ^ - J U I  £ j \  0 \ U J \ * U \  J  1 ^ 1
J ^  y^dJ^ SulU I J jk l o J  L a x >  A4 lil  ^  jJ I ^
^Lilt ^jJI ^flaJI j \  j  «&£*** ^*l»JI ,>?*?) I \3 t j^
I ^  *^ c ^ ^ j J I I  b <■§ 1L
I ^  *j  ^^ IkJ I J^ a*» U JI jd  £^*J>1 I l#4 I J
lj  1 yb (J ■iij J «■ »11 |J IrfU*  ^l^ il I J i^l <JJ I j  t Jj xJ I y
^ -  m   ^ *« ^   ^ I I j  ^Ui^J I
*aLj>JI y
L * * i  aJ ^4* a II Lj a J.iJ I L jj<v>  I j t f  4 jL x jd
O  ^  ^  ^  L  jS * J&J>m j  ^i<* >  ^ 4  A ly*» I j j^lt A, * l o
L a * A ^ t ^ l  A J^«1 p |.» a U  I J  JLJ I J  J%«11 ^ 4  (ibl#
I i l l f - f - y  J  t  *Ll I *>• !>^«y 3*o* ^
f f ^  L>- (>• pAj*a* V I Otj* Lb ^2*1 «i! Lb J  l^j V
p  bfcl I I ^4j> lj ia ^ j C* JL>-1 J l j  UL^i aU I *^1 L ^<L> 
a i—S' I u* LU I aJL.j c J au aJJ I ^  JJ 1
♦ I^ JLaJI V I au^L? a* V ^ a J I U a J I ^
f— -L*» J fglft aII I 1 O *  A *li-»* Ajfc aJJ I c «
j — *fbj i^joJi ^ y y o « * t ^ j s d w 1 ^  *xAj ) \
1^——mgJsuJI r U J I ^  f L a J L  y+~~ AjU ^ l a J l £ y f-fJ i
i J  ^jl *jnj* O *  & J L^ ® Vy^ J^
a  j ji«J \ $ y t i y S I  ^ y  j u «  j lg* jJ I J m >  p»l% lI • J  lijA
88
a>«hJLJ I ^ Jl# y » 4&t ImmJ I  ^L#  ^J I UaJ I ^  *aJ I jjJ I ^  j1
L  J* I y  I J  »»> ^yJ U w  aJ^SJ" a <L[1 L  J*p> ^  a J  I ^yl I a <
^  C« ^  O* G ^  J4 v^ -j1aL>JI ^
i*>-^ 15 j  ♦ " dJUU ^y-1 d^JJ I yit" J  li ( jf l)  aJL1 I J y m J  ^1 4J* JL) I 
N ■ i.l I aJL a -^J (>> ^y LaJ J  li <u-«jJ I gl»~ 1 y^lc J L^ J li
1 i^ — V L( Jit 1 I .liable Li0# C j5  J^ y A V~ « i ii 11 aU I A4>j Lm4«I
o - ^ jJ l < o I * j  J k j 4
^  1 •; ■■! I ^  ^  aJJ 1 I ^  yj*S> ^  a U  I i L #  O *  1
: (u®)
c r -*  ^  ® O *  ^ G ^  J * *  ^ s /  ^
o * i >  ^  j*L ^ I J jj; J U  ^^LJI  ^ 5>LoJI aJU V^ -J I
s^ _ i< V ^ I 0 L o J lc liL > ,1 c#*  ^*L&
I *-*( JLaJ I , ^  ^ 6in£<ljJ I ^ I s  ^  A m m J  L  M i  L a U  I l^aa
• * * * V f •
<iLaL’ jA  ^^<^**1# sjt-<rS.j v>» J* ^-JLLw J3-1
V  Li aJLI >li«#y? 11 1 <Jja ^ l y w  ^ * L  aJU ji 1 i i 
O  ^  c r ^  ^  J ^  ^  S^jAX a m
* ** v m
0 — +  v * 9 *1 V > ^  1 c » L > »  t  J ^ J L  I a J U  v ii j l> >  1 j l &  ^ J  j  L J  1
I j  — t> ^ a  "  aJJ 1 V I  L w A e t j j i  V  : a ^ a a I I I  J U » a  L ^ J l  
dJJLyjli^JI ^  o — — ijui I 0 ^ 1  J-^ * t > y y *
p ><> (U  1 JJ I y A.ll I C L >* ^ y  L**■%«♦ y (iJ J U £  aJU I A » l 5 C i J  
^  ■ >i>^ laJ I L^tt ^4 J I y j L ^ J  1 y O t + J ^ 11 (iijUaJL*
0^ 5 j  j u j ^  O ^  )  9  J ^ L J I  a ; '?  f 5 p L ~  ^ 5 J U  a J U I 1^
a ^ „KMaBMllsuia£'J | O^ J^  ^  L Jj J V~-M«i>) yjk y A ^  A*! I A JLA J L  j U  I ^4 y
j —J 1 (iU J  1 aJU I J  Lfc pA Ot **1 1 o-ILJ I £ • «jJLJ I ^ i  a j l j J I  
^ ■ - -  ■ ill L a^4»I J^a il 4ui ( j j  y 0 iJ a t'il aJU I J|JL> (jJUJI O***'
1 ^ 1  aJJ I C P u * )   ^ O **"  o f ^   ^ ^ 4  ( o * }
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^ ^  I j * 0“*s ^  I 1 J li p X»J I clt
jl ^Ull & * * > • " f^ U  1 «JL <111 pj o* J^ LUI
^  |-» fcj ^  4 J  L^J I (liJ J  y  A >1« 1 oj l ^ m  All I JU 14$ U  11^{J  1 JU
•L— J u J l f l I ^  )*> »* ^  j * <—«y JU t aJ y  f J  iU 1 cLij> >
i £ } U l  «jl" I J u J  1 *ly— ,aJ 1 dLAgjjJ 1 4.L>» pJ> p g  jJ 1
oljL*JI p* *J yLeJ-*gJ pJLJI pi j* ' p-LJ I <—J LLJ LfJLaU>1 £Hall 
J_«a<J JuLiJI pJLJI J-*o» pi j * * L J I  ^ y > "  ^  3
0  I 0 \ f L .  JLjuJliLJ,JJI
U—*>1 4 JL>1 p** 4 |JjJ 1 ^ y * jy  p-J 3 l*Aj J V y  \ j Ll J \ y 3 jy *  pi * IgJ 'J t
4^£. 4JJ I ^0J * I J jy} I ^ 1  p *  I y Jyy I J  ^ 1  A>»j».1* jilj ^ » w
P   $  n> pgLUl *LLJ1  ^ *p3L«J I y 4 3LJ 1*JL p*J I p*
^ J }  ^  a U ^  alJI * U > 1  *LLJI o k  ri ol ch^JLJI JJI * y , 1  
* 1 ^ > 1 p-f-^^l^/9 v > ^ ^  o *  45* r t -1  ^ jLc*I I i l  ^
V 4^*mJ I IxaJ I * L l  I JLA  ^>^ ; X»l I ^4^3 I ^ 4  O* 1^ 4^  y
^ ■■>< tL«4>1 3^1 I JL*J i <u! 1 JL>1 < u tc  {J VI JL&J I * I
* '■ * uK 3* u ~ ^  p»ldJL y *  J-i>.
^J 1^— iJ I ^4  jlL # *3 l ^>4> ^ y » L J I  Jrf <ult *^L»I 3* f  t***^  ^ ^
Jj.. ■». ^1 JU^JI 1-JL-: r  ^ a ^ j L o J l j ^ l ,
v  9  a
J  i j >  ^  ^»l LaJ I 4j lp  • * ^ L J  l j ^ < A >  Ijr—*
Lj y t  4 Z j Lj ^y y IjJ J 4 k f i  y b  t i y  rflt« j I 4 it^il aJ I <U^ L ^
UjJJ I aJU pfty **<"11  ^*lt jJ I y jLfeVI y (iijjll I yA L144jjLfr y^ <U
p^L> ^  *-« L« p^ jL  jl«^  4jyl> (jg *^l LJ I Jj# pb* jLpil I 
*l.i.i —f»jJI j * I  cit ^a)I Jl# U J  *J®L# jjL pp#^3
1 ar » v 1
1 >»L* p^ p^ ij5 j p-p.#j £  y  p-ft Lj>I ji  J J I  jVyL>«La4pA«ut
4 _ _ * d^ -i1 V y  yS >  j1 U  J i 1^ ’aJI ^  fl" !^
< ppl)il>lf lj>ll>l y  J | J “Sal I *UjJ  I ^1 J t4  I Jl>1
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m w • | m
I^ J li O I   ^6 kS j jL  f  frJ^  y i*  i I 4 JL& Lfmt ^  LaJ aU\ua>-
j. 1^. oJ V y Lux* f—Qt (■ ?**•*< o  ^  b j f + * ^ ^  f *** t*
j  15^ * ^  jdu  j  LT ^ lt  L j j  jlLu  ^|JU JiJ y a LoL* <ua Ju
(j» I 4 U C  xli I \g^J  (J*f*^ O'* *^ *^  Ali I J U S  ^  tk JU ^Ll
Oj  ' I V  O+J \J? O ^  } * CrM® U I ^A tXA{l j  d-^J I jJ  I 
J u I  ^  < l L i ^ — il I  ^  ^  15^  x J ^ V a  ^ y u L l J  I  c f  J j  j j  ^
J j — V y yA JjL J^ till Jtf j  • *u»1j 1^* Lfjfc X>oJ I jLfJ»l
x*V I j  Jl|J x a *^ ! c-a I JuJ I ^  JJ I 4—4* VI * V^a <^»
1^ I l^ uJ I ^<01.A»I I 4^ llgJ Ll^Stl I j l  ^XwVI J a I JL>1
xlS' * J 4&  V I 4^ uj jl y i  y  J1 . • 11 ^J_fc1 ^ 4 VaJ X  JLv1 j t i t V J I
^ ■■a) J ^  J L j lAg y 4Lr I V xL) I ^  I j )  LaJ xljiJ
^1 -I ■ ..S.aII j j  ,^1 ijs. ^%U j^J 1 y fJ«— y J *
c* l» a—;! Jty*^ t^ L l J ^  I o  I x ll I Kg**}
 ^J  j,wmm ol ) Lj oJ j cJj> <J.^ 11 J > j  tL* JU I V ^ ii«l ^
kjO * J ^   ^i3j~ o  ®o : * dJ*" 0 ^ 0  Vj o J j  • J L
**-■ ■■"■h!<^> j  J ^  «-aJjJ I J li {2 I k5 j ~  $  J y
jjJUJ L jlJ ^ JU I ^  *3 * ^ lyd 1X, 4*1* p) ^ >4
J—  ..1.11 J 45I jJ  j A j l  Jj I 4 JL* ^  '^y l I , J  I JLA>^4 L jI jU \  ^
4y J.-hT>»* J^w^l I ^b1 I4 y • ^1 (J J LJ I x)y*»j LJ j^is jJ I
y— .1 .1 |i> O(j%J l« I JLA Lj*1 ^  JL>1 y 1^ ^J*ll 4<ls jJl^J I4 y
4  ; t,11 J *  L ;U  y i x LLJI ^ y  L a U I dJL.4 9 4*Jx J y ^ j *
■■ i ijt l i;  r>L VI «L iiU «LJ I c ij 15^ ^  IJ J I d  L, j*z*} * 4aL>J I y
q ... ■■» ^>» ^ J l ^ .U j^  ViApl^gJI d J Id ^  ^yL v>g*^^l ^LaJI 
»!■■ ii i.Ife dJ J ^ ls  * I^J  I y I |J.; VI y J j l i  I JL JU X  l^ s'S I
m m
4 J«mn <1 J J X  j ) L  X  fig L > l V ^  J  UAj V JJI
• v 4 *
tf Vj  ■ . J 4  ^  LaJ ^ A «JL) I J S y  ^L > oJ I £ 4 * 4  J+S, aJ I
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 ^ ® ^  0 ) j ) } t  )  O  ^  K f^ O y t*9**?
& } 2 L  j i 5 l  ^ a J  I A*li ^4 ^IjaJ I y j ^ « J  I j ' m U  I c  ^ - i
y  Ijjl I*  ^ C  L y J  I |i h »1 ^ A IjfU w  A* I*
t 4ylt 4 —a A ^  J^ «|J L '■—^ J.x) I 1 yJLjAO LammJ I ^  
<■«.». aJ I ^y y J«li)l ^y ^u* ^1  ^>.1 • J y 1  aa*£pJI ^y LjJ
i^/t9 i f  i f j b  o +  Jl*Cj») ^a^aIII <j *
&  V>1«J1 ^  ® J jsfi^  ^  * y ®  )*
£**G>* J li  ^3 L J 1 f f U  I U IJfc a U  1 i^ y^j y
o ~ '"*' <y
S— ^ j J L  ^ l j  o-»" J li t y S^LaJI *JLfr A,*! A^£ aDI ^0JW+A 
p— 'i ^C^l5'^l V j4 A, l*lJ I ^  Ia*A*£ y J  C^L.mJa*
^  • 4s£* O— j-"
tj-ftl ^rl^J I ^  <J li (j») a U 1 J^*»j ^ 1  a D  I y  y
d—*aJ L<JL5' ju>J I J La£» yyy d* jl*—, d*Jlj ai^«J I
j — * U J I  y j U  L jlLL^ ^ y  jJJ L J  AUldyl i> » j  L j j  j
t>— I dJb ^ y  o L ^ i J I  < y  y j  aUI U  L j d l J  ^ y  j— {-£ y 
i yn** o& I* J V ^  y Lk*1 L ( a * ^ 1 ^
y  <J5 ^  £ _ * ? !  gfl jj I l^{L>-li * y A  ^*1 I f&^J I ^  ^ 9  U J  1
^ ■’ 1 y «i* f-fj *3tS ^  •* ^4 V>j^ * O—«*^  } O*"4!^  ^o y ~ ^
y i  j  ^3 I ^  |j0 41 aJL) 1 4« %> y 4 y i y J  I I JLA y  ^ iL s ul I
I J— -ft jtAgfcy&JI f LJL>.S/L «j-^y — *■"» < L ^ > J  I ^ . dlLsii
A — *1 j'J 4 IJnL^ y 1 y » - ^ l L  ^  ^ >4 4 I ■* | aJLI I o J t f l  U  4]^ 
*j 1 '"%! yl*^  45^ J*> ^  I ^  4^ La1 I aJL 4 4> ylt 1 ^ Ally ^ 
4 »U  I j3u* • y A «  A « y  j aJLI I AjJ 4  J 4 C .fc«» y a U  I * L*»
• |i^ IhJ i  ^yMI* ^ >« 4 y l*^  ^^  A — !>>  ^4 ^ Cji >»  ^ In * «»
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Appendix 57 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to J . Green 
requesting a British vessel to bring back -his son , 
Mawlay Ibrahim from Alexandria.
Date : Beginning of Jumada 1/122.6 / May, 1811. 
Source; ' F.O. 174/21, ' . <' ; '
^  U  / ,  * S £ j b j  Ii i  U  b f e  o  i
> L U  / jJj i  ^  / c-i///£_. y^jCT___  ' --- - - ----—  - - - v O
c lj
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Appendix 58 : Letter from al-Salawi to J . Green concern­
ing the payment to Mawlay Maslama of an allowance by the 
British consul at Alexandria.
Date : 15 Jumada I, 1 2 2 6 / 7  june, 1811.
Source: F.O. 174/21.
J F ^ b - r r 3 1
t e s j j  U l t p J j J J !  1
** —)c b l  d  L\ j
s * i j J  £ 2 :  (_• \ £ .  i jJ i  ^  J j  f £
«-$j{ j ^ Q , > U j ^ S ^ C ^ p i , ^ ( J ^ x , |
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Appendix 59 : Letter flrom Mawlay Sulayman to' 'J- Green • 
apologizing for the impossibility of alleging 'the export, 
of wheat. . . .5 *' ' "* • ■* /•'
Date 9 Qacda, 1226 / 25 Nov./, 1811 • '
Source: FiO. 174/21. •! '■ '.li. < •
Appendix 60 : Letter from al-Salawi to J. Green asking 
for a British vessel to bring back the prince Mawlay 
Ibrahim from Alexandria and requesting verification of 
rumours according to which Moroccan pilgrims would have 
been prevented from visiting the Holy Places.
Date : 15 $afar, 1227 / 29 Feb., 1812.
Source: F.O. 174/285.
J L r t J o > J  t  t j - 1 2  c .
L•k— ^ ^ 1 ^  
; _ S  L I  o  J L C i f ^ U  f j U ! 6 —  h i *  *
A ^J  J J /2 _ :[P _ ^ y  V  ^
J) ) J 1. i  Ji’
'— f a 6 ^ 1 - r  &  V j t f K
0  L> I >J* 1 ^  I, i i>> •
/r i l -1 ^  1
L cJf^ xS  ’
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Appendix 61 : Letter from al-SalSwi to J. Green 
about the training of Moroccan artillerymen at 
Gribraltar.
Date : 23 Safar, 1227 / 8 March, 1812.
Source: F.O. 174/285.
X ’* ( £>*  of  ■ ^ j cA^  I
1^-nh'k
Op 1*W,_S)jV VS Ji I j S b p J b c J l  i
\ l Z 7 k f ) p * 2  s i
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Appendix 62 : Letter from al-Salaw! to J. Green in­
quiring about the war between MuhammadcAlf of Egypt 
and the WahhabL-s of the Hijaz.
Date : 1 Rablc I, 1227 / 15 March, 1812.
Source: F.O. 174/285.
\
x L &
U s J ^ y i - X # /  
1 2
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Appendix 63 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman tocAbd al- 
Rahman cAshcash concerning the salary and equipment 
of Makhzenian troops.
Date : 2 Jumada II, 1227 / 13 June,1812.
Source: D.A.R.
aJ l*5 *s« U U  i.u*> *D I i.—  ^ aU I
 ^11 — J aLI I  ^ *'L.L  ^ 4 (J» L« «Lj  I >UP J;l>J I 4>
j I <^4 U *  j  I ^  jl5 liJ I 4jA L,..i.i, L L i *  ^ LL» ^
4 J  1 £9 J-L> L a ) \y 4 J A I J  I i lL  JlLjc* I ■, j m Li I
,4 ) 4 *v J—^  ^ ^  )* w I
^ L   ^ AgA < V J lj 4^  ^>1 4>l I t 9i.nJ.»i I  ^ 4 ^ >1
j  ■ ^  aL) 1^ 4 cj Lj*1a ^^4 Vj 4 aU I * La o J 4 I ^  <-il*l I
♦ 1 227  ^Ia i j j L >  2 ^  4 Jlj tibt
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Appendix 64 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman tocAbd al- 
Rahman cAshcash concerning the striking of copper coins 
to which a proportion of lead is to be added.
Date : 11 Hijja, 1227 / 16 Dec., 1812.
Source: D.A.R.
^  y 4-J\*y «A« *S< b y L* kLw aJD I 4 J l> -  y ill JU I
( 4. .i i»» ii ill I JkS- i.V> *S# ^  L j I >— t ^  .w Us )
JL*£ I U ^ J L >
l-L  ^ ^ ^ J iJ I j J I t ^ l I l i t  15  LwiL juw  iC 15^  ^ ^ y )L c  J J 1
— Ul » U 0 J , iSt9^  I I 4 a U  I 4 I ill) J
/ • .  
cA  —-*■* j   ^ j y ~ s  ^  1>«J I ^  JJ» j  J 5  ^  ^ 1 ^ 1 1 ^ 4  I-
• ^   »ifcl 1^  J J  i.«4 ^yfe L
• i  2  2  7   ^I. ........ «f   ^I I «L>oJ I , J  J  1 1 ^ y
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Appendix 65 :Letter from the governor of Essaouira to 
the British government about allegations made against 
James Green, British consul at Tangier, who would have 
sold to his own account Moroccan cereals allowed 
initially as an assistance to the British army in the 
Peninsula.
Date : 6 Safar, 1228 / 8 Feb., 1813.
Source: F.O. 52/16.
, J ~ J I ^ 1  A i l  1 }  Z y  V, <111 ^
s — ■ itj v  ^ j !  U aJD L I a IaJ I a# jl>- 4^ 1x>» ^4
a
m
If JUy 0  I ^ ^  <J^  JlH
I— — J y y l <wJ l >  ^  <4 A?J I ^ 4JU
a U ! J  f UI r* o*J' l^JL L ; U l 0 U L  l-V^ b o ~
4 ^UaJ^ v j j l  ^ < J  ^
J jUJ! >JUw-Vi «jUJ tfU  ^  ^  1^  U j
^  ■ ■ .« jJ I ^  Arit <«> b ^  <> y  o°^ •** y~
"* * - c.
a ■'- -J o ’  4 * 1 * I f J u y
4 ■ %.*k 4 < « m >  4 lx » f  4'j*£S- L|«m ^  jU x *J  l - l j l  0 ^ 1
J  J-yw b  .1 aJ t a 5 L t f  j*£- ba*^j jJ  I bj
I - H y ciUlj V-Lb ^ J J I  ^
tf I k*1 U, dJlj aJ £ J.l jyj^i J*L 2^ULLj1 J* AuUI *J40U
4 J fcl —i ■ >*V/ b Jjb Ajb^ ^  ^blbLw A> yy ^   ^LJ
|>-lj I ^ 4  Cf AA« tlJj*£> 4*mSJi} AXj^  j l> y I ■ .ft ^  j b AX L*
*^111 J AS^ Ow A^J,C- ^ . b V^« ^  A< I k b  ^ A^
^  j A*1 , ..  ^b? b 'L j  1 < 4.4 *» \*S O Ji.«t  O** ^  ^  jJ ^  ^  I—^  (J-ft
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bJ I ^4 AJ I y A y  1 J IA  L j b L  d j j l  >^4 < jW *  *b . „*,
■. ■.»*-" y J  L .b 'j j l  k._f. ^u l<  ^4
— *Lo ^  jlo. ‘ ^  yd ^  J ^ ^  ^ £—**VO * Lft^ JI
. 12?» f l f ^ !
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Appendix 66 : Letter from al-SalawT to the British 
ambassador W. A'Court allowing additional export of 
provisions for the British army in the Peninsula. 
Date : 8 Shacban, 1228 / 6 Aug., 1813.
Source: British Museum, Add. Ms. 41,512.
i f — -  , - I l  11 C U f w *  4 L  W ,
J z l j j
vteJ 1 / 4 ^ ; t>o/^\uyA6L>jV^\<j\'
^M^LcrO-C^JJait- J A  1 / U J Z r J )
^£aJUi» c *
»L 1*46 ^ I O  b
f e f - * 1 ^ A  L * - ,  I  \ £ . j ^ .  j t / I J b  ^ ) H U b
"  ;f;
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Appendix. 67 : Letter from al-Salawi to the British 
ambassador William A'Court inquiring about the 
possibility of sending Moroccan students to London. 
Date : 26 Shacban, 1228 / 24 Aug., 1813.
Source; C.O. 2/4.
To the Ambassador William A'Court.
I am directed by His Imperial Majesty to write to you 
respecting some young men H.I.M. intends sending to 
England to learn the art of medicine, and the science 
of gunnery; they are to remain until perfect in both. 
H.I.M. requests you will make known his wishes upon 
this subject to H.R.H. Prince George, if he acceeds to 
them, he requests the Minister be directed to acquaint 
him that H.I.M. may send the young men to London. We 
beg you will not neglect writing upon this subject as 
we shall anxiously wait for an answer, and peace.
( S E A L )
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Appendix, 68 : Letter from al-Salawi to J. Green 
expressing satisfaction of Moroccan authorities after 
the surrender of Napoleon.
_Date • 15 Jumada I, 1229 / 5 May, 1814.
Source: F.0.174/286.
• «
L f  | . j j  ^  ,
p c S J
V I  i  A k  2. ^  I j > ^  1 >; i t  ’
r i >  J l X r
J  * // Cfc 2. J | ^
t ’
I  U j ! > r
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Appendix . 6 9 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to cUmar Abu 
Sitta appointing him governor on the cAbda tribes after 
they rebelled against Muhammad b. cAbd al-Sadaq.
Date : 23 Rajab, 1230 / 1 July, 1815.
Source: Mic.4, H.P.M.D., Rabat, 1978, BGR.
aU I ^  L j 1 w
# »i 11 eL i f l  u  i  iiH^ jl>
L< v*<<>1 < >u.o) ^  1 Lf j la« y # a? 15^ /  ^ aU J 1 f ^
*» A< %< y  ^| ■ >< JL> y  ^ iU  I f  t'1* L ill
A JL*C J5l JbjJJI A*>j ^  uJ I* ^
f 1 '('I * ■ * vs f C4 c ^
* - A  * -^  lla  1 ,<» j^ * o >  a L w ?  c J j I  i a i  I4J | J t  j  11 %** AO JC^j> l«
ijj-inLilj alU I Jk^w Jl>w JL> -^a >* L aJJI au^ j U jJIj oH>>^
1 #
w ^  ^  ^ alU I AU>J L* jJ (J
• '
^  ^  aJJ I J l>  J 4 J ^  I ji^J aJJ L l« y  ti^C V
J li .1 rtl I I Vi 1 if  ^ ^  ^  j • ^  ^ ^  Lk{^  ^  *LI*
4 j^ J* j ^ j* y O-*tf"i £ ^ f
A i f  AlU I A) aJ^J l) I ^ 4  J  aC *>  V j ' j I x i  aJ J ^ w  V  A u k lt
aJU alUI ^  ^JJI alU! ^  cjaJI I,j1 • <JL,
 ^■ | .*<♦ ^ )J  j o i  j  < iU  I*  %A>^ ^ ;J  ^
4 J I t   ^ 4 ^ ^  VI) AlU I V^ J I l^ ,i iV jiim I ^ | ^ ^ -*jp ^  A^t^iJ I AJ)oJ L
j  j  I a J  1 > u t  ^  1 j  j l*>J j  i t -  ^  u  _i« u  1  ^ i j  a ji«
U   ^ * 1.^ .a<» ^*> au<m» Lj]  ^ j»  l>  ^It j^aJ 1 1^5 < Lrfi l I cl«4l>
j^-dt ) 4}jr^  ^ <*S) j}  ^ ^J—t jy *1* j\<o } j} jJ ^
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 ^ wfct %) J  ^^  <^ 4 i Vi#  ^JLft 0 J tl 1 |* o l) I
l— J 0 &  Jb*- f±*< vj-* J**** ^  J U  J (J-* J> U l*o) ! J—t
1^ £>^/l juLz j l j l  J-»U J 5 o l^o J  Vlj * ^  J L J I  J t o o J I
 ^ L%4 —»»t <. 4,«J,f- * *w ^  y  ^4 t y)s j Cw I til I J j J a I I ^  L y A  y  A>t  ^.>11
lU  I J«a V A h> L  A^  ^-y 1/ I4 J  l.<»vJ I  ^ ylx ^L«^t ) I ^O w  y  AO Lr.
J  in    C  V^J I y  I j k  y  Jl>1 j^ >LiX ^^ iJ  I ^ li> -l 0 «w.O ^ o J  I
9
A m A a I  L  ^^. * k 4 0 « ^   ^ JlmI^  |t I.M .^%11 ^ 4  L>vX 1 la ,1. wJ I «Lw V ( j vl I
rt „
  t ..U« < > ^ylt aJ Aj JJ V , yO JU I J-^ ^  |J^ J ^
4  .1 ■ mIc li*i 3 I— J>L«jL J-*i o J^4 <bjj1 till jJ J^U»
0 I____- j V l £ _  —>j * J i  ♦ J4 * J LaJ I JUt 0"J^  ^  ^
r ^ y  f - 3 k ~ y o-» j. 3 . -JJ! J;j1 L, ^  ^ -------- o j u ---- «3*/b
- I— .,« ^  L j  jJ I ^ j P y . ^ i  0Lj y  ^-—; '* 1 { S z *  V j J
— J t  I wit y  4 alU I  ^I ^111 O  I JlaJ I  ^  ^X  * l l j i  .o il
f  i i  c J ^ a jI VJ y  f Z L *  ^ J — i  * D I Jj->w  V  J j j l
4 1230 r ! r ’^ l ^ J I ^  k \\ ^ > - j 23 ^  ^ ------)\y
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Appendix. 7 0 : Letter frm Ahmad b. Muhammad to J. Green 
asking for a British bombardier to train Moroccan 
artillerymen.
Date : 29 Jumada I, 1231 / 27 April, 1816.
Source: F.O. 174/286.
/ b i y u x, /
* -  M l ,
d J£ ? < ft  ^  d ( J J J  '-V fjJ { £  iJVj,
t ^ ^ b i  M  f c V  cy ^  l l k r  cSJ
P g t  \ U y d f y  I & U , } ] ---- ^ I / J * j  { / & ?  p # ^ * /
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Appendix - 71 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to Lord 
Exmouth commenting the English raid on the port of 
Algiers.
Date : 26 Shawwal, 1231 / 19 Sept., 1816.
Source; F.O. 174/284.
^ k o J I  ^ — L J I  * U L  VJ J*— «V j "i) ^ j )  1 J J I  p -w
( ( w U J I  ,  UJ! )
j  *i! <U^L>u! I jJ I ' J  ^ p >Xt>j I J Lal) I I
t
*y<— L^ L. ».L t J  1^4 J J t *  J;jJ I 1 (1 **» J 1|*m"^^  J-A.O CJ I L ,
J I  ^ I Ajl J tfJ A»« >n I I —U y 'j.oj  I O^ ". 3 ^  *«i »
 ^ I V^yti>J L lix l 1 I aJJ I AljJ jJ 1*5"
li »*J I AlL) I J ^AT.Mi^ .1 I Jp I j  p^ tl I 1 ^ j-X  (J^Jv
J« -A ^  # I ^yl"X J J aJJ I J •i' JL««t ) j f t  *■■ I
(j— ——t 0“*3^ 3 o* J U  Vj
lj-  alU I I^ Jaijv * 4/ * + t  Cf+ 0
i ^  j  ^ C % m h 5 ’ lv  «f*v< ^ 4 jXLdl Lj * ^jUV o*
 ^ | < J L a ,  <- aLwL  liX  AisaXMW L »  L aJ^ , V ^ ,jll I aJU I
 ^ II I L./ 1^ 4 j^ <Lj; AnJs 5^"L>* Lj*^ JL^ 3  ^ ^ .. 4 1* 4  J Ij  ..< p4 A U
^ ■', 1 ' »L J *^**^#3 *^ 3^ ** a^  L £-**£ ^ 0^ 3 O"4 ^/s *>»3
# 1231  f L 0*3 oJ AU>-ial  ^ 4*)jJ I J  L*
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Appendix 72 : Letter from Ahmad b. M ’barak to the 
British vice consul at Tangier concerning the punish­
ment of a British citizen according to Muslim law. 
Date : 1 Muharram, 1232 / 21 Nov., 1816.
Source: F.0.174/286.
b —  d
j. \ 3 j j Yj  ^
)J ls J  T^ J ^ (— f
v*v*
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Appendix 73 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to Louis 
XVIII authorizing the export of Moroccan wheat.
Date : 1 Rablc II, 1232 / 18 Feb., 1817.
Source: C.C.C., vol.25.
4\j 1 L VjJj fi-jUJ U J U V  LiL * U
A ^j^ ini wJU < J L J  <L» >^J I ill I 1<»i» 4 ***' I 4 JLJfc * I O ’* ^ rfXrf jJ
^  ^ I j U  j )L ^ 4 I J I#
 ^ i l l  I * Li j^J < ^  I a 4 j,jJ * l>j }  I
I ■ f  j i  J ^4  ^ ^ 1 j  *i* j i t  I4
dLnaaoBBfeAtfMM* L^i A CiiJ J ^ „, ».l V A (Uf j A»^tl I J ^
*' * (^ )J I j j £  * * !> . .  ■ «■« I* I t J J Jjyl I
I oJ 1 . « Ljv^, U <_SI .all ^  15 ,1# iSI *J t ty ^ j C  l«l » *111
.,51 II, ^ _ i V ,  lU ^ J J I  * l i 0 J p - t y l j  * » ^ U  p —' M ,
• 1 2 3 2  , U  v _ - b J I  J - . - y J — ^
Ill
Appendix. 7 4 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to Muhammad 
b. Ibrahim al-Dukkali restricting his prerogatives as 
mufti.
Date : 5 Ramadan, 1232 / 19 July, 1817.
Source: D.A.R.
( 4 *J aII I j*£ *S« ^ 5 L«l— )
V  * A)\ I 1 ^  > U %♦ »L««»11 <U>il I
JLtfl ^ 1— il l>* I 0 I5IJJ VJ J Lai! I ll>.1 jft-.tL <_?***
>JI Jl JJ # Al* J i > J  I Jj li)I >U  ^ 1 JLJ^I ^  J
*A■ *
 ^jlaJ a«1>  <JLc Vj ^  ^  *■)
4 1 . I ■ cJ^UJ I £>•^  5^UJ I 4jkt ,J* t-ij-tl *J j£J
 ^ <ult ^ j I I ^ JLaJ I j jf l 11< aJ  ^. ij ia! ^  jJ \S 4^  J Li I
* \Sj l U <i«L  ^  4 <m< \S I Jl) I I ^  4,t * Lwl A>^  I.*h4» I
a j*m ..« rt.) I <jJL) I tilb ^  Jl) I « Jj* <J—aj I y^-aliJ I ‘-i-5 •
J *  f t ««-»■;) L 1^ -LaI iitf jjl* H
* ^ L— jck! I a j l ) I ^  T..i Lie T^il I tflb I
.  12 3 2 ^  i — - f ■^.KwJ  I ^ Li.j 5 ^  j *  ) L _ J
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Appendix. 75 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to Muhammad 
b. al-Raqli, qa3 id of Agourai, ordering him to enforce 
the economic blockade of the Ait Oumalou.
Date : 3 Hijja, 1233 / 4 Oct., 1818.
Source: D.A.R.
Igloj  aJ ’>** U b «iUa* aD J 4 J >  y aU >|1< 1
aJUJI
<J — UJI Ui! L* 1^1 eiw!•Jj ! juJI ^  y *  j i j f
C j » l * L i l i b * 5  c^i
*^-b i l^Ki ^  ^  ♦**« I * j  I * i y  J5  ^ * <ut i k i  I
,. ,- U L o-* fj— 9 > • ft-** o +  <J3) p * Ljjl^
4 u S  m.I ^ >* /t^-» ,_r~. ^  f  ■** oJ ^  * r—f i  .z-**
• 1233 fl j  flr*^   ^ j  o-» 3 ^
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Appendix 76 : Letter fron Mawlay Sulayman to cAyyad, qa5id of
the Oudaya, ordering him to reorganize the troops that were 
spared by the plague of 1818.
Date : 21 Shawwal, 1234/ 13 August, 1819.
Source : D.A.R.
<l>>»■*? y L jV j y L j .Lo aU 1  ^ 4 . . 4, -LI I
J JO ) — -Vji y  *111 y  tiLU j L t  L-JU
4--------- U I pA l»L L -J  y L i j/S fI I J !^ > 1  £ _ ^1 d ^ b
4. . I ... «m .*v y  d-J Lm« 4 ■* It p.—  f.l I y * L«^ J 1 1 1ft »t JJ J L —  >1 I y
J— y L -j 711—• <J—^  J — J O—i / -**' 1 *- ' **>*-^ > 1 3
^ V  ^  *5 l« J — 4 it ilc  j - J  15 V  ^ 1— :>■ |i ■« y
 ^ ft*1 «««b 4 >i U»<a1 |k JlJ y 3 4mm **** *Wl Cj* vJ—^  4
4. Xmy U5* J-Z9 J dJ J J  »jJ yb 1 ,^1 4 .LnJ 25 U JL-5 U Jl) y
• -*
! ■" l L  A  i»i <» 11 y jy A —* J  ■* I n  111 .11■ »j ^ l t  4lU  I 4  > l w  jJ  l j
• t y |i i I^t A > j l f  <*1 i i.m
. 1 2 3 4  f l _ * d r _ ,'} l  J l j — 1 2 1  ^
Ill
Appendix 77 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to ^Ayyad 
ordering him to incorporate the tribes of Himyan and 
Oulad al-Haj into the army.
Date : 21 Shawwal, 1234 / 13 August, 1819.
Source: D.A.R.
I «> ' '.Vi *V< L ' y*}  ^.V.j dJ I .^1 4 JL>  ^ ill I
( t— UJI )
*—U I J.j-'y ^  jla^   ^ ^  l_*j JJ I J— ^  j Lt u! liJ I ULt 
. I Jj ^  I LJ <S~^r3T J L ^  o-* ULk>. j ^L J  I J o ^ ■ »»♦ v I
^ .. i 9 I ». ^ m> ^ J_0w L^ w f \-i 1^ 11 4 ^
^___J l.1234 rUf s r \\ J l^  0-21 J  r 3U I; J C
IK)
Appendix . 78 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to cAbd al- 
Rahman cAshcash calling for the mobilization of the 
Jbala tribes for the jihad against the dissident 
Berbers.
Date : 2 Muharram, 1235 / 21 Oct., 1819.
Source: D.A.R.
4y JU *S« L/ y b  l U  I <JLJ JU^J I
( ^ U - J i  )
* ■■■■ I I l «'-LU  ^ ^L>^JI ju£ £-LJI  ^ I LUj. jl>*
I — > A a J  I ^<1  I ^4 ^  I * * i ^ a L  <J— J -Cj  ^  ^ ^ jj L a I
^ ■■i. J*..a y < ^  tiy W  I ^  blJ J 1^*1 ^ J a—r l* > “ p ^ j
«— Jl I J---* UJJ <JJ I j —cl L p^ U^ w * * L* jJ I I
(-* ■,.» <JJ 1 <JJ U<j» lj) 1 y JL«J I j l y >  p jLi-^ 4 y ^yj^1 *V jjfc
^  * IJ I aU J A*l5" ^ jlf ^4 *th A t\ t i A41 I y& y 1—
j '  ■ ' ^~*k) I a «t*«> 11 pi> ^  aU I j  L t  L  p ^ i j  U« j L ^ .^ ) I  Ju .'s ) J L j
j a  i *01 ^4 ^ m J  I j  j . >) I %4>  ^  j  V I J 5  jL ^ i>  aU I J m w  o L ^? J  I 
I ^  ^  J A  l>4 * l>  ^4 y A ' i L j i l  I4 y\ V ,. 1,11 ^  J « > lj <—i l l  4jJi&
; >,ji aJUI JUf a)^  L JL.fc- JuJ I a! Cv L.^ j A4 p ^ L* *j| I x <0
*. M . rt *
J  ■ *0^ J  ^   ^Cj* u j  I ^yL«w ^ ^  b e  L , UJ-*J I
*—JU l j  . *  *+>-j y * J*~*+ } ALL* c U j j  ^ J jia x  1^>*1 ^  JLtUJ I^ L x  ^  JL> I js J  I «cD I 
• 1 2  3 ?  ^ l i  p I I p v > *  2  * p 3 L J  l j  p— j  p— 55#^
IK)
Appendix 7 9 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to the French 
consul Sourdeau concerning this latter's grievance 
against a deranged Baqqall sharTf.
Date : 12 Jumada II, 1235 / 27 March, 1820.
Source: C.C.C. vol. 27
I <—1.1 L VJ Vj ^  o L — >.jJ I aJLI!
( j— . iw i  )
LJ1^ *  Juu U  Jj[ i^< 1
j J^ I AltCj l j  J »^j£) I jJ I VJ ^  L  •* o *
1 ■ * * * f  ^  j j  <111 I-  ^ ^  j  dJ V aj1
^  i; l  ^aJL) I *Lj <i> J  eJj l —; ^  l^ J  I U I ^ a L  ‘'JJ i  ^.L
"■ — 1 1 4i<i> j C 1 JLfr cV ^ jl  ^A i^ £j\jAl\ 1
aJJ I U lr a* ^5L l aJ I l .  W I  j >  L  y  r - J *  dK  
c  • - 1^ 1 Ammm ■ * I f • aJU I , j l - ^  A.~.cj j + c C S  I ^  1 JjsJ I A] s K t  I* JL»J 1 1
 ^■ ■'— f • L w '  J  LmJ 1*^ ^  J aJJ I 4 ^ j l 9 j  J ^ j  I A 111.)
L.i t>j  ^  ^f **** O^ "! ^  J LJ I^ J I# aJ 1 Iam") ^  aJJ 4
 ^ ^  ^  1 £—• j  L—' LJ J  l5j  £ V I j
a — .. i,j  l*>  d  1*4^ .*^  a*< 1 «aA y 4 J i t  aJ ^ I  LJ ^»a)
»■' a- L vi» jjj ^ L.t v j^ I )iL bl j L  *** *|j I J a  1 dJ«*a Cyt J
J, *, U *  V, T-JJb LdLJ 'jp Jj-1 ur^s Y) l'-U •» Ul» U  Jl <ii»>.
1?35  fl----------1-:---jjUl j j U  o - 12 J  ^r-r^l JJI
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Appendix 80 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to Sourdeau, the
French consul general, asking for military equipment on the 
morrow of the Zaian defeat ( May 1819) .
Date : 9 Shacban, 1235/ 22 May, 1820.
Source : C.C.C., vol. 27.
^ ira *J I J L VI 5^ 5 V  ^ Jj-** ^ 5  ^  ^ ^  ^
1^1 I 1 «■> I h« *S| I JL V L*l 4 I
4 11. 9 >U  I I (^J •* *S\* J U  <0 J ■■ ‘tt I >11 4 J '' ^ aJJ I <...t
 ^^  ^ lj^  ■»11 L.il I ^ aJL%^
1 % •«
. . ^ j I < jla 1 — i ^  »i L  Ixi I. «4
^ -----9 L2L-i ;---mj V 5&r _ llfAe r Lc I__'j'i 4__ ^ > - y  A   1 l . -U I
I b  L^jJ L i.i.ro I.,.—o x y  .—-*v 151 JI y 4 edJ .15"  ^ y  (> p  5" >««.* •>» 
. JJI *U
.1235
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Appendix. 81 : Letter from Muhammad b. Ibrahim and 
cAbd al-Salam al-Azami to Mawlay Sulayman asking for 
the revocation of the qadi al-cAbbas b. Suda.
Date : 2 9 Shacban, 12 35 / 11 June, 1820.
Source: K.2276, BGR, pp.328-329.
I ■ ■ I -i.."*! y A ( jl iJ  I aJ LI y   ^  ^   ^ ^ ^  ^
m m
I If  I ^  I y  I 4  jL a ^  y  ^  i^ > j I
J   ^ rtf  4 , <»**«■■■ >ji.i ^  ^ o.l I 4  ^  I*  J  JLa) I ^
U J ^  J  I J  1 m.^ 4 L l  aJU I j l  ^^JaJ I ^ l f
6 j l  OiVI *l*-J  I 4*
4 *0
j - ; * ■ ■>! I Ji* * |> I J »*J I f LV I  L-V ,. 4
^  1 ii . i * ^ 1 \ y \  I l l  4 ^31 iJ  I 4 j  <v aJLJ I ^  l« jl »»
JLf ^ LmAj t^f t ^ y  I u U  LJcJ I y  Lay«1 I
j  I— 5 >  y  ^ ^.*« I t  j  ^ > 1  ««i> 11 < ,.jt 'J ^ aJ^ « ^  xU  awJ I
|> ^ 4 9  l^tl ^ Q 'J * ^  «M 4  1 I *—» jJ  I y  ^ - X iJ  I ^4 jU C  j | 1 ^ I r t l l  I
L*J J  I f  # A - ^ 5  ^ ic , 1 L  j *  4 j i £  k Z ^ y j Q y A J  1 Q ^ « a f 1 j J  J
J j  J *  ^  0 *  J  ^  j 4 * f jJ -A f  j2 lu  ^  o > *  U jl  V  I j j t f
 ^  J *if r*t*> ^  ^  ^ ^  |«* ill J Ly  ^J ^  ^«u i*1 cj ti
f  »i i j j l^  aJLJ I ^ I j l  b  V j4  pti*** c f*  ^  L  jt fm ** ^  I x  x >
*
0  IL c a IJ I ^  jJ f mi iJ I j^0 Aj^IaJ I A< Aj^ i'a 4^ 1f  CvJL*>» 1« ^
m m
O 1" 1 si-*-: (* O * j l y  J y >  o *  V
< j l # *?l ^ y  aJ L  t_rU«uL|JbJI j  J^LaJ I <La 4^u U u U I  j t ’ l jCkV I
j b j J I  j  4\y jJ  I ^ y  *j O i  I y  Os
>1 » 1  ^ b  I J  aJLI I 4 JL>1 y  | J  6 J  L » j  I ^ J y >  .^hi<rti* y  b
^ J I ^ y  Js 1*1 > V I  j  L^JIt 1 ».*« b  *—iJ J  ^y
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)j<n *vl I C> L lfl i tX I .It I^  y V uu5 y • * JCJ " ' ^
mj^ (J^  f  t"?'"'**'** J^ }  4 J-*^J I  ^ I £y *  ^f. JfiA» lls 1^ 1
J^VL ^1>JI i^—UJI 4 jJLJI ^ o li jji j  4 Jai V I ^  I ^4
4 -  Vj L^ J * U-*» V I o  L , jla i) I  ^ o  l.^ .J il I  ^ 4 < .^Ail I 
>1 m s ly  ^4 < *itl> j j l t  Vj ^ ^ 4 4«lcwl
. f^ » ^ J  I «JL>-1 y I y ) I I ^ w % J lj V I. \J$ y 4
^fct>VL ^  j l  iJ ^4  (ill JL J^Jv4 J  JLiJ I i-JyAll I y
4y — ~ ni"^>l  ^UC £ f + *  ^lpA^ jt  ^< jU  J 4 JLft * L|»t> ^4 1 j,£ y j P  y
V 1 J  j J^l«J I (Jjkl 4JL0I L o. !■! r>;U (js liaJ I *JU c—^ il l
J^ 4 ) l  4 JLA ^l-ull>4 V LUI j  4LLmJ I y ^1«>VI (j^>   ^ 4 fjji \$y} i
4 1^-JajVI y  L» v>- (>• i^aill I a_ft j^£ ^  L^j J^ s^JI
>J V c.pt^y 4 ^Lo(VI ^4  jkJL.—> (J-fcl L|w *■ *-^V J^ y
I I Jo^ MpJ « 1 J y^laj I JpW ^ L^ > PW %1 4m^*S\j ^ J
£-— Aj y Ift I^L  ^ i««5 ^M 4^ J I ^ *1 L -V  J *  o l  J L -  «UI
I^ C 1 laibm I 4 \&j *X 1 |«» 4^4 LaJ I A<(dl^ l I CaiLtf «UI 4 U l j i i
I j  j  ^ 4j J  i o ^ »  ^ o l  ^  L^ JL**1a 4 Lw^ o  Vj I^ 2lj L^ J
4jy*0 y 4 I * \jy l^dl^  ^ OCij  <*11 >l>> JD ^  V C ti^ y
4^   ^ I tlA 4lU I J Lm 4 A^ jJ I JL4I
*aJ I j^pLa j l>  iU  >X4*>«) I y ^L*J 1 y 9 l»LwJ I y 4 ^*«4^J I
120
i ^  *w ^  hL ^ <uJ LaJ J I ^  JL ^ ii«JL) 1 ^ ^ >Jy  iiiw.it
1 ^  y •  « o  I I y I ii . f t  < U j  « « )  I ^ I  * J l >  V  I ^
*1235 fl* o L-»  ^ <j— y
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Appendix 82 : Letter frcm Mawlay Sulayman to the people of
Fes acknowledging his incapacity to guarantee their security 
and advising them to seek the protection of Berber tribes. 
This letter was interpreted as an abdication on the Sultan's 
part.
Date : 13 Qacda, 1235/ 22 Aug., 1820.
Source : Ms. D 2795, B.G.R., p. 393.
*4— LJ I
J }  j - &  L-lrJ I J  ^ S t O U ^ lJ  I 1 .U r j I
J  ■" ■'■»* ■ ^ & LJxLifcl I wi n I j J . .tg I— j(i I Jla ^  *>« ,^4
 ^  ^  ^ " k  0 ~ ~ *   ^ , j  I « 4 .— . ^
(Jf— —j J f  ^ t JL& I y i y — X *  4  |W— ^  rt.* £  I j
• *0 j — 9 La L_*\ dly ju.wjb J l I^JL J *
I ^  . l j  J  »l i ■ V»  ^J  J*sl I < < ,  ■ « Q  I t i ^ 4 ~ m } j  jJ  I ^>T y
U l U J  1^— J I — J 1 o— ^   ^ J-’ U a J l o —
• j .  f■ -* I oJ.111 I jJ  U  ^ I ^  15 1 j t t  > L j& U .
Jt J — L pJC-JLrl ,t ^l»
<-jU5J L „ ,m  .1* j  ^J-kJ I f .«.**■• j - m m  2  £ m m * j \ y — m9 p f j  Q  l j
J  11 *  ^ UaJ I 4  J  j  i ,i ^ J  — *>»1 ^  ~   ^ V  4  j ^ jS  a»m rtt  J  ^
O **>>^  cr— o1 3 U p L ^ l i U I
4  iim jJ  I 4  11 ^  J 4»l ■«  ^ r  ^ 1 ^ 1  J J !  j l , 1  I J l ,
| «I I - J  I# I J (J J u j  I 1—S. |i l l  J .  i I nil.! JJ  1 I l* j ** * ^ j l -
* . — : ,  j l - 5  ^  l i u  J J I  . __; l _ 1  L ^ - .  J u y  4lU I ' 4  Jjfe
j  ■ y — *  o — • J— * *  o — * j — I j a  c — >^j>1 q  1^
i j r — — * ** j *1/ —  ^ ^ I* >1 ,j ... ^ 1  ^  ,.« .-J 15 ^  - i
• “1235 rU rl-pJI J j-*juJI ^ J o-*13 ^ ^  I JUI
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Appendix 83: Fatwa by the calim-s of Fes in favour of 
the dethronement of Mawlay Sulavman. This fatwa was 
issued on the basis of Mawlay Sulayman's letter of 
abdication (Cf. appendix 82 above).
Date : Hijja, 1235 / Sept., 1820.
Source: Ms.D.2795 , BGR, pp.393-397.
^   ^  ^ C/i ^  ^  * * * I L  w  ^  I Ju mm
S
*^ 4 *«* L  I I J . f t  I ■ .14 ^ i . i i i u '  I i l l  I t U  -* ■ — 4 * I ^
 ^^   ^  ^ J  ^4 LmJ I J JL i 'lO  JU y  U v j l.1! *  y* /•
•  ^ ------— 4-* 4lL ) I t - ik J  I ^ l x  <L*j J L jf 1  2  3 5 |»
4— J L  I ^
7-4 }LnJt «JuUI Z l ^ u J t  4^lc1 ojltl) I ^ l a w V l  i ^~.tt,II 7_j \LLJ I
■ * j  J L  j  *  ^ C i l l  I <JLw I® y  I iU *S i ^  y^ -2lSf I
.— , ,  w ,V , * h Ai j j l  J^Vl 1 5^. jU J I ,k_Vl
j *j^   ^I j ^LJI Up I 11 it. i^ lc> I ,  ij j  t|_£ .i .i
jbmm I4 4. *4 ^wIam >1|. Arf ^ 44  ^ 4lL) 1^4 *s' ' M
♦ O'*-  ^ -^ikJ ^  -wj J ^  I Lj ^
w »
O I *  J? 1—* I <4^  ^  j^4 Jj ^  ^ c2 Ia« 4 ^  ^ w j  I jaJ I M
r. ^  <=>U;J ^  p U 1 ^  JsL.^1 0 \  f>U  L*j «
1 5 4 4/ J  U  u U : ^ - 1 *\-£j't\y
J J— ^ ■ < 3 * ^ (0^^ -J3jV*-*^ kj** 0^ ^
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i y ) i 0 y j  6 t'Ui i^ jl
I  ^3-^   ^^  —^wj I ^  LjJ I _£ j I *-^J I 4.1.) 1 11/
 -lil >^4 }.A>- U  t ^ J  iJjUl <i» J.t« j^l 1* y  J-J ^ic
w ?^ )m JI jtL] M, Li)l o^"j *J^-'a^ ‘ L j * )^L»'|jl
^ -. — “) I ^ y u j } 1 4 ,m»t y «° y  ^ ^  '■—S ^Ia! ) jjJ l)v 1 . ■ — ^ <JJ U  1 ^  L JL<£
4 J 1 II i. ^ A I I <i) 1 4-mmZy*C1 4 Luliu4^  4_) I J^*j L ^  ySLf} 1 *3 l>^ 1 i .i .- ^ -X s jb
•lo h» 4 y y Z LJ L 1  ^  ^L^..«<« ^ 1 JL^   ^«L A I J4  4
« ac ^Iai • ^  lw 1 <u^  *_tLpu> ^ ui I 4 L J  jl<4 ^ ^I 1
i>—  , Jl ? ^JLwJI j^lr jlLw pjl * v^b5 4 jlix ^  c^. L
LT. 1 -. .»N 1 <slU ,v5 j ^  ^  ^111 1 5-J5 ^IkJL-JI ^JU -_?— Li >j
^ “si L^ l. *J l^k^ * * 4J jjlk* 1 ^l/V!
4Jf*' 1 i »J 1 lllU J  ^4 1^1^ 1 1 «ijj '--U J ^)4 A.) J^ «3l^ |Jj A j  I J^* V I
^ 1  o  J ^ l ^  0 j? l  J iJ I  J 4-5 ,>  4 ^ U J L  S jI^ U I J lL  V
0 J ^ 4 - j  -1* J ^ * L ^  ? U ; U  ^ - ^ U l  V M  ^ 1  U ; U I
•Ij l j V! !Jl^  * J ^ l ,  ; U J I  J l ^ s l  ^  / J  L *  J U I
Vy> !■■■ - ■ 1 ■ i»^) 1 0 1 ^jlt <JL#j I 3»  ^  *m ) 14 J  i4  ) <^) L  * ^
JfJ Jl5 ^  4 J  Li>-1 3 L  t,/ j * L J I  ^yU 4j*lj L  * y \
*Syl I I jJ JUl* Ju) 1 Ws>w C^4 y} 1 ^  * l^Jl! 1
J—
4 JL o-» er
4 11. 111 L? jj # U  jj J  L* *> 1 +3 1^) j ^ a U  La Usx^
*>-'j v3^*^ o*4 U  j^yi>- * cit/LJ ^ lilL^  o -*4 LL*->> ^  ^djxi) 1 y^)J
|J<  J^4 J L0 S4J 1  ^ • 1 1 3 «rf.C ^  ^ JU )1> 6 lS»aJ 1 4 y  1 J
J-. <*j J-* ) All! J Jl5 •* jLJ) 1^—xL Tju
4 ^  4JJI i—tlaJ ^■■Cj LJ I <y i\<>4 4 y^) j
• c vtX4> 4 J L  ...|( 1 I ^ 1  4^»4l< J  ^ ^j\>w V  6 ill >i« %l I Ml
<)i UK dUI >Lt Cj >l;C
O ^ U !  '~J I f£ I ~J! jit I 4^Ul jJL.jJI Jjl* L j  j^? ^  M
 1  r U J! UK 4^  |>A ja I- Lrf? 4^ , 1 J t ^ 41  ^  ^ 1^ hi * n) I (—^—*
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-‘J. p. i■! a) O' J j  t ^^dJ K jl j^ p^S }  ^ • , ’ |P* P ■ p«J f
t U lL J  U -u . I J  „.* 1 1 ^ 1  L V1 W
t I .... —. — {"" — y  ^ " ‘**v J^ o i^"■* 4  -U a^L^I b y j ~ z )
4 ... t 0 -a*IL>! ,^ 4 J.5LmJ \y J->J I L>
.1 ■«. 4 1 I Uw*^  y 4 4lLJ Ij 4 .^p^wjxp iU I jj ly«5^  11». i 14 . ^  J  I) 4 I mi ^* *C ^
4 -u -ui uiy ( jjj—; J4 *s« yl"*~ y  I
4 ■ - J.l \y 4 fM -.'jP  j  ^L*Vl ^J lf 4^ —L „.. L  ^ylt JL.^ 4 V * iU  JU>JI —
4 U aU I '—*JaJ I LjJ 1 ^  I JUn< *..**$ y *
U  ^ %A
^  £jj> LLJLmJ 1 ^ 1  aN.$1 aJLm^II J^l J  j  4 4JJ ju jnJI m
0 _ . J I r Ujwl ^  r\*V ^  c **3L- J , « >  v ^ ‘ f ^ l  f UJ» 
4-«gL I 4^^ 11 j j l  j  LJl^J I yjy 4 I Jy i>  ^
J^J I J  l> * Otly^J ^  * 1^ 4* y^lx 4-** L«^  ^L>J 1 !^*i>lJ 1 i>c  ^^  LaJ 1 
4  1I4 L  ^ L ^ l j- tt J  xL  •  ^ I ^  jJ  I j  »«»
|^~* ||1 “i|' I J^ 4^  1 -** t - ^  Ll) 1 4jp>mJ 4.4.iU» 4_A  L^ w 1 jS'iJ  ^ 1^ ..>4 Jy<fll4> I
4—.. ...jA* U ^  ^44iJO ^ 4  4^ JUmw4v I Jtf IS? j 1SA.1 ^ ^ o h
4  — . ■ — .If aD I J  j j l  ^  *1> ^  4 4 r n t  aJJ I j4 J ^  I
J U 1 ^  ll*.l « J I ^/J 4 ^  1L  Lw 4 «i L«< ii*j^4 I jj
C/ L 4 A A m  il** ^  jj*u)^ C I 4 ^  • |»L»j c l t 4JJ I J  lx y 4.... ***4^
4-J. L I  <“. ■ ^ *L‘V <U (JjJ jJ I y j  I I 1 (3^K I * aJLa L> 4 _.T y
j...«« . 1.^  ic.uuyi oic^ j^) ^ j l  sj^l» j5 4_jmL« 4—  ^
1  >U *S4 C/j JL f U u ^  ^  4 U J  >J, aJ 1 cLLaXrf 1^  4 «<LJ j ^ U i l
4 4U aD I < jJsJ 0—®j LJ I y -1
L^« j hi «^»J I 4J L ^ )  I O j ^  O '4 ^ jj L *yl I 4U j JkjA L  aJJ IU  *yl I mm
JI uK 114 %4 Ajj hUf A^.*^  ^ 4 ^^ <a)  ^1 J>J' ^
4 (_£ y — J  I j-PiJ I
1%
t ij»— «L  I I JL> 1« J b f  i < N f 1  I4 J J  k U ^ J  I m b
.  .1* 4, JJ» ^kJ
Jy—-* (j t " v-avlsJl j j  4 JU«. ^l~. (J-j— l.J I juSJI —
J—■- , . --^.«JI <u l  I* * I " « Jj-*-^ ^.rN^ *— ^ V l
J lj. . . . . .  «y1 <+>- AjJL>- * i L^_>yJtj
>1— ..if y«1 JJL ^ U l  JJl*  ^ ^ jJ  1^1 ky*JLwJ1
i \  in xf' 11< >>1 L_yt^  I ^vJtJ i l| l  1 J«jLi <.Li> L5* I JJ I
♦ r -J k 1  ^  L*C JJlj (jU ^V i <Jx X^Lv &*--•J  <* JJ1 vjikJ ^U JI jjliJ I
» 4 mmm || > JJ I * 1 n<Ofc^ I <^ U*1 I j j  X^% ^  JL( 4*2^  J
*2^ 1 4-^ 5 U j * ^y-JI JjkjJK y* y  L <iLiV b .
M *JL*J I JLiC <U^  »X^t» w^i!^  y » ^1 ■JJ J ^  ^ (jd J I \^4  ^ I
• ^  -  J  Aj JJ I uikJ yL^ uaJ I \S J— J  I y*—S) I
■/ a ■' m ■!»< A j JLt 4 n^lt^ I A/ y-k«t» I4 •>! I  ^ A JJ -If ^ -1 I M
• 1^ 1«I|^ >J  ^ ^  I 1 A  JJ I -^1 l«Mi ^l^J I 03
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Appendix 84 : Notarial act established by the people of 
Fes to serve as a legal basis for the dethronement of 
Mawlay Sulayman.
Date : Early Safar, 1236 / Nov. 1820.
Source: Ms.D.2795, BGR, pp.397-398.
JJ JUdJI
O  ^ 1 4 ^  ^  **‘ «j I* Oj""*/■*£ * li^ l I^J I
I —».«LJ1 Jjj^ f jjl ^  LJlill iSjjk.J1 LmJ 1 y*L jla -jl
Ljl*! I !■* iS I LUI Cujj .1m ji 11, .>« ^
U I J 4 ^  L-~J ) „1 I  ^ «.-.L .»
i  It«<w j  Lit j  LJ I I L J 3^1
J j o  li^ij I guk* V I J 1^—>-*51 Jj^ >~ 1
y* I 3^l  ^ •aaI^ aJI I ^^yulI dA*. j c>IaLaJI
 ^ p Jj 1 *11 <wJr\jJ I j J jb d l/J l la * U j \  cbL*l^
* %; «■’ LJ I < y  L«1 < *l>j jJ j»  j4  < *l>j * * ■>j yj~*J J
*" *"11 *^j" • *h ^  ^ Ia^ J^ I ^  ^UJI I^Jsl LJ I o * " l*^ *J I c  I j
4 4^ A«*J 11«—' J  I ^ a )  I y uJ I 1 (»> J  1 ^ ! L j t > V  i
j_>^JU I ^UJI ^ L-JL  ^ ^  4LlL«J L dJi J^L
^ l — o +  J j  ^  I  j l a L i i t  4 y  ^  « L > i t  L k j r f (  ^  l ^ i l  I
.1236
^ L c ^ J I  • * - *
J  LJ I J L  U  I i O k  V  I ill i t
m
^ j^ l jj I 3^LJI ju ^ ^ t  
sCrJ I ^L fJ I
jLJI i\«*h. ^  jua*
V jJ I ^ L l I >t| *S. O ^  I i
•  V jJ I ^  l*>jJ I J L t  ^  . I . * * .  O i
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Appendix 8 5 : Fatwa by the calim-s cf Fes authorizing 
the Muslim community to elect a new sultan.
Date : Early Safar, 1236 / Nov., 1820.
Source: Ms. D. 2795, BGR, pp.[398-400.
s J lj II
^Kll (-11^ ?- » JjIV1 v*1/ 11 * •JJ
t j h ,<i^J ^ I 4 Lm4 U  JUJI«fJL
^ ■' — JL y ^ ^  J <JL% j y  ^l*J 1 .»> 1 )
'^■1 ' ■ y^ • I mm ^  j   ^.j t y j I ^rlVl  ^ 4 JLJk a] J t * , * l»M
 ^Vj * Tj>Uj-sJj ^  * «J;L* dJljV yjl y^ U
. rv_____ M, TjU  (_It
< —  11 ^ O  I^ nJ I « aJ \*y Jl« I ■■< «lL) I ^jLo^ 4 JL>* y aJJ JL» n) I as
s ^  yt a ^  L ^. A M 4U >1 ^  M  t 4mmm |« | I^ aJJ I
1 J j jy *!jH j! ^y -Kr-^s L« Jj * y^T f UJ v -** o* — J x
 ^ »’ 4 «rt><JI ^y ^j**y.‘ <<« 11 y^»tJ ^  A«7^ l I ^ 4  JL>-^
o j J I ^ y ^ J I  jJ ik J I o .  f>L k J I r li> ^ !  . U r  J x  V l;
I j] — ., |»t^ <w-A^ ^y jJk till J jj * |t J Ail >i
  ■ <' "K * ^  ^La) ) J ilL 4^4 ( * lft< Al^i I  ^J JL«A»»
. J L c  aJJ ^  * 3-IjJ I ^ x J L a *  y
128
•  ■ 1 ' ■' O  4 -U  I 1 a U  I 0"? *V* **S* J l* **** L-*w 4 r f j  Jut y
^r»—  ■ tl.nl! 4N/I er^ I* • wlj«aJU J^j-J I aLMj aD kUrJI —
A.'-  ->i J  — V <-i  ^ I ^  |J I kJ I X  A/ 1  ^L j  4* LtJ
jZ + *  ^  Im I JLf*  ^ 4 < J l>  4* l« ^  I y *  J ^ A lJ I  Jlt t l <Am
♦ y *  4} y z  y  a*SUj m * 4-aJ t> \ y  J  \s  * Z—*5 ^ l
O'*"** ^  ^ O*.*^   ^ cl J ^ -"*  ^ yt J
4 jv^t y  *y>^ y *i,j!^JI " 1— y lf«*lki;V AlJjJ y 4^cu 1*5
4»l»^|l >3 *fc vJ~  ^ J^4j*i I *•—- L  I O"* «3 *4»i*) I
4 4 J AJ I ^  <Jjk^ I* 0 1  ^IaA  * 4* I* VI J* A3* 4
< Jx  a LI I *!» <J^ .* jy<*» ,y j I ■ 5  >Li<» V I j^t J  I# * ^U j
^ _ U  5 ^ 1  £ .  ^ J l y  ± * & y  0 L ^ V I ;  ^ 1  > 1  f *  4U I  * 4_l_ftl ^ l
J lj______ uJI M*1 J jlJLJ I 4jl^jJli • 41, j j^*—■—M . >  di— I Ju ^Ll) I
>3 in 1 . - m* 4_# I-VU* ^yX^y ^^»<t L-’ JL ^ k j <>,lsj Li>,! 1 4
 LM 4 JJ 4L^ 1^ y  O m ^  4lU 1 J b  4J^ V r^ lKJ< J^lfeJI
^  ■ 1 * 4 . 1—  15 4 j aJ I 4 jla^  « ^l.K*I I LkvJ I
J j—— 4 4^ 4 JU Ja^w '-<»*■* ^  1 I* Lj-|> * 1 ■— .v  £«# ^  I. —  * 4.1-i
4 1 U  I .^t *—' ^ .>J I ^  t .5 I 4 1 mi ( ' I j^ *^ g 4*  ^hit j 4^>vjJ 4.«i.'
* 4* aLH --JkJ vrlww>J 1 -*tV 1 <l^ )y. \j* c  ^ 3 4-1-* ^
v* Sr
^  -— * V  cjL5^ t 4 I 1** ^Jlk 4jl*1  ^k,<MtH  6 4JJ *w>JI —
S *A— «fl-* y  4 -<> w*J  ^ j lf  4 J j  i l l  lj 4 L^jj^aJ L  4.ia«i*l J CL*-l j^_ .^ *^J I L  t r t l l  I
4 1 ' \ rj  |* ^ J  ^  '^ v  » i>  ^  ^ ■^ ■i.jla l I J  I? * 4 J >  j  4 m » J  A*5js*
j . ■—  ■ a v I ^ j J I j S k L ^ J I  ^ k c V l ^  J^-4£aJI ^1 j^JJ 4^LiJ
I —' >^ lj^ 4*11 4^? K"J  I 1^ 4ylyi*Jt jL«>»Vl < J jV l <.-.UJ
4^———! I J Li I 4 *}y ^.:1) 1^ t v.<J I ^y Jj. ■*] I J^ » NMl. I
o l  j a i ^  D V  * f 5L .^ J  f LJ ■ - ^ C , 4 ^  VJ f l ;"VI
jj-—------^  4-* L* VI vJL  J  lL  V * ^s~>31 I j.tt * L l y J  I —  .*aJ I
—> ^ I .>1 t Jj.0 b^ l ♦ jl_«<4>Jl ^  j L*t \i^y* 4 , .rt< j i i i  jlj^ V^I *^ «l **
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0 J I  4 Lalj lj ^ I r^; *^~! I CA»...m< jj5 j j  I VAW I ^  
^ .. J Ik * j l <  ^ ,li> .^ l u^ilT  y  ^ /-^ k  S JlrJI ilLb y  y L  A lt aIJ I 
jJ-aJIj y U U  <^11 JL j^^y c - jJ I  y  aaI« UjJ y* ijoaJ I y
<_#X— — Sw * Jl>»4^^ c U  <JL_5 y J l—A*Vtj vV*^ Ju'
* - *f  Ik  C^ 1 j C^ * ^  x ^ j ^  LJ I a*,15 a  U u lL*> I aJ i.nf < jA t ^y j j^ - * u l I
^ 4 j J t) I aJ (_^ **gl p k ^ i! l j  J Lj ^ i/ I T-» k  i ** j U  L*» l^ I
4 J1 —  »,j^  T>^  j j ^  A Ik jv  a  y l t ^  a ! i5  c*U JL* k5 ^ kJ I
. a ^ J L J ! o j-r-J t * U J I
J 1.1..I. %g ^ i^J J  j j — > jy*f y  JLJ y  k5k»* ^« l^ J - j b  .^»>.v l* j k u  CA j
1 J^j A 4j4\t * 1 ■ ii j j  4ykt ^ yit A jJ k j^Atl  ^ ^ >1 , *  J J  ^ J ,
4^WOMMMHNMHCt C^AXrf fV ^  ^  |  ^ l .^^ j 1 C  ^»W !«■ I ^  ^
*a *jty*S>^^ *iilrI c?-*4 4/ih **j* O*. < *j ajUi^NJ
^ — > juja* <u^ 5 ^  tiU J J L* * fM J 1 «Jk I 4 Uw VI j~$ aJJ 1 y*->
• 4u aJJ I <_ikJ s j  U I I JLt y
A4»
• £——g->**® Xx^ J^b j  Tasg^ C^ j  ^jV*^  - k^^  A*?Vl 5^J k A aU ju>J I —
<yj -  ..... k ?J 1 4 JL> ^  Jy  U  ^kJ C*^ A J<i« 1 ««i* 1 I C>A>j V <—1g5
4glt CyJSg «_«15 «JjUI y  jli l l l  aJLI -^xJI aJJlJ 1*3 .^1-kjJI
^  ■» 11 >L ■*» j5 J J?j * 4ji^> j  4y+Xjy 4y\sJ y 4yb k kg* Jj-*iJ 1 f* t"£'f 0^
* I —  — .v * ... \y Ag UJ1 *J\y aUD I c* k i lU j I  y  aJ c.uJ1j y  ^  UJI
t-*.Ll*11 jla <--l5 y * J-^LaJI ^ 5 j  kg*^  i J^kg aJjUI M^£5!
* 4 ■ 15 A I J > j  —l«oJ I t^^*J 1 I ^
- «*
)^— ——jj lj J  y  JJ&*y ^>A« jA k  ^ >4* j lj>  A ^  yk««fc*J I a*
—g jJ I A<L<tf ^ykO 1 A*k (^l ^4 ^ I Jy.*iX+} I ^J A JJ^1* y £) 1 ’M J" 4*5  ^I
^ n  |  If a J  k JL vJ-5 ci5j j  k * Jj ^ a I 1 v i * . .  ^  Lil lj j^^ i«l »«>»11 4.k b> j
4— gft i«J I *.■— «5 Ajjj'al I 1^ IaJ I jjjJ  ^k I A^*«k* A jl
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r
J   * i^J I 1—*b^>J lj I  ^ * U J  I I Jl^ w  --^ i.i I ^  k^ l^ «lj J t
.iy -^*,11 A  Jj^. I* J 5  jj A A t  4 Jy *f\C 11 4UC <* )L%I I JLiC I ^  >s*^ J I
; .u n i  ■bjj^ J t  W  I »ij J U ^  I J b  # 1 ■ ^»i> k  a  ub-Ag ^ - k ^ l <>*
4------ Sc Ik y  y  J U  ^  J U  TrtU» ^j>J I a*L* q ^ L ^1 LfJU J>-Jcjl
J“ ■ 41 *v O *  ^  *-** 4JJI y j  k^C ^jl ^jig ^Jg5 o i ~ ,,,
t  ^C>JI JUU ^ 1 5  aA .  a y - j J I  ^ j lc  T j jL ?  ^J aA /  4 ^ U  y
j »n ■ I JL>-^  al*S*J I y^CwJ J~*a»y LJ I y *  ^  k  ^  Aglc ,jr Lft aJ5Vj y 
♦ °^yj  '■ <»* l I j* Jf A* JLC y *  ^jL lj * 3  <JJ Jj^g k ^J-A J j  A j —gU L# 
^ iii 1 . k  A ^ lij * ^■'Laj-yJ I kt».w» 11 j  j .  jJ I J.C >1 *«—u IjJ  1 ^ j
J  lj«— — S»l J  I C ^ a *  j ^  k  A t *  J*^" j ^  ^ I J - . *  A  A a ^  y j  1 J j f  y  | » L ^ | I
4 - 1 1 1 4  l j >  A g  U  ^ y  L * 5  4 , « « l ‘ 4j l I >  k  ■*" ^  j l  I j ^ t ^  ^  K l /  lj ^ y l  <.*! 1
l ^ - > y  y  J — — 4  W  I y *  • ^ ^ > l j  <1— M  j S t  4..*>S M  j  J y k l l I ^ y
I 'H'wl^ l 1 Jj AU k  U  4>4 U j ! tit. Jam * . rti U i*W j! I ■' i. m 
J U ! .— -~ l' ^ D l u i J I  l-tf* A4^a ^ TjC»1 4——~Zjyjy*eSf>"
J —w Ik ^ jjj ^« t 1 «».* 11 jJ k«< |i L tl I O1^ a J A jlI 4l*mXJ 4_(JLr>w 1 jS y
j j -  ■ ' ■ V  V  J I J  b j i  J3 J i«oJ  I ^ l>  Agk j  Am A‘ J t  4 y i l *  1
A 4—  — ----- - a k ^ l  Jyvxk^  Ag ,J-S_>w k  «J5 aIc I \  - . . I  ^ f k ^ l  £-U
•  M  -  - —  ♦ ^ l y  J j - A j l  k  j » k i J I  ^ y  4 ^ > u * J  , j t 5  ^ J — *  4 ^ < Al .  a * X ?  J y  ^ J j
J--------^  V J^U I y c ^  *vLd l ^  T j^ U 0 15 UJ 0 lk U !  0 1 JU
0 *1" “J  ^ c A ^ I  O *  ^ j k J l  J X *  ^ ^  / ;  J- f k ^ [ !  ^ J J  y^jb^ >\y A»5jv L f J  J
j—— ^  U J  ^L |^l j l > J  •  A * y  y»l J l * j  A ^ j i .  ^ k j  jljA
4  Jim,mm 1 I  j  U s l5 ^ / I ( jA K g g  4 - 1.1 A  lg  V  ^ k ^ | l  ^  ■ ■ > i*> ^ 4  J l A  j l j  1^1 ^{ I ^ 4
1 J— —— ■“t~t y y  lj& . k i  l j  V  utgJ* 4 ^  j k .i l  I cdJ j l  4^ »t c< w  j  k
a  J  x l j *  ^ y  ( j j j j  J 1 J b  j j j  a  V k  J j ^ * j j  a U !  J  ^ y  L ' y J I
.tit <— *  * Jfc j.j'V A t k J I  ^ k ^ J I  4 k c l ^ 4 j  V * 2^  J * k a i ! l  J a i >  4  J e t *
o — — k s j  I j  ^gkASL* ^^Ig j ‘a-40 f^ 1 J!>*^  c r>-***« f  kJ
til 1 J j^lc a U I Ag L>,-a ) I £ I—m Jv ^  ?-j>k«j y  o  ^Jjul lj
^ . It  *s< I  < jj  ^ < m I I a I,.k _ > -  ^ y  alIc
f L J L H 9  * j^JL-JI y « j > J I  ^—  |. «.i;V jJuJIj J a J I  J >1 <4 j-k
• ^  (jx) L  ^jij ^ ^  *»><) 4g)ji! lj ^ k  i* ^  ^  L  VJ ^ a * L m J  I o^*i ij^  j y aL)
4j i x 411 ^ L.a-jJ 1 >v<t O". 1 y  ji.  aU I jlc  c%5 j  *  ^ ■' i Ifl aD lj
4 4* 4111 0  L-->J I
Aii jv  jjt f  ^J ^ ! ***** A.*Sg v a "  y Tg l j >  4 J a w  I4 > *■ A 4 l j  . «s~l | an
^  ■ 1 iM» 1 A p^Vti < g l4 >  jA  a L ^ J I Jj.t*S4J I 0 1 j j  A ^ k X A i d jijt l
ja. — .■ *S Li <4 L4 ^  I JJt o k  • U J 1  c. J  lj I 1  L >  y
jj—  ■ ■— * J I «K y ^- y  p 1 »Lifc' 4J  Jll I y J k ^  jJ I L ^U, Jj 41 <4! ' J»J0.
r— f J U < J J !  o k - * ;  k v 1  A.I L? 1*5 I ^ - j  UbJ I y  fj J U J I  j l ^ i ; l j
•^A 4  aJJ I 4 lit * ‘ J  ^ j/jAjji I *  l^j 1 I >\4 *N4 j 4 J f l  a U  lj
V *  \ A
jj*l—jj I I——^  4— j I ! JJIj — 4.. I^||1 4—* j! 4. L»bJ l« 4—J M
. _ !  o W  y  *UiS4 y  I
4 a15 ^Sg3-4%s y \ly > »  4 aJ» l» * aU u *cJ1 »
A II lj jlyJ I ^lr J V JLl-Vl Af-Ag aJ j JVjO—Vtj A <ult JLJbJ l^lSSg V
4 JjtMwJ I  ^ t yl^> C y  JLC A*s5 J 4 Jjl
0 !_tjNI*fiLN| j j  j, J U :  JJI 4^-,1 L  o 1 “ U -^', -
*!j  1 Vj <r N ! j Jl> ifllaJ lj ^ i j-H ^4 ^^Itiiii w Vlj jbl/^ lj 
^ I—  ■ !■ 5.**-^ y I A lt..l ^ylt 4j Jll Lj -bjjAt -^Ij-liM 4 J I ^-lljia I ^J4j J  J 1 4 I IJ
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b j ---- *J I j * <LcjJl ( y J j  I ) y  -w. JLH- LjJjfcl U - J  I Jjy I
 ^^ .I i— A i «g Lft* llv L t J  I JajyJ 1 O'* *—U J Jg 1?yyt4? I * Ll*i L 1 A..—.■,» >t
— k y-wSjA C >k^k O-*^  ^ £7“^  * ^ ^   ^Xa yj '-*£*"} • -Ujj-AJI
^yj ^  1 y A T * t k  J  L J  I Jg jjJ  X*kJ Ijg^O  J j) l j  JAaI l j  J a I I J j i l
^  i J k * t VI <ult Um>w I ^gg I «^ 4 I —JjL  k j A ! j J  Ln g jj I
oL >..*! 15 joJ I jygJj a jj L J  14 j Lj y  U  jj a j L J  I 4m
4 ^UJI j^.*l A* aU 1 tfULw ^UJI J y .U>i ^jg .L *St A*5j J 1*
A ^ g V i d  I j Jgjt) I t yX ^  V <<a > y X  IjA 4 ^|{l jkw k  A J J  JLa JI w
4 Ag aU I t *U.l  ^ ■< I jj J I ( frg J <ftl I c^*» Aj «Lt A,.s5 j
-I U— 5 Aj *v<tf T.V>.%A.i j X  lj^ 4 —  ^3ltl j!*4.4i k A aL) Jt **■! I —
4 Ag aU I n k j y^— MWrfjJ I » I4 >>> ^g
j*?{- ■*! 11 ■ L *S« Cj5 Ag j A ^ > 1 c • Xgly^  jki* k® Jl J4J  I •—■
4 Ag aJJ I ctkJ ^ L w J  I ^  1. »jJLi*l lg
<4r
yt
J U I y*U J !
L j tly. 4—XdU kg 4 iltl jkw k A aJJ J) ^ 1 I mmm 
m* Lxj<i» 4gj JLc j A aJU lj I
-J *  A. -JUI c ik lcn-
1  ^  (j» L. J  I Agj Ait cj5 j 4 g^ *va 4 jU, i» k  A -JU At 1 an
4 4— — II I 4 Vj ..—J 4 Jj-u,
cM4-15 4 ^ 1  aJ V U ^ U m. k ^  jl jiq.AJ 15 j> ^  J l  y j l  j.jJ-*U
j  g ju->m U s aJU I jlc  <. s5 j  * L c  -JJ I j  ^  j^  jJ  I Ag U y
# A — J j  -JJ I 4 J y .  y  c J  IkJ I
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I t Jj i» ii ** • ^| ^  I JLt • 4 L 6 aU 3^N>' ^ mm
* J* O’tr*-^ 3 jli^ [l Jjh1 A— '/-*0 ^ ^ ^  -W>J I _
*  a1) I L lk J  V ^ O  (^ ; y l; ^  U -  C j >i*P  ^ • a J Lj
V «
6 *^ l>- J-f-^ w ^  I** JUiVl 4jla—  U * *11 Ju^ Jt M
J J  J <Ji J —  ^ * *0 ^  O ^  O? £***
^y.M. .4 *^ 4 « # ■ .. .1)1 <-*1x1 ^  ^  ^ I  ^Jl) I wU>>« ^ L a J  C j  JUp }
m ^  «A
j^f  1 Ul<^  4L> L.*>ka»«»> <Uj A«P L 4 ^ Ipl y^jtm^  I J Vxmui L A 4JJ xl I
• 3  » .^. 41* O  JJ I olaJ j^J V jj ! ^  l«^ -jJ I Jut ^  JL»A» ^  Ju ^*x >U **»»
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Appendix 86 : Extracts from the bayca proclaiming 
Mawlay Ibrahim.
Date : 9 Safar, 1236 / 16 Nov., 1820.
Source: Ms.Z.3772, R.L., unpaginated; reproduced in
Dawud, Tarikh Ti^wan, III, pp.250-257.
vi 
* % %
I ^ 4  4L.9 1^ 1  ^AX LL>.. **» V! j  ^ I W  I  ^yif 4 J ^ 1^ 4/ I
* jU uV t^  I ^  o<«J 1^* j l l ic V I Z j j » U * <L*j»}I J 4 <gX^ ~aJI 
 ^ ^4^JL 4 lu Lw  ^ A Jj Am *^"U I I #«44w) Ml JX# ILu
4Lx^Ji U ^ > ^ *  L t 4 4 J+Jl I I I l j  >%5*v1
4-JU I 4 J_^1 J-J) * Ia  Jl>• Vj 4 Lfc jLit V  I I dJ J j^!x Ipax ^
^ j 4 J Lfc>J I La < JI j»>^- ^  J  1 m  J^»J ^  4 ^jw^t J O  4
»U *f 4 ''L»J ^ a I!  ^ 4^'O^it, 0^5 4 j \j a m 4 ,^1
 ^I -.—... ,.^‘vV tj "j.**J ^ d-L£JI 4JU U ^ Ik J I  ^ A JL  4 J jJ^sJIaJl^
t*? 1 I j  ^  i > l i ^  4 i v*» ! j  L* ^ 4 ^  j j !  ^L#1 I* j  Ll
4j  ^  j  h — *» I 4 U U I  ^1 4 4  ^ 4lU I j*1 <ulx ^4 ^  Is iJj*? 4
f-f k>s o^ > 4 jy*^^ *y o \  4 vj^s o^j4 o ’
 ^4 lj^ ) 1 '^C- 4 Jy 4 % 4! ^ 4^ ^,>k I L  ^ ^Mutj 4 j. 1 I 4 J l> ^ Jx
f * ►
O" ‘"■tf":  ^ J^ i^ s ''J 4 f * 4 f1*/>"*■* o i *
^ I — ■ ■ ■ "  ^ 4  ^ ^  ^ a ! I j j lx  4 u ^ y j  l l ^a JI
<^ .. 0 I 1J I  cm»> J x  4 d .L L x l 1^ ( j J  pjOu4^ 4 Lj ^ 4 p j j j  1*4
w5^ Ji 4_*Ju 4 d .L l5 lijI J-rfil J  L-iJ! 4 o L U D I j
<4jj 4 4 la I. t,! ^  4 i^ yAj I *A*1 O^ 4 '—" ^  ^
4 JU*J^ ,^1^1 J_ft1 4 ^ I  ^>4 rfJjAXX."
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^ j j  La* 3*; j y ^  ^ 4^ j^ A* <-1/1 V 0^ 3 4 kL»V«J I CuJ-'K
* (_^j>,....- 3^ ^  La*J I jp*j* * cry* ^  ^3 ^   ^ 4 3^ J ^  V ^ y
lJ L*->*A«v V  ^ « -*■**»-> • ^jJ-C 3“1 4 I j j^fA^ *J I d * - o  U  ^  ^  0  ^3
i i % • ^  4 4»^i‘v  > 1 <u.j 4 La 1 < 1 1 J . j i «it ^4 l i  t yix I n I j O  *—*j A < ^  4 *■ ^ « 4\* > ^
J ■■ |» 3  ^ 3 * ^  j 4 y^uJ I ^ li®. jJ-*»>^ 0^3 4 *^*"jy 4 '^~>' »y *-*i' «y
m
iA  ~ 3   ^ Orf’i  C^3 4  ^ <3y* Cf* y  ^   ^3  ^ 0^*s ^  o l?  4 !-^ 3t  ^  3^
o^ j—wj-J l ^  4 I <-^»LlJ lj j« I 6 ojj^ ^ ^y y ^  ^ jlit 3^ 1 ^  ^3
jj — 1 4  ^ J j O w  V ^ |j 4 cJj d L i  j j J  3£®^ *4*^ bVj4 <J ^  L^ J
4M  * a ~  4 j v ,  j l i ) I tdJ j ^ V  4 y j  ^  j  UjJ I j  ^  1 ^ywL-J I
' 1 j y  t L*j3 Oj-* CiLL^* ^ 1 I* Jj1 I J I j  ^3 L*-' Jl? 4 j* .. fcj lj J L— t)1
j — V> jj*t 3 0^3 4 u  La L/ja j# 33^ ^ lj%3^ ~ c?**"4 Ii*x4
4 «^iiim —4 I«rt3 I ^ 4  1 3  0^ 4^ 4 dxlali dil J Can.* L*T j 4 Cmk>
<.• J>^ 4 4 ^j..J^ ^lyL 3 ^  ^<».*>>)I jlx j*c
j iv in i ■ .» ‘■LL** 4 j^k irf^jVyJI j j j  4 tiL? j %\aja ^>JI 3 ^ 1  4 3 ]
4 t^Cj 1 1 ^il L  J I ^ylt j 4 C- L  L*J I* 1*>-^ JL ^   ^jv I9 4 I.— v V !
4 nl 11 # ■ 4^ 5* jJ  ^ i vlxJ I ^ 4  < I Ijw I# 4 ^ J«J  I t ^ 3D I <#♦ Ijaj
»«* 1 i— . t j 1>.aJ IjJ J^ic i^jil 14! I 43 ^ [>J L 4 JI j j 4 1*^3^
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Appendix 87 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to the people 
of Fes following their repudiation of his bayca.
Date : not mentioned (1820-1821)
Source: Al-^Arbi al-Mashrafi, al-flusam, Mic. 1207, BGR,
pp.485-487.
4aU u -^JI
4  ^ Lc aU I  ^ ^  4315"
I >*t li? ^Jx. 4*jS*} I 1 — I aU I jS J JL*i« j
i JL c  J  y j^Jl j yLU L *111 i I
!* W  j u  ^ -  aJui i^ o >1 i^ V
J  J  ^  j4 P *  u  J  vsr <iht >- J j  O ® 3 !> * g k l  3
O "- "l J  ^  O * J ^  ® t  IP  i>* ^ ®  ^ 0>L»- ^
i - t> ^ li> 1  ^  ^ 4 jil ^4 j Al *>J I J > J  
ju_i icL>J I <Jjl* * J li jA * ^ *Ut jif gytf«1 Lot ^  j 
5jL«VI J JlL~I y AfXpJ I Lfcl <j* J U ^ 4 % AjJ-ft U- Al^ i O L 
V y { y y l  I aJJ 1 V aSMJ * J  If j4 * 4 jJs. aJ )l j aU I 5^J
o ^ t r - ^  o ’  J . b l k L . e c l l J ^  : p J 1 v l •** rt"J * rt^/s 
jSj ktl ^ A L JJ ^ 4 I V| ^ AS aJ
' \A
£  I$ I q  I Ji,|..wj L ly l^ j j )  LaJ J li * i^ JL' L* I 4 - ,i« *■> l^ lt
Ll j » ? ^  JLfc U  I j  I J|-A I J
L  {^ 3 I* J ->1 J  L a J  a J U  I j  'i d J  j  J I  M i  I
• jAl'Si ^  } 4 hij > A4! If Aam Am> ^  U O t K  I ^  1^  }
A-JU I ^li A*Ja_*JI j  jJaJLJI j #lyjLJI i |.>  ^  ul 4^ P • • •tfucUl * 
A#h> *11 y ^  \ j j  * L y jL JI " S JdL) I JLdJ I ^  J *4^ *1 J * <-J U
>4 I I ■ it if If • A i m . l  a t  *■>• l|^f <£^3 L  4 lj ^
fJLJJI ,4 JL^VI , * < $  j 0#1 ,,20 3 o l^ J I jU
ir"—" "-** LliJ I vJ1a J-f—* Aiil0 t ®  ^4  ^ J-f4s
(^ _ t1fiJcu;l5>Jri l v -w-'3l0 ^^ JuJ U U 4 f o ^ l t
13 7
1 <* j vJ* ^  ^  o^  l}*J-*j o^  X )
J i*^   ^j  Ln« V1 *^las j (j I (^ « L#^L»»1  ^o-^ ** tig j-*»1
t
L — <  i«*h*w * U d  I 4 j l t  a U  I V a j j ’ ^  ^j« h> * J  I tf J  ii.ii *>) I <Cl < «m» ^  ^ w  l«
* i i J id  L  pltlftl JUU 4 4 j>> *J I ^  wrfl < JLfc j >  o *  O *  )
^ ^5^; *<*> ^  jSj£*S liil J ^  \£y**m I ^ 4 I ^  >»J ^
4 j JLaJ I ^H»i» Lnt ^ ^1 ji*!? I ^ L j  ^ il*< ^jl ^ mi." >ii t*> j 6 jSjy*\* j
*— *‘k  o r - L ^ J ilill^ jl^ ^ lk ^ l J i j^  . , l j tfVI,  
^ * U  I i-> . «^ > ^ j ^ | ^ U  tiw^1 * lj J j  U=»
mi jJ i j >1 Xtl^ ^ j >> IW pjl L ^ 4 VI ♦ # ♦ ^  >lf^J L ^  I
J»— J ^ • |m)1 I 4C ^ |« n <nj ^1 <Lm> ^  c^ *1 ^jt> Ia<
^  m j | J c l ^ >  p^li«f ^ 4  Id ^|«k g pi# o  Ld" p5" i L
* Ijy 4mmm*y JLtaM |M A>l^ t44M ^  !^Lc Aa^4*L  ^ ^ J*1 L <» 4m liiJ 4
1 _ *• * 
w  ^ |_ ^ ^ ^  I ^  # I ^ • 1^  U L m  I ^ I •# Lift
• • V
o**~ ~-  v~ ^  ^ )  * l f-L*» U <^ — I ^ I# ^  ^  o* ^ )  f * “.|f 
...^■■■— - ^ L J I j u a J  I L ^ m  ^ j l J  ^j) LaJ aJU I o i  ^ j  V
P^ Jdl • *JLJ d j j j  *L>.4j*j >u». 4JUI v lift pi;1# VI **iiw jlxJI
V «
•  r3U I y  j j  | .>>i 11 l«i»l» l*jj
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Appendix 88 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to the 
sharif-s of Fes during the Fes rebellion.
Date : not mentioned (1821)
Source: Al-ZayanI, Tuhfat al-nubaha3, Ms.K. 241, BGR,
pp.181-185.
;  J J  * . — u
4 mm* Uj I I ^  ^  I jjJ  ^  I
—  ^ ,1 ..l<1 «JL) C j^ > 4 (5 ^ AlU I Aa> ^  ^«l t  ^ ^ L» 1 ^  k ^
4 i—91 , i  . . .A_wJ J  JLaJ I 4 <11 I j l i  JLU J Im O m
j —. wj>J I U ^ l ajL1=>j vj ^  U  ^ I- j^LU l Vj
^ 1 > J  J t  cJaJU ^ j — i ■ 1X4 1 I ui^Jb^ l£ I* ^4 <! L«i>4.*J I
4 j 1 I, ,a,«J I cf^w a l5j  ^U_^>‘ j 4 I c?-* ^ ^  ^  ^  b l«
\ • ’
m — k_ji <4? I jl c* wby*-j V1 1 j  l*i I ^y < ..m
’ ^
 ^ J f-fj 4 lijTJ U  * j Lj J  l*i I *-"-»£* O 4
/
y^-j ^  j V I^ ii< l*>  j*51c b k a  I 1 j* *  4 ^1,1.^ |JL>^ j j  l i *  j I*) I
p — X J ]  4 1« j»>fJ o *^  <y  b’ j j r f
j —1 ...•vl  Lj <jJj Otj^y* (Z*\j^ di*jv ^  0-*
0*1—  ■: ft-*^ 5 (^t*^ J"i f-f-** 0>-*^ *)£*< I* J-**< O * 4
O"4.? 4 <- -].«** V Ujl J <j1 Uy-A-«i L* j$j\y>- ^Jh
lj  L* jij |mL«> j^ jjl] dJ <lj IyX^fc 4 b L ^ j  O.M h ‘****1
|> — 4 I 4 1^ * - L L^L J |» bb>^ j 4 X  J I ^
^ \  bUt “^•J.jl l« |XJ J JuJ ^  <1*11 4 ^ 9^ ! 1^ I Jb^*»j g^**4aJ I
**■ ■■! Lf 4 1 b) O ^ p ' / * 4* jb*' 1 bit V bJ bl 1 1 | I 1 1^  ^  1 bl*l 1
—bil I ^iL*> ^lLm3 L** -« « " « V»* U AlU I *i~£ U li • ^£>^3“ j  J^-4
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^' i^f Jii» ■■tj ^ V I l^i ,A>w p * l.L^» j ji^Li» VI J^L/j
JlJV • /\»J I > \ i <i^l ^ 1 yi t *•$ ^J«C ^  lj |j Vfc V I U  I
* '/*. m^ ) L j j *  ^5^5® f’y** } ^  33P ^
^  «■ I ■< V t t. l%( [^*^*1*«cs»> ^ i%*i 1J j i  I
J ' *^3" ^ O^ i Cr^iJ  ^ 0“i *^ ' L*"*) I -^?S*J L  ^^  U^  jy *V>«*J I j^l
y^ l«n » j^A  j i  I >- iJ L» ^4 J ->  I* pA jV ^  ^4 «» JW l^ L  oJ^ 4 3>?-^ 3
A I J  1 - . * y  ^ '■4,f  ^   ^ A i j* I i ■ nj  c w ^-.n! lj |J  j ' * * - a ) lj I
m m  «
j l —i j l j  ^«*»u ) ^ L^aJ I j  ♦ ^ j — *«5j ^ (,/«  Chs 3  * ij^ L *J I|
^ * r f 'v  t ^ < j * i ^ j L - > l ^ i ^ / l  * L j a  ♦ o y * j j  J -*^ 3
^ iL a ^  I a  ^ L x jl aJLI I JJ * i j  l j  J J  l^ a j I K/*J ^  ^  J- li|J  I
J  L « a  Jl) I L < |n < y   ^LmmJ I t JL 1 • i | r '  1 s f j  'T* I*** 4 L lv  ^  » » «  V  j  1
f^ L j j l  <-U ^J *J-<*>- *-'1 u i  3  ^ 3  ^ £?~- * —" 3  L* ^3 3
^  ) 0 1 IjJ^A* V^ A »^> Jilt ^JL A 4^^ j) Jl) L.»A JL L-* L) ) ^JL 4y^ j^ \f
m
3«—  -* *J"i S "• f -*V 3 O ^ -* ^3 uA?* L  3 3 **^ *•' *» j„j 4 ij JJ I y &  4 -intT 
<^ *  » ««j ^  ^ * ^ J  ) «j( p ‘. Q  I Jj I Ijjlw |Jj ^ o J  ) J  1^  jJ j * *y J a i
^  ^  ^  I ^  I'u) I LJ I UJ I ^ ** *1*4 JJj — kJ) A ^-<*^) I (J Juij I ^|4 ^«4/ i#rf
!■■! 1 ■ 1 u L5  1 jla c J ^  ^ 3 * ^ 4  J J  I La L« I jl> jl ^ 4  #j*Jjlj
L jJ j lj  %^«>i J^ ^  J j-a ) lj iix*) L I j j  a t .^x l L 1 j  L 4#
l j — )«*i^w j^   ^ JL JL^J I ^4 4 j l t  I4 A iff IjJL^a* y JL J  \ ) I ^ v l^  4 jJ  ^ 3 ^  ^  3^
“^^ 3 J ^ j  ^  J  ^L La 1^^ t 3  ^W4>M jL5i la  JL^ » Aa lj«> jLSKa j l  A I Llf> L  U ^ J
■ I 1 jXJ J I^a) I cImwIJ I j*  ^|it> >■ J * JE^  Lwj y jS J V^ l ^ yj ■» ^
o _ J l ,U — :J3 T,IJU l VJ I Jl* -i) < z ^ s  L, . jt_i£JI ^ * 1 *  u  o y - t K
A J lj ■ »i I I !»■"■ ^4 4.J ^ L), jl jJI A JA ^ 4 1 jJ^ -j^ J A* <>^l I j * L ^aJ I ^4 ^ 1*4
^ I^JU* < J y &  V  *  0 3 " ^   ^ f  f »** 3 W^^3  03 ,^,#^ -A  ^  ^VJ"*"*^  ^ * L L  ^^-aI jJ *
^  AI «»«4 I I pJlaij ^4 L i- 33^  p) L  J «— >LJ*. J^^ J-iA*J I
*■" j J  lj — I.. | ) I3 J JJ I ^  A?) J fpj*° ^  (J|L ill I L JUAA a I14 J
*  .1 i.. —1l;jLLc> <*J)L->S\ ) I LU j j— r jifj ^1 j —jVlj J Ij^VI
^3 «aJI J L oU^AJIj J j l a J L  aJJ ju ^ J lj fS) L iL L m  j a  .J L a ;^ !
J I—* V j  ^ —."a.  ^3> ^  JJI ^ 1 ^ 1  JL VjA (jiJ b l ^  JJ I -JWjJ I J L V j ij JJ I
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^ — i ) ^ ! ^  j - _ j1 l U i > !  a a j l  4 JLft ^  Z^j JL JAj A .£ jj I J L-sl! I
^ is jJ  lj ^jiyjI ^Js ^  ^  ^ j^>J V ljLI* a jIaaJ lj lj * I j^JLc I^Lwi* 
jjLJL J — w j ^ y  j L»JU 4* L,  ^  I ^ylc a U  I Lsg ^  1 jl. Vj I J  L  Ic j
31 J (j— IJ ^ y — aj j  L  jJ I y  ^ >w %1* vi^ ^3** 3 3^  O'* JT; L  ^  I3—
^  j ■■ nl.iil I 4 JlA ^4 4JJ I |5 JLVcj 1 L j > ^  L  jJj ^  J—-A A J IjJ I j j>J I
d,
■ .  r ^ U J l j  r —
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Appendix 8 9 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to the 
sharif-s of Fes.
Date : not mentioned (1821)
Source: al-Zavani, Tufrfat al-nubaha3, K.241, BGR,
pp.185-188.
4 j  — >3 tf-JLI ju>J 1
i - j l  jV ! o ! j U I  J J
ij* O-* ^  t>* 0*1—"  ^)
4 4—*4 O"4!^  ^*1  ^^  ^  40 l*J> aJD I A« ^
JLj 1^4 lj^  4jj*A*y jJ 1 *J?.J j‘yvl^U I (Jl L>
i< J JlV 1 • 4 X.l AJL LmJ I 1 4^S ' ^JUol JJ
J* ^  I J >  J U y!> J ^  C/*) j/NjWU J  Vj
tsMt j I I ^Ji X l» l it»l I l^ 4«J Uj I I J
*4 yJ  Jb^ U ;C 1 r fJLu  ^ 4 a1^   ^4^ 1 I
1 ajVI j dJ <sjL*-«J J
L* J 5 ^  *Jj *» J5 ^  dJ J ^  1^ If -* /  ^ I  j  juJ I
I>^La5 i La i J , l  J  ol> j * Ll  j  lu  j LmJ J5,
. -*
J — ft I {**) /Ii^, O 4 ^  ill I I (J/4 A l ^ a - M W  I U J  ^  f-*4
J  ^  J V jl  ^ ^  mmt *  l j  p ^ J j j  ♦ j l^ >  ^M»>J < >1>J  j  *1#^
4 — >ii.»^ *J I J Jilx l 1 J ^ L gj  ^|. >• ^ 4  <*L*1 I4 ^ lf "T J li*.JI
* U »  »^ jj p Jla> JJ I * L^ jumJ I  ^ v^f I ^jJ  ^I.. I.- ^ :y> j y
 ^ (J ■» wl v_> I I U  ‘t l I d j J J Ijj J LmJ JO^ / I lj J * 1. ^
-.mL.m.1 i ^jlt <—jlaJ L>_*? U 6 <J L>- 4J4 jlmjI ^.-mLwU 1
1^11 -   ^l j  X^s 4 4^ ,1 j . ^A (44 <ul> L ^  (4 J^ *1^ *mA  ^  ^ J  ii 1C
d-J
r142
J V aJJ I ^  J »i) 4^   ^  ^ ^  l.o.^ j  ^L U? I
"“ -U-i j  vj-^J 0,'J^   ^ (*^ 0*1? (*^5 O*^  jjr'^ j^ -"' ^
a ^ ... 4^f I 1 I j t  ^5j5 X j aLl >.1 I #Mw |«5U j j  |>U j  UJ
O ^ ^   ^(~i^  ^ /*** ow. ^ 0 ^  ^ 3  lj UJ J
l^<l L jJ j j l  J V j 6 ^ j l j J 1 ^ j  ^SU^tj ^  L jJ j U j O 1 (***»^
A ji«— O  jl Vht~' *■*■•* Cx I oJ ^  4 r*/t~^  O^ rO j W  J  ^  ^
(ji» ■■ ■ A 1 j^  <bJ 1 i iiC 4*A ^0 Cm 15 j l i  A j^ ja J  J ^ j4 ^0 liU J U  J “l
^ — .XV j . £*+ ^U  j  ^  U j (*‘4'“*4 jZ51 |jDJ j  < -J j J ^» i.* UJ 4 . M.,;^
-• - ^  J *  5 * f’^ a"‘“') 0“* 3  ^&3 C**..*"**1?
I jj  ■ Ui < I# « 4a«^  j  J *J AJV O  LJ J l >l»if  4^JVj^’1 jA j!b  I4 4L**  ^»m J .t % I
—ftLv j ^  j Vj ^  1LJ.W L oj—j t ^ U5JI <>*sf .,£ jjIjjJ 1 »Vit o**?J Jju
s* *■
1 mi t,4I 1 ^ jlt  4 j  U t  V j^ >1« J  U  |J j ^ j M j r t J  * J lj1 W  Jjv 4uoJ> J  a_*M
^ L - jU ,j^ U y  VJ |^ » L j o£jP* o^s**^ aJVI < * ljj O t d l
1 (j* - 1 J  J O" ■ — j  Vm ^5 j  l i j  ^.—5.. if- j >  l j  Jm U p j*  * j  L ^J -*<  ^
j  j>£^ jJ  ^ jA j o *^   ^^  p i c u d  IjJ ^ lj V j « ^ t jA jir  L j
m m
4 «J ■-—^ | J  *2—*4 JJ U J • p ^  »> p J j^Jw j I j J  I c j  Ij J  J ^4  ^M i^U  j  p ■ L *4 .*^
*^* f ^ cr*  ^Jl) *Xi*  ^^  0/  £>V ^ ‘-h*  ^j ^ J  )
O
o
O '
r
4— L jk J I J l  0 J-J  a ^ l / V l j  f U ‘VI;  - U ^ l ,  - J l ^ l ^  V, 
/
l j  .1. . — > j^ w j 1 I >^4 J a 4  ^4  J “j ^Uj j j  Jjlf pL>«^ JLW ^ |l*J  I
/ |
>Xj ^ | j  A 4 «J I j  j I jJ  0  UJ I j j f  < j^  j> -  j l  4 j I «J I ^4 J L f  b  jJ j
4 vJ U 4^ >-jJ I ^  V a V -wiij ^  ^  jl? L Jl I ^1J »t —^ 5 [.j U  ^ .lt
- -J  p 5  JU> • p^ wmAmU U IjjVA^ ^j^L U j^A ji fJU I ob  ’  ‘  r * - ’
4JLII l j  I j l i  (Aj4.j}5 j  Lfe^ 5jt lj j  j r  |Jb 4JL4 U*  ^4 * -j ij^ lj 
<"»'*f * *) O I) J  *J I ^4  c* U p»*jJ j j j i^ * ." p 5 ^ J • La L^ jl*4 jwU
-JU Ip^jl; ^UJI iJlkulj^U-M^I 55Uj jU jS fl J^ UJj jU C J IjJ I^ I
(^ J **" JJ I * U i J ‘~*sj9 ^j«*l A j\ j j  I 4 JA ^U  jU ^ J  L* 4?
I "| I ^4  «_> V J L Jkj I pU If- O jAw < j*  JU i >f  Ij-^  j   ^ jb  ^j4 -b Ij^ J pUUf
J——*JI o- #I>JUa ^L>VI J  ^vxi* I J *  VJ jjaLo; V Jj jlil*
* ^ V „ ..-I lj ^jidJ <~,j— *1 pJ_nX J j J  lj *JJI * L t ^.J
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Appendix 90 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to the people 
of Fes contradicting the Fasi merchants' decision to 
prevent Jewish shoemakers from selling their produce in 
the markets of Old Fes.
Date : not mentioned .
Source: al-Zayani, Alfiyat al-suluk, Ms.K.224, BGR,
p. 210.
* * U I 4 V -J I
ZjyAj* jy *JJ I <.j I ^ alU I 4JJ I Jy— j j l  I
9
yjf* ■ ■■ >■;* ^  aU I Al jJ  I (J *iy y-* JLit
A J  L * >  J  ^ Z f  j  A t  I ^
4 IJL< dydl J fWI5 JJ
O ■" ■* * **c J^  L «J I ^  <« JJ I Ja I iiji
t
^ l t  J j “^  ^ 1 J~ ^  A J  <f tA U J j  ^  j j i j i .  1.1 A a J U i t
>^j  1 ■-.J  I (jt»J I • *  Lt L <  *  L  t .4^  ^ » i  j ih i  1 A j ^ ,  <■, J  v  y J s  LwJ I
j j <— "  ■•s i H  j j^ U j i  V ^  j ^ J  I 1 -  .^ . K  ^ j L l o I I  ^  ^ J L m J  I * j L _ £
j * •• I jj VJ £ymm, fcn.+J Va A 4.11 X J^> JU jA Lnhllj ^  <Lt4 
P _ _ 5 jllc  I— 5 ^Jy * J—*fVl  ^ V—5" ^  4L.JLfr -^JLI»1 ^  1^ 5 ^LJ! 
*. r V II, U 4ymf~>y Jo LJ I Ja 1  ^V . JA L J®4
111
Appendix 91 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to al-SalawT fixing
inport duties for Moroccan Muslim merchants.
Date : not mentioned.
Source : al-Zayani, Alfiyat al-suluk, Ms. K 224, B.G.R., p. 209.
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Appendix 92 : Letter from Mawlay Sulayman to one of his 
qaJid-s (al-GhazI) concerning the maintenance of 
Makhzenian prisons.
Date : not mentioned.
Source: Ms. K.1264, BGR, pp.357-358; al-Mashrafl,
al-Husam, Mic.1207, BGR, pp. 362-464.
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